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Abstract
Previous histories of the establishment of Spanish rule in Louisiana have centered
primarily on its first two officials, Governor Antonio de Ulloa and Captain-General
Alejandro O’Reilly. This work focuses on Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, governor of
Spanish Louisiana from 1770 to 1776. It challenges previous interpretations of Unzaga’s
tenure which have traditionally viewed the Bourbon Reforms as detrimental to the colony
and viewed the governor as merely benign and transitional in the colony’s history.
Comparison o f shipping records and governor’s records from Cuba and Louisiana
indicate that the colony actually maintained the same volume of shipping with Havana that
other portions of empire did and that it often received exceptional freedoms unavailable to
the remainder of empire. The colonial documents show that Unzaga integrated the
colony’s economy into the new reforms and that he fostered domestic industry. Treasury
records also attest to the governor’s stewardship which filled Louisiana’s failing coffers.
An exploration of the judicial records and correspondence of the post
commandants points to a stabilized population re-oriented toward the rule of Spanish law
because of the governor’s conciliatory diplomacy. Unzaga’s abilities also aided in
establishing alliances with formerly hostile Indians and maintaining peace with the British
under difficult circumstances. This dissertation argues that effective implementation of the
Bourbon Reforms in Spanish Louisiana took place not in 1769-1770 with Alejandro
O’Reilly, but in the arduous seven-year administration of Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga.
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Chapter One
Introduction

Borderland's history is not a new topic in the study of Latin American history. For
U.S. historians, its roots lie in the work done by Herbert Eugene Bolton. He taught at the
University of California at the beginning of the twentieth-century, writing on Spain's North
American hinterlands, which he called the “Spanish Borderlands.”1 Bolton’s 1921 seminal
work, The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and the Southwest, began a
drive to awaken U.S. historians to the integral part Spain played in the early history of the
United States.2
From 1911 to 1935, Bolton worked to give his students a vision of what he called
“Greater America.”3 During that time he published over a dozen major works on his
beloved borderlands and passed on that interest to over three hundred masters students
and more than a hundred doctoral students who continued his scholarship. Bolton's

'In his biography of Bolton, John Francis Bannon indicates that Bolton used a term
from several titles offered by his editor. John Francis Bannon, Herbert Eugene Bolton:
The Historian and the Man (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1978), 120-21.
Herbert Eugene Bolton, The Spanish Borderlands: A Chronicle of Old Florida and
the Southwest (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921).
3Herbert Eugene Bolton’s work which expanded the historic vision of Spain in
America was The Colonization of North America. 1492-1783 (New York: The
MacMillan Co., 1920). See also Wider Horizons of American History (South Bend, IN:
University ofNotre Dame Press, 1939; reprint 1967). He also published a guide for
teachers interested in using the theory of a “Greater America” in their teaching titled, A
History of the Americas: A Syllabus with Maps (Boston and New York: Ginn and Co.,
1935). Bolton’s term “Greater America” finally entered the title of a book in a festschrift
published in 1936, Greater America: Essays in Honor of Herbert Eugene Bolton
(Freeport, New York: Books for Libraries Press; reprint 1968).
1
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students went on to train new borderlands historians and the combined efforts of these
two generations of scholars have filled journals and library shelves.4
Despite continual scholarship, extensive research and an extraordinary variety of
topics explored in Borderlands studies, historiographically it remained a marginal topic to
Latin American programs across the country until the last two and a half decades. Many
Latin American historians deemed it more a U.S. Colonial topic. This was a peculiarly
ironic idea since the borderlands contain some of Spain's first settlements in the Americas
and its last, beginning with San Miguel de Gualdape in 1526 and ending with the founding
of San Francisco in 1776.s
Bolton focused, as did other early Latin Americanists, on exploration, biographies
and political histories of the establishment and administration of Spanish institutions in the
borderlands. More recently, borderlands historians have added breadth and depth to the
historiography following the Armales approach of studying such topics as ethnohistory
and historical archeology, ecology and historical geography, demography and disease.
Scholarly works include ecological histories by Timothy Silver, A New Face on the
Countryside: Indians. Colonists, and Slaves in South Atlantic Forests 1500-1800 and
Albert E. Cowdrey, This Land. This South: An Environmental History, as well as studies
on the role of disease in demographics such as Henry F. Dobyns, Their Numbers Became

4David J. Weber, The Spanish Frontier in North America (New Haven and
London: Yale University Press, 1992), 7.
5See, Paul E. Hoffinan, A New Andalucia and a Wav to the Orient: The American
Southeast during the Sixteenth Century (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1990); and Herbert Eugene Bolton, Outpost of Empire: The Story of the Founding of San
Francisco (New York: Alfred A. Knop£ 1931).
2
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Thinned: Native American Population Dynamics in Eastern North America. There have
also been numerous archeological examinations of the explorers’ routes, and studies of
city planning including Gilbert R. Cruz’s Let There Be Towns: Spanish Municipal Origins
in the American Southwest 1610-1810.6
Borderlands research is complicated by the very richness of the area’s history, and
the fact that it includes several different colonies. Adding to this complexity is the
tendency of its historians to focus their studies exclusively on either the eastern
borderlands (Louisiana and Florida) or the western borderlands (Alta California and
Spanish Texas). Only John Francis Bannon’s Spanish Borderlands Frontiers. 1513-1821
and David J. Weber’s, The Spanish Frontier in North America have sought to give a
comprehensive vision o f the area since Bolton’s first volume.7
The Louisiana territory entered the Spanish borderlands during the reign of
Spain’s fourth Bourbon Monarch, Charles ID. Despite the feet that it was originally
explored by Hernando de Soto in the 1500s, Spain failed to settle the area and by the end
of the seventeenth century it fell into the hands of the French through re-discovery and

tim othy Silver, A New Face on the Countryside: Indians. Colonists, and Slaves in
South Atlantic Forests 1500-1800 (London and New YorlcCambridge University Press,
1990); Henry F. Dobvns. Their Number Become Thinned: Native American Population
Dynamics in Eastern North America (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1983);
Albert E. Cowdrev. This Land. This South: An Environmental History (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1983); see Jeffrey Brain, “The Archeology of the Hernando
de Soto Expedition,” in Alabama and the Borderlands from Prehistory to Statehood, eds.
R. Reid Badger and Lawrence A. Clayton (University: University of Alabama Press,
1985); Gilbert R. Cruz, Let There Be Towns: Spanish Municipal Origins in the American
Southwest 1610-1810 (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1988).
7John Francis Bannon, Spanish Borderlands Frontiers. 1513-1821 (New York:
Holt, Rhinehardt and Winston, 1970) and Weber, Spanish Frontier.
3
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subsequent settlement. While Spain never relinquished her ownership she did little to
reclaim the region. By the time the Spanish did regain control of the Louisiana
borderlands in 1763, it held little in common with the rest ofJLatin America. Louisiana
offered no profitable mineral deposits, no large, sedentary Indian populations with
exploitable mineral wealth, and the colony was already populated by non-Iberian
Europeans, as well as Africans. The new colony also entered Spain’s empire at a time
when, as David J. Weber so aptly puts it, “Spain came to regard its North American
[borderlands] colonies as defensive money-losing outposts.”8 Consequently, the Spanish
crown never invested the men or money in Louisiana that it had in its earlier colonial
endeavors.
Despite the territory’s complex problems, Charles HI strove to develop his
Louisiana borderlands through the introduction of the Bourbon Reforms. These imperial
reforms promoted centralizing administrative and military reorganization, lightened
commercial regulations, and enhanced agriculture and immigration to the Louisiana
borderlands. While Louisiana historians have decried the effects of Spanish mercantilism
on Louisiana’s trade, the colony was one of the first to receive and later benefit from the
new trade regulations, a centralized government, the establishment of the rule of law
enforceable by colonial authorities, and enlightened economic reforms which worked to
create domestic industry and markets. Although the colony struggled with the reforms in
its early years under Spanish control, by the end of the Bourbon period trade became less
restricted and one-third of the ships coming into the port o f New Orleans remained
*Weber, Spanish Frontier 175.
4
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Spanish in origin. In an age when Britain ruled the seas and the Anglo-American trade
dominated the Mississippi River, maintaining Spain’s presence at that level was a
remarkable feat of perseverance.
An abundant bibliography exists on the Bourbon Reforms. Earlier works include
such publications as Troy S. Floyd's edited study-text, The Bourbon Reformers and
Spanish Civilization: Builders or Destroyers? which furnished students with essays and
questions on the problems of the reforms, its monopoly systems, the disposition of older
ideas likefueros (grants of privilege by the crown), the effects of the reforms on the
independent spirit of Americans, and the progress of material wealth in the colonies.
There are a number of monographs which cover different aspects of the reforms,
including economics, the military and political and administrative changes.. Such works
include books on economics like Roland Dennis Hussey's, The Caracas Company 17381784: A Study in the History of Spanish Monopolistic Trade. David Anthony Brading's,
Miners and Merchants in Bourbon Mexico 1763-1810. Brian Hamnett’s, Politics and
Trade in Southern Mexico 1750-1821. Jacques A. Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe's edited
work, The North American Role in the Spanish Imperial Economy 1760-1819. and
Keuthe's work with G. Douglas Inglis in “El consulado de Cadiz y el reglamento de
commercio libre de 1765.”9
’Troy S. Floyd, The Bourbon Reformers and Spanish Civilization: Builders or
Destroyers? (D. C. Heath and Company, 1966); Roland Dennis Hussey, The Caracas
Company: 1738-1784: A Study in the History of Spanish Monopolistic Trade (Cambridge,
MA* Harvard University Press, 1934); David Anthony Brading, Miners and Merchants in
Bourbon Mexico 1763-1810 (Cambridge. England: Cambridge University Press, 1971);
Brian Hamnett, Politics and Trade in Southern Mexico 1750-1821 (Cambridge, EnglandCambridge University Press, 1971); Jacques A. Barbier and Allan J. Kuethe, eds. The
5
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The largest portion of work on the Bourbon era involves the military and political
reorganization and includes such publications as Christian I. Archer's, The Army in
Bourbon Mexico. 1760-1810. Leon G. Campbell's. The Military and Society in Colonial
Peru. 1750-1810 and Allan J. Kuethe's two works, Military Reform and Society in New
Granada. 1773-1802 and the more recent Cuba. 1753-1815 Crown. Military, and
Society.10
Jacques A. Barbier and Mark A. Burkholder with Dewitt Samuel Chandler offer
insight into the administrative reforms with their respective works Reform and Politics in
Bourbon Chile. 1755-1796 and From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish Crown and the
American Audiencias. 1687-1808. The reactions of the colonists can be found in John
Leddy Phelan's The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in Colombia. 1781.
Additionally, there are several studies on the Intendant system such as Lillian Estelle
Fisher’s seminal work, The Intendant System in Spanish America and John Lynch's,

North American Role in the Spanish Imperial Economy 1760-1819 (Manchester, England:
Manchester University Press, 1984); Alan J. Keuthe and G. Douglas Inglis, “El
consulado de Cadiz y el reglamento de commercio libre de 1765,” Joumados de Andalucia
v America IV (Seville. 19851.
/
I0Christian I. Archer, The Armv in Bourbon Mexico 1760-1810 (Albuquerque:
University of Mexico Press, 1977); Leon G. Campbell, The Military and Society in
Colonial Peru 1760-1810 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1978); Allan J.
Kuethe, Military Reform and Society in New Granada 1773-1802 (Gainesville: University
Presses of Florida, 1978); Allan J. Keuthe, Cuba 1753-1815 Crown. Military, and Society
(Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1986).
6
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Spanish Colonial Administration. 1783-1810: The Intendant System in the Vicerovaltv of
the Rio de La Plata.11
Louisiana's place in the Bourbon Reforms has been discussed, if at all, largely in
the work of biographers and institutional historians. Louisiana's historians have
traditionally focused on the reforms, primarily as a local topic rather than placing the
colony in the imperial perspective, though there are such exceptions as Paul Hoffinan's
1992 synthesis Luisiana. A great number of biographies exist on its earliest Spanish
leaders, especially on governors, Antonio de Ulloa, and Bernardo de Galvez, as well as
Captain General O’Reilly who is often referred to as the colony’s second governor. Other
popular biographies exist on major characters in the colony’s Spanish period, such as
Francis Bouligny and Gilbert Antoine de St. Maxent. Institutional works on the Intendant
system and the Cabildo include Brian Coutt's work on Martin Navarro, and Gilbert C. Din
and John Harkins recent volume on the Cabildo.12

"Jacques A. Barbier, Mark A. Burkholder and Dewitt Samuel Chandler, Reform
and Politics in Bourbon Chile 1755-1796 (Ottowa: University of Ottowa Press, 1980);
Mark Burkholder and Dewitt Chandler, From Impotence to Authority: The Spanish
Crown and the American Audiencias 1687-1808 (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri
Press, 1977); John Leddy Phelan, The People and the King: The Comunero Revolution in
Colombia. 1781 (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978); Lillian Estelle
Fisher, The Intendant System in Spanish America (Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press, 1929); John Lynch, Spanish Colonial Administration 1783-1810: The Intendant
System in the Vicerovaltv of the Rio de La Plata (London: University of London, Athlone
Press, 1958).
12On Ulloa see Arthur P. Whitaker, “Antonio de Ulloa,” Hispanic American
Historical Review (hereinafter referred to as HAHR)15 (1935), 155-94 as well as his
discussion of Ulloa's work for the Bourbon king in Peru, The Huancavelica Mercury
Mines: A Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance in the Spanish Empire
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1941); John P. Moore “Antonio de Ulloa: A
Profile of the First Governor of Louisiana,” Louisiana History (hereinafter LH) 8 (1967),
7
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The work o f Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, Louisiana's second governor, is hardly
discussed. Despite the manifest significance of Unzaga's administration, colonial historians
usually mention him in passing, speaking of the years between 1770 and 1776 as an
uneventful, transitional phase of colonial development, distinguished only by the
governor's conciliatory paternalism and his willingness to bend Spanish mercantilists laws
to stabilize the colony's fragile economy.13 This neglect is also a common occurrence
among Louisiana's historians. Only two of the colony’s first historians, Charles Gayarre,

recent short monograph by Hilda S. Krousel, Don Antonio De Ulloa: First Spanish
Governor to Louisiana (Baton Rouge, LA, 1998). O'Reilly has a number of books
dedicated to him the primary authors being David K. Bjork, “The Establishment of
Spanish Rule in Louisiana,” Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1923), David
Ker Texada, “The Administration of Alexandra O’Reilly, Governor of Louisiana 17691770" (Ph.D diss., Louisiana State University, 1968), and Bibiano Torres Ramirez,
Alejandro O’Reilly en las Indias (Sevilla, Spain: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones
Cientificas, 1969). Galvez is covered in John W. Caughey*s Bernardo de Galvez in
Louisiana. 1776-1783 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934); Paul E.
Hoffman’s, Luisiana (Madrid: MAPFRE, 1992). See also Gilbert C. Din, Francisco
Boulienv: A Bourbon Soldier in Spanish Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1993) and James Julian Coleman, Gilbert Antoine de St. Maxent: The
Spanish-Frenchman of New Orleans (New Orleans: Pelican Publishing House, 1968);
Gilbert C. Din and John E. Harkins, The New Orleans Cabildo: Colonial Louisiana’s First
Citv Government 1769-1803 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1996);
Brian E. Coutts, “Martin Navarro, Treasurer, Contador, Intendant 1766-1788: Politics
and Trade in Spanish Louisiana,” (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1981).
“Perhaps the worst offense is in the introduction to the archival documents for
Santo Domingo by Earnest J. Burrus which completely ignores Unzaga’s administration
with the words “Alexandra O'Reilly came in 1769 with enough military might to make
opposition unthinkable and to introduce Spanish institutions into the colony. Within a
year he was able to hand over the command of a peaceful colony to Luis de Unzaga.
A capable governor reached Louisiana during the year 1779 in the person of Bernard de
Galvez.” Jose de la Pefia y Camara, et al (ed.), Cataloeo de documentos del Archivo
General de Indias. Section V. Gobiemo Audiencia de Santo Domingo sobre la Epoca
Esnafiola de Luisiana (Madrid, Spain: Direction General de Archivos y Bibliotecas and
New Orleans: Loyola University Press, 1968).
8
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History of Louisiana and Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana, paid attention to
Unzaga’s tenure as governor. Charles Gayarre devotes some sixty-pages out of four
volumes to the governor's pacification of the French colonists, his disregarding contraband
and illegal commerce, and his conciliatory work between the religious orders. Gayerre's
description of contraband British goods aboard what he calls “floating warehouses” can be
found in many later studies of the period including Fortier’s. Unfortunately, both
Gayerre’s and Fortier’s portrayal of Unzaga as the conciliator is too shallow.14
The majority of the next generation of Louisiana's historians covered even less of
Unzaga's term in office. In his work Les Demieres Annees de la Louisiane Francaise.
Marc de Villiers du Terrage devoted almost no space to Spain's government in Louisiana,
much less Unzaga's administration. Vicente Rodriguez Casado's, Primeros afios de
dominacion esoanola en la Luisiana stops with the end o f O'Reilly's administration in
1770.15

14Charles Gayarre’s, History of Louisiana, was published in several separate
volumes before 1885. Volume one came out as Louisiana: its Colonial History of
Romance (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1851); Volume two was listed as Louisiana: its
History as a French Colony (New York: J. Wiley, 1852); Volumes three and four were
published between 1854 and 1866 as part of a full series know as History of Louisiana
(New York: Redfield, 1854-66). A complete edition o f four volumes was finally available
in 1883. Alcee Fortier, A History of Louisiana 4 vols., especially volume two The Spanish
Domination (New York: 1904).
I5Marc de Villiers du Terrage, Les Demferes Annees de la Louisiane Francaise le
Chevalier e Kerlerec. d’Abbadie-Aubrv. Laussat (Paris: F. Guilmoto, 1904; see also the
English version, translated by Hosea Phillips, edited and annotated by Carl A. Brasseaux
and Glenn R. Conrad. (Lafayette, LA: Center for Louisiana Studies, 1982); Vicente
Rodriguez Casado, Primeros afios de dominacion espanola en la Luisiana (Madrid, Spain:
Institute Gonzalo Fernandez de Oviedo, 1942).
9
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The history of Unzaga's tenure in Louisiana has found its way into a number of
book and articles. Among the books are Herbert Eugene Bolton's Athanase de Mezieres
and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier 1768-1780. John Walton Caughey’s biography of
Bernardo de Galvez, John G. Clark's discussion of British merchants in his New Orleans
1718-1813: An Economic History and Din and Harkins’ 1996 volume on the New Orleans
Cabildo, Light Townsend Cummins', Spanish Observers and the American Revolution
1776-1783 and Paul Hoffinan's, Luisiana.16
The abundant writings o f Jack D. L. Holmes and Gilbert C. Din involve Louisiana
during the Unzaga era, but none deal specifically with the governor himself. Other notable
articles discussing narrow topics during his administration are Brian E. Coutts and Henry
P. Dart on the tobacco and indigo industries, respectively; Bjork on education; Dart on
fire protection; and Laura Porteous on torture and debtors prison.17

16Herbert Eugene Bolton, Athanase de M&rieres and the Louisiana-Texas Frontier
1768-1780. (Cleveland: The Arthur H. Clark Co., 1914; Kraus Reprint, 1970); both
Bernard W. Caughey’s biography of Galvez and Paul E. Hoffinan’s, Luisiana devote a
chapter to Unzaga; John G. Clark. New Orleans 1718-1813: An Economic History
(Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1970); Din and Harkins refer to
Unzaga’s administration throughout their previously cited work on the Cabildo; Light
Townsend Cummins, Spanish Observers and the American Revolution 1776-1783 (Baton
Rouge, LA: Louisiana State University Press, 1991) discusses Unzaga’s network of spies
and aid to the revolutionaries.
17A sampling of Din’s articles which discuss Unzaga’s tenure include, “Protecting
the ‘Barrera. ’ Spain’s Defenses in Louisiana, 1763-1779,” LH 19 (1978): 183-211 and
“The Spanish Fort on the Arkansas, 1763-1803,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly.
(hereinafter cited as AHQ) 42 (1983): 270-93; Jack D. L. Holmes’ articles include
“Indigo in Colonial Louisiana and the Floridas,” LH 23 (1961): 329-49; Joseph Piemas
and the Nascent Cattle Industry of Southwest Louisiana,” McNeese Review 17 (1966),
13-26: “Louisiana Trees and their Uses: Colonial Period,” Louisiana Studies (hereinafter
referred to as LS) 8 (1969): 36-37; “Medical Practice in the Lower Mississippi Valley
during the Spanish Period, 1769-1803,” Alabama Journal of Medical Sciences 1 (1964):
10
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A broader, more thorough investigation of Unzaga's career remains to be done. I
examined his term briefly in my M. A thesis, “Effective Inefficiencies” using research from
the mircrofilm copies of Unzaga’s correspondence in the Archivo de Indias: Papeles
procedentes de Cuba, and the Audienca de Santo Domingo: the W.P. A translations of the
Dispatches of the Spanish Governors of Louisiana and the Archives Nationales, Paris,
France: Archives des Colonies.18
Like most earlier writing on colonial Louisiana, my thesis also concentrated on
Unzaga as a Louisiana governor, rather than a Spanish official in the empire. This study
hopes to correct that mistake. I have focused primarily on Unzaga’s capable
administration of Charles Ill's commercial reforms and their effect on Louisiana. In order
to give the work a larger perspective I chose to add to my original investigations by
comparing Louisiana to Havana in the records of the Spanish archives. Studying in the

332-38; Military Uniforms in Spanish Louisiana, 1766-1804,” Military Collector and
Historian 17 (1965): 115-17; Naval Stores in Colonial Louisiana and the Floridas,” LS 7
(1968): 295-309; and “Some Economic Problems of the Spanish Governors of Louisiana,”
HAHR 42 (1962): 521-43. See also Brian E. Coutts, “Boom and Bust: The Rise and Fall
of the Tobacco Industry in Spanish Louisiana, 1770-1790,” Americas 42 (1986): 289-309;
Henry P. Dart, “A Louisiana Indigo Plantation on Bayou Teche, 1773,” Louisiana
Historical Quarterly (hereinafter cited as LHQ) 9 (1926): 565-589 and ‘Tire Protetion in
New Orleans in Unzaga’s Time,” LHQ 4 (1921): 201-240; David K. Bjork, “Documents
Relating to the establishment o f Schools in Louisiana, 1771,” Mississippi Valiev Historical
Review (hereinafter cited as MVHR) 11 (1924): 361-69; and Laura L. Porteous, ‘Torture
in Spanish Criminal Procedure in Louisiana,” LHQ 8 (1925): 5-22 and Porteous as editor
and translator in “Governor Unzaga Decides that the Family Meeting has no Place in
Spanish Probate Procedure in Louisiana, 1771.” LHQ. 12 (1929): 288-99.
18I examined microfilm of the legajos from the Archivo General de Indias in the
Center for Louisiana Studies, at the University of Louisiana at Lafayette and the Hill
Memorial Library at Louisiana State University. The W.P.A papers were typescript
copies in the Hill Memorial Library.
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Archives in Seville allowed access to Cuba’s shipping records and the correspondence of
Governor and Captain-General in Havana, the Marques de la Torre. While in Spain I also
explored the Secretaria de Guerra legajos in the Archivo General de Simancas, as well as
the Biblioteca Nacional. Working with the letters of Louisiana’s post commanders also
opened new avenues of investigation into the effects of the Bourbon Reforms on the
colony and the effectiveness of their implementation. Lastly, a perusal of the colony’s
judicial records allowed a more exacting vision of the governor’s authority and the
application of Spanish law.19
The documentary evidence on Louisiana clearly shows that Unzaga used his office
to enhance and stabilize the colony at the time of its most difficult transition into empire.
Exploration of the documents on Havana's shipping records indicates that Louisiana, with
the exception of one or two years, maintained the same volume of trade with Havana that
other portions of empire did and that she often received exceptional freedoms unavailable
to the remainder of empire. This particular study shows that under Unzaga's capable
government Louisiana's declining population stabilized; its commerce became integrated in
the new mercantilistic reforms, formerly hostile Indians were brought under Spanish
influence if somewhat tenuously, military defenses were maintained and fortified by
Unzaga's use of espionage. Lastly, his stewardship filled Louisiana's failing coffers leaving
in the hands of the next governor, a stable, growing colony, reconciled to Spanish rule. It

I9My research also included extended study o f the microfilm found in the Hill
Memorial Library, at Louisiana State University, the Center for Louisiana Studies at the
University of Louisiana at Lafayette; the Historical New Orleans Collection and the
Notary Records in New Orleans.
12
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is evident, then, that effective Spanish colonial control of the Louisiana borderlands was
not created solely by Alexandra O'Reilly, but in the arduous, seven-year administration of
Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga.

13
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Chapter Two
Spanish Louisiana: The Fruit of the Mameyes
“Now is the hour o f the mameyes!”
(Warning used by the Habaneros for an impending crisis)
At exactly ten o’clock, on the morning o f June 7, 1762 the English surged ashore
at the River Cojimar, east of Havana. Under the protective fire of their ships, 3,963
Redcoats overran the fort near the river and the following morning advanced westward to
the small village of Guanabacoa, which they took "in time for lunch."1 Admiral (Sir)
George Pocock then directed a flanking move to the west of the city, conquering the
promontory of the Cabana. By early July, the English were besieging the massive
fortifications of Morro Castle. It took forty cannon and mortars on land, three ships firing
from the bay, and mines to breach the walls; but on July 30*’ the British broke through and
the Morro fell, killing Havana's greatest hero, Luis de Velasco, in the process.2
As this last bastion collapsed, fresh reinforcements from North America arrived to
aid the British, turning their guns on the city. On the 13* of August the unthinkable
happened—Havana, the key to Spain's wealth and power in the Caribbean, surrendered to
the hated British. Henceforth, the citizens of Havana referred to any impending crisis as

Juliet Barclay, Havana: Portrait of a Citv (London: Cassell, 1993), 112.
^ o r details of the actual siege see: David Syrett, Ph.D., The Siege and Capture o f
Havana 1762 (London: Navy Records Society, 1970) for British viewpoint. Juliet
Barclay’s Havana (see above note) presents the Spanish perspective. An interesting
account from those involved can be found in Sonia Keppel, Three Brothers at Havana
1762 (London: Michael Russell, Ltd., 1981). See also Francis Russell Hart. The Seice of
Havana 1762 (Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, and George Allen &
Unwin, Ltd., 1931).
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the “hour of the mameyes,” a red fruit with black shiny seeds representing the uniforms of
the Redcoats and their devastation of the city.3
It was the second time the British had defeated Charles HI, el Ilustrado. In the
summer of 1742, during the War of Austrian Succession, when Charles was still King of
the Two Sicilies, some six-thousand English troops under Maximilian Brown had
surprised his army at Velletri, and threatened to bombard his palace in Naples forcing
Charles to briefly abandon his brother Philip in the North of Italy. While Charles
eventually won at Velletri, the British affront to his sovereignty while King of the Two
Sicilies made the capitulation at Havana, while he was King of Spain, even more
embarrassing.4
Spain and England were old enemies and the Wars of Spanish Succesion (17011713) and Austrian Succession (1744-1748) had done little to mitigate the conflict. Still,
when Charles came to the throne in 1759, he had not been anxious to involve Spain in the
Seven Years War (Polish Succession). His first order of business was to ensure the Italian
and Spanish successions.3 Too, he had inherited diplomatic problems in the Caribbean
where the British were logging in Spanish territory and smuggling in various Spanish

3Barclay, 1993,123.
4Anthony H. Hull, Charles IQ and the Revival of Spain (Washington, D.C.:
University Press of America, 1981), 43; Enciso Recio, L.M. etal Los Borbones en el Siglo
XVm U 700-1808’) (Madrid: Editorial Gredos,1991), 610-611.
s Carlos' son, the future Charles IV had not been educated in Spain and without the
approval of the Cortes could not become king. Carlos also placed Don Felipe, his third
son on the throne over the Italian possessions so that more hostilities would not ensue in
the peninsula, Enciso Recio, Los Bourbones. 608.
15

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

ports. Despite the King's dislike of the British, he offered his services as a mediator
between the warring parties in Europe and was promptly rebuffed by William Pitt's
government. Charles took British rejection as a personal insult to the Spanish throne and
to the Bourbon dynasty.6
Irrespective of British insolence in this instance, Spain's final entry into the Seven
Years War (1756-1763) was determined by other factors-primarily the existence of a
series o f familial alliances between the thrones of France and Spain. The Bourbon crowns
of France and Spain had already created two family compacts and a third was not
unthinkable. The Minister of the Indies, Zenon de Somodevilla, Marques de la Ensenada,
attempted, through secret negotiations, to create an alliance against British influence at the
Spanish Court in 1754. Ensenada's overzealous actions cost him the king's favor and his
post.7 At the time, Spain's Minister of War, Sebastian Eslava, and Ricardo Wall, Minister
of State, kept Spain neutral, but not for long.
In 1756, the hostilities between England and France had developed into a full
blown conflict. Within the next three years, France's losses in the Americas and Asia, and
her impending defeat in Germany, occasioned another attempt at a family coalition with
Spain. Several key elements determined Spain's actual entrance into the conflagration. As
Charles EQ became monarch in 1759, Sebastian Eslava died. The following year the

6Ibid, 609.
7Ensenada had not only overstepped his office by entering into diplomatic
negotiations, he had given an order to put the Spanish fleet on stand by because of
hostilities over Colonia do Sacramento. Ensenada was deprived o f his ministry and
promptly sent into retirement. John D. Bergamini, The Spanish Bourbons: The History of
a Tenacious Dvnastv (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1974), 82.
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young king recalled Ensenada, who soon overshadowed Ricardo Wall's stubborn
neutrality. The King's Francophile leanings might have been tempered by his Queen,
Maria Amalia of Saxony, but she died on September 27, 1760. Ultimately, Charles'
forbearance broke when Britain ignored Spain's requests that she stop illegal logging in
Honduras and smuggling from Jamaica.8
Events moved quickly. Charles secretly signed the Third Family Compact on
August 15, 1761 and declared war on Great Britain May 1, 1762. It was a costly move.
Precisely one year after signing the compact, Spain stood defeated. Worse, the court soon
received news that Manila had capitulated to English forces on September 24th. The only
bright spot for Spain was the capture of Colonia do Sacramento from the Portuguese with
an added bonus o f twenty-six English ships "richly loaded with merchandise and military
stores amounting to more than 924,000,000 sterling."9
At the peace table in November, the British reigned. The terms of the treaty were
a crushing defeat and an economic disaster for the French. Great Britain took all of
France’s possessions in India and Canada and the Gulf Coast. France retained only a few
sugar Islands in the Caribbean. The British forced Spain to renounce its fishing rights off
the Grand Banks of Newfoundland, legitimize British logging in Honduras, and submit
disputes on the high seas to British admiralty courts. The Spanish regained Havana only

8Spain's investigations in 1759 showed British smuggling in Jamaica cost her
upwards of six-million pesos per year. Enciso Recio, Los Bourbones. 611.
9There were other successes in South America and Europe but none of this caliber.
David Knuth Bjork, "The Establishment of Spanish Rule in the Province of Louisiana,
1762-I770,"(PhX). diss., University of California, Berkely, 1923), 15.
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by ceding Florida to Britain and granting navigation rights on the Mississippi River. The
sudden proximity of the British in North America threatened the silver mines in New Spain
(Mexico). Through another series of secret negotiations with France, Spain gained the
huge province of Louisiana as the sole barrier between her wealth in the New World and
the acquisitive English.10
Charles had little time to spend on his newest possession. His first concern was
to implement a series of reforms aimed at restructuring the administration, finances and
defenses of the Indies. The most imperative reforms were defensive as it had become
painfully apparent that the American armies were for the most part undermanned, the
militias “without arms, organization, or training” and the fortifications were
impoverished.11 Havana appeared to be the heart of the problem.
After the Treaty of Paris had been officially executed (February 10, 1763), the
King summoned Cuba's governor, Juan de Prado y Portocarrero Malleza, and the
members of his war council to face charges in Spain.12 As the Conde de Aranda began

10See Sir Charles Petrie, King Charles II of Spain: an Enlightened Despot (New
York: The John Day Company, 1971), 111, for a discussion of the Treaty of Paris and
British logging rights. The secret negotiations between France and Spain can be found in
Arthur S. Aiton, "The Diplomacy of the Louisiana Cession," MVHR. 36 (1931): 701720.
“ Allan J. Kuethe, Cuba. 24; this idea is supported in Archer's, The Armvin
Bourbon Mexico. Campbell's, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru. 1750-1810. and
Kuethe's, Military Reform and Society in New Granada. 1773-1808.
12Prado's council consisted o f Field Marshal Diego de Tabares, retired governor of
Cartagena, Lieutenant General Conde de Superunda, previously Viceroy of Peru, and the
Marques del Real Transporte, of the royal navy. Jaime Delgado, ""El Conde de Ricla,
capitan general de Cuba," Revista de Historia de America. 55-56 (1963): 54.
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Prado's court martial, his cousin, Ambrosio Funes de Villalpando, the Conde de Ricla,
sailed for Cuba.13 Ricla, now Captain General of Cuba, went to his new post with a full
battalion of soldiers, engineers, a support team of technicians and laborers and emergency
funds. Accompanying him was his close friend, Field Marshal Alejandro O'Reilly, an
accomplished soldier with orders to reorganize the defenses at Havana.
O'Reilly and Ricla proceeded to implement the King's order to rebuild Havana so
that there would be no repetition of the ignominy of 1762. In a relatively short period of
time O'Reilly restructured the fixed battalion and the artillery corps, improved their skill
and manpower and reduced their cost some 200,000 pesos per year.. He also built a
larger militia of creoles14 and pardos15 with the added inducement of the fuero militar.
By 1765 O'Reilly's militia reforms had become regulation.16

13Royal order of appointment, Buen Retiro, March 16, 1763, cedula of
appointment, March 25, 1763, AGI, SD 1211.
14There are numerous definitions of the world Creole, in this work, as within the
Spanish empire, the word Creole stands for anyone of European blood bom in the
Americas, and usually does not represent a person of mixed heritage.
I5Pardo refers to persons who were of African descent, free blacks or mulattoes,
who were literally “pardoned of their blackness” by the crown so that they might serve in
the military or marry someone of a higher social status. This was necessary because the
crown had established laws regarding limpieza de Sangre or the cleanliness (Europeaness)
of blood being a prerequisite for such positions.
16This gave the soldiers similar protection and advantages to the regular Spanish
forces and allowed them the chance at upward mobility, Kuethe, Cuba. 45; It is this
particular action, argues Lyle McAlister, that created the creole army which ultimately
freed portions of Latin America during independence (though not in Cuba), see McAlister,
The Fuero Militar. for O'Reillys regulations see “Reglamento para las militias de
infanteria, y caballeria de la Isla de Cuba,” Havana, 1765, AGI, SD 2120.
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Ricla, meanwhile, focused on rebuilding the fortifications and restructuring
finances. He ordered that the Mexican subsidy to Cuba's treasury be used exclusively to
rebuild the fortifications, and in 1764 levied new taxes on the creole population in Havana
to assist in the project. O'Reilly filed an additional report on the condition of the rest of
the island recommending economic development and more effective government. He
suggested that the crown reduce the taxes on commerce (especially the slave trade) and
open new ports to stimulate the economy. In October, at the behest of both Ricla and
O'Reilly, the Cubans drafted a petition to the crown outlining the commercial reforms they
felt necessary to restructure their economy and ultimately their defenses. This petition
helped convince Charles HI that commerce in the Indies needed reform and reorganization
appointing a committee to investigate problems with commerce in Empire.17
The military reforms at Havana impressed the King enough that he extended
similar techniques to the reorganization of the armies in the rest o f the colonies. In 1764,
the crown also reorganized its ministries, placing military expenditures under Esquilache
as Minister of War rather than the Ministry of the Indies. Working on O'Reilly's
recommendations, Esquilache then established an intendente de guerra which helped
centralize the army’s administration in Havana under crown officials. With reorganization
underway and the proper administrative infrastructure in place the Minister of War turned
to commercial reform to finance his military needs.18

17Ricla to Esquilache, Havana, Dec. 14, 1763, AGS, Hac 2342.
18Kuethe, Cuba. 70.
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At Esquilache's suggestion Charles HI appointed a special committee to investigate
the problems affecting commerce within the Empire. The commission reported that there
were eight major causes for the “decay” in colonial trade. They pointed to the Cadiz
monopoly, high export duties and shipping costs, expensive and restrictive licensing
practices, smuggling, the neglect of agriculture, and the diversion of silver specie to
colonial ports before it reached the metropole. In response to the report and the petition
from Havana, the Crown opened several major Caribbean ports in Cuba, Puerto Rico, St.
Domingue, Margarita, and Trinidad, to trade with eight Spanish cities (Cadiz, Seville,
Alicante, Cartagena, Malaga, Barcelona, Santander, La Coruna, and Gijon), discontinued
licensing and lowered other duties and fees, replacing them with a small “impost o f six or
seven percent ad valorem.”19
Havana immediately benefited from the reforms of 1765. As legal trade increased,
Cuba's revenues soared, reaching 375,000 pesos annually during the 1760s and 562,500
during the 1770s.20 Ricla's hard work and foresight regenerated the colony's
administration and O'Reilly's military reforms invigorated its defenses, giving the
Habaneros a new sense of prestige in the empire and primacy in the Caribbean. Charles
rewarded Ricla with an appointment at court and O'Reilly with an assignment to begin
reform in Puerto Rico.21

19The ordinance of 1765 was actually extended to Louisiana by decree in 1768.
John G. Clark, New Orleans. 171-173.
“ Kuethe, Cuba. 73-74.
2lTorres Ramirez, Alejandro CReillv. 49, 55-94.
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Charles HI tried to create the same transformation in his colonies on tierrafirmer1
but with varied success. He appointed Jose de Galvez as visitor general (an overarching
administrative and investigative position) of New Spain and the borderlands territories,
with instructions to “check procedures in law of the audiencia judges, reform the
collection of revenue, improve public order, and work with the Viceroy, the Marques de
Cruillas, and the military inspector, Juan de Villalba, in organizing defenses.”23
Additionally, the Comanche and Apache tribes were committing new atrocities in the
northwestern borderlands and Charles ordered Galvez to reorganize the mission-presidio
system and protect the colonists or move them to safety.24
Despite his competence, Galvez was not particularly popular, especially since he
was part and parcel of the Crown's eviction of the Jesuits in the Americas (1767). He had
also recently replaced the then current viceroy of New Spain and the military inspector in
an effort to root out official corruption. Alan Kuethe notes that the people and
bureaucracy of New Spain resisted his reforms, sometimes to the point of violence.
Violence and contention also darkened the reforms in Peru, Chile and Central America.25

“ The mainland colonies of the Americas.
“ Hull, Charles UL 209-10.
24A system by which the crown first sent missionaries into Indian territory and if
they survived followed up with soldiers to establish a local garrison known as a presidio.
25Kuethe, Cuba. 76; See also Herbert Eugene Bolton, Texas in the Middle
Eighteenth Centurv: Studies in Spanish Colonial History and Administration (Original
Manuscript,1915; Reprint New York: Russell & Russell, Inc., 1962 and Austin: University
of Texas Press, 1970)
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Galvez and his mission were only part of the larger plan by the Crown to shore up
its defenses in North America, which were being undermined in several places. In addition
to fending off Indian attacks, Charles HI was increasingly concerned with invading
Europeans along the Pacific Coast. He was aware that Russian trappers and traders
searching for pelts along the coast of Alaska could easily occupy the islands along the
California coast. They might also quietly erect military posts with little fear of Spanish
intervention.26 Complicating matters was the British claim to the port o f San Francisco as
New Albion. This stirred Charles to action because Spain held territorial sovereignty in
the area based solely on historical precedence, but Great Britain and Russia might easily
claim the territory through effective settlement.27
Spain's monarch also faced European intrusion elsewhere in the Empire. In 1764
the French and the British had established settlements in the Malvinas (Falklands). The
British in the Pacific were contesting Spanish rights to the rich port o f Manila. Despite the
fact that it had returned Manila to Spain in the Treaty of Paris, Great Britain claimed the
territoiy “by virtue of Spain's abandonment of the Philippines.”2* Once again, lack of
Spanish settlement might rob Spain of its territory.

“ For a larger discussion of the Russians see the Nootka Sound Controversy in
Warren L. Cook, Flood Tide ofEmnire: Spain and the Pacific Northwest 1543-1819
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973).
P e trie . King Charles. 137-38.
2*Hull. Charles ITT 215: Hargreaves-Mawdslev. Eighteenth-Centurv Spain: 17001788: A Poli tical. Diplomatic and Institutuional History (Totawa, NJ: Rowan and
Littlefield, 1979), 121: Petrie. King Charles. 138.
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If problems with the hated British in the Malvinas and Manila weren't enough, by
1765, France again began to agitate affairs in the Atlantic. Britain was temporarily
distracted from European matters by dissension in her Atlantic colonies and she was also
busy with the usual dismantling of the armed forces after her victories in war. France took
the opportunity, while British backs were turned, to bum the naval arsenals at Plymouth
and Portsmouth-to more or less speed up British disarmament. Although Spain had not
taken part in the plot, her alliance with France had not ceased after the Treaty of Paris.
Not only was Spain expected to provide “quiet cooperation” for France's machinations,
Charles also faced the very real possibility of new problems with Britain in Europe, as well
as the Americas.29
At the same time Charles struggled with empire he became embroiled in a war of
wills with the Madrileiios over “proper” dress. Esquilache, the King's favorite but the
most unpopular minister with his subjects, had prompted the monarch to try and decrease
the demand for wool so that more land could be converted to grain production. Charles
and his minister reasoned that by banning the use of long coats, extravagant dress and
wide brimmed hats they could discourage crime in the city and lower the demand for wool
cloth at the same time (long coats hid swords and the hats hid criminal faces). Actual
enforcement of his minister's ideas produced a full-blown riot in Madrid in 1766 which
Charles barely escaped by dismissing both Esquilache and Ensenada and retreating with his
family to the palace at Aranjuez.30

P e trie , King Charles. 138.
P e trie . King Charles. 121-123.
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Ultimately, the king blamed failure o f his domestic reform on the general
intransigence of the Jesuits toward change. Charles' anti-clerical opinions were well
known and he had already dismissed an Inquisitor General for anti-reformist actions in
1761.
In 1767, he gave the order for the expulsion of the Jesuits in the Indies. It was an
unfortunate and unpopular decision for the colonies. The King's own actions now
hampered those of his visitor general. To ensure defensive Spanish settlement in
California and the Southwest, Galvez needed the mission-presidio system precisely when
Charles ordered it emptied of the Jesuits. Instead, the often less capable and less
experienced Franciscans and Dominicans arrived to press into the frontier.31
Thus preoccupied with imperial ambitions and domestic frustrations, Charles had
little time to consider the fate of his latest colony in the borderlands, although Louisiana's
importance to Spain had never truly diminished. As early as 1761, Spain had received
reports from the Quereteran missions in Texas that the English presence in Louisiana
endangered their position.32 Later, in the Seven Years War and its ensuing treaty, the
Spanish monarch's willingness to negotiate was due, in part, to a desire to gain the
territory of Louisiana as a buffer zone. Spain's minister informed the French court that it

31The king felt that the Jesuits had affronted his authority in ecclesiastical matters
and in 1767 ordered them expelled from the colonies-an unpopular act in the colonies
which crippled the mission system in many parts of the empire. W. N. HargreavesMawdsley, Eighteenth-Centurv Spain. 114-15; John Edward Fagg, Latin America: A
General History. 34th ed. (New York: Mcmillian Publishing Co., Inc., 1977), 223-23;
Petrie, King Charles. 147.
32Bolton, DeMezieres-1,68.
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was not “free to dispose of possessions, the right to which Spain, as the legitimate owner,
has never conceded.”33 Instead he suggested that a neutral zone be-established below
Southern Canada and west of Georgia but was rebuffed by the British, who wanted the
Mississippi. The French cession of Louisiana to Spain only alleviated problems with the
British for a short while.34
The Treaty o f Paris actually marked the beginning of a determined Anglo advance
toward the Mississippi, despite the Line of Demarcation drawn in the Appalachians.
Indeed, as early as 1763 the British proposed that two colonies be established in the
Northwest territories on the Ohio and Illinois Rivers and a third at Natchez. Robert
Farmer entered Mobile by July of 1763 and that same month George Johnson was
commissioned to occupy Pensacola with a Major Loftus who would take control of the
Illinois district.35 In the vastness of the Louisiana territory west of the Mississippi and the
proximity of the British on its long, open borders, Spain again freed the interminable
problem of creating a defensive barrier against encroachment and of establishing effective

Spanish settlement in the area.36

“ Shepherd, “The Cession of Louisiana to Spain,” Political Science Quarterly. 19
(1904), 442-443.
“ Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 13.
35Farmer took official control of Mobile whose western borders were stated as the
Mississippi River, to the Iberville River, across lakes Maurepas and Pontchartrain and out
to the Gulf. AN, Col., C13A, 43: 234. George Johnstone didn't arrive until 1765.
“ Bjork, “The Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 21; Clarence E. Carter, Great
Britain and the Illinois Country. 763-1764. (Washington, D.C.: The American Historical
Association, 1910), 105; Clarence W. Alvord, The Illinois Country. 1673-1818. 2 vols.
(Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1965), 1: 164, 166.
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Map of Spanish Louisiana

Missouri

Vincennes
S t Louis
U F t de Chartres
Ste. Genevieve
Kaskaskia

R *v e r

\Vr-M in In* Inn rrm in ry

tjt New Madrid

rChickasaw Bluffs
^

Arkansas River

Cadron
Arkansas Post
St. Louis des
^C addodoch es

Alibamous

Post

Ouachita Post
Natchitoches

1Natchez
Pointe)
foupde

he

Mobile
Biloxi
<——.

New Orleans

GulfofMexico

M ILES

27

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Louisiana presented the Spaniards with a number of puzzles. The first was the
areal extent of the colony. The colony’s huge territory was essentially bounded on the
east by the Mississippi River with the exception of the Isle of Orleans, bounded by a line
which flowed Southeast from the mouth of the Iberville River, through Lakes
Pontachartrain and Maurepas, creating a boundary with western Florida. Above the
Iberville it extended northward, along the river through “Indian territory” to an area
surrounding the previously French town of St.Genevieve (St. Louis was founded later).
The north-south expanse of the colony was so vast that the Spanish referred to everything
above the mouth of the Arkansas River as Upper Louisiana and everything below it as
Lower Louisiana. Above the French settlements and toward the northwest it was difficult
to tell where Spanish Louisiana ended and British Canada began. Fur traders and Indians
dominated that uncharted territory and neither had forts west of the mouth of the Missouri
River. In the Southeast Louisiana's boundaries started at the Rigolets, moving westward
across the Gulf of Mexico and ending at the boundary of Spanish Texas, marked only at
the forts of Natchitoches and Los Adaes and the Sabine River. The area between the two
colonies was so uncertain that it was called “no-mans” land for the next century, harboring
many miscreants and criminals who sought to escape the authorities in Texas and/or
Louisiana. North and west of the Sabine there was no certain western border and much
o f the territory was still uncharted. It was extremely difficult for Spain to guard such
ambiguous and far flung boundaries.37

37Femando Solano Costa, “Los Problemas Diplomaticos de las Fronteras de la
Luisiana Espafiola,” Cuademos de Historica Diplomatics 4 (1968): 121-54; See Louis R.
Nardini, No Man’s Land: A History of El Camino Real (New Orleans: Pelican Press,
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The second puzzle was how to bring about Spanish settlement. The colony held
no particular draw for Spaniards seeking life on the hacienda (large estates) or rich urban
towns. The lack of mineral wealth, no large and wealthy, sedentary Indian communities,
and a small population of African slaves was further complicated by the fact that Louisiana
also held groups of non-Spanish colonists who had been established there for over half a
century.
Louis XVs behavior toward his old colony did not make Spain’s burden any
easier. The French king had deliberately let the colonists in Louisiana believe that he had
“only entrusted the colony to his Bourbon cousin Carlos to satisfy the honors of all the
kings involved.”3® This belief and Spain's tardiness in claiming her last colony led many of
the French in New Orleans to convince themselves that the transfer had not actually taken
place. In fact, by 1764 they believed that the peace between England and France was just
another lull in the continual wars of the eighteenth-century and that France was merely
waiting to retake the colony at the end of another war.39 The following year, to force

1961) regarding the southwestern strip between the two colonies. Also see Eugene
Morrow Violette, “Spanish Land Claims in Missouri,” Washington University Studies 8
(1921): 167-200, for problems with the confusing boundaries of Spanish Louisiana which
extend into the nineteenth century.
“ Thomas Neil Ingersoll, Old New Orleans: Race, class, sex, and order in the early
Deep South. 1718-1819. (Ph.D. diss., University o f California, Los Angeles, 1990), 404.
39Report by Governor d'Abbadie, July 3,1764, in Carl A. Brasseaux, A
Comparative View of French Louisiana. 1699 and 1762: The Journals of Pierre LeMovne
dTberville and Jean-Jacques-Blaise d'Abbadie (Lafayette: University of Southwestern
Louisiana, 1981 [1979]), 120.
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Charles' hand, Louis told his cousin that Spain must take possession of Louisiana or
consider giving it back.
Charles HI moved, perhaps not in the direction Louis had hoped. In May o f 1765,
he appointed Don Antonio de Ulloa to implant a Spanish government in Louisiana.40
Ulloa, who was in Havana, began gathering men and provisions. He also wrote a letter to
the Superior Council in New Orleans, to announce his arrival, telling them that he had
been instructed by the king “to take possession of it [Louisiana] in his name, and in
conformity with the Orders of his Most Christian Majesty”and had taken a moment to
“acquaint” them with his mission.41
Ulloa was an adept diplomat and had previously served the crown in delicate
situations both in the Indies and Europe. In the 1740s he had exposed the corrupt
conditions of the Viceroyalty of Peru and again in that colonies' mercury mines at
Huancavelica in the 1760s. The unhappy, corrupt officials had ousted him from the
colony. Ulloa had arrived in Havana in 1765 expecting to be recalled to Spain, but his
analytical

and observational skills, not to mention his fluency in French, meant a

governorship in Louisiana instead.42

40Ulloa's appointment and instructions are in AGI, SD 2542.
4lUlloa to Superior Council in New Orleans, Havana, July 10, 1765, AN., Col.
C13A, 45: 161, and Gayarre, 131.
42Ulloa's work with the vicroyalty can be found in Irving A. Leonard, ed. Jorge
Juan and Antonio de Ulloa, A Voyage to South America, trans. John Adams (New York:
Alfred A. Knopfj 1964): 3-19. His work at the mercury mines can be found in Whitaker,
Huancavelica Mercury Mines. General works on Ulloa include Whitaker, “Antonio de
Ulloa,” and Moore “Antonio de Ulloa; and Krousel, Don Antonio de Ulloa
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Provisioning his ships and gathering men took longer than expected and Ulloa's
retinue did not reach the Mississippi River until March 5 , 1766.43 Even then, the Spanish
arrival was not awe-inspiring. A single frigate anchored ofFNew Orleans just as a
torrential downpour struck. Even less impressive was the slight figure of the governor
and his small contingent of ninety soldiers.44
The new governor's orders were to take possession without changing the existing
colonial order. While Louisiana was to be strengthened militarily, resistance against the
British onslaught was not to be achieved through the normal mission-presidio system.
Instead he was to create and maintain a group of Indian allies, populate the border at the
Mississippi and bolster the military by putting the French soldiers on an equal footing with
the Spaniards. He also faced the unpopular task of dissolving and replacing the existing
French government.45
The colony’s reception of their new governor was at best luke-warm. Some of the
elite in New Orleans eventually became friendly with Ulloa but, for the most part, they

43The expeditionary force of a hundred men sent to Louisiana did not reach
Havana until December of 1765. By then it had been reduced in strength by death and
illness on the way over to a meager force of ninety men. KrouseL, Ulloa. 2; and John
Preston Moore, Revolt in Louisiana: The Spanish Occupation 1766-1770 (Baton Rouge:
Louisiana State University Press, 1976).
“ Ulloa was short and extremely thin. The Spanish government had equipped him
with the bare minimum of two companies of infantry, and he was accompanied by Loyola,
the commissary of war and intendant, by Esteben Gayarre the new comptroller and by
Martin Navarro, the treasure. Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Louisiana,” 84. In
Louisiana, Ulloa’s contingent of ninety men were soon reduced to seventy-five by disease
and desertion. Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 9.
45Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Louisiana,” 84.
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remained aloof and even mocking. At the time Ulloa took command, the colony was on
the verge of collapse from the malfeasance of its officials and neglect by the crown.
Neglect had left the colonists unruly, distrustful of government, and independent-minded.
Ulloa realized the impossibility of his position and tried to make the transfer as painless as
possible. Without raising the Spanish flag he retreated with his ship to the mouth of the
Mississippi, where he established his fort at Balize. There he met quietly with acting
French governor Charles-Philippe Aubry to complete the exchange. With few troops and
fewer officials he decided to leave the Superior Council intact for the moment and turned
to building forts along the Mississippi while he waited for more troops and money.
During his tenure in Balize, Ulloa began to collect information so the government in
Madrid could decide what to do about Louisiana.
The colonists were insulted and confused. Paradoxically, they feared Spain's
mercantilists regulations on commerce, yet they entertained dreams of Spanish silver
flooding the colony to replace their own paper currency, now depreciated to one-fourth of
its face value. Unfortunately, Ulloa had little money to spend on the colony. The crown
had given him only 34,030.38 pesos for expenditures in 1766. The situado for regular
expenditures, supplies, and salaries amounted to 28,490.25 pesos and extraordinary funds
of 3,333.25 pesos had to pay for lodging the troops, rents on housing for the officials, and
debts incurred by the French officials. Only 2,204.13 pesos could be expended on naval
stores, docks, and rations for sailors. Ulloa had nothing forpoblaciony amistad de
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Indios, the normal funding for new immigrants and gifts to the Indians.46 These funds
were hardly the flood of Spanish silver the colonists expected and after expenditures left
little to save the floundering currency of the colony. Thankfully, Spain did send more
funding. By 1767, Ulloa convinced the Spanish government to agree to increase the
annual appropriation, but it was never enough. Over the next two years Spain's
investment in Louisiana grew, though the monies were often misdirected as the following
figures indicate. In 1767 the crown increased expenditures from the 34,030.38 pesos
originally sent with Ulloa to 145,771.65 pesos, including 7,536.5 pesos for settling
immigrants and buying Indian gifts. By 1768 it raised it expenditures to 155,397.25 pesos
but the new monies were directed toward the Marina (the navy, its men, ships and ports)
and troops and Ulloa found it increasingly difficult to deal with immigrants and Indians.47
With Ulloa at Balize, Aubry stayed on as acting governor under orders from his
king. Louisiana fell under dual French and Spanish rule. Aubry hoped the French crown
would ease the situation but in the summer of 1766 he received a royal order that the
French would make no more payments on bills of exchange. The colonists were
contemptuous and rebellious. Both governors were embarrased and disappointed.4*

46This last oversight by the crown was particularly damaging because Ulloa was
supposed to continue the French policy of giving gifts to the Indians to win them as allies.
Without gifts it would be difficult for him to win the favor of Indians who previously had
been Spain’s enemies. Figures in a letter from Navarro to Jose de Galvez, July 18,1787,
AGI, SD 2684.
47Rodriguez Casado, Primeros afios. 116-29. Accounts of the Royal Treasury in a
letter from Martin Navarro to Jose de Galvez, July 18, 1787, AGI, SD 2684.
^ jo r k , “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 88; Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 10;
Arthur Preston Whitaker, “Antonio de Ulloa,” 155-95; Moore, “Antonio de Ulloa: A
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Despite the tense situation in the colony Ulloa endeavored over the next thirty
months to continue on as ordered. He tried to appease the troops by offering French
soldiers the same pay as the Spaniards, which required that the Spanish soldiers take a
reduction of one-fifth of their normal pay. In protest, the Spaniards deserted and the
French unanimously refused.49 Spain sent replacements, but slowly and in small
numbers.50 The governor attempted to establish a fort at the mouth of the Mississippi,
one on the Red River, one opposite Natchez, one on the Iberville opposite Fort Bute, as
well as two in Missouri, giving Captain Riu strict orders to resist to the “uttermost” and
English interference or claim to the northern side of the Missouri River.51
Indian problems plagued the governor, the French gave them brandy and the
English bribed them with presents that Ulloa couldn't match. Trade with the Indians was
confined to licensed traders, primarily the firm of Laclede and St. Maxent. Only a few

Profile,” 189-318; see also Rodriguez Casado, Primeros afios.
49Common soldiers supposed to be paid 8 pesos per month but actually received
only 5 pesos and 2 reales because the rest was used to pay for their clothing and
“maintenance” a common occurrence in Borderland's posts and a common reason for
desertion since maintenance included food and drink. Pay also often came late during
Ulloa's tenure, another reason for dissent. Abraham P. Nasatir, “Government Employees
and Salaries in Spanish Louisiana,” LHO. 29 (1946): 890-91.
“ Gilbert C. Din, “Protecting the Barreda',” 184-92. All replacements stopped in
Havana for training before they arrived in Louisiana to enter what eventually became the
Fixed Louisiana Infantry Battalion.
51Captain Riu was the Lieutenant Governor of Spanish Illinois from 1766 to 1770
when O'Reilly replaced him with Pedro Piemas, Louis Houck, The Spanish Regime in
Missouri: A Collection of Papers and Documents Relating to Upper Louisiana. Principally
within the Limits o f Missouri during the Dominion of Spain 2 vols. (Chicago: R. R.
Donnelly, 1909; Reprint, Amo Press, 1971), 1: 1-3,20-28.
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soldiers could be sent to the outlying forts and Aubry wrote Choiseul in March that he
feared the forty men sent to Illinois would “make little impression on the Indians or the
English”52
The governor also placed immigrants at strategic points along the Mississippi to
form a defensive line of settlements, often a difficult task since newcomers often wanted to
stay near already settled families (often relatives) and resented the governor's interference.
Also, these families needed at least two years worth of provisions at the expense of the
Spanish government.53
Ulloa's attempts to control commerce met with continual failure. French
discontent grew because his licensing of Indian trade appeared to be a monopoly for
Laclede and St. Maxent. The Indians were not impressed with the governor’s forts,
soldiers or gifts. He tried to curb smuggling and control prices by issuing a decree in
September of 1766 requiring all merchants to have licenses or passports from his officials
and sought to control the slave trade. The merchants either ignored him or grew furious
when they had to comply. Throughout 1767 they worked against Spanish rule with a
mounting distrust of Ulloa and his officials. The governor wrote to the Captain-General in

52Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule, 97.
^Ulloato Grimaldi, September 29, 1766, AGI, SD 2585. The governor was
denounced on more than one occaision for interfering with the Acadians settlement plans.
Rodriguez Casado, Primeros afios. 104-105. For further information on Ulloa and the
Acadians see Richard E. Chandler, “End of an Odyssey. Acadians Arrive in St. Gabriel
Louisiana,” LH 18 (1977), 69-87.
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Havana desperately seeking money and warning that everything seemed to cause “revolts
and seditions” in Louisiana.54
The governor's unbending insistence on Spanish regulations further soured
relations and provoked Aubry to note that had he but treated the French with a little

“douceur ” (sweetness) it might have helped. He also warned the French crown that the
colonists and Indians were angry enough over the transfer that they were considering
offering the colony to Great Britain.55 Ulloa's notable absence in the community made
resistance easier and by 1768 when he returned from an inspection of the lower colony he
was confronted with open opposition under the leadership of Attorney General Nicolas
Lafreniere.
In 1768 the Spanish crown promulgated new and restrictive commercial
regulations. Ironically, Louisiana was the first Spanish colony to receive almost
unrestricted trade with other Spanish ports but the order forbade trade, with non-Spanish
ports and required the use of Spanish owned ships. (This also included colonial ships.)
The French in Louisiana were used to a much larger zone o f trade including the Islands of
the West Indies. While the duties Louisianians were to pay were reasonable, the
threatened disruption of their normal trade patterns both frightened and infuriated them.
When Ulloa proclaimed the new royal order, the colonists rebelled. During the revolt, the

54Thomas Neil Ingersoll, Old New Orleans. 413 and Ulloa to Bucareli, March 3,
1767 in Lawrence Kinnaird, ed., Spain in the Mississippi Valiev. 1765-1794: Translations
of Materials from the Spanish Archives in the Bancroft Library, (hereinafter SMV) 3 vols.,
Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1945. (Washington,
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 1: 20-21.
55Aubry to Praslin, March 30, 1767, Archives Nationales, AC, C13a, 47:6-9.
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Superior Council banished Ulloa in an act of defiance. Thus Louisiana's first Spanish
governor left without taking effective control of the colony.56
The motivation of the rebels was complex. Many believed that the revolt would
oust Spanish rule completely and that when Ulloa's ship, the Volante, sailed for Havana
they might convince either Great Britain or France to take possession. Neither did. The
colonists were even more disappointed when it became apparent that Spain was still
interested in her rebellious colony. As the colonial authority descended into chaos the
colonists grew nervous waiting for some “good king” to take them under protection.
They did not have to wait long.57
As the colonists pleaded for help in France, Spain's ministers debated the
appropriate reaction. Suggestions flew in the capital as to what might be done and what
might happen. One Swiss mercenary who remained in the colony suggested that it might
become a republic. Others knew Charles m would make no such agreement. Spain must
answer Louisiana’s challenge.58 Ulloa arrived in Spain in February and delivered a report

“ For a more comprehensive account of the insurrection from the Spanish
viewpoint see AGI, SD 2543 and Moore, Revolt in Louisiana. Whitaker, “Antonio de
Ulloa,” 155-95, Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 10-15. The French side has recently been
examined by Carl Brasseaux, in Denis-Nicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of
1768. (Ruston, LA: McGinty Publications, 1987).
^Richard E. Chandler, “O’Reilly’s Voyage from Havana to Balize,” LH 20
(1981): 199-207.
58Ingersoll, Old New Orelans. 1: 430, indicates that both England and French
Saint-Domingue suggested a republic jointly governed by the Bourbon thrones but there is
no evidence to support this claim. England did not want to get involved in the conflict and
told colonial representatives as much when they visited London. For other suggested
solutions to the “Louisiana problem” see Moore’s Revolt in Louisiana.
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to Grimaldi on the rebellion, including the names of its key leaders.59 In response to
Ulloa’s report, Grimaldi immediately admonished the French for not punishing the
Louisiana delegates present at their court. The Ministry of the Indies then met to discuss
the situation, and with the exception of treasurer Don Miguel de Muzquiz, decided to
keep Louisiana after comparing the cost of retaking the colony and to the cost of losing it
to the British.60 Added to these reasons was the danger that the idea of revolution might
spread to other Spanish colonies-a reasonable fear considering the rising independence of
many creoles within Spain's empire.
The King acted quickly. He ordered Don Alejandro O'Reilly to recover the
colony, punish the ringleaders of the rebellion and install Spanish government, including a
new governor. A Royal Cedula dated April 21, 1769, identified that new governor as
Lieutenant Colonel Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, an officer with a reputation as a good
commander and organizer, then serving in Havana.61
By June of 1769 Louisiana had its answer. Spain was still interested. In response
to requests for funding from Aubry, Captain-General Antonio Maria Bucareli sent

situation funds from Havana to pay the troops, buy gifts for the Indians and support what

59Ulloa to Grimaldi, February 14, 1769, AGI, SD 80.
60Muzquiz was convinced that Louisiana would never equal in worth what it would
cost the Spanish to defend it.
6lRoyal Cedula to O'Reilly, Aranjuez, April 16, 1769, AGI, Cuba 2357; for Unzaga
see “Hoja de Servicio de Unzaga y Amezaga,” AGS, Secretaria de Guerra 7259, Folio54;
Jacobo de la Puzuela, Diccionario Geografico. Estadistico. Historia de la Isla de Cuba. 2
vols., (Madrid: Imprenta del Establidmiento de Mellado, 1863), 2: 631.
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was left of the Spanish officials in the colony.62 That same month O'Reilly arrived in
Havana where he selected troops, equipment, supplies and support personnel and
contacted Unzaga.63 In a fortnight O'Reilly organized his expedition and early on July 6,
1769 he and Unzaga set sail for Louisiana. This time there would be no expulsion, for
waiting beneath the sails of their twenty-one ships were 2056 troops, firearms and
ammunition.64
The fruit of mameyes in Havana secured a new colony for Spain and produced
Louisiana’s first three governors. UUoa, sadly dismissed from his post by his own
citizenry, had given valuable information to the crown about its newest colony. Within a
year, O'Reilly set in place the structure of government and military defense. Effective
control of the Louisiana borderlands, however, came after seven long years of government
in the capable hands of Luis Unzaga y Amezaga.

®Aubry wrote to Bucareli in February requesting money for medical personnel,
interpreters, and government employees, as well as gifts for the Indians. Aubry to
Bucareli, February 24, 1769, AGI, Cuba 1054. Bucareli sent some 12,783 pesos, 3 reales
to New Orleans, 8,000 of which was for the troops, Indian gifts and officials. Bucareli to
Aubry, June 22,1769, AGI, Cuba 1054.
“ Bucareli to Grimaldi, June 24, 1769, AGI SD 80, fol.1130.
“ O'Reilly also carried 150,000 pesos to cover unexpected expenses. Bucareli to
Arriaga, July 7, 1769, AGI SD 80, fol. 1135.
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Chapter Three
O’Reilly

“There is nothing that makes a government milder and more respected than to render to
each misdeed the justice which is due it. ” Alejandro O’Reilly1
In 1769, Charles III, sent one of his most capable officers to Louisiana to subdue
the rebellion of its colonists and firmly establish Spanish rule. The crown afforded
O’Reilly far more troops, money and munitions than it originally sent with Ulloa. In short,
swift strokes O’Reilly stopped the rebellion and planted the Spanish flag. Working toward
the goals of the Bourbon Reforms, over the next year he redistributed the meager troops
in a defensive barrier around the colony and built a colonial militia along the same lines as
the one in Havana. At the same time he established a new framework of Spanish
government, enforced Spain’s economic decrees, encouraged agriculture through
immigration, and establish a Spanish ecclesiastical presence in the colony. It was a
tremendous task but the King had chosen wisely.
O'Reilly's ship the Volante reached the mouth o f the Mississippi in two weeks but
he delayed his entrance into New Orleans due to inclement weather. He did send notice to
Aubry of his arrival. When the news of the Spanish presence leaked to the general
populace of New Orleans, many of them, notably a number of the rebels, came to meet
with the captain-general at Balize to plead their case. He listened but was stem and
evasive in his answers. Finally, the captain-general and his ships appeared at dawn off
New Orleans on August 17,1769. Numerous cannon volleys announced his presence to

‘Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 136.
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the startled town. Again O’Reilly waited, this time for a day before he made his dignified
entrance, ceremoniously lowering the French flag and replacing it with that of Spain.2
After taking formal possession, the Spaniards turned their attention to the matter
of the rebellion. Three days later O'Reilly invited the ringleaders to his house where they
were arrested. He then posted a general clemency for the city and ordered all adult males
in the colony to sign an oath of allegiance to Charles ID. After a lengthy trial O’Reilly
convicted and passed sentenced on the leaders of the revolt. He appointed a commission
headed by Treasurer, Martin Navarro to dispose of their estates appropriately. The
ensuing executions so shocked New Orleans that afterwards its citizens referred to the
Field Marshal as Butcher or Bloody O'Reilly.3
There still remained the matter of the merchant class in New Orleans who posed a
distinct threat to both Spanish authority and its intended commercial policies. O'Reilly
began by expelling approximately two dozen merchants and their families, a number of
them English Protestants and Jews who refused to abjure their religion. It has been
suggested by Thomas Ingersoll, in his recent dissertation on New Orleans, that with this
move O’Reilly effectively purged the French elite that stood against Spanish authority.
Other historians disagree. The first problem was that the merchant class was not the only
French elite. There was also a landed, slave-owning planter class who distrusted the

^ jo rk , “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 131, Texada, Alejandro O’Reilly and the
New Orleans Rebels. 25-32.
3A more lengthy discussion of the trial and convictions can be found in John
Preston Moore, Revolt in Louisiana and Rodriguez-Casado, Primeros afios. 328-43. A
good biography o f Navarro can be found in Brian E. Coutt’s dissertation, “Martin
Navarro.”
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Spanish government and constantly tried to circumvent Spanish laws and regulations,
especially concerning slavery. Second, the remaining Superior Council was filled with
decidedly anti-Spanish members. Gilbert C. Din notes, in his recent work on the New
Orleans Cabildo, that French planters and merchants competed for offices in the Cabildo’s
government where they could continue to apply the law for their own benefit. Where the
remaining merchants are concerned, Margaret Fisher Dalrymple’s work on John
Fitzpatrick indicates that a number of New Orleans French merchants continued to
covertly funnel illegal trade and money to ousted English merchants during 1769 in direct
disobedience to O’Reilly’s orders. Lastly, it should be noted that many of the elite
families, both planters and merchants, wanted a stable government in Louisiana and were
not adverse to Spain’s presence. The French elite never truly lost its power, it merely
continued the fight through different channels. O’Reilly believed, however, that he had
removed any overt challenge to Spanish authority and that the remaining populace would
gradually acquiesce.3
With the first of his goals met, during October O'Reilly began an assessment of the
rest of the colony and turned his attention to the military and government. His remaining
orders required not only that he establish Spanish control, but that he create a suitable
defense against the British, and finally that he make prosperity in Louisiana possible so

3IngersolL, Old New Orleans, 1,433 ; See the introduction to Margaret Fisher
Dalrymple’s, Merchant of Manchac: The Letterbooks o f John Fitzpatrick. 1768-1790.
(Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978) and peruse the list of names for
the officials in Din and Harkins’, New Orleans Cabildo. Also see Din’s recent volume
Spaniards. Planters and Slaves (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Press, 1999) who
indicates that the French planters continually resisted the imposition o f Spanish law.
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that eventually it would pay for itself.4 In a letter to Arriaga, dated October 17, 1769, he
listed what he considered the necessary steps to bend Louisiana to Spanish rule. He
requested that Louisiana be subject to the same laws as other Spanish colonies and that all
official proceedings be done in Spanish. Additionally, he felt justice would be best served
by a new tribunal of judges who spoke both French and Spanish and that the CaptainGeneral’s court in Havana should serve as the Court of Appeals, followed by the Council
of the Indies in Spain. The Crown agreed. The new law was an abridged version of the

Recopiliacion de Leyes de las Indias, which, combined with parts of the French Code
Noir, became known as the “Code O'Reilly” and included an unprecedented system of
strict enforcement of the law, equally new in the laissez-faire community.5
The next step was to remove French opposition in government, more precisely the
Superior Council, which was a nest of wealthy, French planters. The council had
originally been a court but over the years had assumed both administrative and legislative
powers and the attorney general dominated local politics and law. Despite its importance,
most of the councilors had no law degrees and many members had become complacent
about their duties.6 UUoa had originally been ordered to abolish the council but his orders

4Jack D. L. Holmes, “O'Reilly's 1769 Commission: A Personal View,” I I I 24
1983: 307-313.
’O'Reilly to Arriaga, October 17, 1769, AGI, SD 87, Folio 5.
6Jerry A. Micelle, “From Law Court to Local Government: Metamorphosis of the
Superior Council of French Louisiana,” III, 9 (1968): 103-07; Carl A. Brasseaux, DenisNicolas Foucault and the New Orleans Rebellion of 1768 (Ruston, La, 1987), 58-61; and
Henry P. Dart, “Courts and Law in Colonial Louisiana” LHO. 4 (1921): 255-70; See also
Ulloa's remarks about the inability of the council members in Gilbert C. Din and John E.
Harkins, New Orleans Cabildo. 42.
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were changed to establish a judicial tribunal with a legal advisor, a French and a Spanish
clerk, and the governor as chiefjudge. Because he did not have enough troops or political
power, he left the Council unaltered, which created further havoc during his governorship.
O'Reilly didn't hesitate; he abolished the Council and replaced it with a Spanish cabildo.7
The cabildos of Spain's borderlands varied greatly in size and power. With the
exception of San Antonio, military officers controlled the courts which thus had limited
independence. In Louisiana, the governor as President, ex officio, controlled the cabildo
and the governors were military officers whose authority was theoretically limited only by
the crown.* Beneath him in descending order were the voting members which included
two alcaldes ordinarios, or judges who were elected annually, six regidores perpetuos, or
permanent councilors, five of which held additional duties (see Table 1) and a sixth as

Regidore perpetuo sencillo. The nonvoting members of the Cabildo included an annually
elected Sindico Procurador General or mayordomo de propios (guardians of city
properties), and the escribcmo, a permanent clerk of court who also acted as the court
recorder and registrar of mortgages 9

7Orders to abolish the Superior Council are in Ulloa to Bucareli, August 28, 1767,
57, SMV I, 32; Din, Cabildo. 43.
*There were, however, checks on any capricious behavior by these strong
governors. Louisiana's governors as others posted bond against possible malfeasance in
office and were compelled to undergo a residencia or official review of is term in office.
Additionally, the Cabildo could send records and grevances directly to the crown if
threatened with unscrupulous behavior on the part of their governor.
9Din, Cabildo. 56-60, Jo Ann Carrigan, “Government in Spanish Louisiana,” LS 11
(1972): 216-217; for information on borderlands cabildos see Weber, Spanish Frontier.
322-25; also see Cruz, Let There Be Towns: Marc Simmons, Spanish Government in New
Mexico (Albuquerque: University o f New Mexico Press, 1968); and Florian F. Guest,
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Ironically, O'Reilly only tempered the control of the French elite. As stated before, many
of them remained as perennial regidores whose offices became inheritable personal
property and the ambiguous nature of their duties allowed them far greater control than
other colonial officials in Spanish America. Prime examples of this power are Nicolas
Forstall, whose time in office covered thirty-one years, and the Ducros family, which
maintained control of the office of regidor-depositario general throughout the entire
Spanish period. The only factor which limited Louisiana's creoles from building huge
empires through government office was the short duration of Spain's rule in the colony.10
The duties of the New Orleans Cabildo were deliberately ambiguous. Within the
heirachy of the Spanish Empire, the cabildo was merely a government of local authority, in
this case for New Orleans and its environs. In order of importance and power it stood at
the bottom of the Spanish governmental system, which was multi-layered and overlapping
(see Table 2). In addition to being limited by the governor, the Cabildo also shared its
power with the office of the Treasurer or Intendant and church officials. The office of
Intendant, however, was not active in Louisiana until Martin Navarro received title in
1780.11 The Cabildo under O'Reilly and Unzaga, therefore, in reality did not share power

“Muncipal Insititutuions in Spanish California, 1769-1821" (Ph.D. diss., University of
California, Los Angeles, 1961).
l0Din, Cabildo. 84; for a comparison to other creole dynasties see Peter Marzahl,
“Creoles and Government: The Cabildo o f Popayan,” HAHR 54 (1974): 654-655.
uIn theory the office was extant in 1766 but it was not officially given duties until
Navarro whose intendancy can be found in Coutt's “Martin Navarro.” From 1766 to 1780
the duties of the intendent were shared by Juan Jose de Loyola, Esteban Gayarre, and
Martin Navarro, as well as Governors Luis de Unzaga and Bernardo de Galvez.
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_______________________________ Table 1_______________________________
Offices of the Louisiana Cabildo
Person
Governor or his agent
Voting Members of the Cabildo

Duties
President, ex officio

Alcaldes ordinarios
Alcalde de Primer Voto
Annually elected judges who were senior voting
Alcalde de Segundo Voto members of the council
Regidores perpetuos, with collatoral offices by order of rank
AlferezReal
Royal Standard Bearer
Alcalde Mayor Provincial Chief Provincial Magistrate
Alguacil Mayor
City Magistrate and Warden of the Royal Jail
Depositario General
Custodian of Properties and Funds
Receptor de Penas
de Camara
Receiver of Court Fines
Regidores perpetuos sencillos, without collateral offices. Only one present until 1797,
when six new regidores were added, ranked according to seniority.
Nonvoting Members o f the Cabildo
Sindico Procurador General12and Annually elected, both had executive functions

mayordomo de proprios
Escribano of the Cabildo
Lesser Employees

Lesser Elective Offices include
Alcaldes de Barrio and syndics
of the New Orleans District
(sindicos de distritos) and

Permanent clerk of the council; also court
recorder
And registar of mortgages
Porters, public crier, public printer, serenos,
Appraisers, interpreters, inspector of weights and
Measures, jail employees, keeper of fire pumps,
etc.
Justices of the Peace in the city {de Barrio) and
outlying districts {de distritos). The serenos
acted as night watchmen.

serenos
Sources: Gilbert C. Din, The New Origans rahildn 57.

12Sindico Procurador General was responsible for protecting public rights and
investigating municipal problems. It was perhaps the most demanding and challenging
position of all.
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Table 2
Latin America's Administrative System
King
1
1

Council of the Indies
|
1

Audiencia

Viceroy14
i

—

Captain-General15

(Courts of Law whose President was
often the Viceroy) and the
Judges (Oidoresj
i

Corregidores16 (Municipal councils)

alcalde mayors

-

gobemadores

Judges for minor crimes and (governors)
Mayors of local towns)

I

1

Corregidores de Indias

1
Cabildo

1

Municipal Councils

14The closest Viceroyalty to Louisiana was that of New Spain, but O'Reilly placed
the colony under direct control of the Captaincy-General in Havana.
15The title of Captain-General could be confusing. True Captain-Generals held
political and military power over certain strategic locations such as Havana and
Guatemala. The title captain-general was also offered to men like O'Reilly who took care
of military disturbances in the colonies before turning them back to the officials. In some
cases the captain-general could be subservient to the viceroy and in others the degree of
disturbance warranted the crown giving him supreme command. In some cases the
captain general, as a trouble shooter, stood above all other officials, but in others had no
power over treasury officials or the Intendant.
16Corregidores where often found in large, rural provinces and their powers
differed from colony to colony. They were sometimes accompanied by Corregidores de
Iruhos whose duties lay solely with the Indian population.
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with an intendant, but they worked with the Treasury and annually had to submit their
expenditures and accounts to a treasury official who then forwarded it to the
Treasury office in Havana. The judicial responsibilities of the Cabildo were also checked
by similar and sometimes shared fiscal responsibilities with the Treasury especially that
concerning the circulation of money in the colony.17Louisiana's chain of command went
from the King, through the Council of the Indies, to the Governor and Captain-General of
Havana, and then to Louisiana's Governor and finally the Cabildo.
The other reciprocity the Cabildo shared was with the church. The Cabildo held
the surprising power of appointing the steward of the St. Louis church in New Orleans.
Additionally it might question the fees charged by church officials. The members of the
Cabildo were required by the Code O'Reilly to attend church on special feast days as an
example to the rest of the community. In return the church presided over and blessed
official ceremonies.18
Funding the Cabildo was another matter. The Spanish government sent far more
money with O'Reilly than Ulloa but expenditures were also larger. O'Reilly wrote to
Arriaga in November that he had a balance of 1,930,186 reales in the royal treasury, but
that the bills stood at over 750,000 reales. The Cabildo must be supported from New
Orleans, not Spain. O'Reilly then levied duties on shops, taverns, gaming houses and
other money making establishments to help meet expenses. Inns were taxed twenty pesos

17Din, Cabildo. 96.
l8For further information on the church see Roger Baudier, The Catholic Church in
Louisina (New Orleans, 1939).
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per year, taverns forty pesos, and billiard halls forty pesos which added 840 pesos annually
to the city’s finances. He also taxed imported brandy and butchers. He also ordered the
collection of rent on government properties. These funds were put to use paying city
officials and offsetting the expenses of public festivals. The citizens of New Orleans
acquiesced.1®
Unlike many cabildos, the Cabildo in New Orleans theoretically held legislative
power over the entire province of Louisiana, but given the colony's size this was
impossible. Din and Harkins maintain in their work on the New Orleans Cabildo, that the
only real powers which the Cabildo extended beyond New Orleans were the regulations
concerning levee maintenance outside of New Orleans proper and those on slavery, but
the latter were limited to the lower colony.19
To administer the huge expanse of provincial Louisiana outside New Orleans,
O'Reilly, Unzaga and military personnel next visited the various posts, taking loyalty oaths
and gathering information. O’Reilly sent Captain Don Eduardo Nugent and Don Juan
Kelly to Opelousas and Natchitoches. He and Unzaga went personally to Pointe Coupee .
During these proceedings O'Reilly always introduced Unzaga as their governor, carefully
keeping in the background. The captain-general then solicited separate reports on Upper
Louisiana from Captain Riu and Don Pedro Pieraas.20

^O'Reilly to Arraiga, November 10, 1769, AGI, SD 80 and again December 10,
1769, AGI, SD 80.
19Din. Cabildo. 81.
^O'Reilly to Arriaga, December 10, 1769, AGI, SD 80, Folio 18.
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Using information collected from these visits, O'Reilly decided to split provincial
Louisiana between two Lieutenant Governors. Pedro Piemas at Illinois would serve as
Lieutenant-Govemor in Upper Louisiana and the southwestern territory would fall under
Don Athanazio de Mezieres at Natchitoches. O’Reilly established nine smaller districts
under the supervision of French militia lieutenants and commandants. (See Table III for
his appointments).
Table 3
List of Post Officials Appointed by O'Reilly
Lieutenant Governors
Ylinueses (Illinois') District- Captain of Infantry,-Don Pedro Piemas
Replacing Captain Riu
Natchitoches-Caotain of Militia-Don Athanazio de Mezieres
Post Commanders
Acadian Coast or La Fourche de Chetimachas Captain of Militia, Don Luis Judice
Atakapas (Opelousasl-Don Gabriel Fuselier de la Claire
First German Coast or St. Charles - Captain of the Infantry, Don Francisco Simard de
Bellisle who replaced Chevalier D'Arensbourg (1734-1769)
Second German Coast or St. John's - Captain of Militia, Don Roberto Robin de Laugni
(sometimes spelled Logny)
Santiago de los Alemanes (St. James Parish, Cabanocey) - Captain of Militia, Don
Nicolas Verret (continuing)
Natchitoches - Don Luis Borme who replaced Balthazar de Villiers (1766-1769)
Point Coupee - Captain of Militia, Don Francisco Allain and Balthazar de Villiers,
transferred from Natchitoches.
Rapide - Don Estevan Mardefret Layssard
St. Genevidve-Captain of Militia, Don Francisco Valid
San Carlos III de Arkansas - Don Alejandro De Clouet (continuing)
Sources: Report by O’Reilly, February 4, 1770, AGI, Cuba, 1055; and Derek Noel
Kerr, “Petty Felony, Slave Defiance and a Frontier Villany: Crime and Criminal Justice
in Spanish Louisiana, 1770-1803.” (Ph.D. diss., Tulane University, 1983), 409-412.
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A small junta (or committee) under the auspices of Unzaga then examined the
conditions of the forts and their strategic strengths. They decided that Ulloa's Fort Real
Catolica at the mouth of the river was not of strategic importance and cost too much to
maintain. At their suggestion O'Reilly evacuated the fort and re-established the troops at
French Balise, Pointe Coupee, New Orleans, and Natchitoches. He also terminated Fort
St. Luis de Natchez, opposite British Natchez, and agreed to allow the Acadians there to
move to the Iberville district opposite Fort Bute. The remaining forts stood at St.
Genevieve and St. Louis.
By maintaining Frenchmen in important official posts, O'Reilly created a smooth
transition of power in the province, despite his insistence on loyalty oaths and the use of
Spanish language in official business. On the conditions of the forts in general, O'Reilly
wrote to Arriaga that it was “impossible to construct anything but a moat and a palisade”
around most forts and that the moats were constantly filled “with mud brought down by
the winter floods” and the wood of the palisades rotted quickly.22
Defense of Louisiana, O'Reilly surmised, could not rest entirely on the forts and a
small number of Spanish troops. Louisiana already had a fixed infantry battalion created
under Captain-General Bucareli in Havana. Pulled from various units in Europe, four
hundred and fifteen men stood ready to defend the colony. Many of the troops were
stationed in New Orleans, but detachments sent to surrounding forts had thinned their
number. In October one-hundred and seventy-nine men o f the Lisbon Regiment chose to

22W. James Miller, “The Militia System of Spanish Louisiana, 1769-1783,” in The
Military Presence on the Gulf Coast ed.,William S. Coker (Pensacola: Gulf Coast
Humanities Conference, 1978), 37-41.
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remain in Louisiana, but to build troop strength and cut costs, O'Reilly focused his
attention on organizing militia units for Louisiana as he had done in Havana.23
In February of 1770, O'Reilly conscripted 1,040 men, dividing them into thirteen
militia companies who were drilled by regular army officers and supplied from the royal
warehouses. He stationed four units at New Orleans and one unit at the other posts.
While the crown absorbed the initial costs for training the militia the soldiers themselves
were to be responsible for their equipment and future supplies. O'Reilly made the post
commandants responsible for the maintenance of their palisades, an ongoing problem.24
The troops under O'Reilly had handled themselves well in Louisiana and the
colonists had warmed to their respectful behavior. O'Reilly hoped that this mood would
allow an esprit de corps to develop within the militia. Pursuant to that hope, he had the
militia drill on Sundays. Drills included marching and shooting practice. Because Spain
was then engaged in a conflict over the Falklands with Britain, General Gage (in charge of
the English forces in America) grew suspicious of these maneuvers. O'Reilly, however,
had given the commanders along the Mississippi different orders than Ulloa. Where Ulloa
had instructed them to prepare for a British offensive and to attack if threatened, O'Reilly's
instructions were to maintain peace with the British and retreat to New Orleans if

^Bucareli, Havana, May 2, 1769, AHN, Estado 3883; O'Reilly to Arraiga,
December 19,1769 in Kinnaird, SMV 1:144-48.
“ O'Reilly to Arriaga, December 19,1769 ibid, Folio 25; Jack D. L. Holmes,
Honor and Fidelity. (Birmingham, AL: Louisiana Collection Series, 1965), 18-19; O'Reilly
to Bucareli, November 10,1769, AGI, Cuba 1055, Folio 38.
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necessary. O'Reilly wrote to Gage, informing him of Spain’s peaceful intent and Gage
informed his superiors, which relieved the tension along the Mississippi for the moment.25
With an embryonic militia and a skeletal line of forts in place, O'Reilly turned to
creating a series of Indian alliances. He continued the French practice of gift giving and
distributing medals to the small tribes (“petite nations”) in the Lower Mississippi Valley.
He gave Lieutenant-Governor Athanase de Mezieres the task of dealing with the western
Indians, many of whom were decidedly unfriendly to the Spanish. He directed the French
commandant to pacify hostile bands of Indians, license all traders and forbid any trade with
unfriendly tribes. He gave similar instructions to Pedro Piemas at St. Louis, making sure
that Piemas did not antagonize the British by enticing friendly Indians to migrate into
Spanish territory.26
British sensibilities were not important, however, where contraband was
concerned. English traders had often crossed into French territory to trade with the
Indians and Spain was aware of the British propensity for using Indians against its
enemies. He was determined to restrict contraband at its hot spots in New Orleans, along
the Mississippi, especially at the new settlement at St. Louis, and on the border with
Spanish Texas where the fort at Los Adaes had a long history of contraband with
Natchitoches. To reinforce his directives, the captain-general ordered Lieutenant-General
Piemas at St. Louis to build a prison withjailkeepers, and allow residence only to

“ Miller, “Spanish Louisiana,” 39-40.
“ Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 37-38; Correspondence between O'Reilly and de
Mezieres in Bolton. Athanase de Mezieres. 1: 130-137.
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colonists with special permission from the Governor. No trade with the English was to be
allowed.. As an added check he was to give annual reports to the governor on the
amounts of flour and skins in the district.27
At Natchitoches, O'Reilly attacked the problem differently. Relations with the post
at Adaes and with the viceroy of Mexico were not to be strained. In fact he asked that de
Mezieres give them aid if necessary. In order to keep the colonists from “straying”
O'Reilly authorized the commandant to license two “cabarets” at Natchitoches to sell wine
and taffia,28 and to use the money from those sales to police the area. There was,
however, to be no trade with Spanish Texas, as it was a separate colony, and no whiskey
or guns were to be sold to the Indians.29
New Orleans received even stricter measurers. O'Reilly reinstated the Ordinance
of 1768 which had caused Ulloa's ouster. While he decreased the export tariff on
Louisiana's goods, he did not allow the colony to export good cash crops like tobacco to
Havana because of their poor quality. He tore at the main fabric of the colony's trade and
heavily enforced the new mercantilistic rules, expunging British smugglers in New
Orleans, as well as Manchac (across from British Manchac) and enforcing the law with
troops. The merchants and traders involved in contraband found themselves abruptly
expelled from the colony and their ships and goods confiscated to prevent their return.

^Instructions to Piemas, November 24, 1769, AGI, Cuba 187.
28A coarse alcoholic drink like aguardiente.
^instructions to Athanase de Mezieres in Bjork, “Establishment o f Spanish Rule,”
174, Approval of plan in Royal cedula dated August 17, 1772, AGI, SD 86.
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With the British gone, O'Reilly hoped to end a booming illicit trade which absorbed
approximately ninety percent of the money circulating in the colony. To buttress his
efforts he refused anchorage to British ships in Louisiana ports.29 This last effort struck
heavily at the colony's economy.
Changes in New Orleans and problems for its planter elite had not hindered the
outlying provinces until O'Reilly came to Louisiana. The reason for this was that outside
the environs of the capital the colonial hinterlands were entirely another world. There the
colonists, their slaves and Indian neighbors had created a subtle network of trade and
alliances unhampered, until now, by colonial officials. Commercial agriculture in a large
portion of the colony was limited by a lack of population, slaves for labor, and inadequate
financing by the French crown. Instead, those settlers spawned a “frontier exchange
economy,” of small farms augmented by hunting, fishing and trapping. These pioneers
constantly enhanced their meager lifestyle by smuggling and illegal inter-colonial trade.30
The Indians often taught new settlers to hunt and fish and came to their aid during
times of famine since Louisiana's climate and soil were not always hospitable. Colonists
also intermarried with the Indians, moved into deserted Indian villages or used abandoned
fields and frequently developed the same woodland economy. Native Americans also

^Clark, New Orleans. 175.
“ For furthur information please see Daniel H. Usner, Jr., Indians. Settlers. &
Slaves in A Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valiev before 1783.
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992); The French slave trade failed in
Louisiana. Slave shortages inhibited commercial agriculture, made worse by the shortage
of currency. Slave traders often kept their slaves against a better time but this worked
against both them and the colonists by continuing the cycle o f shortages. Clark, New
Orleans. 133.
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furnished transportation for goods and messages between colonial settlements, even across
colonial borders. They also collaborated with the Europeans in the Indian slave trade. In
order to maintain alliances the colonists often furnished their Indian friends with guns and
ammunition, as well as European trade goods.32
Despite the introduction of plantation agriculture and black slavery in the 1720s,
the hinterlands were changed little by the arrival of the Spanish. Black slaves were such a
precious commodity that they often became part of the local community and its families.
Many were given guns to help augment the meager agriculture of their owners and
allowed to trade with the Indians as well. Indian tribes along the frontier had developed a
new set of trade linkages, exchanging “salt meat, hides and furs, bear's grease and buffalo
suet, for European (especially British) trade goods, guns, powder and shot.” These
products had also attracted tribes from the west-the Witchita and the Comanche who now
immigrated to the Red River area. These particular tribes often smuggled horses, mules,
and cattle from Spanish Texas for the promise of European products. By the time O'Reilly
took control regular routes for contraband such as the Sante Fe Trail existed between
Louisiana and the Spanish southwest. The settlements at Natchitoches, Arkansas and
Opelousas frequently received such contraband. Natchitoches also had a relationship with
the post of Los Adaes which served to funnel illicit goods to Louisiana.33

32Usner, Indians. Settlers. & Slaves. 56-76; Stephen Weber, “The Problem of
Indian Slavery in Spanish Louisiana, 1769-1803.” LH 11 (1984): 117-135.
33Usner, Indians. Settlers. & Slaves. 41-43,154-156;Stanley Faye, “The Arkansas
Post of Louisiana: Spanish Domination,” LHO 27 (July, 1944): 635; Antoine Le Page Du
Pratz. Histoire de la Louisiane. cotenant la decouverte de ce vasste navs: sa description
geographique: un voape dans tes terres: rhistoire naturelle. les moeurs. costumes &
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The posts along the Mississippi also experienced the same trade between Indians
and colonists. On the eastern bank British traders, the Chickasaw and Choctaw trafficked
contraband items to Louisiana where they made their way westward into Spanish Texas
and New Mexico. British settlements at Manchac and Natchez also supplied Louisianians
with accessible markets and ready credit. Trade between Spanish and British Manchac
was so common that the term “going to Little Manchac” was synonymous with
smuggling.34
Before 1769, settlers, Indians, and slaves collectively prospered, often oblivious to
the troubles of their fellow colonists in New Orleans. Indeed the self-supportive system
had continued in relative peace and harmony until the advent of captain-general, Alejandro
O'Reilly. His onslaught against the British now sent ripples through Louisiana's frontier
economy, upsetting the sensitive balance in the hinterland between the Indians and the
European colonists.
O'Reilly was concerned with the colonists in the “imperial sense.” He saw them as
part and parcel of the defensive structure of Louisiana. As a Bourbon official he sought to
encourage domestic agriculture by encouraging farmers in the colony. He believed the

religion des naturels avec leurs originies: deux voyages dans la nord due nuveau Mexique
don’t un iusqu’a la Mer de Sur: omee de deux cartes & de 40 planches en taille donee
Edited by Joseph G. Tregle, Jr., (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1975
facsimile reproduction of 1774 edition), 317; Elizabeth A. H. John, Storms Brewed in
Other Men's Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians. Spanish, and French in the Southwest.
1540-1795. (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1975), 304-374; Henri
Folmer, “Contraband Trade between Louisiana and New Mexico in the 18* Century,”
New Mexico Historical Review 16 (1941): 270-74.
^Clark, New Orleans. 169; Usner, Indians. Settlers & Slaves. 122; Caughey,
Bernardo de Galvez. 11.
57

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

influx of farming families would improve the economy and provide a denser population,
able to act as a defense against the encroaching British. To promote the goals of
agriculture and population, he brought order to the chaos of settlement, fixing the extent
of land grants and regulating land enclosures so that cattle could be penned in during the
summer. Aware of the problems inherent in Louisiana's environment he compelled
Louisiana's inhabitants to keep their bridges, roads and levees in good repair and ordered
that colonists who settled along the river must build levees within the first three years.
Wishing to create permanent, good sized settlements, O’Reilly ordered that landowners
could not sell or give away their land until they had owned it for three years, and only then
with permission from the governor general.35
To take care of his colonists’ religious needs, O'Reilly created thirteen parochial
districts and assigned eighteen priests who spoke both French and Spanish to them. (See
Table 4) He also encouraged the colonists to build churches because he felt that they had
received little “spiritual nourishment” under the French system.36
By the end of November, O'Reilly deemed his work finished. He had already
evacuated the troops, and now it was time to yield control of Louisiana to its new
governor, Luis de Unzaga. On December 1, 1769, O'Reilly installed Unzaga as governor
with an annual salary o f 6,000 pesos. By letter on February 23, 1770, O'Reilly delivered
the crown's instructions, his own reports and correspondence to Louisiana's new

35Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 180-183; Reglamento de 1770, AGI, PC
652.
“ Bjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 177-180.
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____________ Table 4____________
O’Reilly’s Assignment of the Clergy
City of New Orleans and Environs

6 Priests

German Coast, St. Charles and St. John's Parish

2 Priests

Cabahannose and Fourche de Chetimachas

2 Priests

Iberville Parish

1 Priest

Punta Cortada (Pointe Coupee)

I Priest

Opelousas

1 Priest

Rapids Parish and the Apalache Indians37

1 Priest

Natchitoches

1 Priest

Illinois District, St. Louis and St. Genevieve............................

2 Priests

Total Number of Regular Clergy Needed for Louisiana

18 Priests

Source: Coutts, “Martin Navarro,” 59; Enclosure No. 1, Reglamento de 1770, AGI,
Cuba 652.______________________________________________________________
governor. In March, O'Reilly sailed for Havana and after the required paperwork
officially relinquished command of the colony.3*

37The Apalache tribe, refugees from the collapse o f the Spanish missions in
Northern Florida, had been converted in the late 1600s.
3*Unzaga's appointment by the crown dates from April 21,1769, though O'Reilly
remained in control until December first. Confusion over the inception of Unzaga's
government has arisen because the instructions and papers were not sent to Unzaga until
February of 1770, and O'Reilly didn't officially relinquish control on paper until October.
Also confusing to scholars is the difference between the act and its acceptance. Unzaga
accepted his appointment in a letter to Don Juan Gregorio Muniain on December 1,1769
but the crown's acceptance did not come until January 28, 1771. Unzaga's acceptance,
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O’Reilly had previously been part of a team that had successfully reorganized the
defenses and economy of Havana. In 1770, O'Reilly believed he had also succeeded in
executing similar orders, as well as saving the crown money in Louisiana.. He had created
a defensive barrier of forts and colonial settlements against the British and set the colonists
on the path for commercial success within empire. The colony’s success, however, lay in
a different direction and took place under another governor’s hand. O'Reilly created a
Spanish infrastructure in Louisiana. He hispanicized the government and military but not
the people. Colonial reorganization, then, had not created colonial reorientation. That
remained for Louisiana's new governor, Don Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga.

December 1, 1769, AGI, SD 86; O'Reilly’s delivery of the instructions and
correspondence in ‘Tnventorio que explica los papeles relatives al Gobiemo general de
esta Provincia que entrego hoy dia de la feehas a mi successor el coronel Don Luis de
Unzaga”, February 23, 1770, AGI Cuba 2357. Pezuela, Jacobo de la, Dicionario
Geografio. 38; Holmes, Honor and Fidelity. 20; Dawson, Louisiana Governors. 53.
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Chapter Four
Economic Problems and Solutions
‘I t is not as it has been described, and only needs labor to increase production,
especially indigo.”
Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, July 8, 17701
Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga faced three mandates from his predecessor, defend the
border, create orderly and loyal citizens and make the colony economically successful.
Although the Spanish crown focused its attention on defenses against the growing British
presence in the Caribbean, in 1770, it was apparent to Unzaga that he would not be able to
comply with the requests for loyalty and defense if he did not correct the economic woes
of the colony. Louisiana’s historians have commonly pointed to Unzaga’s use of illegal
commerce with the British as the cause of economic recovery. Illegal trade alone,
however, did not enable Unzaga to correct the colony’s commerce, nor increase the
colony’s treasury, which he had accomplished by the end of his administration.
The following discussion views Louisiana’s economic problems as an extension of
the crown’s reforms in Havana and places them within the spectrum of the Bourbon
empire. It shows that Unzaga worked steadily within the structure of Spanish government
to organize and expand the colonial economy while addressing Louisiana’s pressing
domestic problems. During the early 1770s, Unzaga and his superiors in Havana balanced
the needs of empire and of their colonists by adopting a policy of observation and quiet
resistance to the British advance while focusing on internal economic concerns.

lUnzaga to Bucareli, July 8,1770, Dispatches of the Spanish Governors of
Louisiana. 11 Vols., W.P.A. Survey of Federal Archives in Louisiana, Vol. 2.
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In Spain, Minister of the Indies Julian Arriaga had warned the Crown, as early as
1764, that the “haughtiness” of the British commanders and governors in the Caribbean
left him no assurance that they would honor their peace with the Spaniards, nor abide by
Spanish law in the New World.2 Recent British movements into the Caribbean and
growing reports of British ships in Havana threatened Spain’s wealthy colonies in Cuba,
Cartagena and possibly Mexico.
Bucareli reported to Arriaga that increasing amounts of British ships were
“stopping” in Havana and other Caribbean ports for questionable reasons. Despite Spanish
mercantilists laws against trade with foreign ships, in January a British merchant ship was
reported to have boldly entered the port o f Veracruz, although port officials said they
asked it to leave~a few days later and probably after quietly disposing of illegal goods.3
This sort of behavior increased in 1770. While the Captain-General constantly
decried the open attempts at smuggling in his reports to Spain, he was forced at the same
time to aid British ships according to diplomatic necessities. For instance, when a British
ship sank in the Colorados, Bucareli sent help, losing a Cuban ship in the process, but
saving the British crew and successfully sailing them to Jamaica. He mentioned to the
British that it might be appropriate to reimburse the captain of the lost Cuban ship but was

2Arraiga to the Conde de Ricla, September 22,1764, AGI, SD 1194.
3Bucareli to Arriaga, February 6, 1770, AGI, SD 1214, Folio 1353.
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ignored4 Other ships in less distress, or those merely seeking to enter Havana’s bay, were
rebuffed during the last two years of Bucareli’s tenure.
Toward the end of 1770, the pace quickened. Carlos HI landed troops from
Buenas Aires in the Malvinas (Falklands) and evicted the British from Port Egmont.
Diplomatic negotiations ensued to prevent the outbreak of hostilities.5 Bucareli took to
detaining and confiscating illegal ships, British or French, and ordering Spanish officials in
New Spain, Louisiana, and elsewhere to follow suit. The only exception was a British
merchant ship whose crew had mutinied and whose captain was injured. It took only one
evening in port, however, for the Cubans to tend to his wounds, give the crew victuals and
send them on their way the next morning. Bucareli would not chance leaving a merchant
ship laden with British goods in port. By 1771 with war between Spain and England a
distinct possibility, the confiscation of illegal ships increased and in February four British
ships were taken because o f illicit commerce and their crews returned to the British in
Pensacola.6

4Bucareli to Arriaga, March 9,1770, AGI, SD 1214, Folio 1353; Bucareli to
Arriaga, June 4, 1770, AGI, SD 1214, Folio 1438.
5Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 44.
6British ships often stopped and tried to enter Havana, and Bucareli dutifully
reported every attempt, for example in both July and October of 1770 he rebuffed a
British merchant and a frigate respectively, though he did send a ship out to meet the
frigate and retrieve a message. Bucarelli to Arriaga, July 10, 1770, and October 15, 1770,
AGI, SD 1214, Folios. 1467 and 1563; reports of British ships captured in illicit
commerce from ibid, Bucarelli to Arriaga, August 1, 1770, Folio 1482 (Puerto Principe),
August 3, 1770, Folio. 1486, November 10, 1770, Folio 1575, January 6,1771, Folio
1663, February 4, 1771, Folio 1691, and May 10, 1771, Folio 1805. The mutinied ship
was reported in Bucareli to Arriaga, December 8,1770 and December 9,1770, ibid,
Folios 1628 and 1629.
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What really concerned the Captain-General o f Havana, however, were financial
difficulties and the rebuilding of Havana. In February of 1770, Bucareli replaced Unzaga
with Don Juan Dabar, Lieutenant Colonel of the Fixed Regiment. He then focused on the
return of O’Reilly and his Louisiana troops who must be housed and fed. There were also
the expected requests for money and aid from Unzaga. Troops began arriving from the
new colony as early as January. O’Reilly himself, arrived in March and set up
housekeeping in Havana in order to gather his papers and report to the king.7
By August, Bucareli received notice that Spanish reinforcements for Louisiana
would also be victualed in Cuba on the way to their new post. Bucareli finally
complained. His finances, never enough in the first place, were now strained to the
breaking point by the affairs in Louisiana. Havana was still rebuilding its defenses and
city from the confrontation of 1762. Additionally, Havana’s commerce had experienced
difficulties under the Bourbon reorganization, especially in the transportation and
packaging of its exports.8
Before the Seven Years War tobacco and hides had been Cuba’s principle revenue
producing goods. The first Bourbon kings had granted Havana commercial monopolies
which helped the economy recover, but the creation of a royal monopoly on tobacco with
its fixed prices and quotas discouraged investment in that crop. By 1770 sugar had
become Cuba’s main export but that also had problems. Cuba, like other Spanish ports

bucareli to Arriaga, February 18,1770 (replacement of Unzaga), and June 6,
1770 of Captain-General O’Reilly and troops, in AGI, SD 1214, Folios 1347 and 1445.
*Bucareli to Arriaga, August 30, 1770, Reservada, AGI, SD 1214, Folio 1529.
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suffered from a lack of legal markets and the oppression of the Consulado (merchant
monopoly) in Cadiz. Transportation and packaging were made more difficult because the
population of Cuba was increasing and with it the consumption of wood used for housing.
This usage of Cuba’s limited forests was in direct competition with both the sugar growers
who needed wood for shipping boxes and the Royal Navy which reserved large trees for
ship masts and spars. The Crown had promised during Ricla’s administration in the late
1760s to aid the Cubans and make concessions for Cuba’s exports if they would consent
to higher taxation. The Cubans had accepted higher taxes with the expectation o f the
crown’s reciprocity.9
During both Ricla’s and Bucareli’s administrations, however, crown concessions
had never met Cuban expectations. Royal funds sent to Ricla and O’Reilly to rebuild the
military and the militia were reduced during Bucareli’s government and despite the fact
that situado funds often reached over 900,000 pesos annually they were never adequate
to cover on-going expenses. The Crown also “designated” much of its funding, and

situado monies had to be split between the Navy or the port and its expenses, specified
amounts used to buy tobacco (a crown monopoly), and “attention de tierra” or the
ongoing rebuilding of Havana.10 Lastly, situado funds were sent first to Veracruz for
reallocation to Havana and its subsidiaries. The Viceroy of New Spain notoriously
siphoned monies from the Caribbean’s situado funds and a frustrated Bucareli told
O’Reilly, that “The debts increase and the creditors clamor. . . The Viceroy (Carlos

'’Keuthe, Cuba 1753-1815. 53-54.
10AGI, Cuba 149-A, Folios 20,22, and 29.
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Francisco de Croix) does not dare address me on the matter, and is content with informing
the Intendant that on this occasion he can send nothing . . . The funds which arrive do not
cover loans and troops and salaries . . . My letters to the Viceroy are pathetic.”11
To make matters worse, the Kings’ latest mercantilistic rules made Louisiana more
dependent on Havana as an outlet for her commercial goods and Unzaga frequently wrote
to Bucareli asking for extra money or aid with the colony’s failing economy. The added
strain of Louisiana, its revolt, and now its commercial exigencies led Bucareli to ask
Arriaga to inform the king that he (Bucareli) could no longer command the island
“efficiently” on the funds allotted, saying:
I’ve been the head of government for five years and the same
number [of years] I have suffered the continuous lack of funds and lack
the spirit to endure the pressure of not doing my duty as we agreed. All
this has injured my health to the point of wishing that the pity of the king
would take me from this command and return me to Spain to finish my
duties as a soldier of his Majesty.12
Poor Bucareli did not go home as he entreated, instead the King rewarded his “untiring
efforts” to the crown by appointing him Viceroy of New Spain in 1771.
While Havana wrestled with its financial problems, Luis de Unzaga, the new
governor of Louisiana, took stock of his surroundings. As military and political
commander of the new colony, for the first time in his career Unzaga was no longer
second in command. He settled into government housing with his servants (slaves brought

“Bucareli to O’Reilly, August 30, 1770, in Bernard Bobb, The Viceregencv of
Antonio Maria Bucareli in New Spain 1771-1779. The Texas Pan-American Series,
(Austin: University of Austin Press, 1962), 20.
l2Bucareli to Arriaga, August 30,1770, Reservada, AGI, SD 1214, Folio 1529.
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from Havana), and pondered O’Reilly’s orders to keep the unruly colonists subservient to
his majesty and Spain, to make the colony profitable to Spain and to defend the
“Barrera” as historian Gilbert Din calls the Louisiana borderlands.13
Loyalty alone would be a difficult task as Unzaga later confided to Arriaga:
.. although this is a Spanish province... I cannot flatter His Majesty so much to say
that the people have ceased to be French at heart, and that in them is not to be found the
spirit of independence which causes resistence to oppressive laws.”14 The oppression
seemed to come from the same O’Reilly’s insistence on adhering to Spanish mercantilists
laws. The governor decided to assess the problem among his citizens by socializing with
prominent members of the community.
Compared to Havana, New Orleans must have seemed to Unzaga like the
backwater of empire it has often been called. Settled in a place that flooded regularly, the
city was often filled with mud despite the levee built in 1729. Less than five-hundred
houses sprawled only four streets back from the river. Most were one story affairs, made
of colombage (brick between wooden posts and sometimes stuffed with mud and moss),
built on posts approximately eight feet above the ground as flood insurance and enhance
with kitchen gardens and fruit trees. The homes themselves were in a sorry state of

13Din, “Protecting the ‘Barrera’”, 184.
14Unzagato Arraiga, September 12, 1773, in Fortier, History of Louisiana. 15.
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disrepair caused by the shortage of money and drop in real estate value after the Seven
Years War.15
Down river from Unzaga’s quarters a casa capitular was under construction to
house Louisiana’s new Cabildo. In the center of town stood the ruined remains of St.
Louis church which had rotted in the sweltering city to the point where church services
were being held in one of the local warehouses. The ubiquitous dampness ruined even
brick buildings like the Capuchin monastery and often made fortifications a mockery,
rotting wooden palisades and rusting the iron and brass weaponry. Only the guardhouses
and the jail had escaped destruction. The wooden palisades and shallow ditch which
served as a moat must have appeared a joke compared to the stone towers of Morro
Castle and paved plazas in Cuba. The actual doors of the fort would have been useless in
a real attack because one of the French matrons had built a smaller door into the gates so
that she could reach her garden outside the palisades more easily. Thus, the fort around
New Orleans did little other than deter the local Indians. Regardless of the city’s problems
Unzaga was a prudent and patient man who desired to make Spain’s “experiment” in
Louisiana function effectively16

15Stanley Clisby Arthur, Old New Orleans, ed. Susan Cole Dore (1936; rpr.
Gretna, LA: 1990), 15-16 and Captain Philip Pittman, The Present State of the Eruopean
Settlements on the Mississippi With an Introduction and Index by Robert R. Rea. (1770;
Facsimile reprint edition, Gainesville, FL: State o f Florida Bicentennial Commission,
1973), 1-2 and Paul Alliot, “Historical and Political Reflections on Louisiana” in Louisiana
Under the Rule of Spain. France, and the United States 1785-1807. ed. James Alexander
Robertson (2 vols; 1910-11; rpr. Freeport, NY, 1969), 1: 65-67.
16Din, Cabildo. 5; Pittman, Present State of Settlement 11-12; The matron in
question was Madam Rochemore, the wife o f an Ordormnateur, who often defined French
military and political authorities to get her way. For more on Madam Rochemore see
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In the busy city streets he noticed a complex population of French, Canadian,
German, Swiss, Creole, African and Indian descent. According to O’Reilly’s census, in
1769 the city contained some eighteen-hundred white homeowners, businessmen and
laborers (Creoles and Europeans), juxtaposed to approximately eleven-hundred slaves
(black and mulatto). Less than one-hundred free persons o f color ran shops and provided
skilled labor for the city’s inhabitants. Slaves and free people of color lined the streets
with small open-air markets and had coopted a small market (previously Indian), located
along Bayou St. John. They also manned the famous Congo Market behind the city where
under the Spanish principle of coariacion many slaves worked to sell excess produce and
acquire money to buy their freedom.
Unlike the many other Latin America’s colonies, however, Indian slaves (sixty-one
in the census) were a minority among the workers. In keeping with the Crown’s policies
O’Reilly had outlawed future Indian slavery but had not removed those already in
servitude. There were also the men (coming and going) who formed the infantry
battalion, small groups of sailors who frequented the city, and of course, foreign
merchants-despite their illegal presence. At the time New Orleans supported at least a
quarter of the colony’s whole population.17

Villiers du Terrage, Les dernieres annees. 102-103.
17Ibid; O’Reilly’s census in Gayarre, History of I^>uisiana. 2: 355; Stephen Webre,
“The Problem of Indian Slavery in Spanish Louisiana, 1769-1803,” LH, 25 (1985): 11735; Kimberly S. Hanger, “Avenues to Freedom Open to New Orleans’ Black Population,
1769-1779,” LH, 31 (1990): 237-64; Robert A Sander, “The Origin and Spread o f the
Public Market System in New Orleans,” LH. 22 (1981): 281-9.
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Life in New Orleans was frequently “ hot and tiring.” There was little for the elite
to do. There were no theaters, operas or local museums to attend. The first theater
company wasn’t created until just after the Seven Years War. Many of the town’s citizens
were not particularly literate. To quote Gilbert Din, ’’colonial New Orleanians suffered
from boredom because o f isolation and ignorance.” Public schools did not exist and the
Ursaline convent only “educated” young women. Although some private libraries existed
there were no booksellers in the city and the first newspaper wasn’t printed until 1794.
Indeed, entertainments were few and far between, consisting of dances and dinner parties
at wealthier homes, visits to neighbors, picnics along the river, gossiping, drinking,
fighting and visits to the city’s brothels. As Unzaga took office, taverns, billiard parlors,
and even lemonade stands sold alcoholic drinks to help citizens “forget” the dirt and heat.
Even trials and public hangings were considered entertainment.1*
Local Indians occasionally created a popular diversion in the town’s “Communes
de la Ville” (or Congo Plains) with games similar to Lacross which the French called

raquettes, and various dances. Sometimes even their public drunkenness supplied a

‘*Din, Cabildo. 15,26; Jack D. L. Holmes, “Spanish Regulation ofTaverns and the
Liquor Trade in the Mississippi Valley,”in The Spanish in the Mississippi Valiev. 17621804. ed. John Francis McDermott (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois, 1974), 151; Wood,
“Life in New Orleans,” 685-86 and Jack D. L. Holmes, ed., “Louisiana in 1795, the
Earliest Extant Issue of the Moniteur de la Louisiane,” LH. 7 (1966): 133-51; Roger
Philip McCutcheon, “Books and Booksellers in New Orleans, 1730-1830,” LHO. 20
1937): 152-58..
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spectacle. Slaves also broke the monotony of long hot evenings with songs and dances in
Congo Square, many of which worked their way into Louisiana’s folksongs.19
Despite its hardships many women fought to build “townhouses” in the city as it
was more tolerable than the boredom of the plantations around New Orleans. After the
last harvest of the year whole families “removed” themselves to the city for the winter
until they had to return for Spring planting. There they entertained each other with dinner
parties and balls. The local gentry were happy to wine and dine their new governor, which
offered them an opportunity to air their grievances. These discussions were often
spearheaded by the prominent Gilbert Antoine de St. Maxent whom Unzaga had met
earlier with captain-general O’Reilly.20
The colonists most immediate concern was the failing economy. The necessity of
economic revitalization, however, made the application of O’Reilly’s instructions all the
more difficult. It became obvious to Unzaga that defense rested upon loyalty and colonial
prosperity was the first step toward converting the colonists into loyal Spanish citizens.
This posed a knotty problem because the crisis in the Malvinas had worsened Louisiana’s
economic crisis by forcing governor Unzaga to apply his limited capital to the colony’s
security. Spain’s belief that the closeness of the British would make Louisiana’s defense

19Jerah Johnson, “New Orlean’s Congo Square: An Urban Setting for Early AfroAmerican Culture Formation,” LH, 21 (1990): 237-64;Tunes and dances like the calinda
from Congo Square became the very popular “Allons danse Colinda” in contemporary
Louisiana, Shane Bernard and Julia Girouard, “‘Colinda’: Mysterious Origins of a Cajun
Folksong,” Journal of Folklore Research. 29 (1992): 179-193.
b e tw ee n 1762 and 1763 a local plantation wife, Madame Pradel built a house in
New Orleans which she frequented more than her real home. King, New Orleans. 168169.
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expenditures a problem had been anticipated by Secretary Miguel de Muzquiz in 1769
who maintained that to preserve Louisiana Spain would have to expend up to 300,000
pesos annually.21 The real figures worked out to approximately 87,500 + pesos per year
until the end of the Spanish occupation, somewhat less than Unzaga’s situado, but never
enough.22
Undermanned and underfunded, Unzaga informed Grimaldi in Spain that he could
not defend the colony in its present condition, especially since in June a thousand British
troops had arrived to reinforce Pensacola. Grimaldi could only send a small contingent of
one-hundred soldiers and equipment to fortify the colony. Realizing Unzaga’s untenable
condition, he counseled the governor to defend himself with the militia, and retreat if the
situation grew worse. He also sent secret orders to Unzaga to maintain a strict
surveillance of all British movements in the area. Unzaga, like Bucareii in Havana,
continued a quiet vigilance while focusing on more pressing economic concerns.23
Unzaga faced another conundrum in trying to revive Louisiana’s commerce. He
must abide by the crown’s restrictive commercial reforms and mercantilists policy which
disallowed foreign commerce in Spanish ports, while at the same time fostering trade
between New Orleans and Havana. Even O’Reilly, had pragmatically tempered his own
orders regarding foreign merchants, allowing Oliver Pollock, an Englishman, to sell flour

21Moore, Revolt in Louisiana. 190.
C harles H. Cunningham, “Financial Reports Relating to Louisiana 1766-1788,”
Mississippi Valiev Historical Review.fhereinafter MVHR16 (December, 1919): 394-397.
^O’Reilly to Grimaldi, June 8, 1770, AGI SD, 2543; O’Reilly to Grimaldi,
September 30, 1770, ibid; Grimaldi to Unzaga, October 24, 1770, ibid.
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in New Orleans because it was desperately needed and the man’s prices were reasonable.
The captain-general had also modified the Crown’s laws by allowing five ships from
Louisiana to trade with their traditional markets in the French West Indies until he could
notify the king. These moderations, O’Reilly had felt, would at least leave the colonial
economy viable until it profited from trade within the Bourbon reforms.24
King Carlos HI, however, intended to enrich Spain under his reforms, not the
colonies. The reforms restricted colonial trade to Spain and a few choice ports, continued
crown monopolies and favored exporters in larger cities with ties to the Spanish merchant
class. Louisiana found no advantage in trade with the new metropole. The colony
exported, in order of importance: indigo, tobacco, lumber and furs. Spain required neither
furs nor lumber and her markets were flooded with the preferred Guatemalan indigo.
Tobacco was the colony’s second most import money maker, but Havana held a
monopoly on the tobacco trade with the crown. In April of 1770, O’Reilly had further
injured Louisiana’s trade when he banned shipments of tobacco to Havana because it was
of “inferior quality and its introduction to [the] island [of Cuba] would have grave
consequences.”25
Despite these problems, Unzaga and his merchants struggled to avoid the
impending economic disaster and abide by the new reforms. Trade with Havana, however,

^Clark, New Orleans. 174.
2SThe merchants in Havana we re afraid the mixing Louisiana’s tobacco with
Havana’s would lessen the desirability and the price of their product on the Spanish
market. O’Reilly to Unzaga, April 3, 1770, Dispatches: Clark, New Orleans. 176; Usner,
Indians. Settlers & Slaves. 117.
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did not help the situation and often exacerbated it. Merchants who risked such trade
reaped little or no profit. They often netted losses of up to ten percent in Cuba and
sometimes up to twenty-five percent when they tried to re-sell Cuban goods in New
Orleans. Havana desperately needed lumber for building material and for the sugar
industry but expected to pay low prices for lumber shipped across a dangerous patch of
water and refused to entertain ideas of raising prices because of the cost to New Orleans
merchants. There was also little to do if a boat and its cargo were lost at sea. For
example, one letter from Bucareli to Arriaga tells the sad tale of a French Balandra
carrying boards and tar lost on the coast of Cuba in February of 1771 on its way to
Gaurico. Sales of indigo also fared poorly and at least one shipment was sold at a loss.
There seemed little good about the trade with Havana.26
Loss of capital, goods and ships continued into 1771 and discouraged the
production within the normal export economy, at the same time encouraging merchants to
seek other avenues of trade, including those that were illegal. Economic historian John G.
Clark indicates that the years 1770 to 1771 were the worst years New Orleans merchants
experienced during peace time. Things couldn’t seem to be any worse until New Orleans
received a copy of the Royal Cedula, dated January 26, 1770, which extinguished what
little faith the colonists and Unzaga held in the benefits of Spain’s Bourbon Reforms.27

“ Clark, New Orleans. 174; Bucareli to Arriaga, December 10, 1770 and February
7,1771, AGI, SD 1214 Folio 1640 shows the boat stopping in Cuba and Folio 1711 tells
Arriaga of the shipwreck.
^Paul E. Hoffman, Luisiana. 118; Clark, New Orleans. 176.
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This latest Cedula denied Louisiana O’Reilly’s special allowance for licensed trade
with French islands in the West Indies or with any other Spanish colonies. Unzaga met
with the Cabildo and encouraged them to petitition the king. Although O’Reilly had
abolished the Superior Council which consisted mainly of members from the planter and
merchant class, many of the same people now sat in the Cabildo. The Cedula threatened
their business and their lifestyle.28 In July of 1770 the Cabildo had asked the King to lift
the commercial restrictions on trade with the French West Indies, resolving to live with
the rest of his restrictions. Madrid responded with a refusal in June of 1771. By
November the Cabildo tried again to reason with the monarchy. The merchants’ requests
outlined their difficulties by comparing the benefits of Louisiana’s traditional trade
patterns against the collapse of the economy in 1768 and again in 1770. They clearly
stated that restoration of trade with the French West Indies was the only alternative to the
growth in illegal trade with the British. Despite O’Reilly’s ouster of British merchants
residing in and doing business in New Orleans, the Mississippi was open to traffic by
British ships and their merchants, who began to reappear along the Mississippi in 1770.
Their only competition in Louisiana had been the French West Indies. Once Spain
rendered such trade illegal the British were once again practicing a vigorous trade. The
Crown still responded negatively.29
As the Cabildo struggled with the King’s reforms, their governor realized that the
solution to Louisiana’s economic disaster might lie with the British rather than with Spain.

28Din, Cabildo. 59-61.
^ i d , 167; Caughey, Bernardo de Galvez. 50; Hoffinan, Luisiana. 118-119.
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It was a hard choice because continuation of the old “illegal” trade at places like Manchac
actually helped depress legal commerce. But something had to be done, trade continued
to drop throughout 1771 and treasury reports show that “official” trade in the colony,
including British ships, dropped severely. The number of ships passing through the fort at
Balize dropped from 144 in 1770 to 97 by 1771.30 Interestingly, Unzaga was not alone in
his fight. The years 1770 and 1771 show a general depression in commerce in the
Caribbean. Louisiana’s drop in shipping is matched by declines in the value and number o f
“embarkations” in such ports as Caracas, Maracaibo and Cumana and some ports in Spain
like Barcelona. Ironically, the shipping at the monopoly ports of La Coruna and Cadiz
increased.31
Shipping between Havana and New Orleans, unfortunately, did not increase
substantially during Unzaga’s administration. After the hard years of 1770-1771 it looked
as though commerce might improve. The following year ships from New Orleans
accounted for 22 of the 158 ships entering and 22 again of those leaving, but as shipping
at Havana increased commerce from New Orleans did not follow (See Table 5). It must
be pointed out, however, that it didn’t decrease appreciably either.
Another important point is that within the Caribbean New Orleans “entradas” into
Havana were not that far below other ports. For instance, during 1772 ships from New
Orleans only equaled 22 out of 158, but Campeche only sent 14 ships, Cartagena de Indias

C offm an, Luisiana, 122.
31AGI, Caracas 932 and AGI, Indiferente General 2410; E. M. Recinos, El
Commercio Libre entre Espafia and America T^rina, 1765-1824.1987, p. 85-94, 176, and
212-213.
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sent 6 ships, and even Veracruz, the main port for New Spain sent a scant 31 ships
including those for mail, silver and the slave trade (See Appendix 2). Veracruz was also a
rallying point for items from other parts of the Empire before going to Havana which
would have increased the amount of trade going to Havana. A better comparative figure
is 22 ships returning to New Orleans compared to 14 to Veracruz (See Table 6).

TABLES
Entrances and Exits from Havana, Cuba 1772-1776

Year

Total Ships
Entering Havana

Total Ships
Leaving Havana

New Orleans
Ships Entering

New Orleans
Ships
Leaving

1772

158

166

22

22

177332

131

106

18

7

1774

223

206

31

28

1775

203

206

23

26

1776

243

239

25

15

Sources: Shipping figures from AGI, Cuba 1216, Folio 277; ibid 1217, Folios 305, 347,
and 437; ibid 1219, Folios 594, 603,623,636, 659, 674,698, 719, 733, 760, 779 and
807; ibid 1220, Folios 829, 844, 865,876, 892, 912, and 959; ibid 1221, Folios 977,
995,1014, 1046,1059, 1096, 1118,1155, 1198, 1216 and 125<L

^These figures are lower because the records from February to May are missing
from the Legajos.
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Table 6
Entrances and Exits from Havana, Cuba 1772
Port
EuroDean Ports:
Barcelona
Barlovento
Cadiz
Cartagena
Coruna
El Ferrol
Gijon
Santa Cruz de
Tenerife(Canaries)
Tijon
Santander
Sevilla
American Ports:
Campeche
Cartegena de Indias
Cumana
Guarico
Guayana
Maracaibo
New Orleans
Omoa
Puerto Rico
Santo Domingo
Tampico
Trinidad
Veracruz

Entrances

Exits

7
1
15
0
14
2
1

2
0
5033
2
1334
0
2

1
2
1
1

0
0
2
1

8
1
1
2
1
2
22
1
0
2
3
1
14

14
6
1
0
0
0
22
2
4
2
3
1
31

Sources: AGI, Cuba 1216, Folios 277 and Legajo 1217, No. 305

33Includes a flota and troop transports (only three ships)
^Ships from La Corufia to Havana carried the mail but also harina (flour) while
the majority of the ships leaving Havana for La Coruna only carried mail, with the
exception of an occaisional troop transport.
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Spain’s trade with her colonies in Latin America still dominated shipping in
Havana (especially that from Cadiz and La Coruna) as was expected under mercantilists
law and definitely under the Bourbon reforms (See Table 6). In perspective, shipping
figures through the port of Havana show that New Orleans did not have the lowest
amount of shipping moving through Havana. New Orleans was second only to Veracruz
in New Spain which frequently transported mail, troops and silver. The problem with
Louisiana’s commerce was her products, not the amount of shipping allowed by the
crown.35
It was obvious that trade with Havana had little benefit for Unzaga’s colonists at
the moment and that their products would never be sold in the metropole. He could not
offset the trade deficit by buying goods and storing them to help the prices or by using
funds from the royal treasury. Louisiana’s treasury was one of the smallest in the
Caribbean, even by 1775, only the tiny frontier port of Cumana received less in situado
funds (See Table 7). As stated before, Situado monies were forwarded to Veracruz, then
portioned out by the Viceroy, parceled out to the Captain-General in Cuba and finally to
the rest of the Caribbean. Because of this formality, the money frequently arrived late
(sometimes months after it was sent to Havana) and was always just barely enough. After
funding O’Reilly’s expenses to quell the rebels, the Spanish crown (as it had in Cuba)

35AGI Cuba 1216, 1217, 1219, 1220, and 1221. See Table 6 for specific folio
numbers.
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lowered Louisiana’s situado expenses to 120,000 pesos annually and again on Viceroy
Bucareli’s advice in 1773 to a little over 115,000 pesos per year (see Table T).36
Unzaga, furthermore, did not want to use government funding to assuage the pains
of the colonial economy as it was also his duty to build the government’s treasury in the
same manner that he was charged with restoring the economy. Another way must be
found to promote commerce.
The governor began his development by trying to improve Louisiana’s foundering
tobacco industry. To do this he requested aid from New Spain’s viceroy, the Marquis de
Croix (Bucareli did not arrive until late 1771). In November of 1771 the Viceroy sent the
governor ten-thousand pesos fiientes (a special situado) to buy raw tobacco for the royal
government under the newly formed Renta de Tabaco. a royal monopoly formed by Jose
de Galvez. Unzaga then had his colonists gather all the tobacco possible (some 98,000
pounds)and send it to Nachitoches to be shipped aboard the El Santo Cristo de San

Romas to the port of Veracruz.37 The Crown sent its immediate approval of Unzaga’s
actions but Unzaga’s victory was short lived. No additional requests for tobacco came
from New Spain until the end of his administration.3*

“ AGI Cuba, Legajo 149-A, numbers 20,22 and 29-Marques de Croix to Unzaga;
and 35, 62,65-66,67, 7071, 72-72, 74, and 76 Bucareli to Unzaga, and AGI Cuba 1219
Bucareli to Arriaga, June 3, 1774, no. 661.
37Brian Coutts, “Boom and Bust,” 289-290.
“ Arriaga to Unzaga, May 20, 1771, Lawrence Kinnaird, ed. Spain in the
Mississippi Valiev. 1765-1794. (hereinafter SMV) 3 vols. Annual Report of the AHR for
1945, Washington, D.C. 1946-1949,2:193; Coutts, “Boom and Bust,” 290.
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Table 7
Situados for Louisiana 1771-1776
October 4.1771 to October 3.1772
Marquis de Croix to Havana 4 February 1771
Havana to Louisiana 16 April 1771
Amount:

120,000 pesos*

October 4.1772 to October 3.1773
Bucareli to Havana 10 April 1772
Arrived Louisiana 11 July 1772
Amount

120,000 pesos*

October 4.1773 to October 3.1774
Bucareli to Havana 31 March 1773
Reached Havana 31 July 1773
Arrived Louisiana 27 August 1773

115,722 pesos, 6 tominos, 3 granos

In Moneda Menuda del Nuevo Cufio
En la de a 4 rrs (quatros?) 1,000
En la de a 2 rrs (doses) 4,000
En la de a 1 rrs (reales)
300
En la de a ‘A rrs (medios) 1,000
total
6,300
October 4. 1774 to October 3.1775
Bucareli to Havana 13 Abril 1774

115,322 pesos, 5 tominos, 9 granos

In Moneda Menuda del Nuevo Cufio
En la de Doses
4,000
En la de Reales
1,000
En la de Medios
1.000
total
6,000
October 4.1775 to October 3.1776
Bucareli to Havana 27 March 1775

115,722 pesos, 6 tominos, 8 granos

In Moneda Menuda del Nuevo Cufio
En la de Doses
4,000
En la de Reales
4,000
En la de Medios
1,000
total
9,000
Continued Following Page

39Includes 1,230 pesos for widow Doha Francisca Cullange de Villemont who
wasn't receiving her husband's pay.
bucareli noted that this was the amount believed necessary to support the colony.
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Attached Treasurer's report for 1775 (Table 7 Cont’d)
Contadura General de el Exercito v Provincia de la Luisiana
Account of the monies and expenditures up to September of 177S
Pesos v Reales de Plata
-On the account formed due to the corte de cajas and the
additions applied by the treasurer Don Bernardo de Otero
on the 4* of May of this years, resulting in an existing
-Entered into the caja from then on for the situado for Oct/75
to Oct/76
-Item of the product of others
Spent from the 4 of May until now:24,367.2.28
We suppose well spend from now
until end of September 29.095.2.16
53,458.5.2
Diferencia
Vaxa(Minus)
Money set aside for the residencia of the
governor (like a deposit)
3,000.0.00
There should exist:
-Plus the situado for one year
Less obligations assigned to said
situado
5,908.00
New jobs
750.00
Other expenses
1,585.00
Unforseen expenses
Resulting in the following in one year of
October 4. 1776 to October 3. 1777
Bucareli to Havana 17 January 1776
Moneda menuda
En la de Doses
1,000
En lade Reales
1,000
En la de Medios
1.000
total
3,000

132,605.7.18
115,722.6.08
1.358.0.20
249,686.6.12

- 53.458.5.2
196,228.5.2

193,0228.1.2
115,322.5.12
-123,569.5.12
-8,243.0.0
69,662.3.24

115, 322.5.9

Sources: Marqu6s de Croix to Unzaga, AGI, Cuba 149-A, Folios 20,22, and 29; 76Bucareli to Unzaga, ibid, Folios 35, 62, 65-66,67, 70-71, 72-73, 74
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Table 8
Situado Distribution-27 March 1775
Amount

Total

Havana Por Cuenta de las atenciones de tierra
For Cuenta para las de Marina
Por Cuenta de la coasignasidn para
compra de tabacos
Santo
Domingo
Por su situado que cumple en fin de Abril
Para comprar tobacos
Para Pago del 6p% a la Guamicidn
Para la satisfaddn de otro 6% al
Vecindario
Para la casa cuna

300 0 0 0 ...
300 0 0 0 ...

910.000.0.0

Puerto Rico

278 857.7.6.

Destination

Use

310 0 0 0 ...
194 457.3.5.
250 0 0 0 ...
250 682.1.0.
1 835.2.3.
5 00...

Por su situado de todo el afio antecedente
Por la consignasidn anual para obras de
fortificaridn
Por la consign. Para el propio efecto
Para la extincidn de lo que se dij6 de
Embiar en el afio del 1770
Por la limnosaconcedad por una vez
al convento de Carmelitos

fum ani

247.474.6.8

487.858.7. 11V4

100 000. . .
50 0 0 0 ...
58 001.0.514
1 000.0.0

Por el situado correspondement a toda
el afio anterior

40.235.5.3

i nniriana

Por un afio de situado que empieza en
4 de Oct del corriente
115.722.2.IK
Total
1,801.292.2.114
Note: In this quantity is included 300,000 pesos en Moneda menuda with the following distributuion:

Havana

Santo Domingo
Puerto Rico
Cumand
New Orleans
Total

Atenciones de tierra
Para las de Marina
Para Tabacos

Dolores
50 000..
50 000..
60 000..
32 000..
20 000..
4 000..
4 000..

Reales
7000..
7000..
10 000..
10 000..
6 000..
3 000..
4 000..

220 000.. 47000..

Medios Total
6 000.. 63 000.
6000.. 63 000.
7000.. 77 000.
8 000.. 50 000.
4 000.. 30 000.
1000 .. 8 000.
1000 ..9 000.
33 000.. 300 000.

Source: Bucareli to Arriaga AGI, Cuba 1219, Folio 661
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The lack of follow-up orders from New Spain is unexplained, but had there been
Louisiana might not have been able to meet them because of labor shortages. While it
required less slave labor than indigo, to grow tobacco in large amounts one needed more
labor, either vagrants or slaves.41 French Louisiana’s planters who had enough wealth to
maintain large amounts of expensive African slaves, usually produced indigo.
Furthermore, Louisiana’s depressed economy had already begun to drive out many
merchants and planters. The shortage of labor, then, slowed the production.
Prior to the Spanish period tobacco was grown primarily north of Lake
Pontchartrain. In 1770, at Unzaga’s urging, settlers began expanding tobacco production
in Natchitoches, Opelousas, Pointe Coupee and Attakapas. By then these settlements had
over thirteen-hundred and fifty people, having been increased by a number of Acadian
refugees who arrived in 1765 and 1770.42 Still, the production of tobacco expanded
slowly.
Part of the slowness was due to the fact that it was far more lucrative for the
planters to sell smaller harvests to British merchants for higher prices. In July of 1770,
merchant John Fitzpatrick in Manchac (the heart of smuggling territory), wrote to his
dealers in Mobile that he had Natchitoches tobacco for sale and that they should hold on

41Clark, New Orleans. 186.
42In Usner, Indians. Settlers & Slaves. 119-120: Ulloa reported that they could not
cultivate indigo or tobacco without slaves and would never get beyond producing “wood,
indigo of very poor quality, and tobacco in small quantities and of ordinary quality.”;
Coutts, “Boom and Bust,” 292-295: This is even clearer in the late 1770s and 1780s when
Louisiana was unable to keep up with New Spain’s demands despite financial assistance
from the Crown, Martin Navarro to Jose de Galvez, September 12, 1782, Informe 127,
AGI, SD 2633, Folios 219-222.
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to their own tobacco because New Spain’s viceroy had purchased the rest of Louisiana’s
stock. If they would just hold on to what they had, he said, in a few months the product
would become scarcer and even more valuable. In August he observed that his
predictions had been correct and the planters at Point Coupee had grown only enough for
personal consumption. By 1773 he had run completely out o f tobacco and had to send to
New Orleans to his distributors.43
Another problem that both New Spain and Louisiana faced was transportation and
packaging. Although it might be shipped out of Natchitoches to Veracruz with relative
ease, the tobacco then had to be hauled overland to factory warehouses in New Spain.
Louisiana normally shipped its tobacco in large containers which made land transportation
difficult. Only planters with larger labor forces could afford to transform the leaf tobacco
into the andullos or rolls commonly used in Havana and easily turned into cigarros in
New Spain. Most of the tobacco producers in Louisiana, however, used vagrants to
harvest tobacco and so used the easier method of pressing tobacco into toneles or
hogsheads. The labor and packaging problem made transportation harder and also made
the process of creating cigarros more difficult. Both of these issues had to be settled
before the tobacco trade could flourish.44

43John Fitzpatrick to McGillvray and Struthers, July 23, 1770, Fitzpatrick to Peter
Swanson August 30, 1770, October 31, 1770 and June 30, 1773, Dalrymple,
Letterbooks- 90,94 and 97, 152.
“ Informe, Martin Navarro to Jos6 de Galvez, September 12, 1782, AGI, SD 2633,
Folios 219-222.
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Unfortunately between 1772 and 1773 Louisiana experienced a hard winter
followed by a severe hurricane. The hurricane was the last straw for many French
merchants and planters and they left the colony in droves during 1773.45 The planters who
stayed had to settle both the transportation and production issues before the tobacco trade
could flourish. It never did during Unzaga’s tenure. By 1779 there were only 138,808
pounds of tobacco available for Veracruz because of trade with the British, poor labor and
transportation.46
The governor’s work was not totally in vain. He did stir growth in Louisiana’s
tobacco industry. As he left office New Spain forwarded another request for tobacco and
royal contracts to assist Louisiana’s growers. Spain also officially opened trade between
Louisiana with its traditional markets in France and the French West Indies. Spanish
officials had been impressed by British production of tobacco in the Natchez area of
British West Florida during the 1770s. With Royal subsidies and a flood of new orders,
Louisiana actually experienced an economic “boom” in the tobacco trade in the 1780s. It
was not to last. Within the decade Seville built-up a surplus of the leaf. The Crown
followed by lowering production limits and limited all future shipments from Louisiana.
The surplus in Seville created a glut in New Spain’s market, and the Viceroy quickly set
ceilings on tobacco importations in the 1790s. For Louisiana, the results were disastrous.
Many planters had purchased slaves and land as they speculated on the tobacco trade.

45Archives Nationales. Paris. France. Archives des Colonies. Louisiana: General
Correspondence. C 13A.
^Coutts, “Boom and Bust,” 292-295.
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Most of them were bankrupted by the new limits on production. Few had little choice but
to return to frontier economies and illicit trade with the British.47
Disappointed with the results of his tobacco “experiment” Unzaga focused on
Louisiana’s other exports. Indigo would not bring money to Louisiana. It cost too much
to produce and other Latin American colonies produced a better product for the money.
In fact, the governor and his officials (treasurer Martin Navarro in particular) tried to steer
their colonists away from indigo production toward other products. The colonists didn’t
agree and did not diversify their agriculture markedly during the 1770s. Unzaga would
have to find other products to enhance the failing economy.
The governor considered the fur trade briefly. Furs had been a mainstay of French
Louisiana’s economy. Trappers fiinneled their trade from the hinterlands in the southeast
and the northern Mississippi Valley, along the various rivers that fed the Mississippi and
down the great waterway to New Orleans. By the time Unzaga took office, unfortunately,
the fur trade had been disrupted by population growth on the eastern bank of the
Mississippi and war. Traditionally, the majority of the furs came from rich riverine areas
of the southeast and the primary trappers had been the southeastern tribes. Boundary
changes during the Seven Years War had disturbed the normal hunting and trapping areas
along the rivers. The English had changed the balance of trade, disturbing some areas
with settlement and pushing one tribe against another.48

47Coutts, “Boom and Bust,” 293-309; Clark, New Orleans. 184.
^For a complete account of the rise and decline of the fur trade in the Mississippi
Valley see Paul Chrisler Philips, The Fur Trade. 2 vols. (Norman: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1961).
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Tensions between the Spanish and English along the new boundary of the
Mississippi also disrupted the normal markets. French fur traders and Indians alike turned
to the incoming English colonists making their way across the country west of the
Alleghenies and into the Mississippi river valley for profits. New Orleans now competed
with English Indian agents and settlers for furs. This might have been a larger problem had
Unzaga really needed commerce in the product, but Spain did not need furs, neither did
any of the legal ports open to New Orleans.49
In 1772 Unzaga decided that lumber and naval stores might be the real answers to
his colony’s commerce. Louisiana produced forests of oak and cypress and other wood
useful for building. Like the neighboring colony of Florida, it also contained large stands
of pitch-pine which produced tar, resin, pitch and turpentine used in shipbuilding and
repairs. Naval stores had never been a profitable industry in Louisiana. The French crown
had frowned upon the quality of Louisiana’s tar and refused to pay for shipments until
they reached France. The colonial government had taken to paying at least half the price
of such shipments to guarantee their merchants at least some return on their investments.
Toward the end of the French period naval stores continued to be shipped along with
agricultural products, furs and wood but financially they accounted for just over one
percent of the total monies received.50

49Clark, New Orleans. 185.
“ N. M. Miller Surrey, The Commerce o f Louisiana during the French R&rime
1699-1763 (New York, 1916), 203, 206,211,218.
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The merchants’ aaxiety had not diminished when Spain took control of the colony.
Part of the protest against Ulloa had been an argument that Cuban pitch and tar produced
on the Isle of Pines would ruin Louisiana’s trade.51 O’Reilly assured the merchants he
would help them and expeditions into the colony’s interior showed the potential of
Louisiana’s untapped forest resources.52 Merchant fears were realized when, during
Unzaga’s administration, naval stores continued to be a low income item.
New Orleans had additional competition from the governor of Florida who asked
the Spanish government to subsidize his industry to fumish naval stores for the Havana
Company in Cuba.53 That made matters worse because Florida was closer to Cuba and
could undersell New Orleans’ tar and pitch. The Spanish government, furthermore, never
sought to actually subsidize naval stores as a commercial export in either colony until the
1780s.54
Because the naval stores industry appeared only so promising, Unzaga tried create
a new timber industry, of sawmills, shipyards and cut boards for the Havana market.
Louisiana’s cypress was in demand because of the wood’s strength, availability and ability

“Memorial of Merchants and Planters of Louisiana on the Events of October 29,
1768, in B. F. French, ed., Historical Collections o f Louisiana. Embracing Translations of
Many Rare and Valuable Documents Relating to th Natural Civil and Political History of
that State 5 vols. (New York, 1853), 5: 221,228.
“ O’Reilly to Arriaga, October 17, 1769, in Kinnard, SMV. 1:13-104 and the
report of Nugent and Kelly, January of 1770 in AGI, Cuba 81.
“ Jack D. L. Holmes, “Naval Stores in Colonial Louisiana and the Floridas,”
Trwisiana History. (Winter, 1968), 303; and John Jay TePaske, The Governorship of
Spanish Florida. 1700-1763 (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1964) 106.
“ Jack D. L. Holmes, “Naval Stores,” 304.
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to withstand the weather. Many French planters used cypress for their homes because of
its longevity. The governor was also aware of the success of men Like Richard Carpenter,
William Dunbar and James Brown in British Natchez who had made a profit of lumber
through making staves for delivery. In 1771 Dunbar had already produced 100,000 staves
for market.55
Unzaga began his attempts at subsidizing the colony’s timber industry through
Havana. Correspondence between the governor and the new Captain-General of Cuba,
the Marquis de la Torre, indicates that Spanish officials were willing to contract with
Louisiana business men to transport cut lumber to Havana. This would ease the tension
between Cuba’s sugar producers and the royal navy over wood for boxes to transport
sugar.56
The scheme was shared with several of Louisiana’s prominent citizens, planter
Santiago Beauregard, his son Luis Toutant Beauregard, and Santiago’s brother Bartolome
Toutant Beauregard. Prior to Unzaga’s agreement with de la Torre, Santiago had begun
to prepare for a new venture. In August of the previous year he had mortgaged his
property, slaves, livestock and household goods to a friend and business associate,
Francisco Pascale de Le Barre for 9,200 pesos over a three year period. Five thousand
pesos of the mortgage was to be paid to Beauregard in the form of wood which
Beauregard would use to complete his ship. It is not clear in the notarial records if de La

55Clark, New Orleans. 184-185.
56Marquis de la Torre to Unzaga, September 26, 1772, Dispatches: Unzaga to
Toree, October 14, 1772, ibid.
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Barre was also helping him build the ship or not. Santiago apparently was setting up to
transport his own goods and others rather than stay a planter. In the same month he also
sold his slaves in return for goods he could sell, rather than money.57
Poor weather and bad harvests forced de La Barre to resell the land to Beauregard
in December of the next year, but Santiago was convinced he could make the
timber/merchant business work and leased the land to de Le Barre for 800 pesos per year.
That same month Unzaga completed his arrangements with the Captain-General in Cuba
and Santiago sent his brother, Bartolome, to Havana with power of attorney to represent
him in contractual arrangements to ship planks for sugar boxes. He also gave Bartolome
the right to mortgage his (Santiago’s) house and property in New Orleans for up to
20,000 pesos if needed. According to the contract between Bartolome and the
“gentlemen owners of sugar mills near Havana,” he mortgaged Santiago’s New Orleans’
home (a 10-room house on Royal and St. Anne streets), and 21 blacks (slaves) who
worked in Santiago’s “ingenio [sugar mill] in Chapitulas.” By June 25, 1773 the
Beauregards and Habafieros had struck a deal.5’

57New Orleans Notarial Archives (hereinafter called Notarial Archivess), Juan
Bautista Garic, Notary, Acts January-December 1771, Sale of Land to de Le Barre,
August 16,1771; sale of female slave to Don Jan Anoul for 250 pesos to be paid in
quintals of “clean cotton with no seeds” at 15 pesos per quintal, August, 1771.
S8Notarial Archives. Juan Bautista Garic, Notary, Acts January-December 1772,
Resale of land and consequent lease of same to Francisco Pascalis de Le Barre and wife
December 29,1772, Power of Attorney to Bartolome on December 30, 1772, and in Acts
January-December 1773, Juan Bautista Garic, Notary, the contract between the
Beauregards and sugar producers in Havana, June 25, 1773.
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Unzaga’s work and his colonists labor seemed to work. In 1773 four ships carried
half of the colony’s commerce with Havana in the form of wood for sugar boxes. By
September, an excited Santiago contracted with a friend, Juan Villanova, to build a saw
mill, placing Juan in charge of the mill’s operations. Again Santiago put up some thirteen
arpents of land, slaves, and tools as his portion of the contract. The contract is replete
with the hopes Beauregard and Villanova had for their new venture and it reads “may we
never cheat each other, many our children never cheat each other, and may we both work
diligently.”59 By 1774 Beauregard began to buy and sell properties to expand the mill and
free up cash.60
Within a year, however, Cuban sugar planters began to complain that they didn’t
want to have to build their own boxes. Instead, wrote de la Torre, they want to receive
pre-made boxes so that all they have to do is fill them with sugar and send them on their
way to Europe.61 Other planters contracted with Beauregard to carry not only wood, but
pre-made boxes. A single contract, with Don Francisco de Levy and Don Juan Baptiste,

59Notarial Archives. Juan Bautista Garic, January-December, 1773, September 13,
1773 contract between Santiago Toutant Beauregard and Juan Villanova.
“ Shipping information, AGI Cuba, Legajo 1217, Nos. 347-437; Notarial Archives.
Andres Almonaster y Roxas, Acts January - December 1774, contracts made by
Beauregard to sell the property of deceased friend who owed him money, Act 120;
bought property from Louis Ramon near the city for the expansion of the mill, Act 132.
61Unzaga to Torre, January 28, 1773, Dispatches: Ibid, March 7,1773, March 23,
1773, April 29, 1773, May 17, 1773, June 25, 1773, July 1, 1773 and August 27, 1773.
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asked for 2,600 boxes “bien acondiciodanas” (in good condition) with specific
measurements which had to be “in fully usable condition” upon delivery.62
Unfortunately, Cuba’s sugar producers were vague about their measurements.
They sent the amount of sugar each box should contain and expected boxes of similar
width and height. Louisiana’s lumber mills, however, built boxes with a similar internal
capacity, but not always the same measurements in height or width, not thinking it would
be harder to ship such boxes. Some of the boxes were refused openly and had to be
replaced, others were left standing on the docks because the fickle Habaiieros had
purchased cheaper boxes elsewhere. Despite the inconsistency in dealing with Havana, the
lumber business continued to thrive and made up a large percentage of the commerce
between Louisiana’s struggling merchants and Havana (See Table 9). By the beginning of
the 1800s Louisiana had 30 sawmills producing lumber for sugar boxes.63
One point of interest remains in the lumber trade between Havana and Louisiana.
At the end of Unzaga’s tenure, Captain-General de la Torre wrote letter after letter from
Cuba to the government in Spain about Cuba’s wood shortage and the conflict between
homebuilders and the Marina. The question must be asked historically, why did de la

62Notarial Archives. Andres Almonaster y Roxas, Acts January-December
1774;contract in Act 91; another obligation between Dezellet and Beauregard for 2,600
boxes; Act 82.
^ Dispatches. Unzaga to Torre, October 31, 1774; February 14, 1775; the conflict
continued into the Galvez administration; Ervin Mancil, “Some Historical and
Geographical Notes on the Cypress Lumbering Industry in Louisiana,” L§, 8 (1969), 18.
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Torre simply not contract with Louisiana for more wood for building purposes as well as
the “cortes de cajas” for sugar boxes?64

TABLE 9

Shipments of Wood from New Orleans to Havana, 1772-1776
Year

Ships Carrying Wood

Total Ships From New Orleans

1772

1

22

1773

9

18

1774

20

31

1775

9

23

1776

15

25

Sources: Figures from AGI, Cuba 1216, Folio 277; ibid 1217, Folios 305,347 and 437;
ibid 1219, Folios 594,603, 623, 636, 659, 674, 698, 719, 733, 760, 799 and 807; ibid
1220, Folios 829, 844, 865, 876, 892,912, and 959; and ibid 1221, Folios 977,995,
1014, 1046, 1059,1096,1118, 115, 1198,1216, and 1259.

Frequently frustrated with attempts to sell Louisiana’s products, Unzaga even
attempted to make money by sending a boat to Havana with wood, rice, tar, pitch, com,
indigo, cotton, lard, and hides plus two-thousand pesos. He asked Bucareli to sell the
goods wherever possible and use the money from the sales along with the two-thousand
pesos to buy sugar. The sugar was then to be sold in Cadiz and the money from the sales
of sugar to be returned to Louisiana. It was a round about way to try and get some return

64Torre to Arriaga, November 21,1774, February 24,1775, and March 6, 1776
AGI, Cuba 1220, Folio 841.
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on Louisiana’s products. Unfortunately Bucareli did not have time to “tend” to
Louisiana’s commercial problems and the deal fell through.65
Despite his limited successes with legal commerce, the vicissitudes of working
with the Spanish bureaucracy and being at the mercy of Havana’s merchant monopoly
prompted governor Unzaga to believe that his first assumptions had been correct. It
would be the British, not the Spanish, who were the answer to Louisiana’s commercial
problems. Indeed, the increase in exports of tobacco, indigo, timber and skins in
Louisiana had “more to do with the exceptions made to commercial restrictions by
Spanish officials than with any real change in market or availability.”66 Paul Hoffinan,
aptly states that the reality of the situation was:
“Louisiana’s unique characteristics meant that Spain and her
empire, by itself and however equipped with new laws and commercial
institutions, could not provide a context within which the colony could
prosper, although it might survive in poverty.. . . In effect, consolidation
of Spanish rule in economic terms meant at least a short-term adjustment
of imperial norms to Louisiana realities.”67
The stringent mercantilists polices in place during Unzaga’s governorship meant
he must use unorthodox means to deal with his colony’s realities and make it profitable for
Spain. The records at Balize and the Treasury records indicate that Unzaga carefully
husbanded Louisiana’s economy by applying his assets properly and keeping official funds
in the treasury. A look at the fees imposed at Balize on ships entering and leaving the

U nzaga to Bucareli, January 15,1771, AGI, Cuba 1055, Folio 137.
“ Girouard, “Unzaga,” 49; Clark, New Orleans. 179
67Hoffinan, Luisiana. 113.
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Mississippi River, indicates the volume of British shipping on the Mississippi and shows
how relatively little of all shipping tied up at or departed from New Orleans. Between
1773 and 1777, however, the Almojarifazgo tax levied on legal imports at New Orleans,
increased from 2,240 pesos to 16,558, shows a growth in shipping, as well as government
intake (See Table 10).
TABLE 10
Commerce of Louisiana, 1773-1777
Imp. Baliza (Pesos)
Est. Round Trips
Nuevo Orleans, entrances
Nuevo Orleans, exits
Nuevo Orleans, Total
Nuevo Orleans, % Baliza
Almojarifazgo (pesos)
Estimated Goods (pesos)

1773
209.5
104
9
12
21
10%
2,240
89,600

1774 1775 1776 1777
161.5 157
133
147
73
78
66
80
30
23
11
9
17
9
34
20
64
43
28
18
44% 27% 18%
16,558
4,238 16,690
i562,320
169,520 667,600

Sources: Table 4.2 from Hoffinan, Luisiana. 133.
What is confusing is a comparison of the ships entering and leaving Havana, from
and for New Orleans. There are discrepancies which require more investigation than this
study encompasses. For example, Tables 10 and 11 show that, in 1774, a total of 34
ships left New Orleans and only 31 ships reached Havana. In 1775, however, there are
only 20 ships leaving New Orleans, but 23 are registered in Havana. Which bookkeeper
are we to believe? Perhaps there are ships coming from other ports in Louisiana, or the
extra ships are of those who "knew someone” and slipped through Balize without paying
fees. There are some interesting choices to pursue(See Table 11).
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Table 11
New Orleans Exits-Havana Entrances 1773-1776
Year

Ships Leaving New Orleans

Entering Havana
From New Orleans

1773

12

18

1774

34

31

1775

20

23

1776

17

25

Source: Shippine figures from Hoffinan. Luisiana. 133 and AGL Cuba 1216.1217.
1219, 1220, 1221.

The governor tried every possible means to make Louisiana’s economy viable. In
1773 while he pushed lumber and tobacco he also investigated a mine which had been
discovered some 250 leagues from New Orleans. The mere possibility that it might be a
silver mine warranted a guard and a letter to the Viceroy in New Spain. In his letter,
Unzaga asked Bucareli for more men to guard the mine and a royal mining expert from
Coahuila to assay the minerals. The letter does not indicate in what direction from New
Orleans the mine was found but Bucareli’s reply hints that it was north and near the
Mississippi. The Viceroy did not send a specialist or troops, instead he told Unzaga that
“. . . we don’t have the manpower to mine or guard it, and that sustaining such an
operation would not be advisable because we do not want to attract the attention of our
immediate neighbors on the Mississippi.”6*

“ Unzaga to Bucareli, January 28,1773, AGI, SD 2582, Folio 31; Bucareli to
Unzaga, April 26, 1773, ibid.
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Unzaga ignored the Viceroy’s concerns and investigated the mine himself. The
rewards, he felt, would far outweigh the danger if the mine turned out to hold silver.
After investigation, unfortunately, the mine turned out to be one o f the numerous lead
mines. Bucareli was not happy with the governor’s disobedience. In August the Viceroy
addressed his concerns about the British to the Crown. The Minister of the Indies
reprimanded Unzaga’s actions and maintaining that the mine was not to be worked, it was
not silver, and bore no further investigation. Since, however, the governor had already
drawn attention to the area he must now send annual reconnoiters through the area against
encroachments or probes by the English.®
Unzaga’s struggles also included attempts at creating cottage industry and a
domestic market for Louisiana’s handicrafts. In his first two years he encouraged new
settlers to produce products like cotton which would allow Louisiana to become
independent of her “illegal” trade. The governor also encouraged a domestic market.
He wrote to post commanders asking them to send various products produced by their
posts which might be sold to the citizens of New Orleans or traded to other posts.
Arkansas sent game, especially woodcocks which he felt might add to New Orleans’
larder. Unzaga also ordered gloves and stockings from local weavers and encouraged his
officers to do the same.70 Cotton became a limited product during Unzaga’s tenure

®Bucareli to Arriaga, August 9,1773, AGI, SD 2582; Arriaga, March 8, 1774,
Aranjuez, ibid.
^Encouragement o f local industry can be found in Judice to Unzaga, October 19,
1770, AGI, Cuba, 188-A, Folio l-d/32; Unzaga to Judice, October 22, 1770, Ibid. Cotton
production and its problems are discussed in Unzaga to Verret, June 1, 1772, AGI, Cuba
189A, Folio 137.
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because it was often planted in the wrong locations. Another problem was that many of
the inhabitants of New Orleans, especially the elite chose to buy European goods because
of their social status.
The foregoing discussion on Louisiana’s commerce has left out a large expanse of
colonial Louisiana’s territory, Spanish Illinois, but not without reason. The exports from
Spanish Illinois (Missouri) were primarily flour, lead and furs. In the decade between
Spanish possession of Louisiana and the last years of Unzaga’s governorship, the colonists
at Illinois only produced 1,200 and 2,500 barrels of flour. Only thirty percent of the flour
ever reached New Orleans. The rest went to domestic consumption and feeding the
troops, traders and trappers in northern Louisiana. Lead production diminished as the
years went on and never exceeded 60 tons per year. Furs, disrupted by the English forts
along the eastern bank of the river and a steady influx of troops and English merchants
were reduced to approximately 100 to 300 packs per year. English merchants competed
with the settlers in Vincennes, Cahokia and Kaskaskia. The remainder of their exports
included small amounts of tobacco and salt, never enough for the New Orleans market or
its shipping business.71
It was not until after Unzaga left Louisiana that the Crown responded to
Louisiana’s realities. In 1776 they re-opened trade to the French Islands. As mercantilistic
rules weakened, trade quickened. New Orleans reoriented itself to the foreign market and
by the end of the Spanish period 31 of the 81 ships which passed through the Mississippi

71Clark, New Orleans. 182,211-212.
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were actually from Spain By all appearances, in 1799 the commercial reforms of Carlos
m were a success for Louisiana.72
Although the Crown responded too slowly to Louisiana’s requests for freer
commerce to assist Unzaga, there is hard evidence that his foregoing struggles to fill the
treasury were somewhat successful. Historians have often confused personal economic
gain on the part of Louisiana’s citizens with the public monies collected from taxes, tariffs
and husbanded by the governor and his treasury officials. The treasurer’s reports for
Louisiana during Unzaga’s tenure reflect tremendous stewardship by a governor under
such duress. The accounts, according to Martin Navarro and his replacement, Bernardo
de Ortero, show a steady increase from year to year, beginning with 927,839.2
reales/maravedis (115,979.88 pesos) in 1770 and ending with a surplus o f 1,876,856.29
reales/marvedis (234,607 pesos). While the rate of increase, 118.628 reales over seven
years, a rate of 16,946.86 pesos/year, is not spectacular compared to other colonial Latin
America treasuries, it is incredible given the circumstances.(See Appendix A)
The governor’s endeavors at improving Louisiana’s commerce were complicated
by the re-appearance of the British along the Mississippi and domestic concerns.
Unzaga’s predecessor, O’Reilly, had been quite belligerent toward illegal commerce with
Britain and expelled the majority of its merchants from New Orleans in 1769. Most of
these men merely moved upriver to British Manchac o r Natchez and continued business as

^Shipping figures from Spanish Judicial Records, Historical Center, Louisiana
State Museum, Report of Juan de Castanedo. Permanent Alderman and Roval Treasurer
regarding the ships entering through Bavou St. John, lists and anchorage fees. Document
no. 1799123103. December 31, 1799.
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usual. Some even continued business in New Orleans through Louisiana firms which
acted as middle-men for the colonists and their illegal clients. In 1770 British ships quietly
began to reappear on the Mississippi bringing goods upriver to the “expatriate” enclave.
Within a year merchants like John Fitzpatrick and Thomas Bently had recreated their
lucrative, but illegal trade in Louisiana.73
Fitzpatrick and others began a new chain of contacts across the Spanish-English
border through the Amite river. There they did a booming business not only with
merchants in New Orleans, but with local farmers and planters in both Spanish Louisiana
and British Florida. They also received and sold goods coming down the Mississippi from
Spanish Illinois.74 New Orleans’ merchants felt the familiar sting that such illicit trade
inflicted on their commerce. In November of 1771, merchant Francois Marie Regiio
complained that the British were taking advantage of the depressed economy and had
completely “encompassed” the fur trade to the point that “all the pelts which previously
appeared in this capitol, now come there only in their barges and boats.”73 British
merchants, like James Jones and his brother Evan even resided in New Orleans, continuing
business with no complaint from Spanish officials as long as “trade” was continued on the
river and not in the city.76

^John Fitzpatrick, Letterbooks. 13.
74Ibid, 20.
75Fran$ois Marie Reggio to Monseigneur, November 22, 1771, Reggio Family
Papers, Department of Archives and Manuscripts, Louisiana State University.
76Fitzpatrick, Letterbooks. 21.
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Illicit trade with the British also exacerbated the shortages of supplies and money
in New Orleans. It also exposed the lack of integration between the economy in New
Orleans and its hinterlands. For example, in 1770 New Orleans suddenly experienced a
famine. By August there was a shortage of com and rice, both staples. A shortage of
wheat the governor could understand, but not crops commonly raised by most farmers.
Realizing that the farmers were selling to illicit merchants to circumvent tariffs and price
constraints in New Orleans and to get better prices and/or items manufactured by the
British, the governor notified the post commandants of his extremity, and requested that
their grain be sent immediately to New Orleans.77 Amused, the local commandant at
Pointe Coupee, Francois Allain, explained the dearth of grain in his region. He informed
the governor that no rice was grown at his post and that the local com crop had been
damaged by rain and would not mature until October.7*
Unzaga then politely requested that Allain produce a report with the projected
agricultural production for each farm in his jurisdiction. He added, that the report should
contain the amount of food each farmer required for home consumption. Any surplus must
be sent to New Orleans to alleviate the ongoing emergency. Instead of sending the report,
Allain replied, rather smugly, that all future correspondence from the governor (normally
in Spanish) must be accompanied by a French translation so that he could avoid
misconstruing any official orders. Not undone by his Commandant’s obstreperous

U nzaga to Commandant Francois Allain, Pointe Coupee, August 16, 1770, AGI,
Cuba 188-A.
78Allain to Unzaga, September 5, 1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A.
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behavior the governor gently reminded him that he was now a Spanish official and must
either learn Spanish or secure his own interpreter. Allain, refused to budge, replying that
he could not learn a new language because of his “advanced age” and there were no
trustworthy translators at the Post. Instead, he requested permission to resign his post.79
There are no future letters from Allain on the subject, but he continued his post
and Unzaga quietly “did battle” with his other commandants to feed hungry New Orleans.
While he battled with Allain, he also send requests to Commandant Dutisne in the Iberville
District, as well as Verret on the German Coast requesting food for his hungry citizens in
the Crescent City. Both denied any illegal traffic with the British and replied that they also
had a shortage of grain because of the weather.”
By the end of 1770, Unzaga’s solutions began to alleviate the scarcity of food in
New Orleans and the failing economy in the colony. The French commandants finally
responded favorably to Unzaga’s patient insistence. The colonists harvested another com
crop by the end of 1770 and the commandants began to keep an eye on smuggling
between their residents and the British. Commandant Berard even sent a list of Acadian
farmers who had surplus com. (See Table 12)81 Slowly the frontier economy of

^Unzaga to Allain, October 13, 1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Allain to Unzaga,
November 4,1770, ibid; Unzaga to Allain, November 14,1770, ibid; Allain to Unzaga,
November 30 1770, ibid.
“ Unzaga to Dustine, August 11, 1770, AGI, Cuba 193-B, Folio 281 another letter
apparently went to Verret who replied on August 27,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A^olio 1-d,
44.
81Verret to Unzaga, September 25, ;1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Foliol d/ 46;
Commandant Descoudreaux to Unzaga, November 1,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 182,
Berard to Unzaga, December 5, 1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Foliol9.
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Louisiana’s hinterlands began to acclimate itself to Spanish control though it never
completely centered on New Orleans.
Giving way to the exigencies of Louisiana’s frontier did not encourage regular
commercial growth through New Orleans, in fact it actually helped suppress that trade.
Daniel Usner contends that frontier markets continued to resist the new economic order.
Furthermore, British settlements east of the Mississippi devastated the local game and
confiscated the local fur trade. Officially, Unzaga lamented “even our new subjects sell
those [furs] which they acquire from the Indians in our own lands [to the British].82
Treasury reports show that official trade in Louisiana, including British ships dropped
severely between 1770 and 1771, from 144 ships through Balize to 97 in 1771, but trade
began to climb afterterwards.83
Ironically, as trade began to assert itself along the Mississippi, the New Orleans
merchants experienced worse hardships. Another bad harvest in 1772 hurt trade
and the citizens New Orleans as they depended on food from the surrounding countryside.
The hurricane of 1773 further injured both the planter and merchant classes of the city.
Famine and economic woes often created circumstances which prompted less than honest
action among the colonists. In fact, between 1772 and 1773 a number of men became
extrodinarily wealthy, buying up the homes and lands of less fortunate citizens. Among
these men was the well known Notary and member of the Cabildo, Andres Almonester y

U nzaga to Bucareli, July 8, 1770, Dispatches.
“ Usner, Indians. Settlers & Slaves. 107; Hoffman, Luisiana. 122.
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TABLE 12
Excerpt from letter of Jean Baptiste Berard, at La Belle Pointe on Wednesday,
December 5, 1770 which includes a list of his Acadian fanners with corn surpluses
during the famine of 1770
.. en consequence des ordres de monsieur le gouvemeur. J’ait fait faire une assemble
de tous les habittants de ce quartier comme vous me marque ou chaque’un a fait faire
un declaration du maye qu’ils a a vendre.”
(“.. .because of the orders of the governor, I assembled all the inhabitants of this region
as you asked me to where each one made a declaration of the com they had to sell.”)
Noms et notte de ceaux qui ont due maye a vendre au atacapas. Le toute en epie.
Michel Bernard...................................................................
Charles Guilliebeau.............................................................
Francois Guilliebeau...........................................................
Simon Le Blanc..................................................................
Claude Martin....................................................................
Francis Broussard............................................................
Rene Traans (Trahan)........................................................
Joseph Broussard...............................................................
Jean Dugas.........................................................................
Pierre Dugas.......................................................................
Charles Dugas....................................................................
Michel Doucet...................................................................
Baptiste Hebert..................................................................
Baptiste Semer...................................................................
Michel M aut......................................................................
Firmien Landry...................................................................
Total

20Barils
15
20
40
20
20
60
30
20
60
20
20
20
60
40
40
505

Source: Berard to Unzaga, December 5, 1770, AGI Cuba 188-A, Folio 5, No. 19

Roxas who besides obtaining a lucrative treasury post in the colony, also acted as an
attorney for the city. In that position, as a notary for power o f attorney and wills, he used
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his knowledge to gain a fortune. By the next decade he would be one of the wealthiest
men in Louisiana and the Floridas.84
Unzaga could do little to prevent this kind of behavior but he did try and protect
his colonists in another instance. Some of the planters who did not leave for Cap Framjais
after the hurricane of 1773 needed debt relief. Others, whose crops were not ruined and
did not need help, took advantage of the situation, conspiring to get government
dispensations for their debts also. The ringleader of this last group was Gilbert Antoine de
St. Maxent (Unzaga’s new father-in-law), who felt he at least could expect favorable
treatment. St. Maxent, like the other would-be moochers, completely misjudged their
governor. Unzaga felt responsible for all his colonists and acted impartially toward the
whole group. Those debtors who could not pay were granted delays, but not excused
from their debts. Those who had tried to cheat the system were required to satisfy their
creditors immediately.
Unzaga’s fairness and impartiality gained respect not only for his governorship but
for the Spanish system. He also stimulated the economy with his actions because the
merchants realized they would now be able to collect debts and were also more inclined to
provide their fellow colonists with credit. Additionally, the planters and merchants lost in
the 1773 emigration to Cap Fran<?ais removed the last rebellious element from the New
Orleans population. Those families who had been tied to the mutinous rebels of 1768 left

MJack D. L. Holmes, “Andres Almonester y Roxas: Saint or Scoundrel,” LS 8
(Spring 1968), 49-50.
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with the last ship in 1773 and those who were left were far more inclined toward Unzaga
and the new Spanish government.85
While the economy in Louisiana’s hinterlands recovered quickly with the
prompting of British trade, New Orleans limped along until 1774 when trade between the
hinterlands and the city surged. Corn, beans, wheat and even beef moved downriver to
New Orleans which by that time had built slaughterhouses. Some farmers even took to
slaughtering their neighbors cattle for profit.8* Complete economic recovery, however,
came after Unzaga’s tenure when Louisiana became more fully integrated into the Spanish
empire. Meanwhile, his equitable treatment of the colonists had begun to stir a sense of
loyalty toward the new government. His persistence with the French commandants won
him grudging respect and helped integrate the economies of the capitol and the rest of the
colony. There was, of course, still the British to consider.
Mercantilists trade rules notwithstanding, Unzaga had orders to report British
movements to Spain. He, therefore, had to maintain continuous contact with British
settlements and/or British merchants along the Mississippi. The governor surmised that
his surveillance could benefit Spain, the British and Louisiana. By keeping an eye on the
“enemy,” Unzaga could now officially facilitate trade and “contact” with British merchants
by giving permission to unlicenced vessels to sail up river, delivering illicit goods and

85Gayarre, History of Louisiana, in, 98-99; Carl Brasseaux, The Road to
Tnnisiana: The Saint-Domingue Refugees 1792-1809 (Lafayette, LA: Center for
Louisiana Studies), 133-many of the last to leave died en route to Cap-Frangais.
“ LeDee to Unzaga, April 18, 1774, AGI, Cuba, 189-A, No. 38; and DeClouet to
Unzaga, August 30, 1774.
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information. Meanwhile, the governor and the Commandant at Balize gleaned as much
news from their captains as possible, not to mentioned the taxes alluded to earlier.87
Interestingly, as Unzaga welcomed British ships along the Mississippi, the rate of
incidences of British ships stopping for supplies and aid increased in Havana as well. Both
Unzaga and de la Torre took advantage of these contacts with foreign merchants to funnel
knowledge of England’s plans for war and settlement to the Spanish Court. Unzaga
licensed illegal merchants and developed a system of British spies to suit Spain’s needs in
Louisiana. Captain-general de la Torre, accomplished surveillance by questioning the
captains of injured English vessels, capturing illegal slaving ships and sometimes by openly
sending messages and requests to Jamaica via British merchant ships. Despite overtures
of war in late 1770 and 1771, and again toward the end of their tenures, both governors
took a stance of covert observation and peaceful resistence to the British intrusion into the
Caribbean and the Mississippi Valley, a policy their king would adopt as the Revolution of
1776 approached.
In summary, Unzaga made his observation of British merchants both advantageous
and profitable for the colony. He applied the king’s mercantilistic policies to commerce in
New Orleans, trying the create remunerative enterprises from Louisiana’s meager exports.
Working within the Bourbon reforms he began a lumber industry which would continue to
flourish throughout the colonial period and into statehood. His attempts at tobacco

"Light Townsend Cummins, Spanish Observers and the American Revolution
1775-1783 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1991), 14; Commandant Juan
Delavillebeauvre (Balize) to Unzaga, December 28,1770, AGI, Cuba 188; Unzaga to
Delavillebeauvre, December 31, 1770, ibid.
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proved profitable for a time, albeit after his governorship, and only for a short duration.
Cotton, also, would become a cash crop for Louisiana in the future. He also stewarded
public funds and managed to begin filling the colony’s depleted treasury. Lastly, his
peaceful and conciliatory attitude slowly began to reorient Louisiana’s frontier exchange
economy toward the colony’s legitimate commerce and began to re-orient his colonists’
loyalties toward their new king.
Much has been made of his “winking at” illegal trade along the Mississippi,
however, the governor merely applied an old Spanish custom known as Obedezco pero

no cumplo (I obey but do not follow through), to circumstances beyond his control. He
followed Spain’s imperial laws, within reason. If necessary, he bent them to Louisiana’s
unusual circumstances, excusing himself to higher officials and trusting in the just
reasoning of the crown. Control of the British was another matter. He managed to use
British merchants as a network of spies, but his unorthodox means of surveillance and
stimulation of the economy meant he also had to constantly guard against contraband and
illegal trade.
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Chapter Five
Contraband
“Unzaga acted judiciously for the province and for Spain, when he disregarded the
Chinese-like regulations which he was commanded to enforce, and when he winked at
their violation.”
Charles Gayarrd, History of Louisiana1
Charles Gayarrd’s accusation that Unzaga turned a blind eye to illegal commerce
misconstrues the nature of the governor’s true actions. The Bourbon crown’s reforms
which opened new ports but eradicated Louisiana’s best trading partners reinforced the
“informal” and often illegal network of trade that had always been present in the colony.
In the huge, semi-wild territory, Unzaga’s few troops and little money could not stop the
majority of Louisiana’s long entrenched, inter-colonial trade although he made examples
of blatandy illegal activities which threatened Spain’s authority. Through the use of

obedezco no cumplo, the governor pursued imperial goals by overlooking the colony’s
informal trade, using it instead as an opportunity to enhance his stifled economy, maintain
relations with the local Indian tribes and monitor any possible British threat to Louisiana.
Smuggling and illegal commerce were endemic to all colonial systems, not just
Louisiana. Spain never developed adequate manufacturing to supply its own empire and
consequently her colonists turned to illegal trade for items which were far less expensive
from British or French smugglers than those bought second-hand from the metropole. A
study of the governor’s letters at Havana and New Orleans shows that smuggling and
illegal trade continued and were often useful occurrences despite the commerce reforms

‘Gayarrd, History of Louisiana, m, 46.
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instituted during Unzaga’s tenure. Indeed, given the size and geography of the Spanish
empire in the Americas, no colonial Latin American governor or viceroy completely
controlled all commerce in his region nor did he aspire to do so. As Margaret Dalrymple
says in her work on John Fitzpatrick, “Spanish colonial officials, recognizing that this
trade was essential to the prosperity and sometimes the very survival of their colonies,
tended to ignore or even protect foreign traders, and the entire commercial process,
although absolutely illegal, became a recognized and highly valued branch of the overseas
commerce of several nations.”2
Louisiana, straddled the mouth of a river upon which two colonial giants
transported goods and communicated with two of the most infamous bodies of water in
the history of American piracy and smuggling—the Gulf of Mexico and its sister the
Caribbean.3 The constant and aggressive piracy that was the nemesis of Spain’s treasure
ships had generally disappeared by the eighteenth-century for a number of reasons. Under
Colbert, the French reorganized their empire and took greater control of its economy. At
the same time, Spain experienced a depression in its silver imports and a resulting drop in
shipments of that commodity in many parts of empire (New Spain excluded). Also by the
1760s, England began to organize her newly-won empire in the Americas, reasserting
mercantilist principles and limitations on colonial trade to replenish its diminished

2John Fitzpatrick, Letterbooks. 8.
3Good works on piracy include Clarence H. Haring, The Buccaneers of the West
Indies in the XVII Century (London, 1910; reprinted, Hamden, CN, 1966). There is also a
brief, but accurate description in Franklin W. Knight, The Caribbean: The Genesis of a
Fragmented Nationalism. 2d ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), 96-106.
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treasury after the colonial wars. Buccaneers and their constant chaos were, therefore, no
longer welcome and the European monarchies began to make treaties which included the
elimination of organized piracy.4
Smuggling, however, continued practically unabated between the colonies of France,
Britain and Spain. It was precisely because of the mercantilist policies practiced by the
metropoles that their colonies used smuggling and illicit trade to circumvent the system
and support their often meager existences. Of the three European giants, Spain practiced
the most rigorous mercantilism, exemplified by its flota or fleet port system. This system
required that all ships leaving the Americas for Spain gather at Havana once a year and
travel together, while ships going to the Americas had to trade through selected ports.
Unfortunately, Spain’s lack of an industrial basis forced it to import manufactured
products from other Continental nations at exorbitant prices. These inflated prices were in
turn passed on to American consumers. The fleet-port system left many colonies without
favorable or even beneficial access to European goods. Inter-colonial smuggling,
therefore, developed early in Latin America.5
Spain's flota system was revived slightly in the 1700s and this event should have
brought with it the dwindling of illegal smuggling. Instead, the opposite was hue because

4Anti-piracy efforts date from the 1690s but by the middle of the eighteenth
century were firmly in place and part of national policy.
5A larger discussion of theflota system can be found in J. H. Parry, The Spanish
Seaborne Empire (London: Hutchinson, 1966), John Edwin Fagg, Latin America: A
General History. 34® ed., (New York: Macmillan, 1977) and most good texts for colonial
Latin America.
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the rules which limited official trade to select ports remained, enhancing business for the
merchants in Cadiz and Seville and hurting colonial merchant houses.6
Latin American merchants who had ready-made family connections in the Iberian
peninsula increased their business, while those who did not have those all-important
connections did not do as well. Still, in the mainland colonies, (those to the south of the
borderlands) the merchant class had managed, through official and unofficial means, to
become a dynamic organization by the end of the eighteenth century. It did not matter,
however, whether the colony was wealthy or destitute, contraband was always welcome
in American ports.7
Societal change affected trade as well. By the mid-eighteenth century, most of
Latin America’s frontier, conquest society and its attempts at recreating Spanish
feudalism in the Americas had given way to a “commercially integrated system” of
plantations, mining and merchant houses.8 During the late 1600s, African slave labor and
sugar revived the depressed Caribbean economy and in time came to encompass tobacco,
indigo, cochineal, cacao and other colonial products from the mainland. It was precisely

6In fact one of the principle chores of the committees under the Bourbon reforms
was to change the monopoly system in Cadiz and reform the port-fleet system.
7See D. A. Brading, Miners and Merchants for a discussion of alternative routes to
wealth and the growth of the American merchant society and Roland Dennis Hussey’s,
The Caracas Company for a look at monopolistic trade in the Americas.
8Knight, Caribbean. 106.
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this triangular trade in sugar, slaves and rum which engendered many new navigational
acts in Europe, especially in Britain.9
The benefits of the sugar and slave economy were particularly dynamic in Cuba.
They reinvigorated trade in the island which had long been eclipsed by the discoveries of
the mainland and its abundant silver mines. Cuba’s primacy had barely been maintained
by theflota or royal fleet system whose ships were forced to congregate at Havana. The
island's only other “claim to fame” within empire was its unique defensive position
astride the Caribbean and Gulf. Sugar production reactivated the long island’s long
suppressed economy. While it hardly reached the production of the French and British
islands, Cuba’s sugar production more than doubled in the two decades between the
1740s and 1760s.(See Table 13). The new economy also re-intensified the smuggling
between the French and Spanish islands.
Because of the increase in sugar and the new arrangement to purchase slaves
from the British Antilles, in the late eighteenth-century Havana received many of the
slaves sent to the Caribbean and redistributed them to the surrounding Spanish
possessions. Prior to 1763, the slave trade had devolved through different Spanish ports.
Santo Domingo was the foremost slave market until 1560. In the Papal Bull of 1493, the
Spanish colonies were excluded from the African slaving coasts. After the middle of the
sixteenth-century, when African slave labor became important to Latin America, an

asiento, or the privilege to bring slaves into the Spanish empire, was given to various

^ i d , 111-115; See also Herbert S. Klein, African Slavery in Latin America and
the Caribbean. (New York: Oxford University Press, 56-67.
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European countries. For a century after the asiento was installed, all slaves entering
Spain’s colonies had to come through the port of Cartagena de Indias in Colombia.10

TABLE 13
Sugar Production in the Americas, 1741-1770

Annual Average in Tons
1741-1745

1766-1770

French West Indies

64,675

77,923

British West Indies

41,043

74,452

Brazil (Portuguese)

34,000

20,400

Colonv

8,230

Virgin Islands (Danish)
Suriname (Dutch)

9,210

6,800

Cuba (Spanish)

2,000

5,200

Sources: Jan Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean from the Arawak and the
Carib to the Present (New York: Meridian Books, 1992), 105; Richard Sheridan, The
Development of the Plantations to 1750 (Aylesbury, England: Ginn and Company,
1970), 22.

10Jan Rogozinski, A Brief History of the Caribbean from the Arawak and the
Carib to the Present (New York: Meridian Books, 1992), 101; Hubert Herring, A History
of Latin America 3d ed, (New Yo±: Alfred A Knopf, 1968), 105.
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At the end of the War of Spanish Succession, when the Bourbon dynasty took
over Spain, the British received the asiento. The British were forced to give it up after
the War of Jenkins Ear (1748). Charles HI tried to create a Spanish monopoly slave trade
based on Puerto Rico that would compete with the slaves coming from British Jamaica
but it failed because the Spanish colonists did not welcome the change in their “system,”
and also didn’t want to pay the King’s 40 peso tax on Spanish slaves." After that, the
Crown contracted with foreigners to import slaves. This encouraged the British and
French islands of the Caribbean to smuggle slaves and other contraband to Cuba and
other Spanish possessions. Cuba’s coast was replete with tiny, hidden bays and coves
which could conceal the small boats used to bring illegal slaves, and contraband into the
island. Slaves were a particularly expensive commodity and could bring smugglers a
quick and lucrative return on their investments. By the mid-eighteenth century, Havana’s
French neighbor, Saint Domingue became the riches sugar producer and the largest slave
island, thereby adding to the general smuggling of slaves in the Caribbean.
Slavery also became a high lucrative and legitimate industry. Introduced by the
English who brought 10,700 African slaves into Cuba during 1762, the base population of
10,000 in 1770 slaves grew to 44,300 in 1774. Licensed ships left Havana regularly for
Jamaica as early as 1772 carrying Spanish silver to exchange for flour and slaves.12

"James F. King, “Evolution of the Free Slave Trade Principle in Spanish Colonial
Administration,” HAHR. 22 (1942): 41.
,2Entradas and Salidas, AGI Cuba 1216, Folio 169.
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Spain managed license the slave trade but smuggling in general continued. Sugar
and slaves brought wealth to Havana. As Cubans grew wealthier they sought to
accumulate foreign goods and opportunistic merchants were more than willing to chance
bringing contraband goods into the island. It is a great irony that the one man, Martnn de
Arana, who knew in advance of the British invasion of Havana was a Cuban smuggler
who was promptly jailed upon his return to the island before he could warn the
governor.13
Vigorous entrepreneurs from France and Great Britain also attempted to enter
Havana’s harbor under the pretense that their ships were damaged or taking on water or
needing food before they continued their journeys. Some ships which initially required
only minor repair managed to stay docked for over a month. Ships which stayed for over
a week were quite possibly involved in illegal commercial transactions because other
ships with similar problems made their way back to the Gulf almost overnight14
The Cuban governor’s reports during the tenure of the Marquis de la Torre (17721776) speak more of illicit commerce discovered at sea and the Circum-Caribbean than of
domestic smuggling and de la Torre allowed far more ships to enter the port than did

13Klein, African Slavery. 86-87; Barclay, Havana.103.
,4Entradas and Salidas from AGI, Cuba 1220 and 1221; by 1775 and 1776 some
of this pretense may have been used by the British to observe what was going on in
Havana as well. An inspection of the cargo aboard ships which sat for a month in harbor
might provide further answers to the length of stay but at present that information is not
available.
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Bucareli. This may be because de la Torre intended to use them as weathervanes for
English activity or because he, like Unzaga, found them economically useful.15
In contrast to Havana’s economic recovery, the dearth of supplies and settlers in
the borderlands meant that French and Spanish settlements in those areas remained small,
often isolated and even more dependent on illicit trade. Smuggling was deeply rooted in
real necessity. The Spanish in both S t Augustine and Pensacola traded regularly with
French Mobile and New Orleans for supplies. S t Augustine even bought or traded for
weapons and ammunition from the English in Carolina, regardless of the state of
hostilities between the colonies. The market in St. Augustine was so good that even when
their mother countries were at war, many Carolina merchants refused to attack St.
Augustine for fear they would disrupt their profitable exchange. Indeed, merchants as far
away as New York and Providence exchanged British goods for “gold, silver, deerskins,
and oranges from Florida.”16
Sometimes war produced money-making opportunities. During the colonial wars
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, British merchants entered French New

I5Reports range from captured French and English boats to reports of illicit
commerce at other islands like that of the local official at Santiago de Cuba who reported
to Captain-General de la Torre that the English were illegally doing business in Puerto
Rico, Juan Antonio Ayano de Urete to Torres, April 21,1774, AGI, Cuba 1144, No. 198;
or the regular reports of English and French ships which “needed assistance” in the port
of Havana and stayed anywhere from overnight, to a week and even to a month before
they left, Entradas and Salidas, AGI, Cuba 1216, 1217,1220,1221.
I6Surrey, Commerce of Louisiana. 418-27, William S. Coker, Financial History of
Pensacola’s Snanish Presidios 1698-1763. (Pensacola: Pensacola Historical Society,
1979)2, TePaske. The Governorship of Spanish Florida . 204-205: Weber. Spanish
Borderlands. 176.
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Orleans under a system called “flags of truce.” These merchant parlementaires, as the
French called them, were commonly used to exchange military prisoners. Colonial
governments allowed the ship captains to offset the expense of transporting the prisoners
by allowing them to sell otherwise “illicit” goods in enemy ports. New Orleans and
Mobile afforded such a lucrative operation that by the late 1750s, “British mercantile
houses . . . came to dominate the trade of the Gulf C o a st. . . ” Many Englishmen even
settled in New Orleans.17
In colonial Louisiana, French settlers, slaves and Indians alike welcomed all
opportunities to obtain European goods and food . During the French regime this
necessity was so acute that the French fought with the English over the southeastern
Indian trade, often pitting one tribe against another. Trade at places like Natchitoches and
the Arkansas Post disturbed the balance of power in the west by bringing new Indian
groups down from the Great Plains and into the Red and Mississippi River Valleys, who
were in search of better hunting grounds, European dry goods and weapons. In the
process, they disturbed other groups like the Big and Little Osage, setting off a number of
intertribal wars. Spanish officials harangued French settlers who gave the Indians guns
because too often those same arms were turned against Spanish settlements, yet the
Spanish were not above arming the Indians themselves if the need arose.18

17Abraham P. Nasatir and James R. Mills, Commerce and Contraband in New
Orleans during the French and Indian Wan A Documentary Study of the Texel and Three
Brothers Affairs (Cincinnati: American Jewish Archives,1968), 6-7,166-67; Fitzpatrick,
Letterbooks. 9.
18Stanley Faye, “Arkansas Post,” 635; Elizabeth A. H. John, Storms Brewed in
Other Men’s Worlds. 304-374;Weber, Spanish Borderlands. 178.
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Unzaga, like other governors in Spain’s borderlands, found smuggling and illegal
commerce firmly entrenched in Louisiana. Even after Ulloa’s arrival, the frontier
economy of Louisiana’s hinterlands had remained oblivious of the changes in the Atlantic
trade. Indians, settlers, and slaves continued their frontier exchange of contraband goods,
resisting change and prospering collectively in relative peace and harmony. Despite
O’Reilly’s dismissal of the British merchants in New Orleans, the informal system of
trade in the frontier struggled to remain intact, hoarding goods until better times returned,
and seeking other outlets. Although Unzaga slowly turned the domestic economy toward
New Orleans and legal commerce, his colonists found new “outlets” for their goods.
The Louisiana province was a sieve. Major apertures were at Spanish Illinois
(Missouri) along the Northern Mississippi; British Manchac, approximately 1500 yards
north across the narrow Bayou Manchac, which connected Lakes Pontchartrain and
Maurepas to the Mississippi through the Amite River, the Arkansas Post at the junction
of the Arkansas and Mississippi rivers; New Orleans; and Natchitoches, just across the
border from the fort of Los Adaes in Spanish Texas. The smaller holes of the sieve,
furthermore, could be easily entered and exited by Indians, experienced traders and
trappers, or any settler with a pirogue (or a horse to reach Los Adaes).
British Manchac was one of the worst offenders in contraband. It had developed
on the abandoned ruins of old Fort Bute. Named after the Earl of Bute, George Hi’s tutor
and unpopular secretary of the treasury, the fort had originally been positioned to guard
the entrance to the chain of lakes and waterways that ran east from the Mississippi. After
the 1766 the British government abandoned it. The Lieutenant Governor of British West
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British West Florida, Montfort Browne, in 1768 recommended that his government
establish a town there to deflect the fur trade going to New Orleans.19
During Unzaga’s tenure, British merchants believed that the settlement at
Manchac would entice many people not only to trade with them, but also to emigrate
from Louisiana to British West Florida. The British government concurred, and in 1771
drew up plans for such a settlement although the town was never officially built. The
settlement grew nonetheless. Manchac was not a pleasant place to live. It was low and
swampy and flooded regularly. Still, as early as 1770, British merchants like John
Fitzpatrick, Isaac and Manuel Monsanto, and Thomas Bentley moved in, cannibalizing
wood from the old fort to build homes and stores and using the fort for a warehouse.20
Settlers from the areas around Point Coup6e, Natchitoches, Attakapas, and
Spanish Illinois favored Manchac because it cut ten days off the normal trip to New
Orleans and the British paid better prices for furs and produce. Manchac was a magnet
for contraband. As has been noted, Unzaga faced continued smuggling with the few
British merchants at the old fort during the New Orleans “famine” of 1770. While
Unzaga argued with his post commandants over the supposedly devastated com crops,
the Acadian fanners in the Iberville district and the German Coast were caught, not once,

19Joseph Barton Starr, ‘Tories, Dons, and Rebels: The American Revolution in
British West Florida,” (Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 1971), 51; Fitzpatrick,
Letterbooks. 13; Robin Fabel, “Governor George Johnstone of British West Florida,”
Florida Historical Quarterly. 54 (April, 1976): 501.
“ James Jones, (a New Orleans Merchant) wrote to General Frederick Haldimand
in 1770 that he believed the abandoment of Fort Bute was a mistake and that a town there
would entice many Louisianaians to come across the river to British West Florida,
Fitzpatrick. Letterbooks. 13.15 and 19
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but twice, smuggling with the British at Manchac. The farmers found it useful to tell the
commandant that the first crop had failed, or the seed had rotted in the ground. Even
more common was the deliberate miscalculation of how much they produced. The
frustrated and angry governor chastised both commandants Dustind and Verret because
the Acadians and other farmers were selling their com and rice to the British for good
prices in exchange for otherwise unavailable manufactured items. Even worse, the
Acadians in the St. James district were giving gunpowder and lead shot to the Tensas and
Houma Indians.21
British merchants continued to do well in Manchac. In 1772 merchant Rufus
Putnam passed through the settlement noting that there were a number of good homes
with “very good gardens.” He also noticed the absence of any soldiers, a strange
occurrence for a frontier settlement. Manchac’s famous swamp still plagued the
settlement, however. When it was not flooding, the swamp dried up and the fish died,
giving off an almost intolerable stench.22
Swampy land notwithstanding, Manchac continued to pose a problem for Unzaga.
British merchandise also attracted a large number of Indians and the merchants tried to
entice other, supposedly Spanish-allied tribes, into trade with British West Florida. They

“ Unzaga to Dustin6, August 11,1770, AGI, Cuba 193-B, Folio 281; Judice to
Unzaga, August 28,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/21. Unzaga to Verret, August 30,
1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 44a.
“ Albert C. Bates, ed., The Two Putnams. Isreal and Rufus, in the Havana
Expedition 1762 and in the Mississippi River Exploration 1772-73 with some account of
the Company of Military Adventurers (Hartford, CN: Connecticut Historical Society,
1931), 174,245. The lack of soldiers would be “fixed” in the late 1770s.
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did not have a hard argument Their wares included “knives, axes, scissors, combs,
blankets, shirts, hats, and cloth, as well as firearms, gunpowder, and flints.”23 Liquor
added fuel to the fire and the merchants often deliberately enticed their Indian patrons
with alcohol, a practice decried by both British and Spanish officials. It appears that
some of the alcohol consumed at Manchac was actually brought by Unzaga’s colonists.
In 1772, a series of letters between Descoudreaux and Unzaga discussed the continual
occurrences of smuggling between the Acadians and Manchac. In a letter dated February
6th the Post Commandant at the small Spanish fort across from Manchac indicates that the
boats also carried beer, as well as foodstuffs.24
The merchants continued unabated and ungovemed in Manchac throughout
Unzaga’s tenure. Any attempt by the British to apply “legal” restrictions was “dealt with
summarily” by the merchants themselves. Such was the case with John Thomas,
commissioned as an Indian agent and Justice of the Peace, who moved into Manchac in
October of 1771. Thomas was pompous, dictatorial and thoroughly unpopular with both
the merchants and the Indians. He abused his authority with the former and ignored
custom and decorum with the latter (see Chapter 6).25 The merchants had no use for him

23Weher. Spanish Borderlands. 178.
^Descoudreaux to Unzaga, January 15,1772, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folios 565-566
and Descoudreaux to Unzaga, February 6,1772, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 563. The
letters continue into 1773 and 1774.
“ Robert Rea, “Redcoats and Redskins on the Lower Mississippi, 1763-1776: The
Career of Ll John Thomas,” LH, 11 (1970): 5-33.
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and in 1772 had him dismissed from his post, but not before Luis de Unzaga had a chance
to uncover British plans to settle Natchez.
Both Unzaga and Thomas used Manchac as a source of information. Unzaga,
recruited the help of James O’Kelly, an Irish Catholic from Manchac who requested
Spanish citizenship for religious reasons. Through O’Kelly, the governor traced the
whereabouts and plans of both British Indian agents, John Stuart and John Thomas.
Thomas himself used the Indian tribes to glean information about Spanish fortifications at
New Orleans. The disagreement between Thomas and Unzaga became so heated that the
governor threatened to arrest him if he entered Louisiana.26
The liquor which flowed at the taverns and merchant shops in Manchac also
created other problems for Unzaga. Frontier life was boring and tough and alcoholic
drinks softened the dirt and grime of an otherwise brutal existence. Trappers, traders,
settlers, slaves and Indians enjoyed drinking, often to excess. Manchac’s taverns
encouraged the local settlers in St. James Parish to begin running their homes as cabarets
where they could sell liquor, play cards and indulge themselves. As early as November
19a>of 1771, Abraham Landry petitioned Post Commandant, Louis Judice, for a license to
open such a cabaret in his home. Three days later the governor approved the licenses.
Unzaga hoped that by licensing Spanish cabarets he might divert some of the drinking at
Manchac, and also some of the smuggling.27

^Fitzpatrick, Letterbooks. 18; Cummins, Spanish Observers. 14-15.
^Judice to Unzaga, November 19, 1771, and Unzaga to Judice, November 22,
1771, AGI, Cuba 188-C, Folio 93.
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Unzaga’s hopes to stop smuggling at Manchac were in vain, but the cabaret
licenses became a hit with the locals. The next year home-cabarets were so popular that
the governor decided he would auction off the licenses, thereby gaining another meager
source of income for the government Licensing was big business by 1775 and had
spread to other parishes.28 Unfortunately, the cabarets led to gambling and other illegal
activities which had to be either ignored or dealt with. It appears that Unzaga ignored
such activities during his tenure, although later governors like Carondelet had to deal with
citizens complaining about the gambling. For the moment the government turned a blind
eye to the proceedings.
British contraband exacerbated Unzaga’s problems and added to the drain on
empire. By the end of his tenure, in 1776, some twenty houses hugged the Mississippi at
British Manchac. The New Orleans merchants ousted by O’Reilly had been joined by
men like John Blommart, Thomas Barber and James Willing. These men tied London,
Pensacola and even Jamaica to New Orleans, Natchitoches, St. Lotus and sometimes even
Santa Fe. They openly sold contraband goods and slaves to Louisiana’s colonists and
drained the economy of coin. Indeed, Spanish pesos entered the colony in large amounts,
large enough to offset many of the problems the colony faced. Much of the specie,
however, immediately left the colony through the large hole called “little Manchac.”29

“ Judice to Unzaga, September 20,1772, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 436 and
Dutisnd to Unzaga, June 23,1775, 189-B, Folio 234.
Fitzpatrick, Letterbooks. 20; Arthur P. Whitakers, “The Commerce of Louisiana
and the Floridas at the End of the Eighteenth Century,” HAHR. 16 (1936), 203.
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The smuggling at Manchac was only a portion of what that entered Louisiana.
Slaves and other goods from the Caribbean were commonly smuggled in along the Gulf
Coast of Louisiana which contained the same kind of small coves that Cuba had.
Moreover, the Louisiana coast was deltaic and possessed entrances to numerous rivers
that flowed from the colony. This was prime smuggling country for slaves and
contraband from the Caribbean and would continue to serve privateers and smugglers like
Jean Lafitte well into the nineteenth century.
Slaves were never a large element of legal commerce in the first two decades of
the Spanish period, although all three of Louisiana’s first Spanish governor’s backed
slave importation. Indeed, slave sales to Louisiana lagged far behind those to the sugar
islands of the Caribbean and even to the British colonies in North America. In fact, the
only Circum-Caribbean colony with lower slave imports was Spanish Santo Domingo
(See Table 14).
There are several explanations for this phenomenon. Sugar did not become a
large portion of Louisiana’s economy until Etienne Bord brought in a chemist from Saint
Domingue to show the colonists how to properly granulate sugar in the 1790s. Louisiana,
therefore, was never part of the eighteenth-century sugar boom in the Caribbean. Also,
slave revolts in Saint Domingue during the Seven Years War retarded slave sales because
Louisiana strictly forbade the importation of “domiciled slaves from the Antilles.”30

Bruto or bozal slaves, those imported directly from Africa, were the only ones accepted.

“ Thomas N. Ingersoll, “The Slave Trade and the Ethnic Diversity of Louisiana’s
Slave Community.” LH. 37 (Spring, 1996): 141.
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Slave traders, however, did not find Louisiana’s sales large enough to justify the risky trip
from Africa, across the northern Caribbean and then another hundred miles up-river to
New Orleans. It was far easier to sell slaves to the sugar islands. Still, before O’Reilly
removed them, several merchants established themselves in New Orleans and sold slaves
to the planters.31 Sales were never extensive even though Ulloa had tried to encourage
slavery in order to induce agricultural expansion. He even offered his “mark of
protection” to English merchant James Jones of Pensacola if Jones would sell to
Louisiana’s planters on credit.32
Unzaga encouraged African slavery. He wrote to Bucareli in 1770 that the colony
might yield a number of crops and only needed the proper “labor to increase production,
especially Indigo.”33 Still, the majority of Louisiana’s colonists could not afford many
slaves, especially during Unzaga’s governorship. Only the planter elite along the lower
Mississippi could purchase large numbers of slaves and their plantations did not expand
until late in the Spanish period. Also, the colony’s planters could draw from a number of
labor resources, including vagrants, to harvest crops. Using such seasonal labor was less
expensive than the purchase price, housing and feeding of slaves. Slaves were a precious
commodity and smuggled slaves sold legally for three times their purchase price. The
limited legal sales therefore also reflect the fact that smuggling Africans was still

3‘See Abraham P. Nasatir and James R. Mills, Commerce and Contraband, for a
larger discussion of British merchants and slaves sales in New Orleans.
32Ingersoll, “Slave Trade,” 141.
33Unzaga to Bucareli, July 8,1770, Dispatches, vol. 2,54-55
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TABLE 14
Estimated Slave Imports 1701-1810 (in thousands)
1701-1760

1761-1810

British Islands
Barbados

180.4

72.0

Leeward Islands

142.4

159.5

Jamaica

263.8

398.5

Windward Islands

—

70.1

Trinidad

—

22.4

Grenada

—

67.0

10.0

15.0

Martinique

146.8

111.6

Guadeloupe

160.5

76.6

Saint-Domingue

308.7

481.0

Other
French Islands

Spanish Islands
Santo Domingo

—

6.0

Cuba

—

139.2

Puerto Rico

20.0

16.6

Britsh

170.6

177.4

Louisiana

18.0

10.2

Brazil

959.6

931.8

Spanish Colonies

271.2

167.6

North America

South America

Source: Figures taken from Rogozinski, Brief History. 124.
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profitable until well into the nineteenth-century when towns developed along the old
slaving rivers used by Jean Lafitte.
The Mississippi offered many avenues for contraband, from Balize at the mouth
of the river to the forts in Spanish Illinois. Contraband could come ashore at any number
of places. One of the more favored locations was the Arkansas Post Arkansas, which
means “south wind” in the Algonquian language, had three locations during the colonial
period.34 In 1756, the fort had been moved downstream and rebuilt on the northern bank
of the Arkansas at the junction of that river and the Mississippi. The deltaic region
contained abundant wildlife and natural resources. Elm, cedar, and cypress grew for
building materials, and the loamy soil of the delta gave rise to huge canebrakes, reeds and
thickets which hosted thousands of birds, rabbits and deer. Even remnants of the once
plentiful buffalo still could be found on the Arkasas river. The move also made it more
convenient to receive trade coming downriver from Spanish Illinois.35
The choice had not been a wise one for several reasons. The new location was
swampy and flooded, having none of the good agricultural land of the older site.36

34Arkansas is an abberation of Ak a kon ce or south wind, sometimes seen as
Akakanze the same Siouan tribe which produced the Kansas Indians, Samuel Morris
Dickinson, “Colonial Arkansas Place Names,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly (hereinafter
called AHQ), 48 (Summer, 1989): 138.
35Harold K. Grimmett, “Early Plant and Animal communities of the Arkansas
Delta.” AHQ. 47 (Summer, 1989): 103;
“ Despite its defensive position the fort was relocated up river to the Grand Prarie
grasslands in 1779 in hopes that it would finally grow and produce another barrier to the
English. See Monis S. Arnold, “The Relocation of Arkansas Post to Scores Rouges in
1779.” AHQ. 42 (Winter, 1983): 317, 319.
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Settlers tended, therefore, to pursue their traditional trade in hunting and fur trapping
rather than raising crops and the post remained relatively undeveloped. Instead of
fanning, most male occupants at the village eked out a living hunting, while their families
depended on foodstuffs from the Indians, and grain (specially wheat) and drygoods from
Spanish Illinois.37 The residents of Arkansas, to quote French commandant Alexandre de
Clouet, were “not truly settlers,” and “not a single resident had an outdoor oven.”38
In truth, the settlement at Arkansas never grew very large during the Spanish
period. The census of 68 whites and 31 slaves taken in 1768 changed little within the next
decade. In 1771 it read 62 whites and 16 slaves and by the end of Unzaga’s term the
count had dropped to 50 whites and 11 slaves.39 The families continued to hunt, trap and
fish. Development was so slow that it there were no grist mills in the community before
1791, and the first sawmill didn’t appear until after the Spanish period. Still, some hardy
souls managed to produce small amounts of tobacco and send it downriver to New
Orleans or better yet, to Concordancia.40

37Salted buffalo tongue was a big trade item for hunters. When wheat wasn't
available, the residents turned to sagamit6 (boiled com mush with bear oil and tallow) as
a substitute accompaniment to their meal of birds eggs, wild game and buffalo tongue.
38DeClouet to O’Reilly, October 6,1768, AGI, Cuba 107 and Morris S. Arnold,
“The Significance of the Arkansas Colonial Experience,” AHQ. 51 (Spring, 1992): 73.
39Census material found in AGL Cuba 107 and 190 and Arnold S. Morris,
Colonial Arkansas. 1684-1804: A Social and Cultural History. (Fayetteville: University of
Arkansas Press, 1991), Appendix II, 179-181. The census, of course, did not include
solitary hunters who lived away from the post for the majority of the year and might
number anywhere from 50 to 100 men.
‘“’Arnold, “Significance of Arkansas,” 73-74; Stanley Faye, “Arkansas Post,” 635.
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Another problem was that the Indians objected to the move, and even more to the
change of ownership-French to Spanish. The post commandants had been given
monopoly rights to trade among the Quapaw but the removal of the fort stressed trade and
the tribe petitioned the governor to allow them to move to a more suitable site on the Red
River. This was a serious problem because many of the French and Spanish commandants
were actually merchants who also happened to be officials. Some received their
monopoly trade rights before they received their military commissions.41 The
commandants at Arkansas post, therefore, often focused on the fur trade rather than
agriculture.
Because of its isolation and position among the Indians, contraband had long been
a part of business at Arkansas Post. During the Spanish administration, settlers not only
traded furs illicitly they also had a large business in salted buffalo tongues which were
extremely popular with the British. Then too, Arkansas attracted a great many men
considered the “wrong element.” According to Athanase de Mdzi&res the people who
hunted and trapped around the Arkansas post were the lowest of scum, “hunters,
murderes, rapists, and fugitives from justice.”42 This was perhaps too harsh a judgment
of the men at the Post, but many hunters did commit crimes. Hunters often did a double
business-one with the Spanish colony and another with the Indians. In 1770 one hunter

4lIbid, 69,79, Morris S. Arnold, Unequal Laws Unto a Savage Race: European
Legal Traditions in Arkansas. 1686-1836. (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press,
1985), 107-108.
42Bolton, Athenase de M6ziferes. 1,166.
131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was caught not only selling illegal goods to the Indians but also acting as a gunsmith to
the local tribes. The Spanish government frowned heavily on arming the Indians and the
hunter lost his license, his possessions and his freedom.43
Some hunters fell into the trap of accepting powder and shot in exchange for a
contract to provide their “backers” (often post commanders or merchants from New
Orleans) with the first lien against the gross profits of their catch. Hunters at Arkansas
post frequently fell heavily into debt to their creditors due to poor hunting seasons or the
many accidents which befall men in the wilds. Hunters who owed too much money
sometimes just never returned to Arkansas post. They might contract out at another post
trying to recoup their losses before they returned home or they might just stay in the
wilderness living among the Indians. Those who stayed in the wilds frequently turned to
lives of desperation which included murder and thievery.44
The land west of Arkansas post and south toward Natchitoches was filled with
Indians, (Osage, Quapaw, Caddo and others), where a man could get lost. Among the
Indians one could find isolated hunters, and colonists who served the Indians by repairing
guns or giving them access to European goods. One could also find any number of
deserters from the military. Many ex-military men had already experienced smuggling
with the Indians or the British and chose to disappear among the tribes. These men,
indebted hunters, smugglers, criminals and deserters gave Arkansas Post its bad
reputation.

43Arnold S. Morris, Colonial Arkansas. 64.
“ Faye, “Arkansas Post,” 637-638
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Post commandants and merchants also became debtors because of the hunting
contracts. Commandants in charge of licensing hunters also invested in outfitting hunters.
Some commandants like Captain de Villiers, appointed to the Post in 1776, had fallen
into financial straits from such contracts and could barely make their payments on their
loans. Because of the poor return on their investments, Arkansas post was subject to
many changes of leadership. It was considered a hardship post and had the most changes
in leadership of any post during Unzaga’s governorship.45
The English settlement of Concordancia built on the Mississippi just across from
the mouth of the Arkansas exacerbated both the Indian problem and contraband trade in
furs and tallow. British manufactured goods and liquor soon lured the Indians and thenvital com and furs away from the Post. All the Spanish commandants had trouble halting
the gradual migration of Indian trade into British territory. They had few gifts and smaller
medals than the English and often had to make illegal deals with the tribes to give them
whiskey in order to keep the Indians on the right bank of the Mississippi.
The French at the post thought liquor necessary to keep the Indians happy, an
important point since many of the people at the post depended on them for food during
hard times. O’Reilly had strictly forbidden liquor sales and the first Spanish commandant
at Arkansas had refused to give the Indians liquor, hi 1770 commandant DeClouet
reported to Unzaga that one woman in Concordancia sold liquor to the Indians and had
been known to enter Spanish territory with her assistants, traveling several miles up the

45Faye, “Arkansas Post,” 345.
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Arkansas to trade with the Indian villages. He also complained of an Englishman who
had dared settle among the Quapaw, trading illegally and ridiculing the Spanish.46
By 1772, with increasing influence from the British, the Indians began
demanding liquor from the little Spanish post at Arkansas. The tribe informed governor
Unzaga that they preferred the French commandants who treated them better, and that
Captain Fernando de Leyba, a Spaniard, didn’t even speak French, which was their
language of trade. The Indians were also incensed because earlier that month Leyba had
arrested Nicholas Labussi&r, a favored French trader living with the Quapaw, for selling
liquor and “other trade violations.”47
Unzaga defended his commandant but as time went on was forced to admit that it
was probably wiser to license liquor dealers than to forbid liquor altogether. That rule
seemed to maintain some peace at Arkansas Post although it never stopped the Indians
from “double dipping” at Arkansas and at Concordancia.48
Illicit trade between the settlers, slaves and Indians of Arkansas Post and the
British continued unabated by Spanish rule or attempts at law enforcement. It became
such an important way to supplement colonial lives that in 1777 Athanase De M6zi6res

46Demaselli£re to O’Reilly, January 15,1770, AGL Cuba 107. The trader stayed
among the Quapaw until 1774 when the new guns and fortifications at the Arkansas post
impressed the Indians enough that they chose to believe the Spanish and evicted him. De
Leyba to Unzaga, November 22, 1771, and October 26,1773, AGI, Cuba 107; Orieta to
Unzaga, July 14,1774, Ibid. (See Chapter 5).
47Amold, Colonial Arkansas. 155; Leyba to Unzaga, June 15,1772, and Leyba to
Unzaga, June 25, 1772, AGL Cuba 107.
^De Villiers to Galvez, September 15,1779, AGL Cuba 192.
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reported to Unzaga’s successor that the English at Concordancia had built a block house
which could store larger amounts of trade goods.49
South of Arkansas three posts guarded the western regions of lower Louisiana.
On the Mississippi itself Pointe Couple guarded the south bend of the river below the
English fort at Natchez and traded among the small tribes. Its commandant presided over
a number of the small Acadian settlements and coasts built and occupied during Unzaga’s
tenure. North of Point Couple, and into the wilderness along the Red, Black and then
Quachita Rivers, was a small trading station among the Caddo that became known as
Ouatchita Post Farther west Natchitoches guarded the colonial boundary between New
Spain and Louisiana. Together these posts controlled most of the Indian trade in the West
O’Reilly had given a Lieutenant Governorship to the commander at Natchitoches because
of its sensitive location near the fort of Los Adaes in Spanish Texas.
Of the previous posts, Point Couple and Ouachita carried no military
significance to Captain-General O’Reilly, who appointed a series of tenientes particulars,
or militia captains who acted as government agents for such areas. In reality, during the
1770s, Ouachita post was merely a meeting ground for the French courier de bois who
went up the Ouachita River to trade with the Ouachita, Osage and Quapaw Indian.
Unzaga’s report to Arriaga, Noticia General de lo que produse la Provinacia de la

buisiana, October 26,1771, stated that the Ouachita lands afforded settlers litde
agricultural area and less in the way of wildlife. In fact, the only thing they yielded were

49Bolton, Athanase de M6ziferes. 2: 141.
135

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

medical plants like fems for making cough medicine (syrop de capillare), sarsaparilla and
ipecaguana, and except for foxes, few animals capable of making good pelts for sale.50
Most residents were semi-permanent, subsistence hunters whose sole property was a rifle
and powder hom.
The Ouachita settlement stayed small and insignificant until 1785 when it was
removed to a new location at present day Monroe and renamed F t Miro. Few works,
other than Unzaga’s report describe the early colonists. Most discuss the life of JeanBaptiste Filhiol, commandant at F t Miro who didn’t reach the Ouachita country until
1782, after Unzaga’s tenure. Still, by Filhiol’s time the people on the Ouachita River
remained subsistence hunters and could not easily be coerced into agriculture. These men,
he said, had the same reputation as the hunters at Arkansas Post Many were fugitives and
deserters, and their independence was more important than any loyalty to god or king.51
The post at Ouachita was probably rife with contraband, particularly goods the
Indians might have been able to bring from Spanish Texas (northern New Spain). There
are no records on the subject however, and any military importance the post received
happened only after its move down river during Mfro’s time.52

50Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, Noticia General de lo que produse la Provincia de
la Luisiana, AN (Havana), Cedulas y Ordenes, v. 284 in Faye, “Arkansas Post” 635.
51Arnold, Colonial Arkansas. 159; for Filhiol’s description see Jean-Baptiste
Filhiol, “Description of the Ouachita in 1786,” LHO 20 (1937): 476.
52See James Fair Hardin, Don Juan Filhiol and the founding of Fort Miro the
modem Monroe Louisiana (New Orleans: T. J. Moran’s, 1937) and E. Russ Williams,
Spanish Post d’Ouachita: The Ouachita Valiev in Colonial Louisiana 1783-1804 and
Earlv American Statehood. 1804-1820 (Monroe, LA: Williams Genealogical
Publications, 1995).
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Unzaga disagreed with O’Reilly about the importance and leadership of Point
Coupde. The post was situated only sixteen leagues south of the junction of the
Mississippi and the Red River (across from present-day St. Francisville) which opened
into the western frontier. Point Couple regulated all river traffic and licensing in and out
of the western area between the Mississippi and Natchitoches. In 1770, Unzaga replaced
Captain of the Militia, Francisco Allain, with a military commandant, Captain Balthazar
de Villiers, recently of Natchitoches.53
As the entrance into western Louisiana, the primary problems at Point Coupde
surrounded the Indians, and English attempts to get through to the western tribes. On
April, 1770, Francois Allain wrote Unzaga that the English had sent Chickasaw and
Indians of “La grande nation,” (perhaps Creek) across the river into Spanish territory.
These English-allied tribes “drank continuously” and in that condition perpetrated raids
on the fort. It appears the Choctaw were also stirring up problems and Allain was
delighted when they retired back into English territory. Both the Chickasaw and Choctaw
continued to trouble Allain and his successor Devillier. They also continued going to
Manchac for liquor before they began their campaigns of terror.54
Indian depredations hurt many Louisianans’. For example, Point Couple
continually had property damage and livestock stolen by such Indians. Even the British
suffered at the hand’s of their erstwhile allies. Allain reported in September of 1770 that

53Faye, “Arkansas Post,” 645.
^Allain to Unzaga, April 20,1770, AGL Cuba 188-A, Folio 16 and Unzaga to
Allain, April 26,1770, Ibid., Folio 17. Allain openly accused the English of such
offenses in 1771, Allain to Unzaga, January 4,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 24.
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an Englishman named McIntosh sought refuge at the post because he feared death at the
hands of the Choctaw.55
Smuggling at Point Coupee varied. The primary spots for smuggling near the post
were the English settlements at Manchac and Natchez and both Allain and Devillier
reported smuggling by the Acadians with the English across the river. Natchitoches also
passed along contraband goods, especially horses, as well as certain criminal elements.
As early as September of 1770, commandant Allain informed the governor that the post
had received a number of mules and horses. Unzaga replied that he must check them
carefully for those branded with a “B.” That brand belonged to the Baron Juan Maria de
Riperda which meant that the cattle might have been stolen from Spanish Texas, a
common occurrence.56 Then too, as Point Couple became a tobacco producing location,
illicit trade in that item began.57 To date there has been almost no examination of the post
and setdement at Point Coupde. Considering the importance of its location and the
continued trade in illegal goods further investigation is warranted.
The Post at Natchitoches has elicited a number of historical works including the
famous Bolton translations of the letters of Lieutenant-Governor Athanase de M^zidres.
De M6zi&res was a Frenchman who had been appointed commandant of Nachitoches by

55Allain to Unzaga, September 25,1770, AGL Cuba 188-A, Folio 37
^Ibid.
U n zag a to Allain, November 15,1770, AGL Cuba 188-A, Folio 45.
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O’Reilly in 1769. He continued to act as a diplomat and Indian agent under the Spanish
regime until his death in the 1770s.58
Natchitoches had been an important fort in Louisiana since its founding by Louis
Juchereau St. Denis in 1714. Originally called St. Jean Baptiste, its location near the
Natchitoches Indians earned its present name. St. Denis felt that Louisiana would profit
from trade with Spain’s borderland colonies despite the ban on inter-colonial trade. He
even ventured into Spanish territory, winning a bride and an audience with the Viceroy.
The outcome of that conversation was further Spanish movement into eastern Texas to
place a buffer of four mission/presidio settlements between the French and New Spain.
These settlements became a constant source of illegal trade between the French and
Spanish. New Spain experimented with moving the missions around to remove their
temptation, but nothing worked. Also, since both Spaniard and Frenchmen profited, and
the settlements were in isolated locations, little was done about the inter-colonial traffic
during the French period.
Increasing Indian attacks pressured New Spain into re-examining the missions in
Texas and the Southwest The crown ordered field-marshal, Marquds de Rubf, to inspect
the area in the late 1760s. Accompanied by Spanish engineer, Nicolds de Lafora, Rubf
toured the missions, reporting in detail the dilapidated conditions of the settlements east
of San Antonio de Bdxar (present day San Antonio). The missions frequently housed
only one priest and some had no Indian converts residing with them. The garrison at Los

“ Louis R. Nardini, No Man’s Land.. 76; for a complete biography on de Mdzifcres
see Julia Vivian, A Cavalier in Texas. (San Antonio, TX: The Nayor Company, 1953).
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Adaes hosted only sixty-one ragged and shoeless soldiers. Between them the soldiers
could produce only two working muskets and only twenty-five of their horses were
healthy enough to be used. Part of the reason for these conditions was the post
commander’s embezzlement of the soldiers’supplies and pay.59
Rubf recommended that the viceroy rearrange the presidios to form a string of
strong fortifications between Bahfa del Espfritu Santo in the east, and the Gulf of
California in the west, with San Antonio and Sante Fe holding the middle-ground. This
area he really felt was the border of empire and other mission/presidio holdings were
“imaginary possessions.”40
In response to Rubf s recommendations the King issued a Royal Cedula which
created a New Regulation of Presidios, dated September 10,1772. The Regulations
called for the redistribution of missionary and military personnel in northern New Spain
and the abandonment of the easternmost presidio. The following year the viceroy of New
Spain sent L l Col. Hugo O’Connor to officially reorganize the Provincias Internets, as
the area was called.61
While New Spain reorganized, Unzaga investigated the trade between
Natchitoches and Los Adaes. The leader at the settlement of Los Adaes was army officer,
Gil Y’Barbo, a notorious smuggler who had already been arrested for selling mules and

59Carlos E. Castaneda, Our Catholic Heritage in Texas 1519-1936 vol. 4 (Austin,
TX: Von Boeckmann-Jones, 1936-58), 238-39.
“ Lawrence Kinnaird, ed. and trans., The Frontiers of New Snain: Nicolas Lafora’s
description 1766-1768 (Berkeley: Quivara Society, 1958), 166.
6IWeber, Spanish Borderlands. 217.
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horses, stolen from other presidios, to the French, in exchange for supplies and food.62
During Ulloa’s tenure, Viceroy Marques de Croix, had written to Ulloa regarding
contraband at Los Adaes. In 1770 the governor questioned De M6zi£res about such trade.
De M6zi£res replied that Los Adaes was destitute and that the long established trade was
humanitarian in nature. He also reported the exchange of supplies for mules and horses
which Louisiana badly needed. The lieutenant-governor was bold enough to send a bill
for goods (cloth) sent to Los Adaes in hopes that the governor would pay for his “lost”
supplies. Unzaga, however, had already received notification from the Baron de
Ripperda in Texas regarding the return of stolen animals. The governor gendy chastised
the commandant for the contraband. While the governor chided De Mdzi&res about the
horses, he applauded his efforts and recommended that any further “exchange” between
the two setdements be in the form of “foodstuffs or humanitarian aid.” In regard to the
bill, Unzaga reminded De Mdzifcres that he could not spend the money from the treasury,
though he would like to, because it was “against the order of His Majesty whose will he
[was] to inviolably execute.”63 He also couldn’t pay for the bill because it was for goods
being used in inter-colonial trade, an illegal activity he would be forced to report if De
M£zi&res pressed his claim.
De Mdzi&res reported the return of some horses, stolen from the Arkansas Indians
by the inhabitants of Natchitoches. He again asked for money to pay courier Juan

H erbert Eugene Bolton, “The Spanish Abandonment and Reoccupation of East
Texas, 1773-1779,” Texas Historical Association Quarterly. 9 (1935), 85.
63Unzaga to De M6zi£res, September 20,1770. AGI, SD 81, Folio 216.
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Baptiste Biebel’s expenses for returning them. A wily Unzaga congratulated his officer
on keeping the peace with the Indians, but refused again to pay the bill from the treasury
because he said “thieves and any other criminals must make restitution from their own
interest.”64 He admitted that the Indians could not be expected to pay such expenses but
the thieves could and should be charged the twenty pesos for the courier’s services,
adding that “the monies of the King [were] a sacred deposit in the hands of his ministers
and they may not be touched without his majesty’s express mandate and grace.”65
Unzaga’s position on contraband with Spanish Texas was vacillating at best
Officially he condemned contraband of all kinds and only permitted humanitarian trade
because the people in Los Adaes were, after all, Spanish. Reading the governor’s letters
one gets the opinion that the man followed the rules, as closely as possible, and saved the
king money at all cost
Unzaga’s position on contraband depended on the situation at hand. In fact he
was not above such trade himself! The need for horses, mules and cattle led Louisiana’s
governor to defy official policy in 1773. He authorized a colonist named Jean Hamilton
and two “English carpenters” to penetrate Baron de Ripperda’s province and “keep an eye
on things.” Hamilton actually began to engage in surreptitious trade for horses and cattle.
The news of Hamilton’s deals reached the ears of the Baron who questioned Gabriel
Fusilier de la Claire, then post commandant at Attakapas Post The commandant replied
that such rumors were greatly exaggerated. Unfortunately, Ripperda caught Hamilton and

^Unzaga to De M6zi6res, September 20,1770, AGI, SD 81, Folio 215.
“ Ibid.
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his spies and threatened to hang them. Louisiana’s governor pleaded ignorance of the
whole affair until Fusilier de la Claire found invoices and permits in the bottom of
Hamilton’s boat bearing Unzaga’s signature.66
That same year Ripperda ordered the evacuation of Los Adaes and the other
eastern missions. In a cruel forced march, the settlers abandoned their crops and homes
with only five days to prepare for the long journey to their relocation in San Antonio. In
their absence the Indians reclaimed the tiny settlement. Over the next two years Unzaga
had to look elsewhere for horses, and the Indians frequendy stole horses from one post to
sell to another.67 In 1775, Unzaga tried another tack. Acting through Alexandra de
Clouet, the current commandant at Atakapas, the governor sent five men to San Antonio
with trade goods, hoping to exchange them for livestock. The Viceroy intervened this
time circumventing the illegal trade and frustrating Louisiana’s governor.68
With the loss of Los Adaes the main problems at Natchitoches consisted of
increased disturbances among the Indians and intra-colonial difficulties between the
hunters in the west and the setders at the western posts. De Mezi£res spent his last
remaining years in Louisiana bringing peace to the western tribes.
Unzaga’s vacillating policies on contraband continued throughout his career in
Louisiana. His real attention was drawn by the English on the Mississippi. Up-river in

“ Fuselierto Unzaga, March 1,1773, AGI, Cuba 189-B.
^Nyal C. King, “Captain Antonio Gil Y’Barbo: Founder of the Modem
Nacogdoches, 1729-1809,” (M A Thesis, Stephen F. Austin College, 1949), 16-18.
“ Holmes, “Problems of Spanish Governors,” 528.
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present day Missouri, Spanish Illinois, lay the two fortified settlements of St. Louis and
Ste. Genevieve. Ste. Genevieve had been one of six small French settlements in Upper
Louisiana near Ft. Chartres, before the advent of Spanish rule. French Illinois “was
linked to the center of America by water routes: the Mississippi, Missouri, Ohio,
Tennessee, and Illinois rivers and their tributaries.”69
Ste. Genevi&ve was perhaps one of the poorest and most ill-placed of the six
towns. It suffered from constant flooding, a fact which prompted Pierre Lacl&de Liguest,
and his partners in 1764 to found the settlement of St. Louis in a drier location just south
of the mouth of the Missouri River. (See Chapter Six)70 O’Reilly had placed LieutenantGovernor Pedro Piemas at St. Louis and given its merchants the monopoly on the fur
trade with the Missouri and Osage. The two settlements also mined lead, produced food
and, more importandy, flour for the colony.
Smuggling and contraband came to Spanish Illinois two ways. The French
setdements had been a wealthy agricultural community known as Le Pays des Illinois.
The colonists had been wealthy enough to buy their clothes from France and accumulate
many material possessions prior to the Seven Years War. Their biggest difficulty had
been labor, which they answered with the purchase of Indian and African slaves. With
the transfer of Louisiana to Spain, Ste. Genevieve suddenly became Spanish and the

65The other setdements were Cahokia and St. Philippe, north of the Fort; Chartres
and Prairie du Rocher, just to the south and Kaskaskia near the Indian village and fortress
of the same name, across the river from Ste. Genevieve. Winstanley Briggs, “Le Pays
des Illinois,” William and Marv Ouartelv. 3ri series, 47 (1990): 33-34.
70See John Francis McDermott, “Pierre Laclede and the Chouteaus,” Missouri
Historical Bulletin 21 (July, 1965): 279-83.
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other, once French settlements, English. Many French settlers crossed the river to escape
what quickly became English military rule. This influx was accompanied by Indians
seeking trade with their usual partners. Cut off from its usual stream of manufactured
goods and its normal market, Ste. Genevieve continued to trade with its French neighbors
across the Mississippi. As the flow of European goods dried up, all of these small towns
stagnated and the inhabitants of St. Louis and Ste. Genevieve were reduced to a frontier
existence. By the time of Unzaga’s tenure, the two towns stood isolated in the North,
dependent upon their own agriculture, lead mining and trade with the Indians. Piemas’
arrival stifled trans-Mississippi trade. Despite these problem, translations of
Piemas’letters in Louis Houcks’ collection of documents related to Upper Louisiana,
show that St. Louis and Ste. Genvifcve prospered on their own. New Orleans was
dependent on their wheat, com and flour.71
The contraband the Spanish couldn’t stop was trade with the Indians. Part of the
problem was that the Big and Little Osage and the Missouri wanted firearms. The
monopoly on trade in Spanish Illinois pushed many tribes like the Big Osage into a
pattern of migratory behavior much like the normal seasonal round of mobile Indian
tribes, except this one was based on predation. They arrived in Missouri in late winter
and early spring, received their gifts and while they were there sold Indian slaves (despite
their illegality), stolen horses, furs, tallow, and herbs. While in the north they also traded
for illegal powder and munitions. Having finished, the Osage returned South, strafing

71Briggs, “Le Pays de Illinois,” 54-55. See also Louis Houck, ed. Spanish
Regime in Missouri. 1:50-52.
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Arkansas post on the way with a few raids, and then settling in for the summer near
Natchitoches where they preyed on the Caddo Confederation and its association tribes.
They stole everything possible, but favored horses and captives which they could sell. By
fall they returned to Arkansas post just as the hunters set up camp along the river. There
they took firearms and replenished their ammunition, taking captives and killing others.
By late winter and the following spring they returned to St. Louis to repeat the cycle.72
The Spanish struggled to control the Osage’s contraband. However, the
merchants at S t Louis continued to trade guns, powder and munitions to the Indians,
making their predation possible. Even when, in 1774, Unzaga finally ordered that trade
with the Osage must be cut off so that they would be forced into more peaceful ways, the
merchants at S t Louis never stopped trading with them. Piemas reported in Spring of
1775, that although the Osage trade was forbidden it still accounted for over forty per
cent of the furs which arrived in St. Louis.73 Thus the problem of contraband at S t
Louis was perpetuated by the merchants of that city in the same way that Arkansas
perpetuated its problems by continuing to trade whiskey to the Quapaw. Unzaga’s orders
from New Orleans had little impression on the lives of those at Arkansas Post and St.
Louis; therefore contraband and Osage depredations continued.

72There were several different bands of Osage. The Little Osage and the Missouri
stayed near St. Louis while bands of the Big Osage were more mobile. See Gilbert C.
Din and Abraham P. Nasatir, The Imperial Osaees. (Norman, OK: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1983) for a larger view of Louisiana’s problems with this group of
tribes. See Chapter 6 for a larger view of Indian problems in S t Louis.
^Piemas’ report to Unzaga, May 19,1775, AGI, Cuba 2358 in Kinnaird, SMV 1:
228 and Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osaees. 96.
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The easiest contraband for Unzaga to control was that aboard British ships when
they passed by the pilot house at Balize. With O’Reilly’s departure in 1770, British ships
began gradually to reappear along the Mississippi, ostensibly bringing goods to the
traders at Manchac. The British had the right to transport goods on the Mississippi as
part of the Treaty of Paris. Once merchants passed New Orleans there was little the
governor could do about trade with the plantations in lower Louisiana. Ships ascending
the Mississippi fought against the current They had to carefully hug the bank to avoid
the faster waters of the main channel and navigate the numerous curves on the river. This
often necessitated landing men on shore with ropes who literally helped to drag the ship
upstream. At night exhausted from the fight the captain and crew took refuge at the
nearest private dock, especially at local plantations74 Once tied to the dock, a ship
immediately became one of the floating warehouses described by Louisiana’s historians.
As long as the such ships had the right to transport goods on the river, British trade with
the plantations and the settlers of the Acadian and German Coasts was inevitable.
Louisiana’s colonists deemed the trade a necessity.
Unzaga was frustrated but not defeated. He used several different strategies with
these ships, keeping in mind the need to act solicitously toward the British. In July of
1770, he encountered two British vessels carrying food from West Florida who entered
the Mississippi. At the same time he received a goleta (small Spanish ship) from Merida
with letters from the governor and the cabildo requesting food (maize) because after a
recent hurricane they were in “misery.” They were especially concerned about the tribute

74Hoffinan. Luisiana. 136.
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Indians who had gathered into small bands and were disappearing into the interior,
“eating the roots of trees to keep alive.” Many were dying, poisoned by their attempts to
forage. The famine, they complained, had stripped away the people necessary to work for
Royal Service. The captain of the goleta had instructions to find food in Louisiana and
return as quickly as possible (within 15 days).75 Unzaga decided to furnished the British
captains with letters of recommendation and send them to the colonists in the Yucatan.
Food was already tight in New Orleans and the governor couldn’t spare any. He could,
however, solve two problems at once, supplying the people in the Yucatan with food and
preventing contraband trade along the Mississippi at the same time. Knowing that he had
skirted official policy, the governor quickly excused himself on the grounds of
expediency, writing to Bucareli, “I have freed myself from the interchange which these
vessels would have made in this vast country, the English having great freedom in going
to and fro through this river; it would have been almost impossible to avoid it.” He
further excused himself reporting that the locusts were eating Louisiana’s crops and the

langostdi (crawfish?) were destroying the rice. The governor would have had to wait for
other crops to come downriver to New Orleans before he could help the Yucatan. Surely
the British were the most expedient answer to the problem.76
In writing to Bucareli, Unzaga knew that his superior could not stop or reverse his

fait accompli. In fact, he had deliberately resorted to the old colonial ploy obedezco pero

75Unzaga to Bucareli, July 8,1770, AGI, Cuba 1055, attachment to Foliol 12.
76Unzaga to Bucareli, August 3,1770, Dispatches and Unzaga to Bucareli, August
31,1770, AGI, Cuba 1055, Folio 117.
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no cumplo (I obey but do not carry out) to avoid laws which did not fit colonial reality.
Colonial correspondence from the colonies took months to reach Spain and months to
return. Even mail to Havana and back had a slow turn around time. The very slowness
of the Spanish system of command and correspondence allowed Spanish administrators
like Louisiana’s governor to act first and seek permission later. Bucareli did litde more
than mildly reprimand Unzaga, admonishing him not to do it again.77
Turning two ships aside did little to stem the rush of the British to the Mississippi.
By the next year more and more ships appeared, asking for passage by Balize and New
Orleans. Unzaga wrote in frustration to Bucareli:
These same vessels, which from time to time pass in front of
this city with the pretext of going to their settlements of Manchac
and Nachez have no other object than that of obtaining what commerce
they can on this river, and the purpose of finding out news, and in order
to prevent this they cause me a lot of vigilance. These ships [are] going
from one side of the river to the other in small groups, and I caution
the captains of these ships to observe their conduct and their ships, not
having other means to impede the free entrance which they have on
this river and to preserve harmony with a nation so delicate and
touchy.78
The governor’s frustration did not last long. He soon pieced together a plan to
keep peace with the British merchants, limit the amount of contraband flowing through
the mouth of the river and follow the imperial directive to keep a surveillance on the
British. British merchants were now stopped twice on their way up river. At Balize the
pilot house sent messages to the governor of the nature of a ship’s cargo and her captain.

^ a g g , Latin America. 167-71.
^Unzaga to Bucareli, January 22,1771, Dispatches.
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Upon receipt of the report, Unzaga could, if he wished, invite several of the captains into
dinner where he could also carefully glean information from them about the British in
Pensacola and the eastern seaboard. He could also stop them on the way back from
Manchac to ask them about the progress there. For instance, in May of 1771, he dined
with the captain of a British barge returning from the Illinois country. He noted the cargo
of the barge and also extract information about the growing settlement at Natchez.79 By
piecing together this news with reports from French and Spanish traders, as well as his
commandants, Unzaga, in New Orleans, had a clearer view of the Mississippi and the
movements of the British.
Unzaga also developed a network of spy/merchants like James O’Kelly who could
enter and leave Manchac without suspicion. Many Irish Catholics preferred to live under
the Spanish crown and Unzaga rewarded their “efforts” to spy on the British with the
required papers for citizenship. Even after the Malvinas crisis passed, Unzaga in
Louisiana and de la Torre in Havana continued to build their network of spies (See
Chapter 8).80
Unzaga appears to have continued using the merchants in New Orleans for more
than surveillance. In May of 1775 he bought flour from British merchants in New
Orleans because of the paucity of the commodity. He also continued to buy flour from
Oliver Pollock, a merchant found “acceptable” even by O’Reilly. In September of 1776
he sought to explain himself to the new Minister of the Indies, Jos6 de G£lvez, explaining

^Cummins, Spanish Observers. 15-16.
“ Ibid, 22;
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that he knew he was not supposed to buy flour from foreigners, but “because of extreme
need” he had done so. He promised not to do it again, adding that he would seek in the
future to supply himself from Veracruz and Havana.81
Not all of Unzaga’s subordinates appreciated the governor’s economic strategy.
One such person was the treasurer, Martin Navarro. As a representative of the crown,
Navarro wrote lengthy letters to the Minister of the Indies deploring Unzaga’s pragmatic
approach to Louisiana’s economic woes. He agreed, however, that the colonoy needed
immediate assistance, admitting that trade with Spain was not the answer to Louisiana’s
difficulties. Instead, he suggested ways to implement better control of contraband along
the Mississippi. Unfortunately, the tone of Navarro’s letters suggested that Unzaga’s
laxity concerning contraband and the British was also part of the problem. His plans,
while interesting on paper, were not always practicable given the manpower and money
available. It is also quite possible that Navarro was not appraised of the governor’s plan
to use merchants for secret surveillance of the British. Unfortunately, Unzaga was not
tolerant of Navarro’s penchant for “going over his head” and an enmity developed
between the two officials which lasted until Unzaga’s departure from Louisiana.82
hi contrast to Navarro’s complaints, allowing trade with British merchants to
help revitalize the economy in Louisiana and supplement the needs of his colonists did
not mean that the governor accepted blatant disobedience. He must maintain order in the

8lUnzaga
“ For a larger discussion of the problems of Navarro and Unzaga, and of Navarro’s
plans, see Brian E. Coutts’ previously mentioned dissertation on Navarro as treasurer,
contador, and intendant of Louisiana between 1766 and 1788.
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colony and continue to establish Spanish authority. Accordingly he chose certain cases to
make an example of what happened to those who attempted overt smuggling. One such
case was that of John Nash, a Rhode Island merchant caught selling merchandise to
soldiers above New Orleans in 1774. Unzaga’s officials intercepted and arrested Nash,
sending his belongings to New Orleans where they were sold. The British governor of
West Florida interceded on behalf of Nash but the merchant only managed to retrieve part
of his confiscated property. As the story of Nash’s misfortunes circulated, the severity of
the penalty became magnified. One merchant at Natchez named Richard Carpenter,
wrote a friend in Newport that five or six British ships had been confiscated.83
The amount of British ships and goods taken into custody was minimal compared
to the smuggling that actually happened and British ships were not the only ones of which
Unzaga made an example. Records indicate that many of Louisiana’s ships were also
seized, their captains arrested or fined and the illegal goods confiscated, including slaves
taken aboard an illegal French ship. Among those involved was prominent merchant
Bartolomd Toutant Beauregard. Unzaga apparently did not favor even the most
prominent citizen who overtly flaunted his disobedience. This list, again, is small,
indicating only nine cases brought to trial between 1771-78. Even among his citizens
Unzaga sought merely to make an example because he did not have the forces or the
funds to do otherwise.84

“ Unzaga to Arriaga, September 7,1774, AGI, SD 2482; Testimonio del proceso
contra Joseph Nach & Co., ibid; Hoffman, Luisiana. 137; Clark, New Orleans. 178.
“ For an extensive look at testimony concerning the illicit commerce brought
through New Orleans see Collecci6n al Documentos Indditos para la testimnnia de
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Louisiana historian Charles Gayarrd states that the early economic reforms under
Charles ID, created an “oppressive system [which] was exceedingly foolish, as it could
benefit neither the colony nor the mother country.”85 His statement, while harsh, has been
supported by others, most notably Clark’s economic study of New Orleans. Unzaga, in
charge of New Orleans, had to work within the empire and the imperial vision within
which Louisiana was only one part and an impoverish one at that In many ways, the
reforms reinforced the smuggling and contraband trade already entrenched in the Gulf
Coast if not the Caribbean. Indeed, as Havana’s economy bloomed, Louisiana’s began to
wither, and its population turned to contraband and smuggling to survive. Unzaga strove
to work within the confines of empire to maintain and revitalize Louisiana’s failing
economy and fight illegal commerce at the same time. Given his manpower and financial
problems Unzaga could never have controlled the ingrained, inter-colonial trade, nor the
illicit trade with the colony’s Indians.
The historical records supports claims that Unzaga “winked” at illegal commerce
and contraband but that comment is too narrow a vision of a complex problem. Unzaga
rightly believed that attempts to disrupt the informal economic system would have
angered not only the British but many of Louisiana’s Indian allies as well. As his
experience grew, he endeavored, instead, to use the colonial system to further imperial
goals of colonial growth and security. He also circumvented impractical crown policy
through obedezco pero no cumplo, managing to help both Louisiana and empire. In

Hispano-America. AGI, Cuba, legajos 1389,1393,1396, 1398-99,1401,1405,1410.
“ Gayarrd, History of Louisiana. 44.
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particular, he, like his superiors in Havana, took advantage of British ships passing
through the capital to maintain a constant surveillance of the British. Through these
merchants Unzaga gleaned important information for the Spanish crown regarding the
British along the Mississipi, in Florida and the eastern seaboard. Unzaga’s greatest
frustration, and perhaps his greatest failure, was his attempt to control contraband and
establish regulated trade through licensed traders and a system of post monopolies with
Louisiana’s Native American population.
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Chapter Six
The Indians

“The Indians shift their loyalties to the person or persons that have most recently
given them gifts, without paying any attention to what they had received before, even
though it might have been a thousand times more. ”
Pedro Piemas, St. Louis, 12 June, 1771
Spanish Louisiana’s security was based on an informal defense system of militia
men, small numbers of troops in a few strategically placed forts, and a stable population.
Unzaga was also aware that only peace with neighboring Indian tribes, or at least a truce
based on gift giving, would guarantee his colonists’ safety. Native Americans also
affected the economic progress of the colony as traders, trappers, customers and part of
the population engaged in contraband.
Historian Patricia Galloway pointed out that a major part of Louisiana’s narrative
on Indians and Indian diplomacy was hidden away in the letters from various post
commandants. Galloway was referring to French Louisiana, but the same holds true for
Unzaga’s time. This study of Louisiana’s Native Americans, therefore, focuses on both
the governor’s and com m andants’ letters, with special attention to the latter. In them it
appears that during the 1770s many American Indian tribes regrouped into various
confederations to play encroaching groups of Europeans against each other. Despite
treaties, truces and gifts, the Indians, not the Europeans, continued to hold the upper hand
in the Trans-Mississippi West Because of their power, freedom, and semi-sedentary

‘Piemas to Unzaga, June 12,1771, AGI, Cuba 81.
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nature, Louisiana’s Indian allies often frustrated Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga in his
attempts to keep the peace, control contraband and defend his colonists.2
The Spanish inherited three separate Indian problems with the Louisiana territory.
East of Mississippi the Choctaw, Chickasaw, Creek (the major tribes of the Muskogee
language group who made forays into the colony), the Tallapousa and the “petite
naci6nes”or “small tribes,” (the general term for a loose confederation of Indians living
within a hundred-mile radius of New Orleans), were restive or in open conflict with each
other. Northward along the Mississippi, Arkansas and St. Louis struggled with the Little
and Big Osage and Quapaw whose continued depredations against each other and the
posts kept the frontier in an uproar. These Native American tribes were also constantly
engaged in contraband and illegal trade which stretched from Upper to Lower Louisiana.
Finally, to the west there was trouble between the Osage and the Caddo Confederacy, as
well as incursions by plains Indians pushed eastward from Spanish Texas.3
The colony’s Indian problems began in the French period. From the last decades
of the seventeenth century onward, colonization, slavery, disease and the colonial wars

Patricia Galloway, “Louisiana Post Letters: The Missing Evidence for Indian
Diplomacy,” LK[ 22 (1981): 31-45.
3See Alice B. Kehoe, North American Indians: A Comprehensive Account 2d
edition, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992) for a regional and chronological
history of Indians in the present day United States; The classic compendium of Native
Americans is the series by John R. Swanton done with the Smithsonian Institution’s
Bureau of Ethnology, especially his volume on The Indians of the Southeastern United
States (Washington D.C.: Smithsonian Institutuion Bureau of American Ethnology,
Bulletin 13,1946); Fred B. Kniffen, Hi an F. Gregory and George A. Stokes, The Historic
Indian Tribes of Louisiana. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1987) has a
good general description of culture but his chronology should be checked against other
sources).
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uprooted, economically impoverished and/or eradicated many of the southeastern Indian
nations. In the Mississippi Valley, the French maintained a policy of inter-marriage and
trade, while at the same time encouraging intertribal warfare. Native Americans slowly
elicited a “diplomacy” of gift giving with the French because they habitually engaged in
trade and political alliances with the highest bidder, as represented by medals of
recognition and annual gifts-preferably manufactured European goods.
In the first decades of the seventeenth century the French establishing missions
and trading posts in the Mississippi Valley to monopolize the fur trade. Between 1703
and 1704 French missionaries founded a mission at the junction of the Kaskaskia and
Mississippi Rivers (near present day Utica, Illinois). The missionaries Christianized the
Illinois Confederacy and courier de bois intermarried with the tribes, making them
steadfast French allies. Fur trappers, traders and missionaries brought with them the
common European problems of disease and alcohol. Trade created factionalism in the
Confederacy. Before mid-century a population of some six-thousand Indians was reduced
to two thousand. As Canadians settled into French Illinois, expeditions headed by
Bienville and others pushed northward from the mouth of the Mississippi following its
tributary rivers westward.
As the French moved into the Mississippi Valley some tribes resisted. For
example, in the north, the Fox Wars (1712-1736) decimated the Masquackies (Fox) and
their allies the Sauk, Kickapoo and Dakota, setting off a decade of warfare around the
Great Lakes. Eventually continued French depredations led the remaining Fox and their
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allies to shift their fur trade to the English.4 In the South, the Natchez revolted (17271731) under their leader, Great Sun. The surrounding tribes refused to join the Natchez
and some, like the Choctaw and the Tunica, fought on the side of the French. By 1731
the war had reduced a tribe of four thousand to approximately three hundred. The
survivors were enslaved or scattered among the major tribes to the east-the Chickasaws,
Creeks and Cherokees. Giving refuge to the Natchez in time increased existing friction
between the Chickasaws and the Choctaw. War flared between the Chickasaws and the
French from 1736-1739.5
Following the Natchez revolt the French re-evaluated their Indian policy.
Constantly underfunded and virtually unprotected from Europeans and Indian tribes alike,
the French leadership in Louisiana, after 1731, realized that increased Indian diplomacy
through gift giving was necessary for survival, especially against the encroaching English
to the east However, the ministers in France and the treasury officials they sent to the
colony fought against expenditures on gifts for “savages.” The Indians understood the
colonial official’s difficulties and often took advantage of the colony by selling their
services to the highest bidder, which was frequently the English.6

4Judith Nies, Native American History: A Chronology of a Culture’s Vast
Achievements and their L inks to World Events (New York: Ballantine Books, 1996),
168-169; See also Charles J. Balesi, The Time of the French in the Heart of North
America 1673-1818 (Chicago: Alliance Frangaise Chicago, 1991).
sKehoe. North American Indians. 191.
6Michael J. Foret, “Irresolution and Uncertainty: French Colonial Indian Policy in
Louisiana, 1699-1763,” (Masters Thesis, University of Southwestern Louisiana, 1982) 7.
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The French also faced constantly changing Indian populations along the
Mississippi, as groups moved west to avoid slavery and death at the hands of the British
or Indians allied with them. Thus tribes from the British seaboard colonies moved into
the Ohio Valley, displacing others who subsequently moved into the Mississippi Valley
and across the river. In the southeast, the English, Spanish and French fought for control
through their mutual Indian allies. The smaller tribes, the Biloxi, Alabama, and
Pascagoula were pushed westward through the Gulf South to the Isle of Orleans. At the
mouth of the Mississippi the portage area near Bayou St. John witnessed the extinction of
the Tangipahoa and the Acolapissas. By the 1720s it became home to Biloxi and Houma
who came seeking trade and were followed by other diminishing tribal groups. Those
Indians, joined on occasion by the Choctaw, became migratory populations, appearing
and disappearing on either side of the Mississippi. They followed seasonal game
resources and attempted to stay away from danger, rather than settle in one area.
War and migration also brought with it an expansion of trade in European
merchandise and weapons. The new availability of goods and weapons in turn changed
traditional tribal politics and inter-tribal alliances. It created new chiefs, separated and
dispersed tribes, and thus helped destabilize and decimate once stable groups. Smaller
groups created confederacies to make up for their lack of strength. The Indians refocused
their economies and lifestyles, using their greater mobility to take part in the changing
market
The changing population of the southeast was created primarily by the
“diplomacy” of the British and their colonists along the eastern seaboard. This
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“diplomacy” was based on trade, inter-tribal conflict and debt-slavery. At the end of the
seventeenth century the English raided Spanish Georgia with the aid of Indian Allies. The
inability of the Spanish to protect their mission Indians at Guale began the end of the
Spanish mission system in Florida. Devastating raids in 1704 destroyed the Apalachee
missions and caused them and Yamassee living with them to disperse in several
directions. One group of Apalachee moved west across the Gulf South, eventually
becoming one of the migratory tribes along the Mississippi. Some of the Yamasee moved
northward to South Carolina in search of European products and trade.7
In 1715, unable to pay their debts to the English, the Yamassee lost their wives
and children to debt slavery and revolted. In the ensuing conflict the English pitched their
allies, the Creeks, against the Yamasee. The Creeks invited the Cherokee to join the war,
believing that together they could turn the tables and push the Europeans (especially the
English) out Unfortunately, the British paid the Cherokee to murder the Creek and then
cut off their ammunition. The Yamasee lost8
Following the Yamasee war, a new problem appeared in the form of an increasing
European population. Population pressure accelerated intertribal hostilities and
competition among the Native Americans in the Gulf South. English families soon
populated the Carolinas and pushed the Spanish southward towards what would become

7Kehoe, North American Indians. 190-191. See also John TePaske, “French,
Spanish, and English Indian Policy on the Gulf Coast 1513-1763: A Comparison,” in
Spain and Her Rivals on the Gulf Coast, eds. Ernest F. Dibble and Earle W. Newton
(Pensacola: Pensacola Preservation Board, 1971), 9-39.
8Ibid.; Weber, Spanish Frontier. 179.
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Georgia in 1733. War in Europe brought more immigrants into the Carolinas until, by the
1740s, South Carolina held ten times the European colonists who lived in Spanish
Florida.9
Population pressure presented Native Americans with the additional problem of
infectious disease. Typhus, dysentery, smallpox and other epidemics changed Indian
demographics, wiping out whole tribes that had existed in the early 1700s. The remnants
of many decimated tribes joined together forming new tribes and moving westward away
from the devastation. By the mid-eighteenth century, these movements, and ensuing
epidemics disrupted the trade network in deerskins and changed tribal warfare, as well as
traditional Native America lifestyles and alliances. Once sedentary tribes became
migratory gypsies who wandered steadily westward, appearing with more and more
regularity in the Mississippi Valley.10
During the first half of the eighteenth-century Native Americans along the
Mississippi and to the west of the valley also experienced the same disruption in trade,
lifestyle and alliances. Pressure from European populations and hostile tribes moving

T’eter H. Wood, “The Changing Population of the Colonial South: An Overview
by Race and Region, 1685-1790,” in P o w h a ta n ’s Mantle: Indians in the Colonial
Southeast edited bv Peter H. Wood, Gregory A. Waselkov, and M. Thomas Hadey
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 38, indicates that the Carolinas held
20,300 Europeans, to 2,100 in Florida. European migration was influenced by the civil
war in England and also by the War of Austrian Succession in Europe (1740-48). See also
Robert S. Cotterill, The Southern Indians (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press,
1954)
l0Daniel H. Usner, Jr. “American Indians in Colonial New Orleans,” Powhatan's
Manrie: Indians in the Colonial Southeast. See also Henry F. Dobyns, Their Number
Became Thinned, for demographic change due to disease in the Southeast
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across the river or pushing eastward from Spanish Texas was exacerbated by the demand
for European trade goods, especially weapons.11 Spanish mission Indians in Texas also
sought out the French along the Red River at Rapides and further west at Natchitoches to
trade stolen horses for arms and ammunition.12 They used the arms to pursue their own
political ventures either against the Spanish or each other and sometimes with Louisiana’s
Caddo confederation, Witchita tribes or the Shoshonean Comanches who were new
arrivals in the colony.13 European weapons increased intertribal warfare and disrupted the
normal trading patterns among the western tribes as they had done in the east
Further north the Arkansas Post, the Quapaw, the Big and Litde Osage and the
Missouri tribes offered the French both trade and trouble. The French offered trade and
gifts for Indian allies, holding an annual gift giving ceremony for friendly tribes. The
Quapaw quickly became dependent on French firearms and fire-water, moving out of
their traditional trading patterns to obtain the desired European goods. Their villages and
agricultural products subsidized nearby families throughout the French and Spanish

"Ibid.; Also see Herbert Eugene Bolton, Texas in the Middle Eighteenth Century.
Studies in Spanish Colonial History and Administration. (New York: Russell & Russell,
Inc., 1962).
l2The Red River hosted four Caddo nations: the Kadohadoches, Petit Caddos,
Yatasis, and Natchitoches and the Neches River held the Hasinai confederacy comprised
of the Nabedaches, Asinais, Nacogdoches, and Nadocos. See F. Todd Smith, “Indian
Policy in Spanish Louisiana: The Natchitoches District, 1763-1803,” The Spanish
Presence in Louisiana 1763-1803. edited by Gilbert C. Din, Vol. 2 in The Louisiana
Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History, Glenn R. Conrad, General Editor,
(Lafayette, LA: Center for Louisiana Studies, University of Southwestern Louisiana,
1996), 285.
"Collectively these tribes were known to the French and Spanish as the
“Nortenos” or Northern Nations.
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periods, but they often threatened the small fort on the Arkansas. The Missouri began
raiding European settlements to gain merchandise the easy way and entered an uneasy
friendship with the little Osage north of the post Once again, shifting populations
brought about shifting alliances. The Osage, however, were particularly predatory on
both Europeans and other tribes. Europeans meant easy access to weapons which could
be used against other Indian groups. As French trappers moved into the wilderness the
Osage began to attack them for their weapons. The normal seasonal round, south in the
winter, north in the summer now took on a different meaning for both the Osage and the
people they attacked.14
The Seven Years War and the consequent change of ownership in the Mississippi
valley further disrupted Louisiana’s tribes. Tribes who had previously been Spanish
enemies were now “Spanish” tribes subject to new boundaries and laws. Many of these
tribes realized that the change in ownership meant they had lost their negotiating leverage
between what had been French and Spanish communities. Previously legitimate French
trading partners were now no longer “legal” and the Indians had to trade with “official”
traders licensed by the Spanish government in New Orleans. Indian slavery was no
longer a welcomed practice. Only the familiar annual gift-giving stayed the same because
Antonio de Ulloa realized that the best method of benefitting from Louisiana’s Indians
was to retain the previous French policy. Necessarily, however, he moved the annual

l4See Gilbert C. Din and Abraham P. Nasatir, The Imperial Osaees for
comprehensive account of Osage problems.
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presentation ceremonies from Mobile to New Orleans and ceased to court the Choctaw
and Creeks unless they came to New Orleans.15
French allied Indians also scrambled to avoid British persecution east of the
Mississippi. They flooded into Spanish Louisiana especially near New Orleans whose
“petite nacidnes” were refurbished by Indians moving out of the previously French area
of Mobile. In the north, French allies suddenly found themselves among the British and
sought refuge on the western bank and its settlements. Some tribes moved across the
river into Spanish territory and others fought against the British. The best example of the
latter is Pontiac and his allies who tried to continue the war to gain land and expel the
Europeans, but ran out of ammunition and had to halt the conflict.
Spanish rule between 1764 and 1769 was still uncertain, however, and while the
tribes waited to see who gained control of the colony old tribal agendas emerged. In the
east the Chickasaw and Choctaw became predatory on the “petite naciones” and in the
west the Osage continued to steal horses from the Caddos and Wichitas, but now with
smuggled British arms.16 An example of the conflict created during this time period can
be seen at St. Louis which had held the monopoly on the trade with the Big and Little
Osage under the French. The Indians were supposed to visit the post annually to receive
their appropriate gifts and medals, hi 1764 Pierre Laclfede Liguest and the Chouteau
family were established in the new town of St. Louis nestled at the entrance to the

15Usner, “American Indians,” 299. See Moore, Revolt in Louisiana, for a full
discussion of Spanish Indian policy.
16Smith, “Indian Policy,” 286.
164

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Missouri river and close to all the major Indian groups in the area. (See Chapter 5)17
There he attracted trappers, traders and Indians. As the French began to evacuate Fort de
Chartres and cross the river the Missouri Indians moved to the Mississippi where they
treated with Louis St. Ange de Bellerive, the aging French commandant and Pierre
Laclede to protect them from a band of some three hundred Osage who were marauding
in the area. The two Frenchmen created a small peace between the two tribes but it was
not the last the citizens of S t Louis would hear of the Osage and their depredations.
The Osage were supposed to be the swom enemy of the English across the river
from S t Louis. Like other tribes along the Mississippi, however, they clandestinely made
alliances with British commandants in order to receive gifts on both sides of the river.18
This double dealing proved troublesome for the Spanish who by 1767 were finally taking
control at S t Louis under Captain Francisco Rfu y Morales. Ulloa’s orders were to
license traders for the Indians, continue gift-giving and use the Indians as a weapon

17Lacl£de, a prominant partner of Maxent, Lacl&de and Company in New Orleans
had been granted an eight-year monopoly on trade along the Missouri River including the
Big and Little Osage. The French government eventually denied the monopoly but that
news had not reached Lacldde in 1763 when he left New Orleans. See Mdmoire of Sieur
LaclMe, AE, Correspondence Politique, Espagne, IV; John Francis McDermott, “The
Exclusive Trade Privileges of Maxent, Laclfcde, and Company,” Missouri Historical
Review. 30 (July, 1936): 272-78; and Gilbert C. Din and Abraham P. Nasatir, The
Imperial Osaees. 52-53. The story of the founding of S t Louis can also be found in John
Francis McDermott, “Pierre Laclede and the Couteaus.” Missouri Historical Bulletin. 21
(July, 1965): 279-83 and John Francis McDermott, “Myths and Realities Concerning the
Founding of S t Louis,” in The French in the Mississippi Valiev (Urbana, IL: University
of Illinois, 1965).
18Clarence W. Alvord and Clarence E. Carter, eds.. The Critical Period. 17631765 (Springfield, IL: The Trustees of the Illinois State Historical Library, 1915 ), 48183.
165

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

against the English if necessary. Rfu immediately began the military reorganization of
Upper Louisiana, directing the building of two forts on either side of the mouth of the
Missouri, much to the consternation of St. Ange. The British, who by now had an
organized Indian policy under William Johnstone, were busy regaling the Osage and
Missouri with medals and gifts, and promises of more in the future. Local tribes who
visited the new Spanish leader in St. Louis were suitably un-impressed with his gifts and
said as much.19
In 1768, Ulloa made a critical mistake concerning the Osage and other Indians in
Upper Louisiana. He chose to cut expenditures by keeping traders away from the Indians
villages along the Missouri and tried to keep the gift-giving at a minimum by keeping the
Indians away from the posts. His policy allowed the licensing of traders only out of New
Orleans. This upset both the merchants in S t Louis and the Indians. Worse, the meager
Spanish gifts insulted other tribes who came to treat with the Commandant at S t Louis.
The necessity of the moment overrode Ulloa’s orders and Rfu wrote to the governor
explaining that if they did not give good merchandise to the Indians they would probably

19Rfu to Ulloa, November 12,1767, AGI, Cuba 109; and Rfu to Ulloa, AGI, Cuba
2357 in Louis Houck, ed. The Spanish Regime in Missouri: A Collection of Papers and
Documents Relating to Upper Louisiana Principally within the Present Limits of Missouri
During the Dominion of Spain (2 vols. Chicago: R. R. Donnelley, 1909; Rpr. New
York: Amo Press, 1971) I: 1-11. Louis Houck also covers the history of S t Louis in a
narrative history, A History of Missouri from the Earliest Explorations and Setdements
until the Adm ission of the State into the Union 3 vols. (Chicago: R. R. Donnelley,
1908). Information on William Johnstone, is in Abraham Phineas Nasatir. Indian Trade
and D iplom acy in Spanish Illinois. 1763-1792 (Berkeley: University of California, 192122), 19.
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take it by force. Ulloa acquiesced, allowing merchants who had already been licensed to
trade that year, stating they would have to go through New Orleans the following year.
Clearly neither the Spanish, nor the French held the upper hand on the Missouri.20
Rfu was an argumentative and overbearing commander, whose leadership
promoted insubordination among his troops and disorder among the civilians. His
manner was so harsh that twenty soldiers and the fort’s storekeeper deserted in the first
year of his command.21 Ulloa then appointed Captain Pedro Piemas to replace him but
when Piemas arrived at Fort San Carlos el Principe in March he was forced to turn the
fort over to St. Ange because of the French insurrection.22 Spanish leadership did not
return until 1770. In the meantime the Indians had developed a system to play the
English, French and Spanish against one another for the benefit of the Indians.
With the absence of Spanish authority in the north between 1769 and 1770, the
Osage had made it a point to visit the Arkansas Post repeatedly to ask for gifts and trade,
despite the monopoly held by S t Louis. Arkansas Post was a haven for illegal traders,
especially the British, who openly traded guns and whiskey to the Indians. Both of the
items lured the Osage to the Arkansas River where they threated the Quapaw.
Commandant Le Chevalier Alexandre DeClouet, found it impossible to keep the Osage

20Din and Nasatir, Imperial Qsapes. 62-63; Rui to Ulloa, June 25,1 768, AGI,
Cuba 109; and Nasatir, Indian Trade. 25.
21Rfu to Ulloa, December 13,1767, AGI, Cuba 109.
“ Nasatir, Indian Trade. 24; Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osaees. 67-68. Rfus’ report
is dated October 29,1769 and Piemas’ is dated October 31,1769, both in AGI, Cuba
2357.
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out of the Arkansas River valley. Worse, they began to attack other Indians in the area.
DeClouet had written earlier in July of 1769 that the trade in liquor must stop, and the
British be expelled or the Osage would continue their depredations.23
The confusion over leadership in the colony stopped in 1769 when Alejandro
O’Reilly firmly re-established Spanish rule. He then initiated a firm program of licensed
traders, agents and laws against Indian slavery.24 He also hosted diplomatic meetings
with the tribes in Lower Louisiana in the fall and assigned both Athanase de Mezi6rfcs and
Pedro Piemas as Indian Agents in their respective territories. These men, in turn, licensed
traders in their areas to bring annual gifts and to trade with the Native Americans for
pelts, crops or other items. O’Reilly’s policy was to use friendly Indian tribes to prevent
English intrusion along the Mississippi and to maintain peace in Louisiana’s western
territories. His main concern was that the Louisiana tribes did not set off conflicts with
the British whom he saw as a far greater threat Further, he felt that a formal policy of
licensed traders and post monopoly systems would gradually evolve into a peaceful co
existence between the colonists and the tribes. In that he was wrong.
O’Reilly began with ceremonies of recognition and gift giving among the eastern
tribes. From September 1769 through the following year he and Governor Unzaga
received delegations from the Tunicas, Taensas, Pacanas, Houmas, Bayogoulas,
Ofogoulas, Chaouchas, Ouachas, Chitimachas, Chatos, Biloxis, Pascagoulas, Mobilians

“ DeClouet to Ulloa, February 27,1768, AGI, Cuba 107; DeClouet to Monsieur,
July 14,1769, ibid.; and DeClouet to O’Reilly, September 1,1769, ibid.
“ See Stephen Webre, “Problem of Indian Slavery,” 117-35, for a full discussion of
the difficulty during the change to Spanish rule.
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and finally the Quapaws.25 In respect to the west, both Captain-General O’Reilly and the
new governor of Spanish Texas, the Baron de Ripperda, agreed that peace with their
mutual Indian allies must be preserved. The experienced commandant at Natchitoches,
Athanase de Mdzi£res, suggested to Louisiana’s leaders that an alliance with the
influential Kadohadachos was the key to peace in the west. O’Reilly agreed and allowed
the lieutenant-governor to begin annual gift-giving ceremonies at Natchitoches and to
license experienced traders to visit their villages. By April of 1770, the Caddo formally
became Louisiana’s allies.26
As stated before, O’Reilly’s Indian policy was far more conciliatory than Ulloa’s.
He authorized Piemas to license traders in Spanish Illinois and allowed him to distribute
gifts to the Indians annually at St. Louis. He also ordered Piemas not to incite the Indians
against the British and prohibited licensed Spanish traders in British territory. O’Reilly
wanted no trouble with Gage and Great Britain. Piemas took O’Reilly at his word and all
seemed tranquil in Spanish Illinois because he reported no disturbances with the Osage
for over a year. It was an illusion. The Osage had merely moved to a better vantage point
near the Arkansas post To combat the Osage O’Reilly replaced the aging DeClouet with

“ Kinnaird, SMV. 2:185,258 and 3: 141-43. Many of these tribes wanted to
continue their familiar practice of meetings with the post commandants. Both O’Reilly
and Unzaga instructed the commandants on the German Coast the Acadian Coast, Point
Couple and elsewhere that all tribes must go to New Orleans and meet with the governor
to swear their allegiance to Spain. See Unzaga to Allain, order for the Tunica, November
14,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio: lg/45 and Unzaga to Dustind, regarding the Taensa
and Alabama Indians, December 24,1770, ibid:lc/l 1.
“ O’Reilly to De Mdzifcres, September 23,1769 in Bolton, Athanase de Mdzi&res.
1: 130-131. De Mezieres to O’Reilly
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Captain Francois Demasellieres, who stayed at the post through the end of 1770 although
Captain Joseph de Orieta became active commandant on July 21,1770. Arkansas
received a large number of Spanish commandants but none were able to deal
appropriately with the Osage.27
By the time of his departure O’Reilly had firmly instituted Spanish policy
regarding the Indians in Louisiana. He had befriended and, he felt, suitably impressed the
“petite naci6nes” of Lower Louisiana. Through his Lieutenant-Governor, Athanase de
M6zi£res, the important Caddo confederation had become allies in the West. Finally in
the north, the Osage and the Quapaw traded under a monopoly system of licensed traders
from Arkansas Post and S t Louis. Spanish policy, however, was not always Spanish
reality in its American colonies and Louisiana was not an exception.
As he took office, Unzaga found O’Reilly’s policy problematical. O’Reilly’s
main goals, it will be remembered, were to establish gift-giving ceremonies to maintain
alliances, to enhance trade through a series of licensed agents, to end Indian slavery, and
most of all to keep peace among the tribes and not endanger the tenuous peace with the
English along the Mississippi. The new governor divided his problems into three
geographical areas: the lower Mississippi inhabited by the petite nacidnes; Upper

27Demaselli6res was governor of the Arkansas Post from December of 1769 to
December of 1770. He was replaced in December of 1770 by Lieutenant Josef Orieta.
See Morris, Colonial A rkansas. Appendix 1.178; See appointment of other commandants
in Table HI; on O’Reilly’s position regarding the Indians and the English see O’Reilly to
Lieutenant-Governor of Illinois district, February 17,1770 and O’Reilly to Arriaga,
March 1,1770, both in AGI, SD 80.
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Louisiana whose main tribes included the Quapaw, the Big and Little Osage and the
Missouri; and finally the Caddo, Witchita and Shoshone in the West
He focused first on the “petite nacidnes” residing near New Orleans, whose ranks
by now encompassed the Apalaches, Taensas, Pacanas, Mobilians, Biloxis, Chahtos ,
Pascagoulas, Houma, Chitimacha, and Tunica, most of them previous French allies. The
smaller nations who crossed the river into what was now Spanish Louisiana strung out in
a long line starting in New Orleans and the German Coast and then northwest along the
Mississippi into the Acadian Coast, Pointe Coupde, and Rapides on the Red River.
Settlements of Apalachee, Mobile and Alabama resided at Rapide Post and were later
joined by the Pascagoula and wandering bands of Choctaw. Pointe Coupde and the
Acadian coast played host to shifting villages of Taensa, Pacana and Hoctchaya Alabama,
and Houma. Other Pascagoula, Houma and the Chitimacha settled closer to New Orleans.
The Mobile and the Choctaw pushed across the Mississippi near the Amite River to gain
access to the best of both worlds, the English at Manchac and the rich lands of the
Acadian and German Coasts.28
With their normal fur trade activities disrupted by war and migration, the “petite
nacidnes” created a seasonal cycle of activities designed to enhance their position and
opportunities. Native Americans supplied New Orleans with a number of necessary trade
items including game, bear fat, deerskins, and other furs, as well as woven items, herbs

^Locations gathered from the census of several posts, including report of Louis
Judice, September 5, 1768, AGI, Cuba 187-A, Folio 194; Census of the Apalachee at
Rapide, 1774, AGL Cuba 189-A, Folio 1108, and Usner, “American Indians in Colonial
New Orleans,” 301; also see Wood, “Changing Population,” 73-76.
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and firewood. They also provided a source of inexpensive labor, entertainment and
gambling.29
Gift-giving was necessary and individual Indians loved wearing Spanish medals
and vying for European recognition which legitimized their own power in the tribe. Like
the French, unfortunately, the Spanish in Louisiana never received “awe-inspiring”
merchandise for Indian presents. This was especially deplorable considering the
importance of gifts in maintaining alliances. When the governor received an Attakapas
delegation in April of 1770 the importance of gifts became startlingly clear. They wore
English medals and demanded the Spanish produce a better product.30 He could never
really be sure of the “loyalty” of his tribes without the appropriate merchandise,
especially since many of them contrived to play the Spanish in Louisiana off the British in
West Florida or in the Ohio Valley area. Native American alliances with Europeans,
therefore, continually shifted during Unzaga's tenure.
Another problem in the lower Mississippi was how to keep the peace among his
allied Indian tribes and protect them from the depredations of the British and their allies.
Across the river in British West Florida, Unzaga contended with a particularly callous
English Indian agent named John Thomas for the loyalty of the “petite nacidnes.”

29 Usner, “American Indians in Colonial New Orleans,” 301; James A. Robertson
(ed.) Louisiana Under the Rule of Spain. France, and the United States. 1785-1807.2
vols. (Cleveland, 1911), 2:81-83.
U nzaga to Judice, April 9,1770, AGI, Cuba, 188-A, Foliol d/1.
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Thomas’ scandalous treatment of Indians and colonists caused Louisiana a great deal of
trouble. He encouraged English tribes to prey upon tribes who were Spanish allies.31
Because of Thomas’ continued actions against the Spanish allied tribes, Unzaga decided
that peaceful neutrality was no longer the best diplomacy. His concern was heightened by
the growth at the English settlement at Manchac which sold liquor and guns to the local
tribes and by the enlarging English settlements around Natchez. Manchac and the
English also exacerbated inter-tribal conflict by funneling contraband into Louisiana and
instigating attacks on Spain’s allied tribes. They frequently fed the Choctaw and
Tallapousa whiskey, driving them into murderous rages against Louisiana’s colonists and
its Indian allies.32
As his commandants dealt with Indian problems along the lower Mississippi, in
1771 Unzaga began a concerted effort to entice the English tribes over to the Spanish side
of the river. It seemed to the governor that Indian allies in Louisiana might also help
create a buffer against the English. At the same time he invited L t Thomas to visit him
in New Orleans where he assured the British agent that the Spanish had no interest in
“his” Indians. Thomas left unaware of the conspiracy but soon became enraged when he
found Spanish gifts and medals among tribes on the eastern bank, of the river. He angrily
protested to several Spanish commandants but his threats accomplished nothing. Thomas’
unfeeling attitude toward the tribes in his jurisdiction eventually cost him their loyalty

31Robert R. Rea, “Redcoats and Redskins on the Lower Mississippi 1763-1776:
The Career of Lt. John Thomas,” LH 11 (1970): 12-35.
U nzaga to Judice, April 9,1770, AGL Cuba, 188-A, Folio 1 d/1.
173

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and respect. Many “petite nacidnes” transferred their allegience to Spanish Louisiana
because they preferred its licensed traders and its prohibition of Indian slavery.33
English allied tribes also kept alive the constant threat of Indian attack on Native
Americans and Europeans alike. This forced more tribes into Lousiana. For example
Unzaga contended with Choctaw aggression against smaller tribes. The Pacana and
Otcheangas (?) sent delegations to visit the governor in New Orleans asking his
permission to relocate their families to Opelousas because they feared the Choctaw.34
In reality the Choctaw remained tom between Louisiana and British West Florida
and troubled both colonies. As former allies they attempted to remain friendly with
familiar French traders in Louisiana. In British territory they suffered mistreatment by
abusive Indian agents and domination by the now powerful Creek whose trading zone
extended from Georgia to Mobile.35 Frustrated and denigrated, the Choctaw sometimes
even robbed local settlements in West Florida. When “liquored-up” however, they
carried out depredations on both sides of the river. The Spanish tolerated the Choctaw in
their territory because they acted as a counterbalance against their mutual enemy the
Osage, whose predation had by then reached the Red River territory.36

33Rea, “Redcoast and Redskins,” 34-35.
MJudice to Unzaga, April 10,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Foliol d/6.
35See Kathryn Holland Braund, Deerskins & Duffels: Creek Indian Trade with
Anglo-America. 1685-1815. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), especially
chapter five on trade.
“For more on the Choctaws in Spanish Louisiana see Lawrence Kinnaird and
Lucia B. Kinnaird, “Choctaws West of the Mississippi, 1766-1800,” Southwestern
Historical Quarterly 63 (1980): 349-370.
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Trouble with another group called the Talapoussas (Creeks) became incessant in
Lower Louisiana. In June of 1771 both Commandants Descoudreaux and Dutisnd wrote
the governor that they were having trouble with colonists because of hostile incursions by
that tribe. The next year Commandant Judice informed Unzaga that his colonists and the
Houma Indians in his district at Cabannoce were growing more afraid of Talapoussa
assaults and that he was fortifying the post against such an attack. All the residents of the
Acadian and German coasts feared them and their depredations increased. The following
June Spanish Manchac asked Judice for aid against the same tribe and he detached thirty
men to aid the fort37 Unlike the Choctaw, the Talapoussa never became friendly to the
Spanish.
The “petite nacidnes" who moved in Spanish territory were not always peaceful
and immigrants didn’t always get along. Native Americans traded with each other, stole
from one another and vied for land. Several post commandants reported murders among
the tribes. The settlements of the Houma and the Alabama became openly hostile by the
fall of 1770 because of a murder. Commandant Louis Judice informed the governor that
he had given refuge to the Houma Indian accused of murdering an Alabama brave with a
tomahawk. The Alabama now wanted to kill the Houma in revenge. Judice was forced
to mediate between the tribes to keep the peace.38As stated before, immigrants to the

^Judice to Unzaga, June 1,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 218; Descoudreaux to
Unzaga, June 1,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 231; Unzaga to Judice, September
12,1772, AGI, Cuba, 189-A, Folio 438; Judice to Unzaga, June 15,;1773, Cuba 189-A,
Folio 478.
“ Judice to Unzaga, September 13, 1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/27.
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lower Mississippi were not always peaceful and neither did they immediately sign peace
treaties with the Spanish until they found it appropriate. The Apalachee, for example
moved into Louisiana at the end of the French period, locating their settlement on the Red
River at Rapide near a group of refugee Alabama families. Spanish Florida had become a
dangerous place for the tribe because they assisted the Spanish in capturing a Tallapoosa
brave. The Apalachee feared Tallapoosa reprisals because the Spanish could not or
would not protect them. When Etienne Marafret Layssard the Spanish Commandant of
the newly designated Rapide Post arrived he found the Apalachee contemptuous of
Spanish government because of their experiences in Florida. At the time the Native
American population overshadowed the French and Spanish at Rapides and the
Apalachee therefore held the upper hand in political negotiations concerning land or
trade. They had also refused to make peace with Governor Ulloa whom they said
“considered them dogs.”39 During Unzaga’s tenture, however, the Apalachee changed
their minds. Threatened by constant English raids and influence by other “petite
nacidnes,” they made peace with the Spanish.
The trouble with the British and their allies continued unabated through the next
two years, hi 1773 other “petite nacidnes” moved across the Mississippi to escape raids
by the British allied tribes. Rapides Post welcomed settlements of Mobilians, Choctaw
and Pascagoula Indians. In April, however, the Chief of the Mobile Indians began
spreading rumors of an English threat to all the tribes on the Spanish side of the

39Donald G. Hunter, “Their Final Years: The Apalachee and Other Immigrant
Tribes on the Red River, 1763-1834,” The Florida Anthropologist. 47 (March, 1994), 345 gives a complete story of the Apalachee, Biloxi, Mobile and Taensa at Rapides..
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Mississippi. He and a Chickasaw brave visited the camps of the Choctaw and Biloxi
telling them that after 26 days the “large nations” in English territory would kill all the
Indians left in Spanish territory. Lassayrd explained to Unzaga that:
The Chief of the Mobilliens is a bad subject, he comes from Manchac
where he received a present from the English and has held here many talks
He
brought two Tchactas who cause much worry among the Apalaches, Chactos,
Alibamons, Pascagoulas, and Biloxis who are in this p a r t . . . And their chief
Gaspar (Choctaw) came to tell me that the English threaten to destroy all the small
nations that I name if they do not come over to their land.40
The “petite nations” around Rapides were suitably impressed with the British
threat and in 1773 the Pascagoula, Biloxi, and Choctaw re-settled on the English side of
the Mississippi just below the mouth of the Red River. The Apalachee remained.
Unzaga and Layssard slowly wooed the Pascagoula and the Biloxi back into the Red
River area. The Chief of the Pascagoula played both the Commandant at Rapides and
Governor Unzaga off the British, arguing for larger medals and secredy trading with the
English when it suited him. Unzaga blundered by giving both the Apalachee and the
Alabama one annual present which might have cost him the loyalty of both. The Chiefs
of each tribe needed recognition and they complained to Layssard but remained loyal to
the Spanish.41 The Biloxi Chief never became totally loyal to the Spanish, continuing to
wear British medals and failing to remain allied to the Spanish under the threat of attack
by other Indians. Perhaps he had a point.

40Layssard to Unzaga, April 22,1773, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folios 1084-1085,
translation in Hunter, “Their Final Years,” 9.
41Layssard to Unzaga, AGI Cuba 189-A, Folios 1084-1085, translation ibid, 14.
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Another problem the “petite nacidnes presented Unzaga was that even established
and loyal tribes did not always condescend to abide by Spanish policies, particularly
concerning land. They did not really understand land ownership or boundaries and if
asked to move from one area merely relocated a small distance away, sometimes on a
setder’s property. Often such movements partitioned tribes into separate groups which
then tried to gain recognition, changing the balance of power and threatening the integrity
of the tribe.
The prime example of these problems was the prominent and loyal Houma tribe,
with two villages near New Orleans. During Unzaga’s tenure, the Houma began to sell
land to local colonists. In 1774 they sold land to a man named Patrick Conway. The
Indians, led by a young chief named Calabee and twenty braves, eagerly accepted
Conway’s payment but merely moved a small distance away (about two leagues). Three
different groups of Houma Indians suddenly emerged and began to address the
commandant separately. They wanted to speak with the governor. Judice tried to explain
to the new “chiefs” that Unzaga was “indisposed.” The creation of new tribes was part
of a competition to be recognized by the governor to gain more material wealth as each
tribe could expect to receive separate gifts from the Spanish government. Judice
reasoned, however, that this kind of separation was not useful and cautioned Unzaga
against recognition of the new “chiefs”. He believed that keeping the Indians in one area
was tantam ount to continuance of the tribe. Once they separated and gained individual
chiefs the competition would separate them even further. Smaller tribal units actually
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meant less chance of survival for each group and less defense for Judice. He tried to stop
them from leaving the area but a division had already begun.42
The problem of Indian slavery also concerned the “petite nacidnes.” Such slavery
had been abolished with the advent of Spanish government, although many Indian slaves
remained in the colony. The new law required current owners to report their slaves to the
local authorities for census purposes 43 The laws did not, however, remove current Native
Americans from their owners. Stephen Webre concludes that part of the reason was the
ambiguousness of Spanish policy and a wish not to generate disputes over debts “incurred
in slave purchases prior to the cession.”44
Several things made freeing currently owned Indian slaves difficult. The first
problem surrounded the idea that the French colonists in Louisiana saw slaves, Indian or
African, as immovable property rather than people. Stephen Webre points out that during
the Spanish period the courts continued to protect slave owners against damage to such
property. It was also easy to sell current Indian slaves by listing them on the bill of sale
as “mulattoes.” Webre also notes that with enforced avenues to freedom, the Indian slave
population in New Orleans almost entirely disappeared during the Spanish period. One
of the reasons may have been that they became “Africans.”45

42Judice to Unzaga, October 1, 1775, AGI, Cuba 189-B, Folios 284 and 285. In
time the Houma broke apart, intermarried and disappeared as an individual tribe. They are
presently trying to regain recognition as Native Americans.
43See Kinnaird, SMV. 1:189-92.
44Weber, “Problem of Indian Slavery in Spanish Louisiana,” 355.
45Ibid; Usner, “American Indians,” 298.
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Unzaga’s work with the “petite nacidnes” produced mixed results. The Biloxi and
Choctaw never became true Spanish allies. Truly independent, despite their “small”
status, the Biloxi took neither the British or Spanish side during the late 1770s, moving
north toward Pointe Coupde to avoid “other men’s” wars. The Choctaw continually
plagued both sides of the Mississippi for trade and recognition in a changing world.46
Other tribes, like the Apalachee, became permanent residents whose loyalty eventually
allowed the Spaniards to lead them into battle against the British. Despite their
disappearing acts and uncertain allegiances, the “petite naci6nes” remained a necessary
part of Louisiana’s trade and its defense. Indian slavery plagued the governor throughout
his tenure. He walked a particularly thin line between enforcement of Spanish law and
the realities of Louisiana’s labor systems. In the long run he reduced slavery but never
eradicated it
Sales and ownership of Indian slaves allows us to focus on Unzaga’s second
geographical location, Upper Louisiana. In 1770, the governor ordered Commandant
Pedro Piemas to enforce the new slave codes and to have the citizens at S t Louis and Ste.
Genevifcve formally declare any Indian slaves in their possession. Piemas sent back a
census of sixty-nine Indian slaves in S t Louis and twenty-eight in Ste. Genevieve. He
also noted that there were problems in enforcing the slave code because several of his
citizens had already advanced money toward the purchase of such servants. Unzaga
pragmatically skirted the law. He allowed all sales in progress to be consummated and

46For more information on the Choctaw see Jesse O. McKee and Jon A.
Schtenker, The Choctaws: Cultural Evolution of a Native American Tribe (Jackson:
University of Mississippi, 1980).
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instructed Piemas not to allow any future enslavement of the local tribes. Once again,
those who had slaves were not deprived of their property.47
The loneliness of life at outlying posts in Upper Louisiana added to the problems
of enforcement. Toward the middle of the eighteenth-century Indian women became the
prime subject of slave sales at places like Arkansas post. Such slaves often became
concubines of their owners and in some cases their wives. Native Americans also
undermined Spanish policy on Indian slavery. In some cases they deliberately sold
women to Europeans because of the possibility of marriage. Such intermarriages could
be used as leverage by the tribes to obtain trade connections and maintain or increase
diplomatic power. Such slavery therefore continued.48
Indian slavery was not the greatest issue which concerned Unzaga’s commandants
in Upper Louisiana. For these men, diplomacy with the Osage tribe was the constant they
shared. The Osage occupied an area in the Great Plains from the Missouri and Arkansas
River Valleys to the Rocky Mountains. They settled mostly along the Osage River south
of the Missouri, but they were an extremely volatile and mobile group that murdered and
pillaged from the borders of British Canada to Spanish Texas. If they found the Spanish
unwilling to sell them firearms and munitions in St. Louis it was easy enough to remove
themselves from the area and raid the Arkansas and the Red River valleys.

“"Piemas to Unzaga, May 26,1771, AGI, Cuba 81; Unzaga to Piemas, n.d., ibid.
^See Arnold, Colonial Arkansas. Chapter 3,53-72 for a discussion of
intermarriage with the Quapaw.
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As Unzaga took command of Louisiana, the Osage began a double-pronged
attack, this time in the west, where they attacked hunters near the Arkansas Post and
Natchitoches. At Natchitoches, Lieutenant-Governor, Athanase de M6zi£res wrote
Unzaga blaming the lascivious behavior by the hunters in the area for the problems with
the Indians, claiming most of the hunters were deserters, robbers and rapists and
recommending that the Osage be removed from the Osage and Arkansas Rivers and
confined to Upper Louisiana to isolate them from the influence of such men. He also
recommended that the Caddo and their allies be confined to the area below the Arkansas
to keep them away from the depredations and bad influence of the Osage.49
Unzaga responded quickly to de M6zi£res’ report. He instructed Demaselli&res at
Arkansas to order all hunters back to the post in hopes that their removal from the river
would induce the Osage to move north again. Before the men could regain the post,
however, seven war parties of Osage attacked the hunters along the river, looting guns
and ammunition. In the next two months, hunters and their bedraggled families began to
return to the fort. Demasellidres reported that most of the men had Indian “squaws” and
children in such a sorry state that the people at the fort took up a collection to buy them
clothing. He requested a priest be sent immediately to perform marriages and refused to
resupply the hunters lest they leave the post again.30

49De Mdzifcres to Unzaga, Natchitoches, May 20,1770, AGI, Cuba 100, Folio 227
in Bolton. Athanase de Mdzferes. 1: 166-68.
50Demassil£res to General (O’Reilly), no date, AGI, Cuba 107; id. to id. May 14,
1770, June 2, 4,6,15 and 16,1770, ibid and Arnold, Colonial Arkansas. 158-159.
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In July of 1770, Unzaga changed tactics. Removing the hunters had not stopped
Osage attacks, they merely chose different targets-mainly other Indians. Furthermore,
they had not left the Arkansas River Valley. Unzaga’s first step was to replace
Commandant Demaselli£res with Joseph de Orieta. The governor ordered him to try and
use the Quapaw to drive the Osage out of the valley. The Quapaw had been staunch allies
at Arkansas post during the French regime in Louisiana but they had little faith in the
Spanish. The Spanish, after all, had already been ousted from New Orleans once by the
French. It might happen again. Worse, the Spanish commandants didn’t speak the proper
language of trade and tried to withhold their favorite trade item—whiskey. Still, the
Quapaw saw in Unzaga’s plan an excuse to take vengeance on their enemies, the Osage.
The great leader of the Quapaw, Cozenompoint, arrived at Arkansas post on September
12,1770, to obtain permission to send out war parties against the Osage. Permission
granted, his warriors set about hunting the Osage but they were not successful and their
fervor soon died. The next year the Osage were back again, ravaging and plundering the
hunters along the Arkansas. Orieta suggested depriving them of weapons since the armed
Indians attacked both Indians and traders.31
A frustrated Unzaga changed tactics and commandants again. He appointed
Captain Fernando de Leyba to the post in March of 1771. Along with the appointment,
the governor issued a special set of instructions Leyba was to follow in his dealings with
the Osage. The instructions included orders to deprive the Osage of any weapons and
further to “reprimand them kindly” on their behavior and bad faith with the Spanish and

51Orieta to Unzaga, January 26, and February 2 and 6,1771, AGI, Cuba 107.
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the Quapaw.52 These “kind reprimands” would be a hallmark of Unzaga’s relationships
with both the Indians and his commandants.
For their part, the Osage had already begun to make a small peace with the
Quapaw and the post before de Leyba arrived. Baffled by the sudden turn of events,
Orieta reported to the governor he had given them a Spanish flag to remind them who
commanded in Louisiana. In the summer of 1771, the Osage returned to the Arkansas
post to treat with the new commandant. Going directly against the governor’s wishes, de
Leyba gave the Osage gifts which included guns. He quickly regretted his mistake when
the Osage used the guns to rob hunters for more weapons and am m unition Still, he
suggested that it might be possible to send the Quapaw after the Osage again if the
Spanish promised to reward them with munitions.53
Unzaga refused to arm the Quapaw. All the Arkansas valley needed was a full
blown Indian war enhanced by European weapons. He maintained his tactic of “kind
reprimands” and ordered de Leyba to secure several Osage hostages to maintain the
peace. Neither de Leyba, nor the governor understood the power of the Osage. The
governor least of all. Commandant de Leyba had no leverage with which to order the
Osage to appear at the post for a reprimand and he definitely had no means to demand
hostages. Unzaga clung fiercely to O’Reilly’s belief that peace could be accomplished

52Unzaga to Orieta, March 8,1771, AGI, Cuba 107; and “Special Instructions
which the Captain of Infantry, Fernando de Leyba, Commandant of the Post of Arkansas,
is to observe,” signed Luis de Unzaga, March 11,1771, AGI, Cuba 131-A. See also Din
and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 74-75.
53Leyba to Unzaga, July 5 and September 11,1771, AGI, Cuba 107; For a larger
discussion of Leyba’s plan see Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 75-76.
184

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

through proper negotiations. He restrained both the Quapaw at the Arkansas and the
Caddo near Natchitoches from retaliation against the Osage lest they interrupt what he
considered the peace process he had begun.54
From Natchitoches, De Mdzi&es warned Unzaga that peace would not work with
the Osage. As if to underscore his warning, the Osage began trouble again. They robbed
and killed the local tribes and stole horses from both Indians and colonists. Moving up
into the Arkansas valley they began to attack and kill the hunters who moved their camps
to the river during the fall. Not only were they not ready to make peace with de Leyba, a
large war party was headed for the small, dilapidated stockade that de Leyba called his
fort Unzaga’s reaction was diplomatic. He understood de Leyba’s fears and frustrations
but wished to continue Spain’s policy of neutrality which placed them in a defensive
position with the Indians. He repeated his earlier orders to de Leyba to try and treat with
their chiefs and if possible to take hostages. If the Indians continued their hostilities they
would fall back to Unzaga’s previous plan of arming the Quapaw against the Osage.
Unzaga desired peace with the Osage but their behavior made him believe it might be
impossible.55 Unzaga’s gamble with the Osage paid off briefly only because the Osage
split into two parties heading back to Illinois and up the Osage River. No truce had been
struck between the Indians and the Spaniards at Arkansas Post

^Draft by Unzaga to de Leyba, September 22,1771, in Din and Nasatir, Imperial
Osages. 76.
55De Leyba to Unzaga, December 26, 1771, AGI, Cuba 107 and Id. to Id., January
4,1772, Ibid. See also Unzaga to de Leyba, January 26,1772, AGI, Cuba 107 in Din and
Nasatir, Imperial Osage. 78 as well as the warning from Natchitoches.
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Unzaga issued similar orders to St. Louis regarding the Osage. The LieutenantGovenor was to continue annual gift-giving ceremonies but he was required to stop
giving them weapons. Piemas did not trust the Indians of Upper Louisiana. He found
them thankless and treacherous, writing to the governor that “The Indians shift their
loyalties to the person or persons that have most recently given them gifts, without paying
any attention to what they had received before, even though it might have been a
thousand times more.” He also reported that the British had continued to “court” the
Little Osage and the Missouri, supposed Spanish allies. Further, he noted the Indians
were adept horse thieves who continued to expand the already troublesome contraband
trade in the area. Despite his fears, Piemas followed the governor’s orders, issuing
presents and requesting that the governor send him Spanish flags to give to the Osage and
Missouri. 56
Osage attacks in the Arkansas River area caused Unzaga to warn Piemas in early
1772 not to retaliate. He again issued orders that Piemas was to treat with the Indians and
quietly reprimand them for their unfriendly and untrustworthy behavior. He also required
that the Osage appear before the Lieutenant-Governor in St. Louis and account for the
murders they had perpetrated. If, however, they did not comply, Unzaga would then
consider them a hostile enemy who needed to be eradicated. He repeated the same orders
to de M6zi6res at Natchitoches.57

^Piemas to Unzaga, June 12 and 23,1771, AGI, Cuba 81; Piemas to Unzaga,
November 6, 1771, AGI, Cuba 81; Nasatir, Indian Trade. 37.
^Unzaga to Piemas, March 14, 1772, AGI, Cuba 81, and Unzaga to de Mdzi&res,
April 3,1772, AGI, Cuba 111. Piemas to Unzaga, November 19,1772, AGI, Cuba81.
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In 1772 the Spaniards began to distinguish individual groups among the Osage,
especially the difference between the Little and Big Osage. The worst offenders seemed
to be the Little Osage, egged on, of course, by the Missouri. That summer the two groups
attacked the fort in Missouri stealing weapons and food. During the perpetration of the
crime they carried and flouted the British flag, insolently planting it on the river bank
afterward. The Missouri also attempted to steal horses from Ste. Genevieve and
Kaskaskia but were caught in the process by both the Spanish and the British. Piemas
suspended trade with the groups although it meant the possibility they might turn to the
British.58
The Indian tribes surrounding Missouri and the Arkansas Post decided to take
matters into their own hands. Patience was not working. In July the Saulteaux and
Potawatomi killed two Little Osage chiefs and cut the arm off another. The Little Osage
were forced to turn to their intended victims for protection. Further west, the Big Caddo
and the Quapaw caught and killed a number of Osage who had been stealing their
horses.59
On the Arkansas, the Big Osage began to sue for peace. Chief Clermont wrote to
Piemas that he wished to come to St. Louis but was afraid of the other Indians. Piemas
wrote to Unzaga saying he believed the only troublesome band was the Little Osage,
whom he considered thieves and who “by treacherous acquaintance. . . find themselves

58Piemas to Unzaga, November 1 9 ,1;772, AGI, Cuba 81, and Nasatir, Indian
Trade. 41-42; Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osage. 81.
59Piemas to Unzaga, November 19,1772, AGI, Cuba 81; Josd de la Pena to
Unzaga, July 14,1772, AGI, Cuba 111.
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in war with all the nations of this continent, who desire their destruction.”60 Piemas was
somewhat mislead, because at the same time other bands of Big Osage were attacking,
killing and capturing hunters who ventured near their camps. Yet Chief Clermont
pursued peace with Piemas in St. Louis. In August, he arrived with his representatives in
St. Louis for the annual gift-giving ceremony. Piemas ventured to reprimand them for
earlier atrocities and was surprised when Clermont offered to find those who had killed
the hunters and bring them to the post The ploy worked to stay the hand of the Spanish
for a while but Clermont did not speak for all the Osage. In October the Little Osage
struck in Missouri again, killing three men. The infuriated governor gave his permission
for Piemas to retaliate. Horse stealing by the Big Osage in the Natchitoches district
elicited an order from Unzaga in early January of 1773, to make war upon the bands
involved “even to the point of destroying them . . . without cost to the royal treasury.”61
In order to view the picture of the Osage properly, it is necessary to bring into the
picture Louisiana’s third geographic territory-the west which was governed by Athanase
De Mdzi&res. Indeed, while Unzaga dealt with Osage depredations in Upper Louisiana
between 1770 and 1773, De M6zferes was busy handling similar problems in the post at
Natchitoches. De Mdzifcres was only too familiar with the Osage who used guns acquired
at the Arkansas post to attack and rob the Indians and settlers of his district, stealing

“ Piemas to Unzaga, July 8,1772 and November 19,1772, AGL Cuba 81.
6IPiemas to Unzaga, September 1,1772, ibid; Nasatir, Indian Trade. 44. Unzaga
to De MSzifcres, January 10,1773, ibid and March 19,1773 in Din and Nasatir, Imnerial
Osages. 83.
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horses and taking captives for slaves.62 At the time De Mdzifcres was involved in
negotiations with the Caddo on the Red River and the Osage had killed an important
Caddo leader. Despite inter-tribal war, De Mezi&res managed to bring the Caddos into
an alliance with the Spanish in April of 1770 as Unzaga was dealing with the Osage in
Arkansas and S t Louis.63
This treaty was quite a coup for Unzaga, since the Nortenos (the Caddo
Confederated tribes, the Witchita and the Comanche) had not been friendly with the
Spanish in Texas previously. In fact an attack on Los Adaes in 1767, had been turned
aside at the last moment by S t Denis, then Commandant at Natchitoches. It had been
O’Reilly, working with Baron de Ripperdl to secure a peaceful frontier between their
colonies that sent De Mdziferes to the Caddo in the first place. After the treaty, De
Mdzi&res arranged an annual gifting ceremony at Natchitoches, inviting the Natchitoches,
Yatasis, Petit Caddos, and Kadahadoches. After licensing traders to visit the tribes, he
singled out two chiefs to receive and officially wear Spanish medals.64 Unzaga distrusted
his French commandants at first, including the Lieutenant-Governor at Natchitoches.
Used to running things with a free hand, De Mdzi&res angered the governor by holding

•“De MdziSres to Unzaga, May 20, 1770, AGL Cuba 110, Folio 227, in Bolton,
Athanase de Mdzifres. 1:166-68.
63See also Samuel Dorris Dickinson, “Caddos Moved to the Little Missouri,”
Arkansas Historical Journal 49 (Autumn, 1990): 240-248.

64 F. Todd Smith, “Indian Policy in Spanish Louisiana,” 288. The two chiefs
were the famous Tinhioiien of the Kadohadachos and Cocay of the Yatasis. For a full
discussion of the Caddo and Spanish authorities see F. Todd Smith, “A Native Response
to the Transfer of Louisiana: The Red River Caddos and Spain, 1762-1803,” LH 37
(Spring, 1996):163-185.
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court and passing sentence without his approval. Still, O’Reilly had believed that the
Frenchman was the most knowledgeable man in his district concerning the Indians.65
After his work among the Caddos, Unzaga grudgingly sent De M6zi6res to make
peace with the remaining tribes among the Nortenos-the Wichita and Comanche. He also
sent along a Spaniard to keep and eye on him in the process. De Mdzifcres talked his new
allies, the Caddos, into influencing the Wichita and Comanche. It wasn’t hard. The
Kadahodoche and the Yatasis were now dependent upon the Spanish for trade and
realized their relationship with the local posts would be enhanced by tranquility and their
position as peacemakers. They promised not to trade with the other tribes in order to
show them that only Spanish allies would receive much sought after European goods. In
August of 1770 the Witchita sent word to the Caddo that they desired to negotiate with
De M^zidres.66
Tinhioiien, chief of the Kadahadoches, arranged a meeting with the LieutenantGovernor, asserting his position as middleman between the Spanish and the other
Nortenos. To assuage the doubtful governor, De M6zi£res took several Spaniards with
him to treat with the Wichita including a priest, Franciscan Father Miguel de Santa Maria
y Silva, who noted that the Indians were extremely friendly with the French but remained
aloof with the Spanish, a holdover from their problems with Spanish Texas. De MSzi&res
carefully flew the Spanish flag during his negotiations to leave no doubt in the minds of

“ The relationship between Unzaga and the Lieutenant Governor can be found in
Bolton’s biography of De M6zi£res, and is discussed further in the following chapter.
“ Ibid.; De Mdzifcres to Unzaga, February 1,1770, in Bolton, Athanase de
Mgziferes. 1:140-42. and Smith, “Indian Policy in Spanish Louisiana,” 288.
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the Indians with whom they were negotiating. He explained that Louisiana was now
Spanish and that if the Indians wished to trade they must stop their attacks on the
missions in Spanish Texas and become allies. The two medal chiefs added their own
arguments in favor of the new government and its representatives.67
The Wichita explained to the Spanish that they were still angered by the Missions
in Texas which had been established for their enemies the Apache. The Wichita also
feared retaliation by the Comanche and therefore refused to sign a treaty with De
Mdzi&res or the Missions in Texas. They agreed, however, to return the next spring to re
negotiate. Unzaga was discouraged and angered by what he considered a failed meeting.
Believing his trust had been misplaced, he refused to allow De Mdzidres to return in the
Spring but the Frenchman quietly persisted and was rewarded in September with formal
alliances with the Hainai, Kichai, Iscani and Tawakoni. Encouraged, Unzaga allowed
him to treat with the Wichita and Comanche in 1772. Once again, De M6zi&res was
successful.68
The peace in the west helped ease part of Unzaga’s Indian problems but it did not
stop the problems with the Osage. In 1772, De Mdzidres suggested that he use the Caddo
and their allies to eradicate the Osage. Unzaga, as previously noted, had refused his offer,
instructing De Mdzi&res to try peaceful methods first Although he was busy with peace
negotiations, the Lieutenant-Governor was constantly aware of the Osage. In July, he

^From the Report by De M&ifcres of the expedition to Cadodachos, October 26,
1770 in Bolton, Athanase De Mdziferes. 1: 204-206, and Smith, “Indian Policy in Spanish
Louisiana,” 298.
“ Ibid.
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contacted Unzaga again, suggesting that he prevent all Spanish allied tribes from trading
with the Osage, create a buffer zone between the colonists and the Osages, and again
induce the Caddo to wage war on them.69 Finally, in December of 1772, Unzaga agreed
with De Mdzi&res that he could not longer proceed with a peaceful solution to the
problem. Heartened by the governor’s decision the Frenchman reminded him that the
Caddo and Quapaw were united against the Osage and could, therefore, could be sent to
fight them. He planned a surprise attack at the end of the summer when the Osage would
return to their villages.70
Mysteriously, Unzaga reneged on his proposed eradication of the Osage. At the
beginning of 1773, he ordered both Lieutenant-Governors in Natchitoches and St. Louis
to return to a defensive diplomacy. Din and Nasatir note that Unzaga probably did not
wish to upset the other Indians with inter-tribal warfare. This is probably part of the
answer. Finances were also a possible factor. De M6zi£res letter to the governor
indicated that he could promote this war if he had the money for munitions and gifts.
Unzaga’s discretionary income was small enough that funding an Indian war could not be
part of the agenda. He, therefore, for several reasons reverted to a conciliatory
relationship with the Osage. Threats of eradication soon turned to terms of imprisonment

^Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 80.
70 De Mdzferes to Unzaga, February 10,1772, AGI, Cuba 2357, in Bolton,
Athanase de Mdziferes. 2:24-27. De Mdzi£res to Unzaga, February 28,1772, AGI, Cuba

81, Folio 5; De Mdzifcres to Ripperdd, July 4,1772, in Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages.
78; De Mdzi&res to Unzaga, Natchitoches, December 15,1772, AGI, Cuba I31-A; and
Unzaga to De M6zi£res, January 10,1773, AGI, Cuba 81.
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and fines where the Indians were concerned. The only method which seemed to keep the
Indians in line was to ban trade with them, a gamble which could backfire at anytime.71
The gamble paid off in April when the Big Osage lived up to their promise,
bringing the parties responsible for the murders along the Arkansas to S t Louis. Piemas
chose to follow his governor’s example and was lenient with the criminals. Instead of
death he imprisoned them, and sent to Unzaga for a decision. In his letter he reported his
hope that all would end favorably, “without bloodshed or expense.”71
In 1773, the seeming peace created by Unzaga’s conciliatory policy seemed to be
working. It was only a lull in the conflict In Lower Louisiana, as mentioned previously,
rumors spread by the Mobile had caused several of the “petite nacidnes” to flee toward
the English, upsetting the remainder. Simultaneously in Upper Louisiana, the Quapaw
began retaliation raids on the bands of Big Osage who were once again attacking hunters
along the Arkansas River and the Caddo turned on the Osage in Natchitoches district It
became disturbingly clear to Unzaga that his Indian policy had not been successful.73
The Quapaw also would not listen to or obey de Leyba at Arkansas Post any
longer. By following Unzaga’s orders the commandant appeared two-faced to the
Quapaw he was supposed to protect They chastised him for his weakness against the

7IUnzaga to de M6zi£res, March 19 and April 17, 1773, AGI, Cuba 18 and Draft
to Piemas, February 19,1773, ibid., in Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 84.
S e rn a s to Unzaga, April 24,1773, AGI, Cuba 81.
^To make matters worse the Acadians in S t James Parish began to agitate to
leave the colony or relocate in Opelousas. (See Chapter 7) Unzaga was faced with unrest
at all points of the compass.
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Osage and went after their enemies with the very knives Unzaga had given them during
the gift presentations in New Orleans. In April they took five Osage scalps and captives,
a fact which, in reality, did not displease the governor. Unzaga wrote to de Leyba that he
should thank the Quapaw for doing what he could not because “the Osage Nation has
been so insolent that it is necessary to applaud all those who try to destroy i t ” Having
said that, the governor banned Chief Clermont from returning to Arkansas P o s t74
At Natchitoches, Jos6 de la Pena reported that the Osage attacks and looting had
caused the tribes of the Caddo confederation to move toward each other for safety. Some
of them had returned to their former locations to remove themselves entirely from the
Osage. The Caddo, like the Quapaw, would no longer go on without retaliation. They
pursued the Osage, killing several and capturing another who informed them that hunters
along the Arkansas River were still providing them with munitions !75
The Litde Osage in the Missouri district completed Unzaga’s disillusionment
when they failed to appear at S t Louis to atone for several murders near Ste. Genevieve.
Tribes made hostile by their continued abuse now began to reciprocate and the Little
Osage fled the Missouri toward the Arkansas. Unzaga sent much the same message to
Piemas as he had to de Leyba, saying that he should force Indian chiefs to execute the
criminals in full view of the post and other Indians to make an example of them. Fearing
retaliation if he killed the captive, Unzaga had de Leyba return him with threats that this

74De Leyba to Unzaga, April 30,1773, AGI, Cuba 107 and quote in Unzaga to
Leyba, June 18,1773, AGI, Cuba 81, and Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 88.
75Jos6 de la Pena replaced De M6zi£res at Natchitoches while the later was in
Europe during 1773. Jos6 de la Pena to Unzaga, May 5,1773, AGI, Cuba 111.
194

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

was the last indulgence they merited. There followed a “tragedy” of errors. Attacks by
their intended victims had shocked and briefly demoralized the Osage.76 In August the
Little Osage and the Missouri visited Piemas at his fort in Upper Louisiana and entered
into peace negotiations. By the end of the year the Big Osage also returned to re-establish
themselves with the Spanish.
As peace terms were concluding in St. Louis, the Quapaw again attacked the
Osage. Now they would not listen to de Leyba or Unzaga. Firm in the belief that the
only good Osage was a dead Osage, three war parties of Quapaw left the post in early
October. A few weeks later reports came to de Leyba that the Osage were about their
seasonal robbery along the Arkansas River. He promised the governor to try and rein in
the Quapaw but speaking frankly he felt the same way they did about the violent tribe.
Peace in Missouri obviously had little to do with peace at the Arkansas Post.77 It had
even less to do with Natchitoches which by September was ablaze with Osage
depredations. These set off retaliatory raids by the Kichais, in turn causing fresh attacks
by the Osage who finally dispersed the Kichais. The Osage then turned their attacks on
the Big and Little Caddo. Unzaga’s plans for peace were clearly a failure yet he strove
one more time to extend the “kindly reprimand” before he ordered an offensive.

76Piemas to Unzaga, July 6,1773, AGI, Cuba 81. Unzaga to Piemas, August 14,
1773, Cuba 81, and Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 90.
^Piemas to Unzaga, September 14,1773, AGI, Cuba 81, and December 12,1773,
ibid. De Leyba to Unzaga, October 6,1773, and Unzaga to De Leyba, October 26, 1773,
AGI, Cuba 107.
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The Osage began what by now was a seasonal retreat In the spring of 1774, they
disappeared. Rumor claimed the Big Osage were building further up the Arkansas.
Trade increased in the absence of the terrorists and new Indian groups along the Missouri
sent representatives to become allies of the Spanish at S t Louis. Unzaga sent word to
the Arkansas that it was okay to trade with the Big and Little Osage again, but there could
still be no bullets or powder.78 Not all was well, however. Once again, as the fall
returned and the hunters reappeared along the Arkansas, the Osage returned. Again the
Quapaw reacted to their pillaging with violence, hunting them down and killing three
braves. Unzaga also replaced de Leyba with Joseph Orieta in 1774. Orieta experienced
much the same disrespect that de Leyba had from the Quapaw. This was made worse by
the British across the river and a trader who boldly set up a store among the Indians,
stocked with merchandise from Concordia. Dressed like one of the Indians he paraded
himself at the post, helping to convince the Indians that the dilapidated state of the fort
and its guns meant that the Spanish really didn’t control the west bank of the River. The
Quapaw were not united in their like of the British but they were used to playing the
British off the Spanish. Somewhat confuted, they went to see Orieta who decided to give
them a show of strength. In answer to their questions about ownership the commandant
fired his canon, which shook the surrounding buildings. The Quapaw were satisfied: they
returned to their village and ejected the trader.79

^Din and Nasatir, Imperial Osages. 95; Nasatir, Indian Trade. 55.
^Orieta to Unzaga, July 14, October 17 and October 30,1774 in Morris Arnold,
Colonial Arkansas. 109-111.
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Other than the problems with the Quapaw, the Osage gave little trouble to the
colony in 1774. Both Piemas and the returning De Mdzferes reported increased trade and
quiet throughout the year. Piemas remained confident of peace as both the Big and Little
Osage provided some forty-percent of the fur trade with Missouri the following Spring.
In the southwest, at Natchitoches, De Mdzidres warned the Osage would return once they
had built another village.

And the Caddos grew restive waiting for the next attack.

The following spring, Unzaga’s attention was directed to increased activity along
the Mississippi and the impending hostilities between the British and their colonists on
the eastern seaboard. He beefed up his defenses along the Mississippi, refurbishing and
manning the small fort at Spanish Manchac in particular. With the governor’s attention
thus diverted, the merchants and traders in Missouri returned to their old habits of trading
guns and ammunition with their “peaceful” Osage neighbors. These weapons were put to
no good use by the Osage. In May the Osage returned to the Natchitoches, attacking
French hunters camped near the Caddo, taking four lives. They also resumed their attacks
on the Wichitas and the Caddo. They also terrorized the hunters near Arkansas post in
early fall. De M6zi6res wrote disgustedly that peace treaties meant nothing to the Osage
and that his Indian allies only awaited the governor’s permission to mount an assault on
their hated enemy. The supposed peace also meant little in Missouri where the Osage
continued to steal horses and make war upon other Indians.80

“Smith, “Indian Policy in Spanish Louisiana,” 290; De Mdzifcres to Unzaga, June
6, 1775, AGI, Cuba 111; Din and Harkins, Imperial Osages. 97.
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The following year (1776) brought little change in Osage behavior although their
trade with the post at St. Louis increased. Francisco Cruzat, who had replaced Piemas in
1775, reported he expected a huge increase in furs from the Big Osage. At Arkansas,
Balthazar de Villiers, who replaced Orieta as commandant, reported several Osage bands
continued to raid and kill hunters in the area but the hunters had begun to strike back A
quiet war continued to rage in the Arkansas river valley though the Quapaw “appeared to
be moving toward a peace with the Osages.” Like Unzaga, however, de Villiers was
more concerned with the British, who now openly crossed into the Arkansas district, and
with refurbishing his small fort on the Arkansas River. At Natchitoches, De M6zi£res
wrote that nothing had changed between the Osage and his Nortenos.81
Luis de Unzaga’s attempts to create a network of defensive Indian allies at best
remained incomplete. His conciliatory nature had created more confusion than loyalty
among the tribes. Many saw his efforts at peace as a weakness on the part of the Spanish.
The Caddo and Quapaw had viewed it as a betrayal. Economically the colony benefitted
from increased trade with the Indians although contraband also increased. This financial
benefit, however, came at the cost of continued attacks by the Osage, despite their peace
treaties. With the exception of the pacification of the Nortenos and Caddo under De
Mdzi&res and the alliance between Layssard and the Apalachee at Rapides, little changed
between the Spanish and their Native American neighbors.
As the American Revolution began in the east, Native Americans once again
chose sides as they had done in the Seven Years War between France and Great Britain.

81Ibid, 98.
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This time the choices were somewhat more difficult hi 1776 many Native Americans,
including those in Spanish Louisiana, had become more dependent on trade with
Europeans. Some tribes saw little difference between the two contestants in the
approaching conflict and hoped to continue their ploy of playing to the highest bidder.
Along the Mississippi, the conflict elicited several responses from the “petite nacidnes.”
Some of the tribes, such as the Apalachee, moved permanently into the Spanish sphere
becoming staunch allies against the British in the ensuing fight. Others, like the Biloxi,
sought to escape northward into more unsettled portions of Spanish Louisiana. Still
others, like the Choctaw and the Pascagoula, grew more restive, their loyalties constantly
changing.82
While the commandants at St. Louis and Arkansas Post prepared for war, the
Quapaw began a peace council of their own with the Osage. The Spanish, now under
governor Galvez, hoped the united tribes would help in the defense of Upper Louisiana.
Not all the Osage complied, however, and other bands continued their depredations in
Natchitoches, to the frustration of De M6z£res and his Indian allies. It seemed
impossible that the Osage would ever come in peace to the Red River, though Unzaga’s
policies had come close.83
As Unzaga struggled with Louisiana’s Indians he also worked toward another of
O’Reilly’s commands-that he develop a colony of loyal subjects. This was a formidable

82Layssard to Unzaga, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 1105, and 1109-1110, in Hunter,
“Their Final Years,” 10-11.
°De M6zi£res to Unzaga, May 2,1777, AGL Cuba 112, in Bolton, Athanase de
Mdzi&res. 2:130-131.
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order considering the recalcitrant independence of Louisiana’s citizens. The governor
believed that loyalty was an abstract quality, one which he could not demand or
necessarily produce. He could bring order to the populace, implant the rule of law, and
thereby continue to reconcile his colonists to Spanish rule. He would see about loyalty
afterward.

200

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Chapter Seven
Order and Loyalty
“I heartily approve some of the instructions . . . which are such as to secure the
rights and interests of the king, the object of which is to retain his subjects under his rule
by conforming as much as possible with their genius, their character, and manners.”
Luis de Unzaga to the Bishop of Havana, September 2 6 ,17721

Luis de Unzaga’s managerial skills remained his most important talent for king
and colony. His attempts at establishing a viable economy had been successful given his
circumstances. The governor also had to attend to O’Reilly’s command to create a colony
of loyal subjects. He believed, however, that loyalty could not be achieved without order.
Through just and consistent, if not always impartial rule, Unzaga created a stable,
growing population reconciled to Spanish rule. He applied enlightened, Bourbon ideas to
centralization of government and separation of church and state, and lastly implanted the
rule of law. At the end of his tenure, he had carefully and deliberately shepherded his
colonists toward loyalty.
Unzaga’s attempts at order included re-organizing and stabilizing the population,
acting as the colony’s chief judicial officer, attending Cabildo meetings, and filling the
spiritual and education needs of his community. These duties meant that Unzaga spent
the majority his governorship in the seat of goverament--New Orleans. As he gradually
settled into the routine of life in the Crescent city his own personality and leadership
emerged. The governor was not a member of the elite in Spanish society. Hard work,
bravery and good leadership capabilities had brought him to his current position. Unzaga

‘Gayand, History of Louisiana. 3: 84.
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did not carry the imperial authority vested in O’Reilly, nor his pomposity. Neither did he
have the social advantages of his well-heeled successor, Bernardo de Gflvez. Still, by
1772, his titles included Brigadier, Inspector, Intendant and Governor General of the
Colony. Such weighty titles meant that the governor must now have his interests
represented at the Spanish court Accordingly, on September 25,1772, he gave his power
of attorney to Don Andrds Lid6n and Don Thomas Peres de Arroyo, “of the city and court
of Madrid,” to “represent him before the King, Royal Councils, Tribunals, and
Audiencias for all business.”2 This allowed him to focus on the colonial government
without constant worry about his family, property and reputation in Spain.
One of the ways that Unzaga won the following of his colonists was to marry
among them, an act not particularly sanctioned by the crown concerning its officials in the
Indies. The marriage in some ways allowed the governor to act within the colony’s
society instead of always acting upon i t As a member of society, rather than its foreign
governor, he became party to useful information about his colonists, their habits and
needs, at dinners and social gatherings. As their governor, and the representative of the
King, he could use such information to establish a stable and effective colonial
government
Unzaga became friendly with many elite members of Louisiana’s society. Not all
of the French planters had been adverse to Spain and many had willingly supported their
new governors. Among these was Gilbert Antoine de S t Maxent, head of one of the

2Andres Almonaster y Roxas, Notarial Archives. January to December 1772, Act
No. 26, September 25,1772.
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wealthiest and most prominent families in Louisiana. The governor was an intimate
friend of the St. Maxents. Unzaga was a particularly handsome man, with long dark hair,
a high brow and flashing eyes and within the first years of his tenure he married the S t
Maxent’s eldest daughter, Marie Elizabeth, then about nineteen years old.3
Little else exists in the records of the couple’s life in New Orleans. No diaries of
either have been found and Unzaga’s correspondence is confined to business matters or
requests to the crown. The notary’s records do not indicate the purchase or sale of any
homes or land in their name either when they were married nor upon their departure from
the colony in 1776. It is probable that the pragmatic officer and his young wife moved
into government housing in the city which was available, cost-free and “close to the
office.” It is also probable that Unzaga did not know how long he would be in Louisiana
and did not wish to have the responsibility of large amounts of property.4
Indeed, the only commercial transactions the notarial records record are Unzaga’s
buying and selling of several slaves in the city. In 1773 he sold a twenty-year-old female
slave named Marian whom he had brought with him from Havana, to Miguel Almonasy,
the Adjuntant Mayor of the New Orleans Battalion. It is quite possible that 1773 is the
year he married Marie Elizabeth de Maxent and was removing a possible “problem” to

3Marie’s birthdate is February 3,1752 in Monsignor Earl C. Woods and Charles
E. Nolan, Archdiocese of New Orleans Sacramental Records. Vol. 2,1751-1771, (New
Orleans: Archdiocese of New Orleans, 1989), 201. The church records for the marriage
have burned and an exact date is not known, though its is believed to have been between
1771 and 1772. See also James Julian Coleman’s 1968 biography of St. Maxent
^ e notary records indicate that Elizabeth had one piece of property which may
have been her dowry, yet it was small and she sold it two years before they left for
Caracas.
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their marriage. Again, in 1775, he sold two other slaves to Miguel Almonasi and
Geronimo La Chappelle.5
We do know that the couple had one daughter, Maria Rafaella Elois de Unzaga y
Amezaga de St. Maxent, who was baptized in 1775, though the sacramental records give
no day or month and no birth date. Her sponsors were Martin Unzaga, the governor’s
brother and Victoria de St. Maxent, Gilbert de S t Maxent’s daughter, who was twelve at
the time. Martin was Canon of the Cathedral Church of Malaga and therefore in absentia
at the baptismal ceremony. His proxy was Unzaga’s friend, Captain Major Jacinto Pams.
Sadly, Maria’s life seems to have been extremely brief. She lived long enough to
become the baptismal sponsor of her cousin Marie Elois Mercedite Maxent the last child
of Gilbert and Elizabeth Maxent bom in September of 1775. Unfortunately, both Marfa
Rafaella and her namesake appear to have perished the following year. The markings in
the sacramental records indicate that both girls received the church rites at home on June
23, 1775, which was usually done for children who were extremely ill or near death. No
further instance of their names is noted.®
The governor’s personal life reflected, if somewhat mutely, the tragic stamp of
early colonial life in Louisiana. Like any frontier colony, life in Louisiana was often
tenuous, especially for women and children. Unzaga’s personal life, however, allowed

3Andres Almonaster y Roxas, Notarial Records. January to December 1773, Act
No. 135. Sale to Almonasi and La Chappelle respectively in ibid., January to December,
1775, Acts 248 and 399.
6Sacramental Records. 3:97, for Marfa Rafaella Elois and 206 for Marfa Elois
Mercedite.
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him a special vantage point and Unzaga used his position to promote order in the colony
with the least amount of resistence.
Colonial order also required stability in Louisiana’s declining population and
acceptance of the law. Stabilizing Louisiana’s population was a difficult and lengthy
process which included immigration and land grant policies, orchestrating and controlling
the internal migration of his colonists, and stabilizing and pacifying Indian groups. At the
beginning of the Spanish period the census indicates the population of the colony at
11,500 souls with 32% living in New Orleans.7 In 1771, the official census shows a
population total of only 11,344.8 Thus the population declined from Ulloa’s tenure to the
beginning of Unzaga’s, despite immigration and importation of troops. In the decade that
followed the population of the lower colony rose to 17,926 persons with a shift in the
population density showing only 20% living in New Orleans.
Historians have generally attributed the rise in population during the 1770s to
immigration and the introduction of African slaves. Other factors must be considered.
The initial immigration of the Acadians may partially account for the increase, but many
of those early colonists succumbed to local diseases. Too, numerous colonists exited the
colony following the hurricane of 1773. Neither can the rise be accounted for by a huge
increase in slaves as less than two-thousand were imported (legally) in the decade

’Census of 1766 in AGI, Cuba 2357.
8Census figures from Antonio Acosta Rodriguez, La Poblacidn de Luisiana
Espanola 1763-1803 (Madrid: Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores. Direction General de
Relaciones Culturales, 1979), 17-130.
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between 1766 and 1777.9 The density of population setdements by the end of Unzaga's
tenure gives the impression that population growth, outside of New Orleans, had more to
do with a stabilized economy and the implementation of Spanish land policies than with
immigration. It is to those subjects that we must now turn.
Throughout the French period surveys of land claims were extremely sporadic and
often left incomplete. Their form changed with each new government and there was no
official French Surveyor General. It was not until John Law took the colony that land
concessions were truly defined and then they were just a little better because they fixed
only the amount of land and its location, not actual on-the-ground boundaries.
Improvements in defining land grants began after the 1730s when the arpent was
introduced as a measure of land in the colony. It continued to be used throughout the
Spanish period.10 The arpent is a French word derived from the Latin arepinnes (Gallic)
which was an ancient agrarian measure.11 The arpent measure was characteristic of land

’Census figures from Acosta Rodriguez and slave figures from Gwendolyn Midlo
Hall, Africans in Colonial Louisiana: The Development of Afro-Creole Culture in the
Eighteenth Century (Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana State University Press, 1992),
graph on page 279; her figures derived from Acosta Rodriguez also.
10Carolyn Oliver French, “Cadastral Patterns in Louisiana: A Colonial Legacy"
(Ph..D. diss., Louisiana State University, 1978,3,42.)
"According to the Sebastian Vincente Pintado Papers. 1771-1818, Vol. I, Part I,
Baton Rouge: State Land Office,). “the arpent of Paris, of which use was made in
Louisiana and West Florida during the Spanish domination, is a square whose side is of
10 perches and, or course contains, 100 sq. perches. The lineal perch of Paris is 18 feet of
the same city.” According to John Whitling Hall, “Louisiana Survey Systems: Their
Antecedents, Distributuion and characteristics” (Ph.D. diss., Louisiana State University,
1970), 24, the Square arpent was 180 x 180 French feet which equals 192 x 192
American feet French indicates in “Cadastral Patterns” that the arpent was .845 of the
modem acre and was a linear and superficial measure.
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grants along the navigable streams in Southern Louisiana but extended into Northern
Louisiana along the Mississippi, Ouachita and Red Rivers.
During the Spanish regime other survey systems were introduced in areas where
the land was under different use. In the western portions of Louisiana where stock raising
was common (including the Opelousas and Attakapas Posts) the Spanish sitio was
employed, a square grant, one league on each side.12 Spanish Missouri, Arkansas and the
lands west were also often given in the form of general concessions much like the old
French system. A general concession described a certain amount of land granted to a
settler who could “locate” it upon reaching an appropriate place. The description of the
location was then filed with two granting officials. In Upper Louisiana this not only
allowed people to select tracts of land convenient to their style of life but also near the
valuable mines.13
During O’Reilly’s brief stay in Louisiana he further defined the land grant system
in a decree dated February 18,1770, which detailed the rules for receiving and keeping a
grant O’Reilly’s system attempted to encourage residents along the Mississippi, and
especially in Lower Louisiana, to settle contiguously. To accomplish this only tracts of
to land next to land that was already occupied could be granted so that no vacant land was
created. Furthermore, land could only be transferred through inheritance and more
particularly, only to heirs who maintained their residence in Louisiana.14

12Hall, “Louisiana Survey Systems,” 25,34. A square league is 84 x 84 arpents.
13Eugene Morrow Violette, “Spanish Land Claims in Missouri,” 174.
14Instructions from O’Reilly’s land ordinance in AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folios 2-8.
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Spain’s laws required that all land recipients be Catholic, married, and farmers or
fanning someone else’s property. Immigrants were required to swear their allegiance to
the King of Spain. Married settlers got two-hundred arpents with an additional fifty for
each child and twenty for each slave. The total land any one family could own was
limited to eight-hundred arpents. New settlers were allowed to bring in duty free any
implements, and slaves and enough provisions to last for two years. O’Reilly directed
that recipients of such grants farm the land for four years although this was reduced to
two years for men who married the daughter of “an honest father with her father’s
consent” and it was totally waived if the settlers had slaves.15
Grantees were expected in the first year to construct levees against flood and
canals parallel to the property line. Additionally, they had to maintain a public roadway
at least thirty feet wide and build bridges a minimum of fifteen feet wide over the canals
and ditches. All settlers were required to have cleared and cultivated their land (the
standard grant being approximately eight to ten arpents on the front and 40 arpents deep)
to at least two arpents depth within the first three years or it returned to the crown. These
stipulations were made specifically to prevent the sort of land speculation which occurred
under the French and which produced large areas of land owned by those who never set
foot in the colony. During the Spanish period some lands were actually confiscated for
lack of “tenure." Harassment was not common, however, because the Spanish were more

15Francis Andrew Elliot, “The Administration of the Public Lands in the
Greenberg District of Louisiana, 1812-1852,” (Masters Thesis, Louisiana State
University, 1961), 12, and 110; Gayerrd, History of Louisiana. 3:387-388; and Hall
“Louisiana Survey System,” 36. See also Francis P. Bums, “The Spanish Land Laws of
Louisiana.” LHO. 11 (1928): 557-81.
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interested in settlement and population density rather than enforcement of laws which did
not fit the colony’s needs.16 A denser population meant, after all, a better defense.
Claimants could apply to the local commandant for permission to receive a grant
If the commandant found no conflicting claims to the land he forwarded the application
or requite to the governor with the quantity, preferred location, amount of land for
grazing and the size of the family (including slaves). The governor then issued the
authorization for a survey and plat to be made at the settler’s expense. Once the survey
was made the governor’s office issued a grant of land. The decree also required that
claimants of existing land grants show proof of ownership on paper, buy the land or
substantiate somehow that they had occupied and farmed the land for ten years.17
All these procedures were good in theory but Unzaga found that many
requirements were impractical in Lower Louisiana. Among his new settlers, the Acadians
were a freedom-loving group of individuals who didn’t like the compulsory closeness of
their neighbors. More than once during his administration Acadian families abandoned
their original grants for larger and more solitary tracts of land. There were a number of
reasons for these desertions including the repositioning of previously agreed upon
boundaries, frustration arising from improper surveys, and grants of land which were
either not good agricultural plots or that slowly sank into the rivers.

16Hall, “Land Survey System,” 40; French, “Cadastral Patterns,” 46. See C.
Richard Arena, “Land Settlement Policies and Practices in Spanish Louisiana,” in John F.
McDermott (ed), The Spanish in the Mississippi Valiev. 1762-1804. (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1974.)
I7Ibid., 45-46.
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Unzaga began surveying and re-granting land during his first year in Louisiana.
He was forced to rush the project because of the wreck of the Britain at Matagorda Bay
which introduced a new group of Acadians into the colony. These survivors wished to
settle the rich agricultural lands along the Mississippi.18 By April of 1770 seven Acadian
families from the Britain incident migrated from Natchitoches to the Iberville district

where they were each given six arpents fronting on the Mississippi just above the mouth
of Bayou Plaquemine. Land granting became strategically important in 1770 to keep the
Acadians in a close knit and therefore defensible community.19
Unfortunately, a lack of understanding regarding the shifting nature of the
Mississippi led to grants along the insides of curves on the river where the flooding and
the natural flow of the water eroded the banks, causing colonist's homes to slide into the
river. Other settlers were given property that was unfit to farm or uninhabitable.
Examples are Paul and Pierre Hebert who complained they had rebuilt their homes twice
in two years and Ignace Babin, whose land grant had no depth because the property was
laced with bayous. Before the surveys were even finished the post commandants on the
Acadian Coast and Iberville were writing to the governor to request he re-grant land on

18De M6zi6res to Unzaga, March 22, 1770, AGI, Cuba 110, Folio 113; Unzaga to
De M6zi&res, April, 1770, AGI, Cuba 110, Folios 398-399.
19A s early as March of 1770 the Acadians settled in the lower parishes and began
building a church in their new community. In April they asked Commandant Judice to
request land grants. Judice to Unzaga, April 1,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio l/d3. The
seven families from Matagorda Bay were settled on the west bank of the Mississippi
River where Unzaga designated. Unzaga to Dutisnd, April 10,1770, AGI, Cuba 193-B,
Folios 283-284; ibid., April 26,1770, AGI, Cuba 193-B, Folios 290-291.
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the opposite bank of the river for their settlers. Unzaga complied with the wishes of his
colonists.20
Surveying proved difficult Discussing lines on a map was far different from
dealing with settlers on their own lands. Many resented and/or mistrusted the presence of
the surveyors. Others complained that the surveyors were destroying their crops and
requested that the survey stop until they had a chance to harvest In Cabannoce, S t James
Parish, Commandant Verret petitioned Unzaga to stop surveying until harvest because the
locals were afraid wild animals would ruin the com if it was left standing in the field
while the survey was completed.21
Not all the surveyors were accurate nor did they care about the property being
surveyed A large scandal arose over the improper measuring techniques of a surveyor
named De Bellevue in March of 1771. He ignored the local settlers and took careless and
sometimes arbitrary measurements. Complaints continued to flow into the governor’s
office during the year and Unzaga finally removed De Bellevue in December. The De
Bellevue fiasco continued to haunt the governor through January of 1772 when the
settlers called public meetings at the local church to petition for new surveys which they
were willing to pay for if the survey was done professionally.22

“ Francois Scimars de Bellile (German Coast) to Unzaga, May 20,1770, AGI
Cuba 188; Louis Dutisnd (Iberville) to Unzaga, July 1770, AGI Cuba 188-A; Ignace
Babin to Unzaga, October 18,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 175.
21Verret(Cabanocey) to Unzaga, September 25,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1
d/46.
“ Chevalier de Bellevue to Unzaga, March 3,1771, AGI, Cuba 192, Folio 329;
Bellevue to Unzaga, May 27,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-C, Folio 64; Judice to Unzaga, May
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Despite set backs such as these, surveyors completed their inspection of much of
lower Louisiana between 1771 and 1772 and turned their findings over to the governor.
This was only the beginning of the process for Unzaga. Now he had to integrate the new
system of boundary lines into the present settlements and acclimate his colonists to the
change. Again he faced a demanding and diplomatic task. Grants of unoccupied land,
especially away from the rivers, generally caused few problems, but the repositioning of
boundaries along the river created real headaches for colonial officials. Spanish tradition
required that the surveyors draw their boundaries in lines perpendicular to the river.
Along large curves and oxbows these boundaries created pie-shaped wedges of property
where the best land, the part near the river, was smaller on the outside curves of the
rivers. Previous owners became infuriated when they actually lost land along the
riverbank.23
The new boundaries also robbed many landowners who had labored years to clear
their land but could not produce any proof of ownership. Others were given property
deserted by previous owners, which caused trouble between neighbors. Settlers,
particularly the Acadians continually petitioned Unzaga for permission to migrate. Many
of the colonists in S t James and Iberville parishes moved, legally or illegally, to the
Attakapas district to enlarge their land, remove themselves from flood zones, or to be

28, 1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 90; Judice to Unzaga, December 4,1771, AGI, Cuba
188-A, Folio 278; Judice to Unzaga, January 1772, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 418.-A
23Judice to Unzaga, April 1, 1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A: Folios 1-3 and Judice to
Unzaga, June 3,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folios 94-98.
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nearer to family.24 Both Unzaga and his commandants frowned upon this migration
generally because it depopulated areas the governor deliberately settled for defensive
purposes. Still, if family was involved Unzaga usually allowed it.25
The Acadians were only part of the new population filling lower Louisiana.
Indians seeking refuge from English tribes requested the governor give them asylum on
the Spanish side of the Mississippi. Like the tribes in the west who feared the Osage, the
small tribes feared the Choctaw and Chickasaw. Indians appealing for asylum promised
more trade for Louisiana and less for the English. The British-backed tribes, however,
were a real menace. Several times Unzaga had to check the migration of his colonists,
Indian and Acadian alike, who sought to remove themselves from the real or implied
threats by Indians.26
Unzaga continued to support immigration as a stabilizing factor in Louisiana and
the Acadians were only one group of many who found their homes along the Mississippi.
Others included Irishmen who favored a Catholic colony over the new English landlords
on the eastern banks of the Mississippi, and other Europeans who gradually drifted
westward, e.g. the French who gradually moved into Spanish territory in St. Louis from
the Illinois side of the river. The governor often used the Irishmen as spies and
translators. For the most part Unzaga welcomed any settler who promised to abide by

24Verret to Unzaga, February 15,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 76.
“ Verret to Unzaga, November 5,1770, AGL Cuba 188a, Folio 1 d/49; Dutisn6 to
Unzaga, January 20,1771, AGL Cuba 188b, Folio 195.
26Descoudreaux to Unzaga, June 1771, ibid., Folio 231, and Dutisnd to Unzaga,
June 1,1771, ibid., Folio 218.
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Spanish land policy, accept Roman Catholicism and remain peaceful. The more
colonists, the better the defense. Peaceful Indians were also welcomed as more Indians
meant more trade. By 1775, Unzaga had the land grant system firmly in place and a
growing population in the lower Mississippi parishes as well as the western parishes like
Attakapas.
Order required more than denser populations Another problem was the
ecclesiastical and social disorder caused by the introduction of the Spanish clergy.
Clerical problems had existed in Louisiana during the French period when the Capuchins
and Jesuits fought each other for control of the province. With the expulsion of the
Jesuits in 1766 the colony fell under the jurisdiction of the French Capuchins headed by
Father Hilaire de Gdnoveuax. G€noveaux was removed by the Superior Council because
he refused to join the rebellion in 1769 and was replaced by Father Dagobert.27
Dagobert was a kindly priest, if somewhat corrupt in the eyes of the Spanish
Capuchins who swore vows of poverty and meant them. He was not, however, unusual
for a priest in a remote, frontier colony. The man was tolerant of colonial life and
considered peace his main goal as opposed to conversion and preaching. Mass was said
on all holy days if not every Sunday as there was a dearth of priests in the territory. He
was loved by his parishioners and favored by many of the Spanish governors. He even
stood as godfather for the children of many of New Orleans’ elite families.28 It had been

27An overview of the French Capuchins before the advent of Spanish rule can be
found in Claude Lawrence Vogel, The Capuchins in French Louisiana. 1722-1766 (New
York: J. F. Wagner, 1928.
MHe was godfather to S t Maxent’s child. Sacramental Records, vol. 2,201.
214

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

to Dagobert that O’Reilly turned to make his list of necessary clergy for the colony in
1770.29
Unzaga’s ecclesiastical problems, however, surrounded the integration of Spanish
priests into the current colonial reality. A pragmatic man, the governor recognized that
there were not enough churches or clergy in the province and that many of his colonists
only saw a priest every six months or on special occasions. He also assessed correctly
that the growing population needed priests amenable to Louisiana’s circumstances, not
those who required strict adherence to orders created in the metropole which were not
based on colonial realities.30 Louisiana, like many other portions of Spain’s empire,
received the gospel primarily from missionary orders rather than secular clergy, a fact not
lost on the governor who had suggested more secular clergy be sent as soon as he took
command.
The governor became enmeshed in the difficulties of the clergy and the settlers as
a point of colonial order. Of the French priests who remained in the colony and the
Spanish clergy serving Louisiana in 1770, many served the people well but others had
already caused trouble among his “parishioners” despite the colonists’ willingness to
build and maintain churches. During the first year of the governor’s tenure, Father

MSee AGL Cuba 2357, Folio 408, “Nombre des Religieux que nouse coryons
ndcdssaires dans la colonie pour desservir les paroisses et pour les devoirs Spirituels des
Habitans”, February 14, 1770.
“ “Relacidn del Gobiemo actual de la provincial de la Luisiana en lo espiritual y
noticias de su constitution y establecimiento por don Luis de Unzaga. (Sobre el modelo
que ha dado el Gobemador de Luisiana Unzaga a aquel Diocesano para el gobiemo
espirituel, 1772-1774)”, New Orleans, November 14,1772, AGI, SD 2594, Folios 74897.
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Valentin, a French Capuchin moved from Opelousas to Cabanocey, where, with great
forbearance, the priest lived in an outbuilding (kitchen) of Nicolas Verret’s property and
served his parish while the presbytery and church were constructed.31 In S t James Parish,
Louis Judice assessed church taxes and had the local families hew the lumber and
construct their church and a presbytery as well as kitchen for the priest’s residence. In
Natchitoches, Athanase de Mdzidres had his parishioners reconstruct the local church, but
the local missionary, a Father Stanilas, pull out anyway, leaving Natchitoches without a
prelate or missionaries by 1774.32 Despite requests for more churches and clergy,
especially in areas where the population was increasing, many priests complained about
the indignities of serving under such circumstances and often refused to deal with the
backward areas and their anomalies.33
The Spanish priests, led by Father Cirilo de Barcelona (recently from Havana),
were particularly annoyed at the French settlers who seemed uncivilized and ignorant of
the rules of conduct concerning the church. They grumbled that the parishioners didn’t
tithe to the Church properly. They complained about the farmers who stood outside the
church on Sundays swearing and drinking and especially about the forwardness of the
women who rode astride their horses. They complained in general that the people of the
outlying parishes did not act in a sedate, civilized manner concerning the church, but

3lVerret to Unzaga, May 21,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/40.
32Athanase de Mdzi&res to Unzaga, February 1, 1770, AGI, Cuba 110, Folio 96.
33Judice to Unzaga, August 18,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/18; id. to id.
August 27,1770, ibid., Folio 1 d/20.; the refusal to serve can be found in Judice to
Unzaga, April 22,1771, AGI, Cuba 188-B, Folio 80.
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these clergy offered little in the way of accommodation.34 The settlers, on the other hand,
did not differentiate between Spaniard or Frenchman as long as the priest was willing to
serve them33 These generalizations can be illustrated with the following examples.
The lives of farmers of St. James and Ascension parish or any frontier parish had
little to do with those of the people Father Cirilo served in Havana or those he served in
New Orleans. Many settlers in the frontier had to travel miles, even to another parish, to
see a priest These colonists sometimes saw a priest once or twice a year. Following
certain customs of the church was impossible in such areas. One of the largest
complaints by the Spanish surrounded the collection of indulgences (a problem which lost
the Catholics half their flock in Europe during the 1500s). In the colonies priests were
supposed to collect the Santa Cruzada, an indulgence given to persons who waged war
against infidels (an extension of support for the Reconquista) or contributed alms.
According to Gayarr6, the indulgences sold for 21 quartos a piece (about 14-15 cents
each). A papal Bull ordered that all Catholics within Spain’s empire must purchase these
indulgences or they were considered suspicious and became a target for the Inquisition.36
The indulgence itself provided the parishioner with the right to eat meat, or use eggs and
milk on fast days. The colonists disregarded the indulgence. It was not a part of the

^Judice to Unzaga, October 6, 1772, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 448.
35Verret to Unzaga, April 25,1772, ibid, Folio 130.
36There was no real office of the Inquisition in Louisiana until the 1780s, although
those suspected of heresy were sent either to Mexico or Havana during Unzaga’s tenure.
See Richard E. Greenleaf, “The Inquisition in Spanish Louisiana, 1762-1800,” New
Mexico Historical Review 50 (1975): 45-72.
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French church and they found no real benefit from such a tithe. This attitude made it
almost

impossible for Dagobert and other priests to collect the “alms.”37
The complaint about the laxity of parishioners in outlying parishes can be traced

to an old anticlerical attitude among the French which included low church attendance
(especially by men), marriage as a formality rather than a necessity, use of the church as a
meeting hall (which including drinking), and a healthy disrespect for the clergy
themselves. This laxity extended to their slaves, who often did not receive baptism or last
rites nor did they practice marriage. Slaves, after all, were often sold away from each
other and the French didn’t “make” families they would soon separate.
When possible, the settlers “attended” church regularly, but the men and v/omen
of the frontier areas could did not have the same social patterns of the colonists in New
Orleans. The men, who worked six to seven day weeks, from sun-up to sun-down,
enjoyed relaxing on the steps of the church with friends, catching up on the local gossip,
which they couldn’t do any other time. Joking and misbehavior were relaxing and
drinking was more common at parish meetings then on Sunday mornings. Still drinking

was as common to these colonists as it was to others in the English colonies who found it
necessary to relieve the tensions and frustrations of the brutal frontier with com whiskey.
Women and children attended church far more often then the men but they lacked

^Unzaga to the Bishhop of Havana in Gayarrd, History of Louisiana 3:87-88.
One reason the Bull was not important was that the French priests allowed their flock to
eat Teal (small ducks) which they decided were aquatic and therefore could be substituted
as fish on holy days or Lent.
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refinements and carriages of their town cousins. This led them to ride to church astride
their horses, an act seen as lewd behavior by the Spanish priests.38
The Spanish priests were far less tolerant than the French concerning any laxity
on the part of their parishioners. The colonists, especially those outside of New Orleans,
were apparently a shock to the Iberians. The Spanish Capuchins whose whole raison

d’etre for being in the New World was conversion really shouldn’t have been so appalled.
Stanley G. Payne’s work on the church in Spain notes a decided anticlericalism on the
part of Iberians extending from time of the Reconquista. The Iberian-Americans in
Spain’s earlier colonies often exhibited the same distrust of the clergy.39 Still, the
problems over control their flock brought the Spaniard’s into open conflict with the
French, a clash which included Louisiana’s governor.
It had been at Unzaga’s request that the Bishop of Havana had sent Cirilo and his
assistants to help “Hispanify” the Capuchin order in Louisiana. Arriving in July of 1772,
the new priests were met in New Orleans by Father Dagobert and the Governor.
Louisiana’s historians have long repeated Gayarr6’s notable chapter devoted to the
argument between the French Father Dagobert and Spanish Father Cirilo de Barcelona.
According to Gayarrd, upon arrival Cirilo immediately wrote a long letter to the Bishop
condemning the French Capuchins. The letter spoke at length about the problems

“ Judice to Unzaga, October 6, 1772, AGL Cuba 189-A, Folio 448.
39See Stanley G. Payne, Spanish Catholicism: An Historical Overview (Madison,
WL University of Wisconsin Press, 1984).
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mentioned above but included a vitriolic attack on Dagobert and his abilities as a priest40
Dagobert, of course, wrote the Bishop in his own defense on the 14th of September,
thanking the prelate for extending his privileges as Vicar-General and express his desire
to work with the Spaniards 41
Father Cirilo was a remarkable and hard working man who, like his assistants,
was used to an austere life. As the Superior of Louisiana’s missionaries he immediately
learned French and set out to serve his new flock. He frowned at the French priests’
seemingly leisurely existence and was disgusted with Father Dagobert who housed slaves,
including a female “mulatress” who served and lived in his household. It has been argued
that according to a French rule, established in 1743, clergy were not to have slaves or
obtain money from their sale. Dagobert’s violation of this was behind Cirilo’s anger.
This is a curious point since the clergy (especially the regular orders) in other Spanish
colonies owned African slaves.42 The Spaniards’ orders, however, were to help preserve
order, which in their eyes required strict compliance to Spanish religious practices within
the colony. Any priest guilty of laxity or moral turpitude was to expect punishment43

““ See Gayarrd, History of Louisiana. Vol. 3, Chapter 2, for Unzaga’s
administration in which he translates a long letter by father Cirilo to the crown
concerning the anomalies and abominations in Louisiana.
4IIbid, 72-82; Alfred E. Lemmon, “Spanish Louisiana: In the Service of God and
His Most Catholic Majesty,” in The Spanish Presence in Louisiana 1763-1803. Volume 2
of The Louisiana Purchase Bicentennial Series in Louisiana History (Lafayette, LA:
Center for Louisiana Studies, 1999), 517-529.
42Lemmon, “Spanish Louisiana”, 520.
43Roger Baudier, Catholic Church. 181.
220

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

One can then understand the reactions of Spanish priests performing under such orders.
Spain’s legacy of fiery missionary efforts and the Spanish church’s long relationship with
the crown as a pacifying force must also be brought into the argument
Unzaga viewed the complexity of the problem in his usual objective manner. He
was intent on enforcing O’Reilly’s commands that Louisiana’s priests follow the
regulations of the Catholic Church. He also knew that the local clergy included men who
did not attend to their duties properly and that many of his parishioners demanded special
treatment if they were to be wooed into compliance with Spanish religious customs. Still,
as protector of the faith he still had to establish ecclesiastical order and support the church
if he was to use the church as a stabilizing factor to promote colonial order.
His response was twofold. He immediately rebuilt the Capuchin rectory to house
the new missionaries and directed Cirilo to increase the power of the church. On the
other hand he refused to allow the prelate to annihilate the work of Father Dagobert or
other local clergy and sought to acclimate the new clergy to the seeming “deviance” of his
colonists. On September 26,1772, Unzaga wrote his own letter to the Bishop of Havana
in order to settle the argument and maintain control of the situation. In that letter the
governor explained while he approved of the Bishop’s instructions to the new
missionaries,
“the object of which is to retain his [the King’s] subjects under his
rule by conforming as much as possible with their genius, their character,
and manner. This is what I call acting in accordance with the spirit of the apostolic
mission
working for the service of God by assuming the
garb of the Jew among the Jews, of the pagan among the pagans... your
Grace will no doubt infer that many of the synodical regulations cannot be
applied to this province without injury to the interests of the king, the
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number of whose vassals might be diminished considerably, if those
regulations were attempted to be carried into execution, and your Grace
will easily understand that it is not always that the laws made for one
region can be safely adapted to another.”44
The problem between Cirilo and Dagobert continued into 1773 and Unzaga
remained firm in his defense of both Dagobert and the colonists, to the point of angering
the prelate in Havana. In another letter the governor admonished the Bishop, insisting
that he should consider the difficulties involved in Hispanifying a stubbornly French
population. Truly it was not the same thing as converting the heathen, although the
Spanish Capuchins often felt that’s exactly what they were doing. Unzaga remained
conciliatory toward both the Bishop and Cirilo. He assured them that things would work
out given time and patience on the part of both parties. Secretly, he told Arriaga in Spain
that the Spanish priests were far too severe and misrepresented the reality of the situation.
He informed the minister that the colonists could be submissive and loyal if their customs
were not undone by zealousness-a daring statement for a colonial governor.45
Unzaga’s solution to the controversy exemplified the governor’s willingness to act
on behalf of his colonists and to assert his legal authority despite pressure from the church
heirarchy. His defense of the French Capuchin’s maintained peace in the colony through
1773 and even generated support from some members of the local elite. City officials in
New Orleans, such as Andr£s Almonester y Roxas, responded by supporting the

“ GayarrS, History of Louisiana 3: 84.
45Ibid., 96-97.
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governor’s advocacy of proper housing and new churches for Louisiana’s clergy. In
outlying Parishes the commandants refurbished clerical domiciles and churches.46
With Unzaga’s assistance and moderation the arrival of Father Cirilo and his
Spanish missionaries actually began a new expansion for the Catholic Church in
Louisiana. Three new parishes were created in the 1770s.47 Cirilo and his missionaries
continued to do their work with limited means and men. As the fight between the priests
faded into the background Unzaga realized that the real problem was a continual
deficiency of secular clergy in the colony. Not all missionaries were priests who could
administer sacraments and as a result no confirmations were made during the governor’s
tenure. In Louisiana, as in many other parts of colonial Latin America, the regular clergy
were given special powers to serve as secular clergy, but this did not happen during
Unzaga’s tenure. In fact it was not until the later part of the 1780s that Cirilo was granted
power as an auxiliary bishop under which he finally organized the “proper” religious
education of the colonists and their slaves.48
As governor of Louisiana, Unzaga sought the ecclesiastical well being of his
community. As a Bourbon official, the governor applied enlightenment ideas of
separation of church and state to the colony’s administration. Not all of the governor’s

““Lemmon, “Spanish Louisiana,” 521; Baudier. Catholic Church. 188-189.
47The three parishes established were at Ascension, S t John the Baptist and
Opelousas. See Cross. Crozier and Crucible: A Volume Celebrating the Bicentennial of a
Catholic Diocese in Louisiana. General Editor, Glenn Conrad (Lafayette, LA: Center for
Louisiana Studies, 1993), xxiv.
■
“ Lemmon, “Spanish Louisiana,” 523.
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decisions were popular and sometimes they were improvident This was the case in his
handling of the Ursuline nuns and Charity Hospital. The Ursuline sisters arrived in 1727
and established a convent-school in a small set of buildings in New Orleans, across town
from Charity Hospital. While waiting to build a larger convent next to the hospital in
order to serve the sick, the nuns expanded the small school into both a boarding-house
and an orphanage.49
The Ursulines provided very important services. Their school was the first of its
kind. The sisters taught young girls, including blacks and Native Americas.50 Working at
long dining tables the students learned their lessons in two languages during the French
period. The school offered writing, spelling, household management, mending and
sewing, embroidery and tatting, etiquette, and of course, religious instruction.51
After the new convent was built near the hospital the nuns began their service to
the sick and remained the only nurses until 1770 when Unzaga relieved them of that
position. The governor was concerned about “professional” health care attendants.
O’Reilly had ordered that only licensed physicians be allowed to serve in the hospital.

49Joan Marie Aycock, “The Ursuline School in New Orleans, 1727-1771,” in
Cross. Crozier and Crucible. 213; See also Roger Baudier, Through Portals of the Past:
The Storv of the Old Ursuline Convent of New Orleans (New Orleans: s.n., 1955).
“ A boys school had been established earlier under Father Raphael in 1725 but
was poorly attended. The elite sent their sons to France and the poor taught their sons a
skill or put them to work in agriculture.
51Aycock, “The Ursuline School,” 213-215. See also Barnett T. Kane, The
Ursulines. Nuns of Adventure: The Storv of the New Orleans Community (New York:
Vision Books, 1959 and Henry C. Semple, The Ursulines in New Orleans and Our Ladv
of Prompt Succor: A Record of Two Centuries. 1727-1925 (New York: P. J. Kennedy
and Sons, 1925) for a larger overview of the sisters and their convent
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The nuns, however, had given a great deal of assistance to both the doctors and patients
and the hospital became impoverished without them. After their dismissal, the sisters
focused their energies on educating young women in the colony. Unzaga’s attempts to
separate church and state in this particular instance were not necessarily beneficial to his
colonists.
As an enlightened administrator Unzaga tried other means to create order. Some
of which were well meaning but either didn’t work or as in the case of the Ursulines
created more problems. One of those endeavors was an attempt to expand public
education in New Orleans. The Spanish administration of the New World held a long
history of educating its charges. Under the “enlightened” Bourbons, the administrators
sought public education as opposed to ecclesiastical education. In 1772, Unzaga brought
a Spanish school master to the capital to begin education for colonial boys outside of
convent or monastery schooling. With this school he hoped to create a group of educated,
enterprising young men in the colony who favored order and Spanish rule. A year later,
however, his plans fell apart when the maestro quit because of low enrollment and a lack
of interest. Unzaga’s attempt at creating an enlightened populace seemed to have failed.52
Another example where the governor’s attempts failed to serve his colonists
involved the administration of Charity Hospital in New Orleans. Built in New Orleans in
1718, its administration was originally placed under ecclesiastical control. With the
advent of Spanish rule, however, O’Reilly decided that the hospital should be

52See Stuart G. Noble and Arthur G. Nuhrah, “Education in Colonial Louisiana,”
LHQ32 (1949): 759-76.
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administered through the governor’s office. He appropriated a fund of four hundred
pesos per year from taxation on New Orleans’ taverns and businesses to run the hospital
and requested that the public make contributions for further expenses.53 The hospital
declined after the removal of the Ursulines
When Unzaga took office Charity suffered further damage from Spanish
administration. Unzaga often acted judiciously to cut government expenses. Part of his
cuts, unfortunately, included reducing the governmental allowance for Charity from four
hundred to two hundred pesos. He expected the citizens of New Orleans to fund the rest.
It was a good decision for government but not for the hospital. Tax collections was
problematical and the hospital endured hardships when taxes didn’t meet the needs of the
patients and staff. In fact, tax collection continued to be uncertain until 1775 when the
governor granted a monopoly on the collection and administration of the funds to Pedro
Morris and Raymond Escote.54
Between the loss of its nursing staff and drastically reduced funding the hospital
limped along on beneficence. It became such a disreputable institution that the Attorney
General suggested it be dismantled. Only public outcry saved i t Finally protests from
New Orleans’ citizens brought the hospital more government funding and better
administration, but not until the late 1780s.55

53Stella O’Connor, “The Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans: An
Administrative and Financial History 1736-1946,” LHO 31 (1948): 17.
54 Ibid., 18.
55Ibid.
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Unzaga’s decisions, however faulty, usually reflected the necessity of the moment
The removal of the Ursulines and funding cuts, should be viewed in the light of Spanish
Louisiana’s constant privation. Equally as important was the need to keep as much
money available as possible for defense while simultaneously building the treasury.
These necessities often overruled civil expenditures. His failure at public education can
be placed firmly on the shoulders of the populace who disdained such a gift Lack of
public acceptance could make any endeavor, no matter how important unsupportable.
Expediency and a desire for order also led the governor to chastise the citizens of
New Orleans and to remind them of their responsibilities. As previously described the
city was filled with buildings of wooden construction and fire was a considerable
concern. The Spanish government had no extra money for a real fire department
Unzaga was, therefore, extremely concerned that the populace seemed lackadaisical about
keeping the necessary equipment to fight such conflagrations. Incensed at their
indifference, the governor promulgated an ordinance which claimed their actions were
tantamount to being indifferent to humanity. He felt he had no other recourse than to
order all citizens to keep the proper equipment (ladders, gaffs, pick axes, and buckets) in
their homes for emergencies and fine those without them. He further ordered that at the
first sound of the bells announcing a fire, all carpenters and joiners, be they white, black
or slave, must come with their equipment to the fire and join in the fight This simple
ordinance exhibits Unzaga’s commitment to the general welfare of his colony and his
attempts to create a sense of community spirit among a disparate population. It also
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further enhanced the power of his office.56 While Unzaga sought to engage his citizens in
their own best interest he also realized the necessity to maintain his authority, especially
if he was to centralize command of the colony.
Historically there had always been a propensity in Louisiana to amplify the
powers of the governor. Under Spanish rule, the authority of the governor expanded, a
fact which reflected the centralizing tendency of the Bourbon reforms, but more
importantly the necessity to establish control over a huge and unwieldy territory. Unzaga
was protective of his position and all that it represented in empire. He was also
apparently unhappy if he felt his power was being usurped or undermined. As top
military official he instituted the governor’s authority over his commandants early in his
tenure. While he expected subordinates to handle normal matters at their posts, he also
expected them to report to him before making decisions on matters considered his
purview. Immediately after O’Reilly’s departure, the colony’s commandants often
found their new governor extremely critical of their decisions. It was not until after 1770
that Unzaga felt he could trust these men to carry out “his” wishes rather than the
traditional status quo. Still, it is apparent that after having confirmed his authority he
began to help establish theirs, and by extension Spain’s. He generated this authority in his
local commandants by funneling appropriate legal cases and decisions back to them.
For their part, the commandants strove to established a fresh working relationship
with their new commander-in-chief, during Unzaga’s first year in office. More often then

“ Henry P. Dart, “Fire Protection in New Orleans in Unzaga’s Time,” LHO 14
(1931): 349-60.
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not the governor began with reprimands to remind the men of the chain of command and
then congratulated them on their proper handling of a local affair. For example, it took
Lieutenant-Governor, Athanase de M6zi£res, a full year to create a relationship built on
trust with Unzaga. De Mdzi&res had been appointed Spain’s Indian agent in Louisiana’s
western territories before Unzaga took office. Natchitoches was a long distance from the
capital and the Frenchman was accustomed to making independent decisions concerning
his colonists at the post and then informing the government in New Orleans. This
behavior was not tolerated by Unzaga.
In May of 1770 de M6zi£res informed the governor that he had allowed a man
accused of murder to go free because the suspect had served a seven year “sentence”
among the Indians. At the local chiefs request, the commandant cancelled the man’s
trial and placed him in the custody of the tribe with whom he had lived. Believing that
Spain’s needs would be served by keeping peace with the Indians, de Mdzifcres requested
the governor’s sanction in his resolution of the problem. The answer was unexpected.
Unzaga informed his lieutenant-governor that he would not sanction his decision. He
further reminded de Mdzi&res that O’Reilly’s instructions concerning such crimes were
that the commandants at S t Louis and Natchitoches were to hold trials locally and send
the perpetrators to New Orleans where the governor would pronounce sentence.57
Unzaga couched his words carefully. At stake was the establishment of Spanish
authority and the creation of loyalty between commander and lieutenant-commander. The

^De Mdzifcres to Unzaga, May 15,1770, in Bolton, Athanase de M6ziferes. 1:160162; Unzaga to de Mdzferes, June 1,1770, ibid.
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governor was dealing with Frenchmen in a former French colony who not only had ruled
their locales before his arrival but were often tied to the area by marriage and property.
He appended his instructions with a note that the letter “caused him much pain” but that
“proper” procedures must be followed.58 De Mdzidres reaction is not recorded.
It was a full year before Unzaga began to trust the commandant at Natchitoches in
his handling of both Indian affairs and criminal offenses. He grudgingly accepted de
M6zieres appointment as Indian Agent but sent along a Spaniard, Josd de la Pena, to
oversee his operations throughout 1770. Unzaga was, quite frankily, skeptical of the
Frenchman’s intentions and his abilities. It was not until the lieutenant-governor finally
negotiated treaties of peace and alliance among the Nations of the North the following
year that the governor finally began to trust him completely. Even so, Unzaga was
careful to take credit for his subordinate’s actions, writing to de la Torre in Havana that
“under my orders peace was officialized by the lieutenant governor of Natitoches with
the various nations bordering this place, and with the Presidios de Adaes and Sefior
Antonio de Bucareli (the Viceroy of New Spain).”59
De M6zi£res was not the only commandant to receive such a rebuke. Iq August of
1770, Unzaga angrily reprimanded commandant Louis Judice for “usurping the
governor’s authority” by granting colonist, Marc Molet the right to sell tafia in S t James
Parish. All licenses were to be issued by the governor’s office. Unzaga, however, was
less concerned with Judice’s handling of criminal affairs because the commandant made a

“ Ibid.
“ Unzaga to de la Torre, December 17,1771, Dispatches.
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habit of inquiring about the crime and making suggestions regarding the outcome rather
than passing judgement out of hand. Several letters between governor and commandant
include Unzaga’s approval of his subordinate’s leadership.60
The governor’s determination to institute his authority also surrounded the need to
keep lines of communication open with commandants unused to such a formal system.
This becomes apparent upon examining his different treatment of various commandants.
In lower Louisiana, Unzaga dealt with long-standing French authority in the forms of
local French land owners who became commandants. He was firm with these men in
instituting the requisite chain of command within the Spanish system. His letters to
Arkansas and St. Louis, however, do not contain reprimands. This may be accounted for
by the fact that these commandants were Spaniards used to the Spanish military and
governmental system. Furthermore, Pedro Piemas, at St. Louis, had received his post as
a promotion under O’Reilly and was, therefore, in Unzaga’s eyes, a trusted servant of the
crown.
Letters from the post commandants in lower Louisiana and in Natchitoches
indicate that Unzaga’s early attempts to establish centralized rule in the office of the
governor did, in fact, open the lines of communication between Spanish authorities and
their colonists. The letters also give insight into the practice of colonial jurisprudence
and the judicial travails of the governor. It was through the courts that Unzaga finalized
his attempts at instituting order in the form of the rule of law.

“ The reprimand is contained in Unzaga to Judice, August 11,1770, AGI, Cuba
188-A Foliol d/17; example of approval found in Unzaga to Judice, July 20,1770, ibid.,
Folio ld/15.
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Earlier studies of the colony’s jurisprudence have asserted that the governors were
often unaware of the majority of crimes committed outside New Orleans. This opinion
was largely based on information gleaned from the few records available at the time. In
studying only court records, past historians missed the countless letters forwarded to the
governors asking their approval of the decisions of local commandants or the governors’
decision’s in judicial matters. While only part of these crimes were actually tried in New
Orleans (and therefore appeared in the records), they were still “dealt with” one way or
another by the governor. Either he sent it back to his commandant to be handled, and
officially supported the commandant’s position, or he accepted the case in the Governor's
Court of the Cabildo, or sent it to the court of last appeal in Havana. Unzaga’s
correspondence with his commandants provides ample evidence of the multitude of
decisions made by Spain’s military governors in frontier posts. Indeed, contrary to the
belief that the governors knew little of their colonists’ day to day lives, the records
indicate Unzaga was appraised on a daily basis of the ongoing lives of his colonists, their
desires, their arguments, their crimes and their achievements. Those lines of
communication allowed him, in return, to gain their confidence and finally their loyalty to
Spanish authority.61
Louisiana’s governor maintained civil and judicial authority through several
courts. While the Spanish system was more complex than the French combination of

61AGI, Cuba Legajos 188-A, 188-B, and 188-C contain hundreds of letters
(primarily in French) which given tremendous insight into the lives of local Louisianians
throughout Unzaga’s tenure. See especially the letters of commandants Verret, Dutisnd
and Judice..
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superior council and military justice, it was also more efficient. The governor presided
over a civil, criminal and a military court. His authority was ostensibly absolute, and
subject only to the King, yet he was limited by realities and practicalities. Beneath him
were the courts of the alcaldes ordinarios, and the alcaldes mayor provincial and the
commandants, and the court of the intendant and ecclesiastical courts.62 The efficiency of
the court system and the Cabildo meant that Unzaga actually knew as much of the daily
lives of the planter class and those residing in New Orleans as he did of his colonists in
surrounding territories. It was also through the courts that Unzaga struggled to establish
the rule of law in the colony and to educate its leaders in Spanish government.
The Cabildo, according to the Code O’Reillly, assembled every Friday to oversee
such various functions in New Orleans as policing, taxation, supervision of the local
markets, regulating licenses for building, health regulations, land distribution and local
festivals.63 On a larger level it was supposed to act as a court of justice for the whole
colony, though it more frequently served New Orleans and its immediate environs.
Unzaga served at the Cabildo and in his personal court on a regular basis. This
consistency, combined with the regular meetings of the Cabildo, created a constant
judicial presence in the colony. This served in turn to support Unzaga’s attempts to
create the rule of law and implant Spanish administrative systems.

62Along with these were, of course, the lesser or inferior courts of the
commandants and syndics in outlying districts. Most maritime cases and those dealing
with the treasury were sent to the court of the Intendancy. The ecclesiastical court tried
cases dealing with church fuero and the inquisition. See Kerr, “Petty Felony,” Chapter
One on the court system.
“ Din, Cabildo. 56.
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The governor’s court convened in a plain room with a raised platform at one end.
Atop the platform the court’s officials presided from various tables and desks, overseen
only by a crucifix to remind them of God’s justness.64 Governor’s courts in the
Borderlands generally handled cases appealed from the lower courts, criminal cases
which threatened the welfare of the colony such as murder or slave offenses, treason and
any cases concerning foreigners. Kerr noted that the kinds of cases the governor actually
saw also depended on his “desire to make an example of an offender or his availability to
handle the court.’’65
Unzaga made himself available for court on a regular basis where he stood as a
constant example for the other courts and his colonists. In his court in New Orleans, the
governor tried various cases which included debt collections, family successions, slave
offences, slave emancipations and damages to slave and/or property, contraband,
smuggling, the appointment of officials to the Cabildo and fines on their offices, and
heard appeals from the commandants. Transcripts of the trials and hearings indicate that
Unzaga remained constantly in touch with the social realities of his colony.66
Problems surrounding debts and debt collection were the most common cases
heard by the courts. A review of the court transcriptions indicates, for instance, that of
fifty-four cases tried by the governor himself in 1774, twenty-nine (54%)were for debt

“ Laura L. Porteous, “The Gris-Gris Case,” LHO 171 (1934): 49.
65Kerr, “Petty Felony,” 19.
“ Abbreviated transcripts of the trials for the Spanish Period can be found as a
series, translated and published in the Louisiana Historical Quarterly, those for Unzaga’s
period are found in volumes 71 through 11.
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collection and several others were suits on broken contracts or damages to goods. The
following year eight out of thirteen cases (62%)were for debt collection. Spanish law
favored the creditor and many cases sought help in collecting from debtors in a timely
manner. The court frequently required the debtor to pay within a three-day period.
Debtors found guilty of non-payment were also required to pay the court costs.67
If they did not pay within the required time Unzaga and the other judges lost no
time in sending the sheriff to collect the money or something appropriate to serve in lieu
of the cash. Sometimes the sheriff was sent to bring defendants who dodged their debts
into court to stand trial For example, on October 7,1773 militia soldier Juan Bautista
Chateau appeared before the governor asking that he help collect a bill from one
Christoval de Liza who claimed to have nothing with which to pay Chateau. Unzaga
decided that de Liza had had more than enough time to pay the debt. The governor sent
the sheriff to de Liza’s domicile to collect the money. He instructed the sheriff to ask for
cash but take possessions if necessary and if de Liza didn’t point anything out to choose
something himself. De Liza, apparently still penniless, stood aside, refusing to point
anything out, so the sheriff collected his straw chair as payment68 In another case from
December of 1773, unpaid creditor Nicolas Longueval was given permission to enter
debtor M. Lamorandier’s home with the commandant in Opelousas to collect either

•"See Court Docket 5, December 18,1773, Collection of debt, court ordered
payment within three days in “Index to Spanish Judicial Records of Louisiana-Sep-Dec,
1773,” LHO 10 (1927): 154. Cited further as SJR with volume and page numbers.
“ Juan de la Fitte vs. Christoval de Liza, October 7,1773, Docket No. 17, “SJR,”
10:131.
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money or possessions worth the same amount69 A final example came on March 3,
1775, where Unzaga agreed to order the collection of a debt By the following week
when the debt had not been paid, Unzaga sent the Sheriff to bring the man to court to
stand trial, pay the debt and pay court costs.70
Spanish law also allowed debts assessed on third parties if the debtor was
deceased. In January of 1775 a creditor sought payment for a slave from a third party.
The original owner was deceased and the current owner hid the slave to escape the
former’s debts. The record does not indicate if the slave was inherited or given away, or
even confiscated by the third party but in February, the governor’s court required the third
party to produce the slave or pay the debt Unzaga sought also to enforce the seriousness
of skirting the law and the courts. Because the defendant sought to conceal the slave the
governor assessed him for the court costs.71
Unzaga honored debts owed before the Spanish take-over. His work with his
father in-law and the merchants is commonly cited as proof of his integrity. It is also
worth noting that the governor worked with the French crown to insure that the Company
of the Indies could collect from its former colonists and their estates, although he
protected his colonists against wrongful collection. In February of 1774, Salmon
Prevost, newly appointed to oversee the affairs of the Company of the Indies in
Louisiana, sued the widow Francisca Ruella in the governor’s court to attach the estate of

69Nicolas Longueval vs. M. Lamorandier, December 19, 1773, ibid.
70See Collection of a debt, Docket 3749 March 11,1775, “SJR,” 11: 159.
71See Docket Nos. 3744 and 3745, January 16 and February 25, ibid., 155-156.
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Membrede Ruelland, for “an ancient debt of 22,400 livres.” Membrede had been dead
thirty seven years but Francisca remained the guardian of the estate under the right of
usufrux. In March the governor’s court determined that the widow did not owe the sum
asked for, nor any debt, and collection was denied. The same was not true for Charles
Mareet de la Tour, however. His estate was charged not only the amount owed to the
Company of the Indies, but also taxed for the court costs. In July of 1774, Unzaga ruled
again in favor of Saloman Prevost and the Company of the Indies against the heirs of the
estate of Gerardo Pellerin. Clearly the rule of law was to be upheld, even if it had been
the law previously established by the French crown.72
It was apparently common to tax such estates for court costs whether in debt suits
or in successions. In many cases surrounding inherited estates or those attached for
payment of debt the court taxed the estate for its own costs.73 Even when estates
produced so little that taxes could not be assessed, the court taxed it for costs. For
example, in a succession heard August 31,1775, for an estate to be relieved of debts and
taxes because it was such a small inheritance, Unzaga agreed to the former but took his
court costs out none-the-less.74

^See Salmon Prevost vs. Francisca Ruelland, February 26, Docket No. 3790,
“SJR /T1 (1928): 283, for the original suit, and March 14,1773, Docket No. 3788, ibid.,
for the court’s refusal. On payment see Salmon Prevost vs. Charles Mareet de la Tour,
May 19,1774, Docket No. 3791, ibid. Saloman Prevost vs. Heirs of Gerardo Pellerin, no
docket no. ibid., 589.
^Docket No. 3831 “SJR", Ibid, 466
74 “SJR ," ibid, 165.
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Unzaga was not fond of debt suits and he encouraged his citizens to settle out of
court if they could. The threat of having to pay court costs apparently was one of the
weapons Unzaga used to get individuals to settler their disputes privately, as the
following cases will show. In some cases they settled out of court but in others they were
forced to stop the suit because the legal costs were prohibitive. In January of 1774, a wife
sued her husband, living separately, to pay her room and board since they were still
married. The governor's court stalled on any decision, the parties cancelled the suit and
the husband paid the wife’s board the following day.75 In another case Alexander Baure
and Vincente Fangui petitioned the governor saying that “for the service of God and to
escape further costs they desire[d] to drop the suit” Unzaga agreed. Family arguments
which ended in court also were frequently setded out of court as in the case of Antonio
Cavelier who sued his brother-in-law Santiago Carriere for a debt in March of 1774. The
brothers-in-law eventually decided not to prosecute through the courts and Santiago paid
Antonio as well as another creditor, Henry Voix, within the month.76 Another amusing
case was a debt instantly dismissed because the governor was given proof, in the form of
a reciept, that the debtor had already paid his bill! There is no indication as to whether
the creditor was just forgetful or if he intended to deliberately cheat the man.77

75See Docket No. 5, January 18,1774, “SJR" 11: 285.
76Alexander Baure vs. Vincente Fangui, July 11,1775, Docket No. 3745, “SJR,”
ibid., 165; Antonio Cavelier vs. Santiago Carrier, Docket No. 74, “SJR,” ibid., 304.
Santiago paid Henry Voix on March 14,1774, Docket No. 12, ibid.
^Henrique Desprez vs. Francisco de la Bane, April 11,1774, Docket No. 3767,
“SJR,” 10:438.
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Not all claims of debts were easily settled and many cases went undecided until a
later date when more proof could be brought to the courts. Instead of becoming frustrated
by a lack of evidence the governor used some of these hearings to re-establish the
authority of the post commandants by referring such cases back to them for final
judgement. For example in September of 1773, Henry Voix sued Pablo de la Houssay for
a debt. De la Houssey said that his agent, Garic, was liable for the debt but Garic swore
in court he was not the man’s representative. Having no further information on who
actually represented de la Houssay the governor allowed the case to be sent to the
Commandant at Opelousas, Fuselier de la Claire, who knew the case and the people
involved. In this way, more information could be brought into play to establish liability
and the governors actions fostered Fusilier de la Claire’s authority in such cases.78 This
did not mean his commandant had a completely free hand in Opelousas, as seen in a case
where Joseph Moreau petitioned the governor’s court to get back land granted to him
during d’Abbadie’s administration. Fuselier de la Claire had taken it upon himself to
evict Moreau from the land and give him another plot. Unzaga, acting as a court of last
resort for his colonists, upheld the French land grant because Moreau showed the
conveyance to him from the original owner Pellerin which described the property he
possessed. With this evidence the governor ordered Commandant de la Claire to restore
Moreau’s property.79

78 Enrique Voix vs. Pablo de la Houssay, September 11, 1773, Docket No. 26,
“SJR,” 10:130.
^Petition of Joseph Moreau, January 21,1774, Docket No. 3704, “SJR" 11:287.
The governor frequently referred cases which pertained to the posts back to the
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While the governor sought to establish a centrality of command he also allowed
the court system to grow as it accepted Spanish law. He upheld the decisions of lower
courts and referred appeals back to the appropriate court of first instance. Thomas
Ingersoll erroneously claims that, under Unzaga, Louisiana was returned to the rule of
traditional Spanish borderlands military governorship. Under such leadership, Ingersoll
claims, the governor answered to no authority other than Havana and the King and the
“planter class lost their right to representation in a local organ of colonial government”
because the Cabildo offered no provisions for the people “to challenge the Spanish
system from within.”80 The Cabildo was filled with planters who bought offices and
fought to serve in the judicial system, assuring themselves a voice in government
Additionally, while Unzaga overrode decisions by the earlier Superior Council based on
French law, he also stood back while the new Spanish Cabildo expanded its powers to
overturn his own decisions, as in the case of Joseph Loppinot vs. Juan Villeneuve, where
Unzaga had ruled against the plaintiff. Loppinot appealed to the Cabildo and the Cabildo
overturned the governor’s decision. The governor declined to interfere, allowing the case
to go to Havana as a last court of appeal. Havana upheld the governor’s original decision.
In the end, Unzaga’s patience accomplished the growth of the court system in Louisiana

commandant because he could verify and deny information given to the court in New
Orleans. In April of 1773 accusations of stolen dairy cattle were settled by sending the
case back to Opelousas for trial where the suit was eventually dismissed. Case of Judith
Chenal, April 23, 1773, Docket No. 35, “SJR,” 9:442.
^Ingersoll, Old New Orleans. HI, 456.
240

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and helped tie it to the Havana judiciary, thus cementing Louisiana more firmly into the
greater Spanish system.81
Citizens of New Orleans strove to become active in the Cabildo. As in any
colonial territory public service meant more business contacts and a higher social rank in
the colony. Serving in the Cabildo was taken as seriously as serving in the militia. Those
citizens who did not do their duty lost their office. In one case, the governor auctioned
off the seat of an absentee official named Denis Braud. Braud was New Orleans’ first
printer and as such had come under suspicion because he printed materials for the French
Superior Council and the rebels of 1768. O’Reilly arrested him and attached his estate.
Exculpated of any crime Braud applied for the office of Regidor but later left the colony
for France, never to return. In November of 1773 Unzaga prosecuted Braud for absenting
himself after applying for the office and fined him. On January of 13, 1774, the governor
declared the office vacant and five days later the office sold at auction to Daniel Fagot for
the fines in the amount one-thousand two-hundred and two pesos, a tremendous deal for
Fagot since the actual price of the office was over nine-thousand pesos. Public service
offered a great many opportunities in Louisiana but it also brought with it responsibilities
which Unzaga and the courts seemed willing to enforce.82

8,Joseph Loppinot vs. Juan Villeneuve, April 15,1774, Docket No. 3780, “SJR,”
9:438. See also Henry P. Dart, “Civil Procedure in Louisiana Under the Spanish Regime
as Illustrated in Loppinot’s Case, 1774,” LHO 12 (1929): 33-120.
“ See Henry P. Dart, (ed.) “The Adventures of Denis Braud, the First Printer of
Louisiana, 1765-1773.” LHO 14 (1931): 349-60; also Prosecution of Dionisio Braud,
November 23, 1773,Docket No. 12, “SJR,” 10:422. For auction of office see the case
tried January 18,1774, Docket No. 20, ibid. 11: 282.
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The records also indicate that both the governor and the courts took measures to
protect colonists’ inheritances and private property. Unzaga oversaw numerous cases
concerned with the rights of wives, widows and especially children in the event of their
parents’ deaths. Under Spanish laws all wives kept control of their dowry (whatever
property they brought to the marriage). By law that property remained theirs and was
inherited by their children, although their father might have the usufructs of it in his
lifetime. A wife also had use of her husband’s estate in her lifetime though it belonged to
his children. Many men in Spanish Louisiana sought escape from debt, from prison, or
just from responsibility by fleeing into the colonial wilderness. Sometimes men who
were hunters or worked with cattle left their homes never to return. In such cases the wife
could approach the court for the rights to her husband’s property. For example, in
January of 1774, a wife asked the court to authorize her to sell her husband’s “real
property” because he had not returned in over a year and in his absence the family had
become destitute. After affirming her story with witnesses to her husbands disappearance
Unzaga granted the wife the right to sell their house to support herself.83
The governor also upheld the right of women to their doweries even while
married. One of his female colonists sued for her property while still married because she
refused to live with her husband on the grounds of “bad treatment.’’ Until the hearing the
husband had refused to support his wife or to give back her property. The governor’s

“ See case of January 17,1774, Docket No. 10, “SJR,” 11: 286.
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court required that the man answer his wife and upon assuring itsself of his improper
treatment granted the wife’s request for her property.84
While women’s rights to property were based primarily on the idea that the law
was inevitably protecting her children’s inheritance, they sometimes protected the mother
from the children. One widow was granted the right to inventory and divide her estate
without interference by the children’s curator. In another case a mother-in-law claimed
and was granted her property from the estate of one of the leaders of the 1769 revolt85
The case of Henrique Desperez vs. Bagriel Dubertrand, shows where the new husband of
a widow even successfully sued to collect her inheritance from the estate of her first
marriage.86
Spanish law strictly enforced the right of female colonists to their property but the
governor was especially interested in the rights of children to their inheritances. An
example can be found in Docket No. 3774, May 20,1774, where the children of a
deceased father were allowed to sue their step father to get their father’s inheritance.
Unzaga ordered the children’s rightful inheritance produced and taxed the stepfather’s
estate for the court costs.87 It was common for children, especially minor children to be

“ See Philippe Flotte vs. Marie Theresa Leiveille, May 25,1773, Docket No. 10,
“SJR,,” 10: 534.
“ See Docket no. 3802, June 15,1773, ibid; and Docket No. 3806, July 24,1773,
“SJR,” 10:747.
“ Henrique Desperez vs.Gabriel Dubertrand, December 10,1773, Docket No. 24,
“SJR," 10:155.
P etitio n for inheritance, Ana and Elena, daughters of Isaac Guinault vs.
Alexandra Reboul, May 20,1774, Docket 3774, “SJR,” 10: 444.
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represented by adults in the family who served to guide them and protect their interests.
Sometimes it was necessary to seek that help outside the family, especially since Spanish
law did not recognize the right of “family meetings” to decide important controversies
concerning inheritance, hi several cases the governor allowed minor children to appoint
curators to protect their inheritances and under special circumstances allowed the
children’s early emancipation.88
The protection of inherited rights extended also to slave children. In an unusual
case on January 17,1774, Unzaga ruled on the succession of a free black woman named
Martha Marton who died leaving a small estate of personal property to her son Pedro.
Martha had emancipated herself but apparendy had not been able to do the same for
Pedro who belonged to Father Bernabe, pastor on the German Coast Despite his social
status, the court upheld Pedro’s rights to inherit his mother’s property. The property was
sold at auction to pay off the mother's creditors and the governor assigned the remainder
of the estate to Father Bemabe for safekeeping.89
Emancipation was an extremely important element of the Spanish judicial system
which saw all persons as human beings and creatures of God whether free or enslaved.

“ In several instances the governor required that curators of children’s inheritance
explain their actions and account for the inheritance. See May 25,1774, Docket No.
3793, “ ”SJR,”10:452. January 2,1774, Docket No. 3758, ibid.
89The remainder of Martha’s estate was small indeed. Her original property was
sold for the amount of one-hundred sixty-four pesos and two reales. Afterwards the
estate was charged one-hundred fifteen pesos and three reales for her debts and seventeen
pesos six reales for costs. Other small bills were presented, subtracted and the remainder
given to the good Father. See Succession of Martha Marton, January 17,1774, Docket
#3787, ibid, 292.
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Several slaves bought their freedom in Unzaga’s courts though the court placed obstacles
against other emancipations. In 1775, the eighty-year-old slave of the deceased William
Dupre gained freedom for the amount of twelve pesos which he had saved. To do so,
however, the man had to submit to public auction as part of Dupre’s personal property to
make sure that he was not counted as part of a debt against the estate.90 It is evident that
despite the view of Spanish law that all persons had souls and rights, once enslaved a
person also became moveable property and both Spanish and French law strongly
protected personal property. More often, than not, the courts found a way to keep slaves
from gaining their freedom. For example, Anonio, a mulatto slave of the Deshotel estate,
petitioned the courts for his freedom in 1774. He produced a paper which granted such
freedom on the death of his masters. Upon examining the papers, the courts denied his
emancipation on the grounds that the paper was not notarized and the writing was not
formal. Anyone, they said could have forged such a note and there was no way to prove it
was the deceased’s writing. A sad Anonio was sold at auction with the rest of his
master’s property.91
The notarial records indicate other ways that slaves could be denied their freedom.
Spanish law provided masters with a legal recourse to maintain the labor of their slaves
even after emancipation. The term obligation referred to the legal requirement that
slaves remain on the property of their former owners and serve for an allotted time before
they were granted complete freedom. Obligation was common in the Spanish colonies.

90No Docket No. “SJR,” 11:155.
9lPetition of Anonio, March 7,1774, Docket No. 3757, “SJR," 10:288.
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It had originally been set up to smooth the transition from slavery to freedom for both
slave and master. It was, however, an abstract theory and as such could be twisted to
deny freedom, despite the right of emancipation. An good example is the account of
Luisa. After serving her master well for twenty years, the owner rewarded her with
emancipation (libertad). They recorded the act with the notary’s office, but on the
following day Luisa was required to swear to continue serving her master another four
years under the rule of obligation, “obeying as she should everything he ordered,
recognizing him as lord.” In the end, her master was not satisfied with her behavior
during obligation and her emancipation was rescinded.92
Luisa was not alone. Many owners twisted the terms of contracts and legal
arrangements to keep what they felt was their property. Indeed the legal theories of the
protection of private property and the right of contract became the most common
arguments to hold onto slaves under the Spanish system.93 Free blacks and slaves
understood this point of law and therefore the most common form of emancipation during
Unzaga’s tenure came at the hands of other Africans who literally bought slaves and freed

92Andres Almonaster y Roxas, Notarial Archives HI January-December, 1772,
Act No. 96, dated March 3,1772, gave Luisa her freedom. The following day, Act No.
98, she swore to the act of obligation . In September, Act. 348, her emancipation was
rescinded.
93The idea of property was strong enough to protect new buyers against the sale of
damaged “merchandise” as in the case of Juan Baptista Richard who sued Joseph Roth in
1774 for the selling him a slave named Marie and her infant daughter. Richard claimed
he had been deceived in the sale because Marie was not of good character and the infant
daughter was crippled. The court supported Richard’s claim and ordered Roth to take
back the slave and her child and refund Richard’s money. January 7,1774, Docket No.
4, “SJR,” 10:281.
246

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

them afterward, carefully notarizing the emancipation. Unfortunately there were ways
around such sales as in the case of Antonio Albert and his nineteen year-old son Juan sold
by Geronimo La Chappelle in January of 1772, who rethought the sale in the court room
and had the sale recinded on the same day because it “inconvenienced” him. Freedom
came to African slaves more under the Spanish system than the French, but it was still
difficult to obtain.94
In volume two of his work on class and race in New Orleans, Thomas Ingersoll
claimed that the French planters of Louisiana rejected Spanish culture and its attitude
toward slavery and that the growth of a free black community threatened their ideas of
slavery. Other historians, however, note that there was already a firee black population
under the early French regime which gave rise to stricter slave codes by the end of the
French period. Further, Spanish law supported the right of slaves as property while
applying humanistic ideas of the slave’s rights to legal representation and emancipation.
Many Spaniards in Louisiana, including governor Unzaga, were slave owners and
approached the application of the new slave regulations cautiously.95

94Andres Almonaster y Rojas, Notarial Archives IE, Jan-Dee, 1772, in Act No.
192, a free black man named Joseph bought a twenty-seven year old slave also named
Joseph (no relation mentioned) and the slave was henceforth freed in the act of sale. In
Act No. 16, January 28,1772 , Antonio and Juan were sold, and Act No. 17, dated the
same day, rescinding of previous act because it inconvenienced the original owner.
95Ingersoll, Old New Orleans II: 454; See Mathe Allain, “Slave Policies in
French Louisiana,” LH XXI (1980): 127-37, and Carl A. Brasseaux, “The Administration
of Slave Regulations in French Louisiana, 1724-1766,” Ibid, 139-58; the Notarial
Archives in New Orleans note the sale or purchase of several different slaves by Unzaga
during his tenure: one previously noted before his marriage, the purchase of a thirty-nine
year-old slave Theodora in 1774, Notarial Archives A ct No. 136; and sale of slave on
April 27,1775, to Miguel Almonasi, ibid., II: January 2 to May 1,1775, Acts 1-270; A ct
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Emancipation cases were not the only court cases regarding slavery Unzaga heard.
During his administration he oversaw cases regarding property and murder, additionally
ruling on commandants’ decisions regarding slaves in their jurisdiction. His attitude
toward enslaved Africans was mixed. As a slave owner, he upheld the right of property
and supported strict discipline where slaves were concerned. As the representative of
Spain’s judicial system, he oversaw numerous cases where slaves were allowed to defend
themselves in court against their accusers. Unzaga exhibited enlightened leadership in
many of these cases, interfering only to steer the Cabildo and courts toward Spanish
law.96
Tackling the problems of African slavery in Louisiana required patience. While
Unzaga could be brusque he began the installation of Spanish slave law by issuing a
proclamation on November 3,1770 requiring that all sales of property, including slaves,
be notarized in order to be considered valid by the courts. That action supported the
French idea of slaves as moveable property but reduced illegal practices within the
system. The governor also fought to lessen the amount of fugitive slaves in the colony
and actually strove to curtail many allowable freedoms which he felt threatened the order

No. 248 and finally a slave sold to Unzaga by Juan Lafitte, Cadet, on May 1, 1775, Ibid.
Act No. 271.
96The following cases concern slaves of African decent, although numerous Indian
slaves applied for and were granted their freedom. In fact the attitude of the Spanish
toward Indian slaves led many slaves to claim Indian decent in order to gain their
freedom. See Weber, “Problem of Indian Slavery,” 118-119.
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of the colony. He supported the actions of Lieutenant-Governor Athanase de M6zi6res
against fugitive slave bands which disrupted the community in Natchitoches.97
In De Mezieres letter to the governor on the first of February of 1771, the
Lieutenant-Governor indicated that there were two kinds of slaves causing problems:
“Africans” and “Creoles.” This differentiation was commonly made when selling slaves.
Newly arrived slaves were considered Africans and were seen as “uncivilized.” As
previously noted, most of the slaves sold in Louisiana after the Spanish take over were
African slaves who hadn’t been tainted with other ideas. Creole usually referred to
second generation Africans, but could also indicate a mixture of Indian or European
blood. The crown considered Africans or “brutos” (sometimes called bozales) less
troublesome but court documents indicate that the crown’s ideas did not fit colonial
reality. Many “Africans” still harbored ideas of freedom and retaliation. The wilderness
gave slaves ample opportunities to disappear, sometimes for years, and the exceptional
relationship between some masters and slaves in Louisiana’s settlements outside New
Orleans created still more problems. Plantation slaves and more especially those in the
hinterlands were often in possession of firearms, despite the regulations against such
possession. Trusted slaves were expected to hunt and protect property but the possession
of weapons often got them into trouble or increased the means by which they might

97See Hans W. Baade, “The Formalities of Private Real Estate Transactions in
Spanish North America: A Report on Some Recent Discoveries,” Louisiana Law Review
38 (Spring, 1978): 686-95 on slaves as moveable property.
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“retaliate” against bad treatment98 Unzaga’s main concerns were order and the
enforcement of law. He echoed de Mdzieres belief that fugitives should be punished
quickly and severely to prevent other such actions and therefore supported the LieutenantGovernor’s application of one-hundred lashes each to the six fugitives at Natchitoches.99
If law was to create order, Unzaga realized that the promulgation of law must be
particularized. In dealing with the colony’s various needs, he learned that law in New
Orleans did not necessarity fit the reality of frontier posts. Accordingly, he left the every
day adm inistration to the commandants. These men could create laws to suit the
particular needs of their posts. One example was De M6zi£res’ ordinance dated January
21,1770, which forbade the sale of alcohol to slaves and their possession of weapons,
whether it be sticks, knives or firearms. He added his own rules which applied to a
territory on the edge of civilization. In the document de Mdzifcres forbade slaves from
engaging in public meetings whether for dances, games or other reasons. This was an
ordinance that would never have been allowed in New Orleans. Slaves continued to meet
at Congo Square and slaves were some of the best customers for New Orleans’
merchants. The Lieutenant-Governor also forbade slaves the ownership of horses which
of-course would have eased illegal flight Punishment was to be sure and swift Slaves

"See Gilbert C. Din, Spaniards. Planters and Slaves. 48; Ingersoll, Old New
Orleans 2:552, indicates that one women caught in the Attakapas area in 1771 had been a
fugitive for two years. See Usner, Indians. Settlers and Slaves, on the arming of favored
slaves.
"Din, Spaniards. Planters and Slaves. 50.
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breaking the regulations were to be lashed and masters who violated such regulations
were to be fined. It was assumed that masters were responsible for their property.100
Control over slaves in New Orleans was a thornier problem. In the city many free
blacks engaged in sales, purchased goods and had businesses. Slaves also ran businesses
for their masters and dealt with merchants on a regular basis. The businessmen and
planters in New Orleans were, therefore, divided over the treatment of slaves. Many
wanted to retain a certain freedom for their slaves to a free day on Sunday and the right of
slaves to earn money for themselves while others sought to maintain stricter control over
the movement of slaves.
Fugitive slaves grew in number in the city and in 1773 the Cabildo and the
planters moved to try and control both marronage and insubordination of slaves whose
lax treatment allowed such behavior. Din notes that Unzaga allowed the Cabildo to act
on its own regarding these new regulations.101 The councillors of the Cabildo agreed to
establish a special tax whose funds could be used to compensate owners whose slaves
were removed from their ownership through the courts. At Unzaga’s prompting they
opened the discussion of the tax, which affected all colonists, to a wider vote. On August
26, the citizenry of New Orleans and the surrounding parishes met to discuss the tax and
changes to laws affecting slaves and fugitives. They eased the burden of reporting

maroonage and suggested that the funds also be used to reward those who captured

100The ordinance can be found in AGI, Cuba 188-A, its date is January 21,1770.
101 Actas del Cabildo, 2:109-12; Din, Spaniards. Planters and Slaves. 58.
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runaways. The Cabildo and the governor immediately implemented the councils’
suggestions while forwarding the new laws to the crown for approval.102
The compensation fund was an excellent example of the growth of law and a
sense of community in the colony but it was not completely successful. Claims for
compensation arrived from slave owners all over the colony. Collecting the tax was
difficult and when compensation didn’t immediately follow a claim the claimants in
surrounding parishes reneged on their tax assessments to support it Still, the governor
gained valuable information from the fund. To assess the tax, census materials were
generated and reports flowed into New Orleans regarding mis-behavior on the part of
both slaves and owners. With that information the governor could more easily oversee
the plantation areas surrounding New Orleans and even the outlying parishes. Stricter
slave codes could be enforced. This reporting also strengthened ties between the
governor and his post commandants, whom he allowed to enforce the regulations.
Fugitive laws did not, however, stop the loaning of slaves and their labor, or the
right of slaves to sell their own labor on Sundays. In the Loppinot case a valuable slave
lost his life on the way back from working for a neighbor on Sunday. He was durnk,
having been given alcohol by the neighbor as part of his reward. The owner sued,
denying the right of his neighbor to endanger his slave. He was actually after more
control of the slave’s life than was possible under the law. Unzaga’s unpopular decision
in the Loppinot case upheld the portions of Spanish law which gave slaves Sundays to be

102Actas del Cabildo, 1: 109-12, and pages 113-14, for the August cabildo abierto.
Din gives a larger discussion of the rules for the slave fund and the actually employment
of persons used to hunt down runaways in Spaniards. Planters and Slaves. 58-61.
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used as they saw fit (within the law). This case exacerbated the problems over congress
between slaves and between slaves and freedmen which some planters felt threatened
their authority. In this instance the governor bent the colonists to the law not the other
way around.103
As an eighteenth-century leader the governor tried to use enlightened methods to
expand the rule of law in Louisiana and truly instill justice in the system. At the same
time he had to use stem measures to back the letter of the law. He imposed severe
punishment on offenders including the use of torture on the rack to extract confessions,
flogging, and drawing and quartering in cases of murder. In such cases, the governor also
enforced scientific investigation of crimes, using appropriate authorities to discuss
evidence, and every defendant was allowed to speak in court in his own defense.
Several cases heard by the governor show the complexity of the problems Unzaga
faced in bringing justice. Francisco Bellisle’s slaves and a “bruto” slave from Guinea
named Carlos were tried for engaging in African “gris-gris” to try and poison their
overseer and master. During the hearing all of the slaves were allowed to give their
testimony (some of which was coerced through torture) and translators were provided for
those who did not speak Spanish, including Carlos. The poison was examined by three
doctors who gave their deposition as to the nature of the concoction. The investigation
began in the governor’s court in June of 1773 and ended in a trial during January of the
following year. In the end, the governor ruled that most of the slaves had been guilty only

103See Laura L. Porteous, (trans.), “The Documents in Loppinot’s Case, 1774,”
LHO. 12 (1929): 39-120.
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of conspiracy and failure to report such a conspiracy to their owners. Since Carlos, the
culprit who concocted the poison, had died in prison Unzaga dropped the case with the
understanding that all of the other slaves were to be separated and sold. The “creole”
slave accused of being the ringleader was given his time already served in prison as
punishment and ordered sold away from the others. In the case of Carlos it becomes
apparent that having “bruto” slaves did not guarantee one’s safety or that “creole” slaves
were less guilty of committing crimes against their masters.104
In another poisoning case in July of 1774, the accused poisoner, Pedro was also a
Guinea bom African. Accused of killing his black overseer, Pedro swore he never gave
the man anything to drink. Without corroborating witnesses Unzaga chose to address the
case scientifically, ordering an autopsy which indicated the man might have been
poisoned. The governor ordered a trial. When Pedro continued to deny the poisoning his
defense attorney suggested the man might have died from other cases. With no new
evidence to indicate the cause of death Unzaga finally ordered that Pedro remain
imprisoned for ten years. In 1777, Pedro’s owners abandoned him to prison which meant
he would be allowed emancipation once he completed his sentence. The courts had tried
a criminal and jailed a possible offender who, if guilty, at least would not be able to
perpetrate another crime for ten years.105

104See a complete description of the testimonies and trial in Laura L. Porteous,
(trans.), “The Gri-Gri Case,” LHQ 17 (1934): 48-63.
,05See Porteous, ‘Torture in Spanish Criminal Procedure,”5-22.
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In the case of Temba and Francisco Mirliton in 1771, two slaves fired their
master’s hayloft and shot him as he emerged from his house to put out the fire. Unzaga
extorted the testimony of both slaves with the use of torture on the rack and condemned
both to the hangman’s noose. The dead bodies of the criminals were left hanging and
Temba’s hands were nailed to a post on the road. Two other slaves implicated as
accomplices were tarred and feathered as an example of what happened to those who
helped criminals. Unzaga withheld punishment, however, on other slaves he suspected of
being accessories because he did not have evidence to convict them. Despite his
vehemence toward slave crime and his determination to halt its growth, Unzaga did not
move outside of the law to enforce his will on the populace.
Din interestingly notes in a footnote to the Temba case that torture was not
common in Louisiana’s courts and that the Spanish did not use “the heinous instrument of
torture and death called ‘the wheel,’ as the French had done, or any other similar
device.”106 In his attempts to defend the Spanish system Din perhaps overlooks the fact
that the “rack,” an extremely painful device, was the favorite instrument of torture used
by the Spanish to extract confessions from slaves. Accused criminals like Carlos
sometimes died in prison from mistreatment while awaiting trial during Unzaga’s tenure.
A more meaningful point might be made by stressing that the governor’s court
and those of the alcaldes mayor often served to disseminate justice before a trail was
necessary and that fines often took the place of imprisonment. As a Spanish official,
Unzaga sought to mete out justice and order in the colony, not revenge or tyranny. This

106Din, Spaniards. Planters and Slaves. 262, note number 12, to Chapter 2.
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last position can be seen particularly in the trial of several soldiers accused of allowing
deserters to escape prison. In November of 1773 the case of Pablo Augraud and Asa
Daniels, escaped prisoners, appeared in the governor’s court. Unzaga heard the testimony
of several soldiers accused of allowing the escape. The soldiers apparently were
hoodwinked by an English Captain who plied the grenadier on guard, Antonio Gossen,
with alcohol and then stole the keys, allowing the soldiers to escape. During the trial in
April of the following year several soldiers were implicated and imprisoned along with
Gossen. The accomplices pled innocence and petitioned the governor for their release.
On April 22 Unzaga released and absolved the accomplices. He did not absolve Gossen
but added that the man had acted with carelessness, not malice, adding that time already
served was enough although Gossen must pay court costs. Justice was served. An
example was set and court costs paid.107
During the 1770s Unzaga steadily worked to create a colony of loyal subjects. He
correcdy judged that order must be established before loyalty could be expected. To
affect order, setded and resettled colonists through surveys and land grants in the lower
Mississippi Valley, thereby creating a denser and larger population capable of defense
and domestic industry. More importantly for the creation of loyal subjects, he bent
Spanish law to fit colonial realities where necessary to protect the colony and enforced
the law where it benefitted the people and the king. Enlightened vision led him to
enhance his colonists’ opportunities for education and worship and religious disputes

l07Trial of Pablo Augraud and Asa Daniels for fleeing public prison. November 1,
1773, “SJR,” 10:133.
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allowed him to enhance his position as defender of the faith and his colonial charges. By
m ainta in in g

a strong and constant presence in the courts he used Spanish justice to

systematically implant Spanish law in the colony. At the same time he indelibly etched
the figure of the governor as the central authority. Indian slavery lessened considerably,
though it did not disappear entirely. Planters continued to fight what they considered
lenient Spanish law concerning their slaves but they also increasingly sought to use the
courts to settle their claims.

Emancipation remained tenuous for Louisiana’s black

slaves, their fate decided more by the owner’s manipulation of legal codes than protection
by the courts. The real emancipator, as always, remained cold, hard cash. Spanish codes
defending slave’s rights to employ themselves on Sundays opened fresh avenues to
freedom. Unzaga left a sound system of justice, an enlightened Cabildo and court system,
and a network of commandants able to serve justice in outlying areas. Justice gradually
brought with it loyalty to the Spanish crown and a grudging obedience to the Spanish
system. The greatest challenge for Unzaga remained the protection of the colony with a
small, indefensible line of deteriorating forts, an untrained, undisciplined militia and an
underpaid military.
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Chapter Eight
In Defense of Crown and Colony
“These thoughts revolve in my head everyday so that I may be able to elect the best
defense should the occasion present itself and as is dictated by my limited prudence and
experience.”
Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga, June 8 , 17701
The Bourbon Crown’s reform of its defenses in the Indies rested heavily on
restructuring the army in the Indies and rebuilding certain defensive outposts. Spanish
minister Esquilache and his successors gradually replenished treasury funds to support
such defenses through increased taxation and better revenue collection. Posts in the
Caribbean received funding to buttress their defenses, although the crown recognized that
military responsibility for safeguarding the Indies must be transferred to a disciplined,
colonial militia system.2 Alejandro O’Reilly applied his remarkable skills to the
reorganization of defenses in Cuba and Louisiana. In both colonies he cut expenses, re
arranged troops, re-built fortifications and created an armed, better disciplined militia of
Creoles and free blacks. In both instances, Spain’s officials were successful in integrating
the colonial elite into a stable and loyal relationship with the Crown. Indeed, Louisiana’s
military reorganization began in and extended directly from O’Reilly and Havana.
The results of the reform varied in the empire. This variance depended on the size
and energy of the Crown’s expenditures, as well as the importance and economic stability
of the colony. The importance of Havana in Spain’s imperial plans led Carlos HI to

‘Unzaga to Grimaldi, June 8, 1770, AGL SD 2543, Folio 999.
2Kuethe, Cuba, ix.
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invest large sums toward its defense during the late eighteenth century. Allan J. Kuethe’s
work on Cuba also indicates that under Alejandro O’Reilly, the king allowed the island to
create a large, independent militia of Creoles and free blacks which shifted the burden of
defense to the colony. Works which cover similar attempts in Mexico and Peru suggest
Cuba’s stability and growth was actually an anomaly.3 Lyle N. McAlister’s work on
Bourbon New Spain also shows that the extension of the fuero militar or military
privilege to the colonial militia often created more conflict than appreciation and loyalty.4
Indeed, Carlos D3, openly faced the possibility of having created a well armed and
supplied army of insurrection in the colonies, yet he continued to construct such forces.
This is most understandable when seen in the light of the continuing tensions among
Spain and England and their colonies in North America.
Working under imperial and sometimes secretive orders, Luis de Unzaga y
Amezaga, refurbished and re-manned Louisiana’s deteriorating defenses. He
concentrated on building and maintaining the army and militia O’Reilly had created,
despite illness, desertion and limited payrolls. Using his unique methods of adapting
imperial necessities to colonial realities he also created a network of merchant spies and
informants to funnel information on the British to Spain.

3Both Archer, in The Army in Bourbon Mexico and Campbell, in The Military in
Colonial Peru, indicate a constant influx of funds and troops and a continual re-institution
of such militia groups elsewhere in empire.
4See Lyle N. McAlister, The “Fuero Militar” in New Spain. 1764-1800
(Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1957).
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This examination of Louisiana’s defenses compares it to both Havana and the
remaining Spanish borderlands in which it existed. In Cuba, O’Reilly rebuilt the regular
army, establishing several fixed regiments including dragoons and artillery companies.
He lowered the military budget, although he was forced to make concessions later. The
Captain-General also worked, with tremendous success, to create a reserve army in the
form of a disciplined militia which remained a stable portion of Cuba’s military for
another century. Pragmatic management produced a well integrated military
establishment using all the available resources. In Havana, and its environs he created
white, pardo (mulatto), and moreno (free black) militias. The officers of such militias
had to live within the district of the company they commanded. To enhance militia
training

he offered higher pay to regular army officers willing to command militia units.

The militia companies also drilled regularly and received standardized equipment
Finally, under the Conde de Ricla, they received the fuero de guerra militar, permitting
the men to appear before military tribunals instead of civilian courts and creating a certain
esprit de corps and a feeling of upward mobility.5
O’Reilly, like other military officials, contended with problems surrounding pay
for the soldiers and militia, desertion (a constant problem in the Indies), proper supplies
and equipment, uniforms and food. Later, the governorship of the Marqu6s de la Torre
oversaw the creation of local funding for uniform replacements and armaments, as well
as promulgating new regulations regarding deserters (both soldiers and sailors) and

5See the chapter on Reform in Kuethe, Cuba. 3-23; McAlister, The “Fuero
Militar.” 5-6 covers the social consequences of extending the fuero to the militia.
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penalties for those who aided them.6 Pay for the soldiers continued to be a problem into
the 1780s and 1790s although Havana received far more subsidization than other
locations in Spain’s empire.
Cuba’s militia units numbered 5,558 men by 1779 and volunteers were common.
Accompanying the militia were a veteran infantry regiment of some 1,358 men both
fusiliers and grenadiers and extra staff and command. The militia included white and

pardo battalions, a cavalry regiment and a dragoon regiment.7 Outnumbering the Spanish
troops, the militia created under the Bourbon reforms guarded one of Spain’s most
important outposts.
While O’Reilly refurbished Cuba’s armed forces and fortifications, Spain’s
ministers attempted to create a net around the Caribbean which would catch possible
spies. As early as 1764, Minister of the Indies, Julian de Arriaga ordered all Spanish
governors to maintain a cautious but continual discipline against any possible attack by
the British.8 Despite the supposed peace between the two nations, Carlos in was
determined not to be embarrassed by the English again. In 1766, agents in Europe
informed him of a possible spy, a Frenchman named Pottier, who had been sent by
England to spy in the Spanish colonies. Arriaga ordered Ricla to arrest and detain Pottier

6Kuethe, Cuba. 79; Royal order, El Pardo, March 10,1785, AGI, SD 2160; and
Marquds de la Torre, Cartas y Bando, July 6,1776, AGI, Cuba 1221.
7Kuethe. Cuba. 179-182.
8Arriaga to the Conde de Ricla, September 22,1764, AGI, SD 1194.
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if he were spotted.9 To curtail such spies the crown issued orders in 1768 to cordon off
the empire by restricting the traffic in Spanish ports. The injunction was aimed
specifically at the British, who were allowed entry only in emergencies and allowed
shelter just long enough for repairs. Questionable ships were to be detained, the ship
seized, and the crew sent to the closest British port with the expenses to be bome by the
British or other foreign crown. The King admonished all governors not to allow
contraband especially if it meant that “hard specie” might leave the empire10
This order was followed in Cuba as long as it didn’t interfere with the normal ship
traffic and apparently with the expected trade in contraband items. Captain-General
Bucareli followed the crown’s wishes as closely as possible, forbidding entry to British
ships and admonishing other governors to do the same. Captain-General de la Torre
“elasticized” such restrictions to benefit Cuba (see Chapter Four). Thomas E. Chdvez
finds in his work, The Ultimate Gift: Spain and The Independence of the United States.
that Spain’s officials also managed somehow to distinguish the difference between
British spies and the regular colonial practices of trade in the Caribbean. They
differentiated, therefore, between English colonists who merely “subverted” the Atlantic
mercantile system and British attempts at subterfuge."

9Arriaga to Ricla, January 24 and March 24, 1766, AGI, SD 1194.
l0Grimaldi to Bucareli, April 30,1768, AGI, SD 1195.
"Thomas E. Chlvez, The Ultimate Gift: Spain and the Independence of the
United States, (unpublished manuscript, 1998), 54.
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Between 1770 and 1771 the Malvinas crisis heightened tensions and Spanish
suspicions in Cuba and the Caribbean, hi Cuba, de la Torre stepped up intelligence
gathering along the Mosquito Coast and contacted the governor in Louisiana. The
English could become a threat at any time, and their proximity on the Mosquito Coast
continued to make that a possibility. While Spain found the English presence
inconvenient it did not wish to openly confront them, either in Europe or the Americas.
Arriaga informed the Marques de la Torre, that he could do nothing but keep up the
surveillance.12 With Ricla and O’Reilly’s reforms in place, and a continued vigil by his
colonial governors, the monarchy’s desire for a self-supporting defense had been
answered in Cuba. The borderlands, however, posed a different problem.
Carlos IH’s long range plans for the Borderlands included the reorganization of
defenses in New Spain, the creation of a defensive barrier in Louisiana and eventually the
retaking of Florida. Actual reconstruction of the Borderlands can be divided between the
provinces of New Spain and Louisiana in both theory and application, as Florida was not
retaken until the American Revolution. As previously discussed, the Marques de Rubf s
crown-sponsored investigation of the northern boundaries in New Spain initiated a series
of reforms under the Regulations o f1772. These included re-organizing the missionpresidio defenses between California and Texas.13 By the third year of Unzaga’s tenure in
Louisiana, Hugh O’Connor had reconstructed the frontier provincas intemas of New

,2Arraiga to Marquds de la Torre, June 9,1772, AGI, SD 1211.
13See Max L. Moorehead, The Presidio: Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands.
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1975).
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Spain. The colony’s northern missions and presidios were relocated and garrisons
rebuilt. The reforms also included the standardization of uniforms, pay, supplies and
military conduct, and a number of regulations to prevent further corruption among the
officers.14
As the colonial border withdrew and realigned itself, the Indians moved into the
vacuum, attacking settlers and raiding other tribes. That is, the reorganization did little to
defend the Hispanic communities on the frontier. In the short run, the King favored
further immigration into the Texas borderlands to build a defense through denser
population. The depredations of the Apaches and Comanches combined with the
indifference and inability of the viceroys, made it difficult to implement such
immigration, however. The north was left poorly defended.15 It would not be until after
1776, under the able Viceroy Teodoro de Croix, that the presidio system recommended
by Rubf was modified to meet the real needs of the frontier.16
As Rubf investigated New Spain in 1769, Alejandro O’Reilly realigned
Louisiana’s military defenses according to the realities of its own frontier. He focused
mainly

on the English threat in the east and the contraband at New Orleans and

14Ibid., on corruption and military standards; See Weber, Borderlands. 204-218 on
reconstruction and standardization of dress and supplies. The reforms did little to better
the lives of soldiers on the frontier. They were paid small sums out of which they were
expected to buy specific, and inappropriate clothing, horses, and food. In fact, most
soldiers pay was in the form of clothing and supplies whose prices were commonly
inflated
15See Bolton, Athanase de MdziSres. on the Apache attacks and Bobb’s biography
of Bucareli, for the inability of the viceroys to do more with the frontier.
16Moorehead, Presidio. 87-91; Weber, Borderlands. 225-227.
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Natchitoches. As he had done in Cuba, the Captain-General restructured the forts as
described earlier, strengthened the regular troops and created a militia for colonial
defense.
The regular troops consisted of a newly developed fixed Louisiana infantry
battalion formed from the Regiments of Guadalajara, Aragdn, Milan, and Lisbon,
approximately 412 men.17 The new battalion included a grenadier company and seven
fusilier companies each with a captain, a lieutenant and a sublieutenant
O’Reilly set monthly pay for the soldiers at 70 pesos fuertes for captains, 44 for
the lieutenants, and 32 for sublieutenants. Headquarters staff such as Francisco Bouligny
received more compensation. Lieutenant colonels received 146 pesos and lieutenants at
headquarter 51 pesos instead of the requisite 44. There were also two flag sub-lieutenants
whose salaries stood at 30 pesos. Pay scales for enlisted personnel were much lower and
varied with time served.18
Officers in the battalion were expected to perform a number of functions in the
community. In addition to their normal duties they were required to serve at military
trials, on councils of war, and as commandants in isolated communities. Additionally,
these men frequently served in naval positions because of an absence of officers. The
enlisted personnel were expected to act as a local police force in New Orleans and hunt

l7Holmes. Honor and Fidelity. 18.
18“Reglamento que explica todas las obligaciones de esta Provincia que se deberdn
satisfacer por cuenta de la Real Hacienda,” O’Reilly, New Orleans, February 23,1770,
AGL Cuba 1055 and Coutts, “Martin Navarro,” 554-555.
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down runaway slaves as well. Militia captains and soldiers acted similarly in their posts
and commandants were also in charge of economic development19
The formation of a fixed battalion followed O’Reilly’s original intent to create a
self-supporting defensive system in the Indies and prevented the constant and costly
rotation of troops previously necessary in such garrisons. He realized the necessity of
more able bodied soldiers because both weather and disease took horrendous tolls on
colonial regiments everywhere, most especially in the Circum-Caribbean. Yellow fever,
malaria and a large assortment of internal parasites sapped the strength of armies and
caused the continual rotation of soldiers which undermined the stability of the army.
Larger regiments allowed for less rotation and made up for the normal desertion problem.
The Captain-General, therefore, requested 100 more soldiers, plus guns and ammunition
from Spain for the colony.20
The new battalion was eagerly joined by many of the colony’s ex-French officers
and the sons of the local planters and merchants.21 Colorful service uniforms, crown pay
and the extension of the juero militar to Louisiana, provided certain social and monetary
benefits otherwise unavailable in Louisiana. The French had previously established the

19Holmes, Honor and Fidelity. 77; see Araham P. Nasatir, ed., Spanish War
Vessels on the Mississippi. 1792-1796 (New Haven: Yale University Press 1968), 1-145
regarding army officers in the navy; and Arnold, Colonial Arkansas, for economic
problems of commandants.
20Holmes, Honor and Fidelity. 20.
2lMany soldiers accepted commissions not only in the army but also as militia
captains which gave them greater status and more land. See testimony to the idea of
French soldiers retiring to be settlers and militia in Louis Judice “Proc6s-verbal of the
examination of a drowning victim, July 9, 1770, AGL Cuba 188a:l d/14.
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idea of using the military as a form of social mobility and it was quite natural, therefore,
that Louisiana’s colonial elite continue that behavior. To assure a “professional” army
and fit officers, O’Reilly issued instructions which required cadets to train in
“mathematics and military subjects.’’22 He also established pensions for the families
(wives and children) of deceased soldiers and pensions for disabled veterans. He
encouraged regulars and non-commissioned officers to stay in the service by establishing
bonus payments in addition to their regular salaries, and further rewarded men who
served honorably for a minimum of twenty years by allowing them to retire with
pensions. Officers also were enticed to perform their duties by the promise of being
allowed to join one of Spain’s Royal Military Orders, increasing their prestige at home
and abroad.23
Paralleling his efforts in Cuba, O’Reilly supported the fixed Louisiana battalion
with a colonial militia. The militia originally embraced 1,040 men in thirteen companies.
He instructed their leaders that the men were to be drilled by regular officers every
Sunday and supplied by the crown. He hoped the discipline of marching and target
practice would create some sort of esprit de corps among the men.24

“ Ibid., 76, who indicates that O’Reilly’s instructions are listed in his “Memoire
sur I’Instruction des cadets” Barcelona, May 25, 1767, and can be found in the
Bibliotheque National (Paris), MSS. Espagnols, Vol. 363 (Esp. 423), folios 242-45; Ulloa
to Grimaldi, July 20, 1768, AGI, SD 2542, No. 5 notes that the French were already
engaged in this behavior and “appreciated” military positions.
23These advantages were actually created for all royal troops, in the crown’s order
of September 29, 1761, see Holmes, Honor and Fidelity. 76.
MBjork, “Establishment of Spanish Rule,” 246.
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In Louisiana, O’Reilly needed to distribute one-third the number of troops
available in Cuba across a territory at least five times as large. He began by concentrating
the majority of the soldiers at the capital in New Orleans, with smaller detachments in the
immediate area. At Balize, he posted troops to intercept any advance up the Mississippi.
He also positioned sixty-five soldiers in twin forts further upstream at English Turn to
catch anyone who might get past Balize. The remainder of the New Orleans forces were
stationed at the old French barracks. These were actually the third set of barracks built
during the French period and O’Reilly chose them because they were large, two-storied
buildings of brick with an ample arcade and brick flooring, and were capable of housing
1200 to 1500 soldiers.25 It was at these building, incidently, that O’Reilly chose to
execute the traitors of the rebellion in 1768. The barracks was positioned parallel to the
river near the military hospital. Outside the building a brick wall surrounded a fairly large
parade ground for drilling the men and showing off to the general public. The barracks
also contained a powder magazine and an armory. The dragoons were placed at another
building located at the present-day comer of Chartres and Toulouse a site now occupied

^Bienville built a second barracks to replace the dilapidated barracks erected
sometime before 1723. See Villers Du Terrage, Les Demiers annees. 45 for a plan of the
second barracks in the Place d’Armes or present day Jackson Square; these however were
made of wood, with no flooring, or chimneys, and lifted off the ground on piles, all of
which rotted. The last French barracks were finally constructed of durable materials and it
is those that O’Reilly confiscated for his troops. See John Smith Kendall, History of New
Orleans. 3 vols. (Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Company, 1922) 1:88 for the plan of the
third and final French barracks.
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by one of the Pontalba buildings. Four companies of militia resided in New Orleans but
as locals did not need quartering..26
The military hospital originally erected in 1733 was a one-story brick affair which
acted as the infirmary for wounded and diseased soldiers. These hospitals were extremely
important. As previously mentioned, disease took a terrible toll on new Europeans
entering Louisiana. In addition to tropical fevers and “bugs,” soldiers and others
contracted a variety of serious health problems including, but not limited to “pink eye,”
gout, hernias, epilepsy, “apoplexy,” hepatitis, abscesses, “pleurisy, cholera, dysentery,
“milk-sickness, goitre, typhus, dyspepsia, measles, small-pox and scarlet fever'’ and
severe diarrhea.”27 Too, the soldiers in New Orleans were near bars and houses of
prostitution, both of which they visited. Consequently the hospital treated a good number
of military men who had been wounded during a brawl or had succumbed to venereal
disease (the curse of serving in the Americas).28 Venereal disease became quite a severe
problem among the soldiers, although it attacked colonists and Indians alike. By the
1790s English Colonel John Pope noted that most citizens in Spanish ports enjoyed good

“ Powell A. Casey, Encyclopedia of Forts. Posts. Named Camps, and Other
Military Installations in Louisiana. 1700-1981 (Baton Rouge: Claitor’s Publishing
Division, 1983), 129-131: Holmes. Honor and Fidelity. 19; Kinaird. SMV. 1:158-159.
“ Jack D. L. Holmes, “Medical Practice,” 334.
“ For a complete copy of O’Reilly’s instructions see Douglas C. McMurtrie, “A
Louisiana Decree of 1770 Relative to the Practice of Medicine and Surgery,” New
Orleans Medical and Surgical Journal 84 (1933): 7-11.
269

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

health except for the garrison whose “mode of living” and imprudent diet of rich foods
and alcohol drunk with “lewd” women would corrupt anyone’s health.29
A. P. Nasatir, notes in his discussion of royal hospitals that these institutions
housed:
stocks of curious old remedies and equipment,... often depleted and
replaced only after long delays and petitioning. Nevertheless the royal hospitals
were important havens for the sick and injured of the whole province. Their
establishment and maintenance was one of the fine, humanitarian acts of the
Spanish paternalism which was otherwise too prone to stifle the economic and
intellectual life of the colonials.30
After establishing the regiment in New Orleans and its environs, O’Reilly
distributed the remaining militia at Louisiana's forts at the posts. One militia company
was established at St. Louis, serving under the Lieutenant Governor, Pedro Piemas, and
another for Ste. Genevieve, serving under Don Francisco VaM The remaining
companies were ordered for Cabahonocy or St. James Parish under Nicolas Verret, at
Natchitoches under Lieutenant-Governor, Athanase de Mdzi&res, at Point Couple with
Francisco Allain, (who would be replaced by Balthazar de Villers whom O’Reilly
transferred from Natchitoches), at the German Coasts under Roberto Robin de Laugni,
and Captain of the Infantry, Francisco Simard de Bellisle, at Attakapas, or Opelousas to
serve with Gabriel Fuselier de la Claire, and at La Fource de Chetimachas, under Don

h o lm e s , “Medical Practice,” 333.
30A. P. Nasatir, “Royal Hospitals in Colonial Spanish America.” Annals of
Medical History. 3d ser. 4 (1942): 481.
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Luis Judice. Arkansas Post and St. Louis received detachments of soldiers which they
kept throughout the Spanish period (see Table 3).31
The last step in New Orleans was to fortify the city. The palisades around New
Orleans were a shambles in 1770 and O’Reilly was of the opinion that it was not worth
the expense on materials and labor to replace palisades which quickly rotted, or dig moats
which silted up.32 He further abandoned the French forts of S t Charles and St. Louis
along the bend in the river South of the city as S t Louis was rotted and S t Charles was
little more than a stockade.
The other decision O’Reilly faced was what forts to keep outside of New Orleans.
The French created a number of forts and “posts” along the Mississippi, then westward
along the Arkansas and Red Rivers toward Spanish Texas. With the exception of forts
near Lakes Pontchartrain and the mouth of the Mississippi, the alignment of these posts
had more to do with the fur trade and Indian diplomacy than they did with the threat of
any European invasion. Moreover, after his tour of the colony, Ulloa had arranged to have
a large number of forts built, including one near the Red and Black Rivers (1767) which
never materialized.
As previously indicated in Chapter Three, O’Reilly kept the forts of S t Jean
Baptiste in Natchitoches, San Carlos HI de Arkansas, and Forts St. Marie and S t Leon at
English turn. He also changed the position of Ft. Real Catolica San Carlos which was
sinking quickly into the mud at the mouth of the Mississippi and rebuilt it at the old

3‘There is a listing also for Don Estevan Mardeffet Layssard.
^Kinnaird. SMV. 2: 147.
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French location for Balize. He used the materials from Ft Real Catolica but did not
“fortify” Balize. He abandoned Fort S t Gabriel de Manchac across the bayou from the
abandoned English Fort Bute and a small French fort called Tigouyou on a bayou of the
same name which connected Lakes Pontchartrain and Maurepas, which was curious
considering the British penchant to enter the Mississippi via the lakes and the Iberville
River. He kept Ft. St. Jean to the south of Lake Pontchartrain, though he never sent a full
company to that location. He also continued the small fort at St. Louis and the stockade
at Ste. Genevieve. All other forts, French or Spanish, were to be abandoned.
O’Reilly did not really have a chance to thoroughly understand Louisiana’s
problems though he did a remarkable job considering he was there only one year. Luis de
Unzaga y Amezaga, given more time and changing circumstances, modified O’Reilly’s
plan and skirted his regulations. In particular, during the first two years of his tenure,
Unzaga faced a widening dispute in the Atlantic between Spain and England. At the same
time he dealt with increasing Indian problems in the west and heightened British activity
along the Mississippi.
With the increased activity of the British in the Atlantic came reports that the
British were planning to rebuild Fort Bute at Manchac which they had abandoned in
1768, taking with them the guns and powder, destroying much of the fort but leaving the
barracks.33 These last buildings were the ones that John Fitzpatrick and the other English
merchants salvaged to build the new setdement at Manchac. British Manchac grew

33For more information on Pensacola and Fort Bute see Major General Frederick
Haldimand Papers, British Museum. Film Ps8 16770(2), Louisiana State Archives, Baton
Rouge.
272

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

during 1769 and early 1770. Unzaga became increasingly uneasy, sending reports of
British movements to his superiors. He wrote to Grimaldi that he could not defend the
long expanse of the Mississippi with such meager troops and equipment. He was
particularly concerned by the arrival of one thousand British troops to reinforce
Pensacola. Accompanying the troops were boats with munitions and two frigates which
had just returned from New York. Unzaga could not help but reflect that these troops
might be thrust at Louisiana through Manchac and Natchez. He told Grimaldi that:
“These thoughts revolve in my head everyday so that I may be able to elect the best
defense should the occasion present itself and as is dictated by my limited prudence and
experience.34
Unzaga’s fears were well grounded. The British were planning to attack New
Spain through Louisiana if the Malvinas crisis became a war. Indeed, early the next year
(1771), General Gage ordered the troops to prepare for an attack on New Orleans and
mobilized British troops in New York.35
As the Malvinas crisis developed in 1770, an interesting exchange of letters
ensued between Unzaga, Bucareli and Spain’s Minister Grimaldi. Bucareli reported to
Grimaldi that he (the Captain-General) did not believe there were really three full
regiments reinforcing Pensacola but that he instructed Unzaga to “always keep himself

^Unzaga to Grimaldi, June 8,1770, AGL SD 2543, Folio 999.
35See the secret dispatch from Lord Hillsborough to General Gage and his reply in
Clarence E. Carter, Great Britain and the Illinois Country. 1763-1764. (Washington,
D.C.: The American Historical Association, 1910),183-184 and James A. James,
“Spanish Influence in the West During the American Revolution,” MVHR 4 (June, 1917March 1918): 193-194.
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aware of the troops that guard Pensacola although we’re at peace with the English."36 He
added, that if the British did attack that troops from Havana could never reach New
Orleans in time to defend it. He was also of the opinion “that the posts in Louisiana only
serve[d] to sign the frontiers of the dominions of the King in both parts,” an opinion
shared by Unzaga.37 Grimaldi’s answer to Bucareli and Unzaga was long and involved.
He agreed with Bucareli that there might not be two battalions at Pensacola, adding
however, that knowledge gained through London and the current condition in the
Malvinas made British plans somewhat complex. Further, he made it clear that the King
saw Louisiana as “useful and convenient” in its position as a buffer between the English
and New Spain because Louisiana “made it more difficult for illicit commerce to take
place on the frontier of Mexico and retardfed] the influence of the Indians that are
situated on Louisiana’s frontiers who [were] provided with munitions [ostensibly by the
British].” Grimaldi clearly stated twice in the letter that Louisiana’s final fate would be
decided in peace and not war. He did not feel it would serve the King to mount any
offensive from the colony.38
The upshot of the Unzaga-Bucarelli-Grimaldi correspondence was that Spain’s
minister sent another letter to Unzaga which carefully delineated what he should do in
case the British did actually become belligerent Having consulted O’Reilly, Grimaldi

“ Bucareli to Grimaldi, August 17,1770, AGI, SD 2543, Folio 1003.
37Ibid.
“ Grimaldi to Bucareli, San Lorenzo, October 24,1770, AGI, SD 2543, Folio
1005.
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again advised Unzaga not to worry about any offensive movements against the British,
cautioning the governor that the King wanted to conserve Louisiana but not at the
expense of having to “Employ forces there that are more needed in other parts, because
no matter what, the fate of Louisiana will be decided in peace.” 39 Having received the
request for troops and munitions from O’Reilly and being informed of the difficulties of
defense, Grimaldi said he was sending Louisiana another hundred men, 800 guns and
bayonets, and 1500 cartridge belts. Grimaldi informed the governor that he must try and
defend the colony with the militia, retreating to Opelousas if the situation grew untenable,
and admonishing him to begin the production of cattle at that post in case such a move
was necessary. Given that Unzaga feared the British might outflank him on the way to
Opelousas from Manchac or Natchez Grimaldi suggested that the governor station a small
force somewhere along the Manchac-Amite connection. If that didn’t work Unzaga was
to “conserve his troops” and retire to New Spain. Grimaldi added that he felt the
Arkansas contingents, with aid from the local Indians, could defend their post or retreat
toward Natchitoches. If the British threatened Illinois, he contended the men could “flee
into the arms of the Missouri Indians whose friendship has been earned by his [Pedro
Piemas’] good treatment” In the meantime, Unzaga was to continue a strict surveillance
of British movements along the Mississippi.40

39Grimaldi to Unzaga, October 24,1770, AGI, SD 2543, Folio 1007.
40O’Reilly to Grimaldi, June 8, 1770, AGI, SD 2543; O’Reilly to Grimaldi,
September 30,1770, ibid.; Grimaldi to Unzaga, October 24,1770, ibid., Folio 1007.
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Unzaga reacted to his orders in several ways. In response to the English
settlement at Manchac, the governor reconstructed old Fort Saint Gabriel de Manchac and
manned it with Commandant Descoudreaux and a small detachment of soldiers.41
Descoudreaux’s letters indicate that his orders were to monitor British movements along
the river and also to keep an eye on Louisiana’s colonists who might be “trading” with the
British at Manchac (see Chapter Five on Contraband).
Considering the one-thousand men in Pensacola and the possibility of attack by
Generals Gage and Haldimand, Unzaga ordered his veteran troops to begin training the
militia.42 Because Grimaldi, Arriaga and Unzaga had reiterated O’Reilly’s order that
Louisiana have thirteen companies of militia, with three at New Orleans and the other
nine to be spread throughout the province, Unzaga tried to bring them to full strength by
recruiting more Frenchmen into the militia companies. Britain was an old enemy to
France and he felt these appointments would further engender loyalty and gratitude
toward Spain.43
From March to May of 1770, while he trained the militia at New Orleans, the
governor also armed the militia along the Mississippi. He sent guns with bayonets,
cartridges (cartouches which were actually the little paper bags that held the powder),
flints and belts for ammunition. There were few arms to go around. As Judice mustered

41 Casey, Encyclopedia of Forts. 193.
42Grimaldi to Unzaga, October 24,1770, AGI, Cuba 174, Folio 46.
43Unzaga to Grimaldi, June 30,1770; Grimaldi to Arraiga, October 19,1770,
Secretaria de Guerra, Florida and Louisiana (1779-1802), AGS in Chlvez, Ultimate Gift.
61.
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his militia, Unzaga sent more arms to the Iberville district through Pierre Brasseau, this
time 30 muskets with Bayonets, “cartridges,” and belts with tin buckles. Commandant,
and Captain of the Militia, Louis Judice, notified Unzaga that he had received the
weapons and munitions and was preparing the men at the Acadian Coast (La Fourche de
Chitemachas) to fight He had named three sergeants, four first class corporals and four
second class corporals to the militia and stood poised for orders. The same was true for
most of the posts. There were no bright uniforms and bright shiny buttons to go around.
Every freeholder was expected to do his share.44
In order to receive a land grant from the Spanish government a colonist in
Louisiana had to agree to serve in the militia. Those who chose to become captains of the
militia stood to gain even more land in exchange for their position and responsibility.
The difference in land between a regular militia man and his officer was considerable. On
the land grant maps the acreage commonly given to colonists on average was
approximately 414 acres. Officers and commandants, however, commanded acreage
anywhere from 1423.27 acres (a former French commandant) to 2,269 acres (Joseph
Alexander Declout).45

“ Judice to Unzaga, March 28,1770, AGI Cuba, 188-A, Folio 1 d/2 and Unzaga to
Dutisnd, May 27,1770, AGI, Cuba 193b, Folio 287.
45Acreage differences began in the French period but were amplified by the land
grant system used under the Spanish administration, such was the case for Declouet who
gained his large acreage in a land grant by Luis de Unzaga in May of 1772. See Gertrude
Taylor Land Grants Along the Teche: Port Barre to S t Martinville (Lafavette. LA:
Attakapas Historical Association, 1979).
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Positions in the militia were requisite but also desired. The commandants took
their positions seriously and militia men who were unruly or recalcitrant were often
disciplined. Those not showing up for militia drills were considered AWOL and would
be “called upon” by their neighbors. If a colonist refused to serve he stood a good
possibility of losing his land.4*5
While the commandants organized their militia units, Unzaga, amplified the
troops at English Turn, bringing the total soldiers to 100 men (a full company). To
enhance the defense of New Orleans, he placed eighteen, six-pounder canons on carriages
by the city gates and gathered others into an artillery park.47 He also refurbished the
defenses at Ft. S t Jean on Lake Pontchartrain, with cannon and a sergeant’s guard. It was
essentially a facade, but the men might act as a warning in case of a large British foray
through the lakes.48
There is no discussion in Unzaga’s correspondence of manning the small
fortifications at Tigouyou, though it would not have been too difficult to send a sergeant
and a few soldiers to scout the area from Spanish Manchac. A glance at a map of the area
does afford a plausible explanation for this oversight. The Isle of Orleans, given to Spain

wEven as late as 1775 the commandants held their men responsible and drilled
them every week. When Simon Broussard refused to appear before Alexandre DeClouet
for drill, the governor and the Commandant gave orders to evict him from his land.
DeClouet to Unzaga, May 1,1775, AGI, Cuba 189-B, Folio 234.
47Casey, Encyclopedia of Forts. 133.
^For a description of the fort in 1770, see Pittman, European Settlements. Also
see Edna B. Freiberg, Bavou St. John in Colonial Louisiana. 1699-1803. (New Orleans:
Freiberg, 1980) for a further history of the area.
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during the Treaty of Paris in 1763, was the only Spanish territory which lay east of the
Mississippi. Located just south of the lakes it actually had formed a barrier of its own.
Only the western portion of the Isle was habitable and arable, constituting the German
and Acadian coasts. The eastern (or perhaps a better description is northern) portions
were swamps which impeded travel and therefore attack. Also, while the “Iberville” was
accessible it was not always navigable which meant a British advance up the rivers would
have to be planned and executed “in season.” It is quite possible that Unzaga determined
that the land along the Manchac-Amite Rivers, would be a form of natural protection
augmented by the re-establishment of the Fort at Spanish Manchac and therefore did not
expend soldiers or money on Tigouyou.
Little could be done with the mouth of the Mississippi. The new fort built by
O’Reilly was not a real fortification although it had men and cannon to defend the mouth
of the river. The Balize stood primarily as a sentinel checking the ingress and egress of
shipping up and down the river and providing pilot services. The buildings at Balize
suffered severe weather damage as did the cannon.
To complete his preparation at New Orleans, Unzaga decided that part of a good
defense was to use the British visiting at New Orleans to obtain information rather than
try to restrict their entry. La addition, as early as 1770 he began surveillance of the British
colonists who left F t Pitt to settle the Natchez area. To further facilitate his vigil, the
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governor gave unwitting and un-licensed British merchants permission to sail up the river
and often invited them to dine with him in New Orleans before progressing up river.49
Turning his attention back up-river to the areas near Manchac Unzaga
encountered more difficulties. The post of Pointe Couple (just across from Bayou Sara)
had a militia but little fortification other than a rough quadrangle surrounded by a
stockade.50 This was not unusual. Many of Louisiana’s posts were litde more than the
commandant’s house, his crib which was used as the local jail, and his bam, which served
to billet soldiers in time of crisis,al though the local militia lived in their own homes.
Point Coupde was just another loose pearl on a broken string along Louisiana’s British
frontier. The posts at Opelousas (Attakapas) and the German Coasts, held little in the
way of defense other than the local militia. There is no evidence that any of these smaller
areas even had more than a small palisade built during Unzaga’s tenure. All rotted
quickly into nothing by Galvez’s term in office.
Northward, at Arkansas, a detachment of the Louisiana Fixed Regiment manned
the post on the Red River. As previously described, however, Arkansas post was not well
fortified nor populated. Grimaldi’s instruction to engage the Indians in its defense was
built on faulty knowledge. The English had already established a settlement at the mouth
of the White River near Arkansas post. The Quapaws with whom Arkansas had had a
monopoly, were also trading with the British. Furthermore, in the summer of 1770,

49Commandant Juan Delavillebeauvre (Balize) to Unzaga, December 28,1770,
AGI, Cuba 188; Unzaga to Delavillebeauvre, December 31,1770, ibid.; Cummins,
Spanish Observers. 14-15.
^Casev. Encyclopedia of Forts. 162.
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Englishmen openly began to settle among the Quapaws. Demaselli&res could do little
about it with so few troops.51 It was not realistic, therefore, to depend upon the
ministrations or loyalty of the Quapaw. It was far better to plan a retreat toward
Natchitoches and eventually Spanish Texas.
At St. Louis and Ste. Genevieve the situation also was different from what
Grimaldi had thought. Piemas received Grimaldi’s orders from Unzaga in February of
1771. In April, the Lieutenant-Governor informed his superior that he would follow
Grimaldi’s orders, adding that he had little confidence, however, in the Missouri Indians.
He wrote that the Indians’ loyalties shifted to the person or persons who most recently
had given them gifts “without paying any attention to what they had received before, even
though it might have been a thousand times more.”52 In another letter he explained that
he also hesitated to retreat into a group of “miserable and irrational Indian nations” (the
Missouri and Little Osage) who to Piemas were traitors because they were favorably
“inclined toward the English for the last four to five years.” If the colonists did setde
among these tribes, he stated, they would still be at the mercy of other tribes who were
friendly with the British and were already attacking the Missouri.53
The last post Unzaga concerned himself with was Natchitoches. Fort S t Jean
Baptiste was erected by the French in 1716 on a site settled by Louis Juchereau St. Denis

5IAmold, Colonial Arkansas. 109.
52Unzaga to Pedro Piemas, February 15,1771, AGI, SD 2543; Piemas to Unzaga,
April 26,1771, AGI, Cuba 81.
53Piemas to Unzaga, June 12,1771, AGI, Cuba 81.
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two years earlier. Located first on a small island in the Red River it was relocated on the
river’s west bank, somewhere between the 1720s and 1740s. Like the Balize fort, San
Carlos El Real, the original fort experienced the same problem of its stockade literally
sinking into the mud.54
In the Spring of 1770 the garrison at Natchitoches held a captain, two lieutenants
and fifty soldiers under the command of Lieutenant-Governor Athanase de M6zi£res.
Mounted on a small hill, the fort was basically a square palisade and a shallow moat
which enclosed a number of cannons, the commandant’s house at one end, a powder
magazine, guard house and soldier’s barracks.55 Natchitoches, as Ft. St. Jean Baptiste
was commonly known, served mostly to deflect Indian attacks because of its western
location. Still it was to Natchitoches that Unzaga and his men might have to go in case of
an attack from the east
In the summer of 1771, Unzaga had prepared the colony for the coming onslaught
and modified Grimaldi’s instructions in light of local conditions. He informed Arriaga
that the roads from New Orleans to the Attakapas Post and Opelousas areas were clear
and readied for troop movements or a forced retreat.56

4

In September of 1771 fifteen families from the Carolinas came down the
Mississippi from the Missouri Area to settle at Natchez and Baton Rouge. Upon
questioning the captain of the boat, the Spanish were informed that another fifty families

^Casev. Encyclopedia of Forts. 194-195.
55Pittman, European Settlements. 32; Casey, Encyclopedia of Forts. 196.
^Arriaga to Unzaga, June 20,1771, AGL Cuba 174, Folio 60.
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were to follow. Unzaga knew that more English settlers boded ill for Louisiana. More
settlement meant more more English shipping on the river and more contraband.
Minister of the Indies Arriaga warned that Spain, and therefore Louisiana’s Governor,
could do little but watch and wait57 Unzaga personally disagreed. The new settlements
posed a direct threat to Louisiana and exacerbated the Indian difficulties along the
Mississippi. Contraband would heighten and British tribes would plague the river.
The governor continued his surveillance as ordered. He gleaned information from
incoming settlers and merchants alike. Sometimes the information was important and
sometimes the information was faulty. Such was the case in 1772 when the British
attempted to enforce the Quartering Act in New England. A French spy named Surriret
had observed General Gage’s consolidation of the British forces, and their reassignment
to New York.58 By the time Unzaga received the news it had been inflated to a British
attack on New York.59 Despite the falsity of the information Spain continued to read all
reports sent from its governors about the English with the inference being that it was the
Spanish government, not its colonial administrators, who would make the final decision
on what was important or unimportant Surriret did however, provide detailed plans of
the British fort on Santa Rosa Island and calmed Spanish fears that the reinforcements at

^Bucareli to Arriaga, September 30,1771, AGI, SD 1211, Folio 49 and Arriaga to
Unzaga, March 21,1772, Ibid, sin numero.
^ ‘Noticias adquiridos de los vecinos colonias ingleeses por Mr. Suriret vecino de
Punta Cordtado...,” October 2,1772, AGL Cuba 1146.
59Unzaga to Arriaga, Three Letters in October 2, 14, and 24, 1772, AGL SD 1211.
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Pensacola were directed at Spain. Gage was trying to shore up his defenses of British sea
lanes around Jamaica.60
In 1772, Lieutenant-governor Pedro Piemas wrote from St. Louis that the English
were busily reinforcing Ft. Chartres. His suspicions were correct and Louisiana had to
fend off a small attack by Jean Marie Ducharme (on behalf of the English) in 1772. The
St. Louis militia, under Pierre Laclede, defended its post and ran Ducharmd off, capturing
his supplies and equipment and a number of his men. Unzaga’s and O’Reilly’s faith in a
militia of men defending their homes appeared to be well founded.61 By 1773
surveillance by Captain-General de la Torre in the Caribbean and Unzaga in North
America indicated that a direct English threat no longer existed. Spain’s ministers
concurred.62 The decision Grimaldi and Unzaga feared never had to be made. The
Malvinas crisis passed and England and Spain once again entered an uneasy truce.
Despite peace, Unzaga continued his efforts to spy on the British and to man the colony’s
forts against any possible attack
During the three years of the Malvinas crisis, as well as in the years of peace that
followed, Unzaga was also required to deal with the day-to-day military matters,
including arguments between and with the post commandants regarding their men and
their territory, and the continued arming and drilling of the militia. This was exacerbated

“ Cummins, British Observers. 23.
6lFor a complete account of the Ducharme invasion see Abraham Pedro Nasatir,
“Ducharmd’s invastion of Missouri,” Missouri Historical Review. 24,1 (October, 1929):
3-25,2 (January, 1930): 238-60; and 3 (April, 1930): 420-39.
“ Torre to Unzaga, January 25,1773, AGL Cuba 1146.
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by increasing desertions and debilitating illness in the ranks. Last but not least were
monthly promotions and re-assignments. Examples of each follow.
In May of 1770, Louis Judice on the Acadian Coast and Nicolas Verret at S t
James began to argue over the boundary between their militia districts. Before O’Reilly
refigured the parishes, St. James and the Acadian Coast (La Fourche) had been one large
piece. Without firm boundary marks it was easy for the men to usurp each other’s
territory. The controversy continued into June when Unzaga finally told both
commandants that he would not rule on the dispute until both of them reported to him at
New Orleans. He was busy with far more pressing affairs. It was not until October that
Unzaga finally settled a definitive boundary between the militia districts for St. James and
the Acadian Coast63
Constant illness among the soldiers continued from O’Reilly’s time into
Unzaga’s tenure. Ships commonly left Louisiana with sick men to be returned to Havana,
and from there to Spain. Some of Louisiana’s troops fell sick on the way to the fixed
battalion, convalescing in Havana before proceeding to their final destination. This was
the rotation problem inherent in much of Latin America.64

“ Judice to Unzaga, May 3,1770, AGI, Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/7; Nicolas Verret to
Luis de Unzaga, May 21,170, ibid, Foliol d/40; Unzaga to Verret, June 2, 1770, ibid; and
declaration of Unzaga, October 10,1770, ibid, Folio 1 d/29.
wSee the notices from Antonio Jos6 de Aguiar regarding the sick prisoners in
Havana waiting to be shipped to Louisiana. Aguiar to Josd Fajordo y Cobarruvias, April
6,1772, AGI, Cuba 585, Folio 292. Louisiana paid for her sick soldiers, whether they
were in Havana or New Orleans! See ibid., Folios 293,294 and 295.
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The worst problem affecting troops’ stability-both regular and militia men-was
desertion. Desertion was already common when Unzaga took office. It became a more
serious offence with a possible British attack in the offing. In September of 1770,
Commandant and Militia Captain Louis Judice reported to the governor that a man
without a passport had turned up at the post. Charles Bernard Lancelot, turned out to be a
deserter. Judice arrested Lancelot and then sent him with three men (corporal Charles
Babin, and two fusiliers (men who had muskets named Joseph Landrie and Joseph Babin)
to take the malapert back to New Orleans.65 Lancelot died on the way to New Orleans
and Judice ordered the militia Sergeant to pay the three soldiers for their time and trouble.
Judice then apparently billed the governor for the cost of the escort In a curt letter,
accusing his commandant of naivete and possible incompetence, Unzaga informed Judice
that he must set an example and not allow this kind of laxity to create vagabonds and
deserters and refused to refund Judice for his own negligence.
The government frowned heavily on desertion but it was such a prominent feature
that it became a fact of life for Louisiana’s governors. Hardship posts like Manchac and
Arkansas frequently reported deserters. Soldiers already disgruntled with being stationed
in Louisiana found appointments to the outlying posts particularly distasteful. Manchac
was a particularly easy place from which to “disappear.” It took very little for a soldier to
“jump pirogue” as they called it and cross the river to the English where they could

"Judice to Unzaga, September 2,1770, AGL Cuba 188-A, Folio 1 d/23.
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readily go to work for local planters, moving up and down river to escape Spanish
patrols.66
Soldiers fleeing from New Spain sometimes made their way across into
Natchitoches and then up to the Arkansas post Unzaga warned the commandant there to
return such men at once. Other men deserted and disappeared into the abundant
wilderness west and north. These men frequently became the half-wild hunters that
haunted the Arkansas post.67
Deserters who roamed the countryside around the Mississippi could be spotted
more easily because moving from place to place within the colony required a passport
from the governor. This was not new. The Superior Council had decreed in 1723 that
passports were required for intra-colonial travel, even from post to post. Under Spanish
governance travelers also were required to have passports and if they journeyed by boat
were required to be licensed for such vehicles. It was quite easy, therefore, to distinguish
legal travelers on business from ne’er-do-wells roaming the countryside-if you were

66Thomas de Acoste, the new commandant at Manchac advised Unzaga in March
of 1775 that a new recruit, Bernardo NiPie(last name distorted) had arrived at the fort
only to “jump pirogue” to the English side. Weeks later they were still chasing the culprit
and the records do not indicate that they ever caught him and he remained working for the
English somewhere near Pointe Coupde. In the end Acoste was forced to return the pay of
12 pesos allotted for NiPie to the governor and asked for a replacement for the deserter.
Thomas de Acoste to Unzaga, March 4,1775, AGI, Cuba 81, Folio 94; and Acoste to
Unzaga, March 18, 1775, ibid., Folio 95 and 96.

61See Arnold, Colonial A rkansas, for descriptions of the kinds of men who
became hunters.
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diligent in your duty. Passports and licenses also enabled the governor to keep track of
Louisiana’s citizens and their movements in an impossibly huge colony.68
Requiring and monitoring passports was good, in theory, and Unzaga enforced it
vigorously. The reality of the immensity of the colony, however, meant that people could
blend into the background and as long as they hired out as menial labor they could
“escape” for years at a time. It took several months to track down most deserters. Most
were found in the next post or in a small settlement nearby. Still others who trekked into
the wilderness found death instead of solace. Lastly there were those who actual escaped
and were never brought to trial. In August of 1770, during the Malvinas crisis, four
artillery men and one infantry man deserted in a pirogue and were never captured. Again
in January of 1771, Francisco Moreno, Sergeant of the Louisiana Regiment, deserted and
was never captured.69
Of the sixty-two military hearings covered by Derek N. Kerr, in “Petty Felony,
Slave Defiance and a Frontier Villany: Crime and Criminal Justice in Spanish Louisiana,
1770-1803,” the offence of desertion was second only to “unknown” during Unzaga's
tenure, amounting to only fifteen actual court cases. Desertion carried a number of
sentences. Kerr indicates that deserters could expect anything from remittance (return to

“ See the Decree of the Louisiana Superior Council, November 13,1723, AC, A
23:43-43vo; and Perier and La Chaise to the Company of the Indies, March 25,1729, AC,
C 13a, 11:322; See a list of passports and licenses issued to colonists in 1771, AGL Cuba
110, Folio 757.
“ “Dispatches,” Court Report 8/31/1770, Vol. m, 4; Ibid, Report 1/15/1771, Vol.
ffl, 21.
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duty) to deportation and imprisonment at Morro Castle in Havana.70 Examples are Juan
Gallardo and Francisco Ochaita of the Louisiana Regiment who deserted from
Natchitoches in 1769 and were not caught until 1772. When they were tried in New
Orleans and remitted to their original post.71 Another interesting incident surrounds Jean
Roubier who deserted in April of 1773 and then again in June of 1775. Upon leaving the
second time he hid aboard an English ship leaving the colony but was found at Bayou
Saint John. Surprisingly, Roublier was remanded to Puerto Rico to become part of the
fixed regiment there.72
In the first year of his tenure Unzaga frequently returned deserters to Havana as
many had come from that post Many of those desertions were sailors like Miguel Lopez
whom Unzaga remanded to the Captain-General of Havana for arraignment and
sentencing.73 Records indicate that in Cuba, deserters were treated to several different
sentences such as imprisonment or the Royal Works (hard labor) rebuilding Havana’s
fortifications and public works. Of interest is the difference in sentencing between
deserters from New Orleans and those from outlying posts. All of the deserters from

70Derek N. Kerr’s coverage of military trials during Unzaga’s period, in “Petty
Felony,” was based on the Dispatches of the Spanish Governors of Louisiana.Volumes 26.

7I“Dispatches,” 4:44.
^Ibid, 5:2 and 51.; the Dispatches lists his final desertion as 1776 but there is a
letter from the Marquds de Torre to Arriaga which indicates that Juan Rubier was already
in custody in 1775 and that Torre had been chastised for allowing the second desertion.
Torre to Arriaga, November 3,1775, AGL Cuba 1221, Folio 982.
73Kerr, ‘Tetty Felony,” 382 and Unzaga to Bucareli, May 27, 1770, AGL Cuba
1055, Folio 108.
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places like Natchitoches were remitted, perhaps a fitting sentence in itself. Others from
the regiment or navy at New Orleans were more severely punished. The worst
punishment seems to have been eight years in the Fixed Regiment of Puerto Rico for
desertion of post and taking refugee in a church.74 Unzaga rewarded those persons who
sheltered a deserter with six years of service in the royal dockyard at Havana.75
Monetary punishments awaited the regiments and officers who allowed the
desertion to happen. Pay for deserters had to be returned and regiments could be backbilled for such costs. An example is a document from Miguel Almonares in 1773, which
deducted the pay of nine soldiers who deserted backward to the date of their desertion in
1770.76 While this may seem harsh considering the lack of money actually sent to support
the regiment many commandants apparently reported deserters as sick in order to
continue collecting their pay.77
A glance at the communications between the governors of Havana and Louisiana
indicate that there was a continual turnover of deserters shipped from Havana to
Louisiana, as punishment. Then many of those men were shipped to Puerto Rico, again
as punishment An assignment to the Caribbean was not the best place to be. However,
an appointment to Louisiana was close to the worst, apparently followed by Puerto Rico.

74This case was against Teodoro Medina, Juan A. Pombo, and Juan GonzSlez of
the Louisiana Regiment, in Kerr, “Petty Felony,” 387, found in Dispatches, 6: 52.
75Ibid, 6:46.
76“Lista y Carta sobre battalion de Luisiana,” Miguel Almonares, May 8,1773 and
18 May, 1773, AGL Cuba 1221, Folios 448,449.
^Ibid.
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A letter from Captain-General de la Torre to Arriaga in 1774 gives some insight
into the real cause of desertions from Havana and Louisiana. Torre informed the Minister
of the Indies that he had received three hundred and forty-three military deserters shipped
from La Coruna, Spain, “to serve in the fixed regiment of this Island (Cuba), and the

Province of Louisiana” Two of them had already deserted a second time in Puerto Rico
and another fifty-eight were in the hospital at the same place. These Spanish deserters
were being punished by assignment to the Dragoons, Artillery and the Fixed Battalion of
Louisiana! Torre further argued that he needed more men, deserters or not, to support the
fixed regiment of Havana.78
In 1775 the receipt of deserters continued. Treasurer Martin Navarro wrote in May
to Cuba that the Louisiana Battalion had received its recruits from La Coruna. After
settling the troops in he wrote that they were missing a deserter from the regiment of
Toledo, one Andres Negro, who, after resting in Puerto Rico, finally arrived in August.
Another, unexpected deserter named Diego Fernandes turned up without papers in June
of 1775 demanding pay and a position in the Fixed Regiment Navarro was informed that
he was one of 24 deserters destined for the New Orleans Regiment but had to recuperate
briefly in Havana before joining his companions in their new location.79

^ o r r e to Arriaga, July 6,1774, AGI, Cuba 1219, Folio 681.
^Martin Navarro to Josd Fajardo y Coborruvias, May 15,1775, AGI, Cuba 585,
Folio 333; Fajardo to Navarro, June 8, 1775, ibid, Folio 334 and Navarro to Fajardo,
August 5,1775, ibid, Folio 335. A rich source of information on the receipt of deserters
and their consequences can be found in AGI, Cuba 1054.
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Desertion and the constant exchange of men became such a time consuming and
confusing task that the Governor General of Havana finally promulgated a document in
1776 which covered all such men and gave explicit instructions for handling and
punishing deserters. It also listed penalties for those who induced them to desert or
harbored them. For knowing the whereabouts of a deserter and not denouncing him a
commoner served four years in the deserter’s own regiment or the same amount of time in
the work projects of the King. Noblemen were to be sent to a presidio in the Americas.
Persons aiding a deserter were sentenced to six years of service in the arsenals or public
works and if noble, six years in the Americas. If a woman, she was to be fined 30 pesos
and if too poor would be sent to jail. The same penalties applied to those who induced
soldiers or sailors to desert80
Monetary rewards awaited colonists and military personnel who helped the crown
retrieve the scoundrels. Those who captured and turned deserters to their proper
regiments were to be awarded twelve pesos, and six pesos went to those who established
their whereabouts. A per diem expense of twelve pesos was also available for the
maintenance and transportation of such prisoners (something Unzaga had steadfastly

refused to do in Louisiana). Militia men capturing deserters were awarded two more
years on their pension after twenty years of service plus sixteen pesos in hand. The latter
was probably more of an incentive. Interestingly, the regiment of the deserter was to be
billed for all expenses incurred to apprehend him. The list goes on to punish judges with

“ Orders of the Marquis de la Torre, Captain General of the Island of Cuba, “Sobre
Desertores del Exercito y de la Armada,” July 6,1776, AGI, Cuba 1221, Cartas y Bando
1134.
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the loss of their jobs and threatens captains of ships with six years in jail and trial in a
military court for aiding and abetting.81
A different and even more important kind of desertion haunted Unzaga between
1772 and 1773. Louisiana’s defenses rested heavily on its militia and therefore the
governor needed to keep colonists in their respective areas of settlement in order to
distribute the responsibility. In 1772 the Acadians in St. James Parish began seeking
permission to leave the colony or to change their place of residence to move near family.
They were unhappy with their land grants, with the requirements of military service in
order to have land, and most of all with new taxes and requests to build a church in the
area. The Acadians petitioned the governor through their commandant for permission to
move some families near relatives in the LaFourche district and for others to leave the
colony for Saint Domingue.82
While the bureaucracy digested the information, the families negotiated with a
captain for passage out of Louisiana. Unzaga did not wish for them to leave because they
presented a sizeable force against the English across the river. He threatened them with
having to return the money invested in them by the Spanish Crown. In response, the
Acadians claimed that they feared the local Indian tribes and that they had been given
worthless lands. He still refused them passage.83 Undeterred, the Acadians had a few
tricks in store for the governor. They immediately abandoned their lands in St James

81Ibid.
“ Judice to Unzaga, September 1,1772, AGL Cuba 189-A Folio 435.
wJudice to Unzaga, September 20 1772, AGI, Cuba 189A Folio 436.
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rather than contribute to the church, moving illegally into Dusting’s district at LaFourche.
From La Fourche, the Acadians requested Dusting’s permission to join their families in
the Opelousas district. Unzaga restrained the urge to summarily arrest them. Instead he
denied them permission to migrate. Dustisng wrote that he had finally convinced them to
stay in the Iberville district84 The dispute continued to spread. The Acadians at
Opelousas now argued about paying the cost of building a church. When that didn’t work
they argued that the destruction of the hurricane of 1773 had devastated their land, life
was too hard and they wanted permission to relocate to Cap Frangais, Saint Domingue-or
the Attakapas district, which ever the governor would allow. Permission for either was
denied. The Acadians finally gave up their hopes to migrate to Saint Domingue and
seemed to settle down, disgustedly, on their appointed land grants.85
These stubborn settlers were not done with the governor yet Some of them sold
their property without authorization and moved to Attakapas without a passport Judice
urged the governor to punish one such colonist a Pierre Guidry. Unzaga complied but
realized he was righting a losing battle. Rather than keep the countryside in an uproar
and continue a useless struggle, he began slowly to grant a limited amount of immigration

“ Judice to Unzaga, March 2,1773, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 472; Dutisn6 to
Unzaga, March 2,1773, AGL Cuba 189-A, Folio 358, Unzaga to Dutisnd, March 4,1773,
AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 359; and AGL Cuba 193-B, Folios 250 and 252.
“ Unzaga to Dutisnd, March 1,1773, AGL Cuba 193-B, Folio 252; Unzaga to
Dutisnd, April 1,1773, AGL Cuba 193-B, Folio 248.
294

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

from one district to the next This prevented mass desertion and actually balanced out in
the long run.86
Louisiana’s soldiers continually presented Unzaga with daily problems. Charges
against soldiers and sailors, other than desertion, consisted of vicious behavior, theft,
perjury, robbery, smuggling, leaving their posts, sheltering deserters, and, amusingly,
being a “bad influence” on the Louisiana Regiment because of their past criminal records.
Salvador Alvarez, Tom£s Camparolas, Juan Martmez, and Manuel Gatica, the soldiers
charged with this last misdeed, could not have been too bad an influence as they were
returned to service.87
The regular army also required day-to-day supervision of a different sort Many
regimental men maintained a respectable life in the military and in time deserved pay
raises and promotions. Several of the original officers brought with Ulloa, Lieutenant
Pedro Piemas and Sub-lieutenants Jos6 Orieta, remained in the colony and received
promotions under O’Reilly to captain and lieutenant. Others who came with the Captain
General in 1769 received promotions such as the newly appointed Captains Fernando de
Leyba and Francisco Cruzat, and Brevet Captain Francisco Bouligny, who became a
major figure in Louisiana’s history. Many sergeants were married and did not womanize
or drink terribly and many enlisted men followed their lead.88

“ Judice to Unzaga, February 7,1774, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 531; Unzaga to
Dutisnd, February 18,1774, AGI, Cuba 189-A, Folio 390.
‘"Kerr, 385-388.
“ Din, “Protecting the ‘Barrera’,” 191-92. In 1776 Orieta died while acting
commandant of Arkansas Post, Unzaga to Sergeant Lucas Garcia, New Orleans, July 4,
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These men were willing joined by French army officers such as Francois
Demasillidres, Francois Coulon de Villiers, and Jean de la Villebeauvre (seen as
Delavillebeauvre in Spanish documents) who helped form the newly created Louisiana
battalion. In some ways Frenchmen were less likely to cause trouble because they
frequently had families and others were at least “connected” by family to the colony.
This family connection offered a support system outside the barracks and the corps.
These Frenchmen helped the Spanish maintain control through their knowledge of the
colony and their understanding of its inhabitants.89
Soldiers in Spanish Louisiana expected pay raises and promotions for consecutive
and distinguished service. Rising in the ranks depended on a number of things including
seniority, ability, education, social standing and service. Seniority was extremely
important among the officers. Many petitioned the Crown for promotions with the help
of the local lieutenant governor, governor or captain-general when they (the soldiers)

1776, AGI, Cuba, 189-B; also see John Franics McDermott, “The Myth of the ‘Imbecile
Governor’: Captian Fernando de Leyba and the Defense of St. Louis in 1780,” in The
Spanish in the Mississippi Valiev. 1762-1804. ed. John Francis McDermott (Urbana,
1974), 314-91; and Din and Nasatir, Imperial Qsages. 96-116, and 131-82 for Cruzats
services as lieutenant governor in the 1770s and 1780s; see Gilbert C. Din, Francisco
Boulirav: A Bourbon Soldier in Spanish Louisiana (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State
University Press, 1993).
^Gilbert C. Din, ‘“For Defense of Country and the Glory of Arms:’ Army
Officers in Spanish Louisiana, 1766-1803,” Unpublished article, March, 2000.
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thought it was time for advancement90 Later in the Spanish period some men were even
able to purchase their offices to ensure promotion.91
Because of the small size of Louisiana’s army (during Unzaga’s time it was only
one battalion) promotion depended on more than seniority. Command was measured by
more than the ability to endure and stay out of trouble. For officers to be promoted they
must educate themselves and, according to some historians, they had to speak Spanish.
While this last requirement may have been true during Galvez’s time and after, it was not
heavily enforced during Unzaga’s tenure.92 The period from 1770 to 1776 contains a
large number of instances where the governor communicated with his men in French
and several of them were promoted despite the language barrier.93 Men who became
commandants (and therefore officers in the militia) during Unzaga’s era found in some
instances that being able to speak only Spanish was a handicap, especially when dealing
with the Indians.94 Also, during Unzaga’s governorship, many French army officers who

^See Din, Francisco Boulignv. 121-27, 172-73 and Janet Fireman, The Spanish
Corps of Engineers in the Western Borderlands: Instrument of Bourbon Reform. 17641815 (Glendale, CA: A. H. Clark Company, 1977), 45, regarding replacement of ability
for seniority.
91See O’Reilly to Jos6 de Gflvez, May 7,1779, AGI, SD 2662 regarding prices for
such offices.
92Din made this point about language twice, once in his paper with Janet Fireman
on the Corps of Engineers and again in his work on the Cabildo.
93The great majority of Unzaga’s letters to Commandants Judice, Dutisn6, Verret,
Fusilier de la Claire, and Logny are in French.
94The Indians at Arkansas Post announced to the governor that they thought very
little of the Commandant who could not speak French “the language of trade.” See
Chapter Six.
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opted for service under O’Reilly, realistically, took awhile to gain significant command of
the language. That would have more easily been done by young cadets who entered the
service at 16 years of age, or sometimes earlier.
A post at the plana mayor or headquarters, however, was different In order to

saber despachar, (process paperwork) in a Spanish army knowledge the language was, of
course, a must. Headquarters personnel in 1776 included a Teniente Coronel (Lieutenant
Colonel), under whom served in descending order, an ayudante mayor (adjutant major),
two subtenientes Banderas (Flag Sub-lieutenants), a Capuchin Father Francisco de
Caldas, a Cirujano (Surgeon), a Tamborilero (drummer), two Ptfanos (fifers) and an

Armero (gunsmith). The officers included, notably, only one Frenchman, Flag
Sublieutenant Raimundo Dubr^vil.95
Promotion also depended upon social status. Status in turn depended on your
family, your comportment and your marriage. If a soldier wished to become an officer he
must not only be educated, but also maintain an unblemished record of service to the
crown, and associate with the right people. Unblemished was a relative term in frontier
post assignments where small acts of misconduct were often overlooked or deliberately
kept off the record if the men were otherwise good soldiers. The fact that so many
military court cases carry the term “unknow n” under the charge bespeaks the need to
guard the future of such men.

95“Carta y listas de Batalion de Unzaga,” April 27, 1776, AGL SD 2661, Folios
118-124.
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Marriages, on the other hand, were extremely important and the proper wife was
crucial. Unzaga (having married a local girl himself) encouraged marriage among his
troops and personally oversaw the marriages of his officers. He investigated the
background of any young woman marrying an officer, including her birth, her family
connections, and her "limpieza de sangre” or purity of blood. A good example is the
case of Jacinto Panis, Captain of the Infantry and First Ayudante Mayor in New Orleans.
He applied to Unzaga to marry Margarita Wiltz in February of 1776. The girl’s father
was deceased but Unzaga had both the girl and the mother investigated. He assured
himself, through character witnesses and baptismal records, that the conduct of both
women was good, that they had “limpieza de s a n g r e and that they were of the “proper
station” (property owners with slaves) to advance his officer’s career. After several
months of questioning witnesses he finally forwarded Panis’ request for permission to
marry to O’Reilly96 Jacinto Panis’ case was common and other requests for marriage by
Louisiana’s officers were handled similarly. The governor wanted his officers to advance
and realized that they might be transferred elsewhere where their marriage would be
closely scrutinized.97

^Jacinto Panis to Unzaga, Februay 15,1776, AGL SD 2547, Folio 4; attendant
documents dated February 16, 1776 include, a statement by Unzaga on the conduct and
bloodline of the two women, a certificate of ownership of property and slaves and another
certifying the bride-to-be’s birth records by the local priest The final attachment, dated
April 12,1776 contains the answers of witnesses to Margarita’s character.
^The same legajo holds several applications for marriage by Unzaga’s officers,
induing that of the Lieutenant of the 6* company, Manuel Perez who wished to wed a
young French woman named Juana Catalina Dubois, Perez to Unzaga, March 5,1776,
AGL SD 2547, Folio 153. Juana went through the same examination suffered by
Margarita. The testimony of her character fills twenty folios (Nos. 30-50) in the legajo.
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Unzaga stayed busy during his tenure promoting many such men. One of his
happiest requests for promotion was that of Captain Pedro Piemas to Lieutenant Colonel.
In March of 1776, he forwarded Piemas’ documents and service record to O’Reilly, with
his recommendation.98 Apparently the governor considered O’Reilly and Arriaga his
superiors where military matters were concerned and totally bypassed the CaptainGeneral in Havana on such matters. All of the military promotions and pay raises in
Louisiana under Unzaga were signed by these two men.
This infraction of the chain of command clearly infuriated the Captain-General in
Havana. In June of 1774 he wrote a terse letter to Arriaga blasting Unzaga’s improper
behavior and reminding the Minister of the Indies that as Captain-General in Cuba, he (de
la Torre), held the right not only to approve criminal processes in Louisiana but also
“promotions, graduations, merits and other graces for soldiers.” Torre maintained that
such promotions were the right of the position of Captain-General yet the only dispatch
for such promotions which had “passed through his hands” was that which raised Unzaga
to Brigadier. He also whined to Arriaga that he didn’t see where it was an inconvenience
for such orders or promotions to be sent from Spain through him to Louisiana.99 Unzaga
answered this complaint by sending a copy of all his requests for promotion to the
Captain-General while he continued to send the requests directly to O’Reilly the man he
obviously considered his superior, even after he assumed the governor’s seat.

"Unzaga to O’Reilly, March 5, 1776, AGL SD 2547, Folio 152 with attachments.
"Torre to Arriaga, June 10,1774, AGI, Cuba 1219, Folio 676.
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Like his officers, Unzaga also wished promotion and recognition. One of the
greatest recognitions an officer could get was admission into one of the “orders” or
brotherhoods in Spain. In August of 1776 he wrote Minister of the Indies, Jos6 de
Galvez, requesting to be received into the Order of Carlos m. He complained that as
head of government in such a large territory it was difficult for him to deal with various
officials, especially those who had received the French Cross of S t Luis, and still remain
distinguished and powerful among such gentlemen. Apparently the request was still
pending when he left Louisiana.100
The other constant in Unzaga’s military duties was the promotion of regular
soldiers according to the Royal decree of 1766. Each year brought a list of soldiers whose
good behavior and time in service demanded reward. Rewards were small, but under
Unzaga, consistant Regular soldiers could expect a pay raise of 6 reales after fifteen
years of service, and 9 reales after 20 years of service. Handicapped or ill soldiers could
count on their pay and the governor took care to see that widows received their proper
pensions.101
Careful attention to detail, constant reward, and fair treatment also helped Unzaga
create strong, vigorous militia units in Louisiana. By the end of his time in office local
commandants could chose to be picky about the men they commanded, often writing the

10OUnzaga to Jos6 de Galvez, August 13,1776, AGI, SD 2547, Folio 170.
101See Unzaga’s requests, O’Reilly’s confirmations and Arraiga’s certificates
coinciding with Unzaga’s tenure in AGI, SD 2661. The special requests for the
handicapped soldier and widows can be found in the same legajo, Folios 428-448.
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governor to send them less insubordinate or more competent men.102 The body of men
entering the militia grew to the point that on the first of June, 1775, Unzaga was able to
create a new unit, the Battalion of New Orleans Militia, with its own red, white and blue
uniforms.103
Despite his achievements, the governor was not satisfied with his work in
Louisiana’s defense. In a report of April 4, 1776, he forwarded the service rostsers of the
Louisiana Battalion. An attachment noted that there were “only two professional grade
officers in the entire province.” He also added that while “the militia company soldiers
can fire their muskets, they have no military instructions; the only exception being those
five companies stationed in the capital and the two companies of Germans.” Again he
complained that there were not enough sabers for the Grenadiers and corporals, the
fortifications were rotting, there were not enough cannon balls, and much of the shot they
had didn’t fit the cannons.104
There were real reasons for Unzaga’s constant concern with Louisiana. While a
general truce had been in place during 1773 activities on the Atlantic picked up in 1774.
Great Britain’s problems with the colonies increased and the Spanish crown re-intensified
its efforts to monitor British activity in North America and the Caribbean. Spain’s

l02See communications of Commandant, Thomas de Acosta to Unzaga, March 23,
1775, AGI, Cuba 81, Folio 98.
103Holmes, Honor and Fidelity. 20-21 and Statement of the military, undated, in
AGL Cuba, 184-A.
104The lists and notes of April 4th are contained in “Carta y listas de Batalion de
Unzaga,” April 27, 1776, AGI, SD 2661, Folios 118-124.
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ministers reported that members of the English court supported and encouraged open war
with the Bourbons to help “cool” the revolution brewing in their Atlantic colonies.105
During 1774 and 1775 the bellicosity of English ships in Atlantic shipping lanes
quickened and Spanish tempers flared. Spain “investigated” every British ship caught off
the Iberian peninsula and even imagined insults led to fist fights.106
England’s bellicose behavior at sea, rumors of attack, and requests for assistance
from the Americans in North America caused a rift at the Spanish court. Grimaldi
favored covert aid to the Americans and public neutrality. He reminded the King that if
the revolution went badly, British forces in America could easily be turned against Spain.
On the other hand, the Conde de Aranda in Paris, and the French Foreign minister,
Charles Gravier, the Comte de Vergennes, openly supported a combined French and
Spanish attack on Great Britain while it was distracted by colonial discord.107
Spain’s court hesitated. The King wisely assessed that France had far less to lose
in open confrontation since she had already lost the majority of her American colonies in
1763. Accordingly, Spain acted to reinforce her defenses in the Caribbean, sending
additional troops to both Cuba and Puerto Rico in the latter part of 1775.108 Both France

I05Cummins, Spanish Observers. 27.
106See numerous instances of British-Spanish confrontation in Spain’s waters in
AGS, Estado 6988.
107The most comprehensive account of the diplomatic exchange between the
French and Spanish can be found in Juan Fernando Yela Utrilla, Espana ante la
inrfependencia de los Estados Unidos (2d ed; 2 vols.; Lerida, 1925).
10SIbid, 50.
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and Spain secretly accelerated their intelligence gathering in the colonies. The new
Minister of the Indies, Josd de Gilvez, authorized the Captain-General in Cuba to use
Havana as a base of operations to funnel aid to the Americans, and send word to Unzaga
of his actions.109
In the Americas, Spain’s colonial governors acted surreptitiously to aid the
rebellious colonists. Unzaga believed that aiding the colonists would help undermine the
British threat to Louisiana. He became aware of the needs of the Americans through their
merchant and ally Oliver Pollock.110 Requests for aid became more open with the events
at Lexington and Concord. Commander Charles Lee of the Continental Army openly
corresponded with Unzaga through Captain George Gibson, requesting aid from the
Spanish and offering to “include” the Spanish in the “re-capture” of English settlements
from Manchac to the Ohio and the Floridas Gong a dream of the Spanish Crown).111

I09Minister of the Indies, Julian Arriaga, died after a long and debilitating illness
in 1775 and was replaced with Josd de Gdlvez in the late Spring but because of some
confusion at the Spanish court he began active duty in December of 1775. Unzaga
congratulated Gdlvez on his appointment in June of 1775, Unzaga to Gilvez, 19 June,
1775, AGI, SD 2547, Folio 163.
u0PoUack’s life and aid to the American’s has been the subject of numerous
articles and books including James Alton James, Oliver Pollock: The Life and Times o f
an Unknown Patriot (New York: Appleton Century, 1937); same author, “Oliver Pollock,
Financier of the Revolution in the West,” MVHR. 15 (1929); and Light Townshend
Cummins, "Oliver Pollack's Plantations: An Early Anglo Landowner on the Lower
Mississippi, 1769-1824," LH 29 (1988): 35-48.
ulLee to Unzaga, May 22, 1776 (two letters) AGI, SD 2596.
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Unzaga favored such support He wrote to Josd de Gflvez that the recapture of
Pensacola would also re-secure Spain’s sea lanes in the Caribbean. Torre agreed.112
While Unzaga wrote for “permission” he actively began to secure supplies for the rebels.
Assisting the governor was the wily Oliver Pollock who successfully slipped Captain
George Gibson of the Continental Army and fifteen men down the Ohio and the
Mississippi to New Orleans to purchase gunpowder from the Spanish.113 Unzaga, in a
now famous exchange, covertly sold the rebels nine-thousand pounds of gunpowder from
the royal storehouses. Publically, Unzaga “arrested” Gibson and returned him and the
gunpowder to Philadelphia. The governor’s use of obedezco pero no cumplo eventually
allowed the Americans to successfully defend both Wheeling and Fort Pitt against the
British."4
Louisiana’s governor also used Philadelphia as a base of operations to spy on the
British, hi 1776 he sent several merchant-spies including his old friend Bartolomd
Beauregard, under the pretense of purchasing flour. us Once again he acted in Spain’s
best interests and excused himself later. After sending the spies he wrote the Minister of
the Indies that he apologized for breaking royal orders against buying from foreigners, but

l,2Unzaga to Josd de Gdlvez, September 30,1776, ibid; Torre to Jos6 de Gdlvez,
October 9,1776, AGI, SD 1224.
u3Chlvez, The Ultimate Gift. 64-65; James Alton James, “Oliver Pollock,
Financier,” 70-71.
II4Ibid.
lI5Unzagato Josd de Gdlvez, 7 September, 1776, AGL SD 2547, Folio 180.
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that he had done so under “extreme need,” and would not do so again, being content to
supply himself in the future from Veracruz and Havana.116
Spain finally formed an allied front with France and moved forward to aid the
Americans against their mutual enemy as 1776 drew to a close. Aid now came from
Havana and Louisiana, despite protests from de la Torre that such action would strip
Havana of the gunpowder and muskets necessary to defend his capital.117 A new network
of spies issued from Havana to English ports in the Caribbean. Under Galvez’s
recommendations de la Torre utilized a network of merchant-spies similar to that of the
governor in Louisiana. Like Unzaga, Havana’s commander also extended his spies to
Philadelphia to watch the emerging war. De la Torre additionally utilized more and more
information from Louisiana where Unzaga’s commandants furnished him with troop and
naval movements and the migration of English settlers in the Mississippi Valley.118
As the revolution between Britain and its North American colonies enlarged,
command in both Louisiana and Havana changed. Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga had already
requested his retirement in June of 1776. hi a long letter to Minister Gdlvez, the governor
reminded the crown of his previous service record, his loyalty against the English in
Havana, and gratefully thanked them for his governorship. He was, however, tired after

116Unzaga to Josd de Gdlvez, 7 September, 1776, AGL SD 2547, Folio 175.
117Jos6 de Gflvez to Unzaga, 28 February, 1776, Royal Order, No. 199, AGL
Cuba 174-B and Josd de GSlvez to Torre, 28 February, 1776, Royal Order, No. 483, Ibid.;
118See Cummins, Spanish Observers, for a complete description of these spies and
their locations, especially pages 35- 45. It is ironic that just as Spain began to actively
move against the British, Havana became host to numerous British subjects (military and
civilian) seeking refuge from the conflict
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thirty-three

years of service in the Americas, and wished to return to Spain with the salary

of a colonel and an assignment in his home province of Malaga.119
The Crown complied with Unzaga’s request to leave Louisiana, but not in the
expected manner. The following September the governor received word that his time in
the Americas was not finished. The Crown gave him the requested promotion, but to a
higher command. Unzaga departed Louisiana as the new Captain-General of Caracas. In
the midst of the American Revolution, he organized his papers, his family and
belongings.120
In a lengthy letter to the Minister of the Indies, governor Unzaga made a final
report on Louisiana and a plea for it independence from Havana. He openly argued that
Louisiana and its defenses would suffer if the colony remained under the auspices of the
Governor-general in Havana. He repeatedly and rather bitterly accused de la Torre of
ignoring Louisiana’s defensive and financial needs. Having received a letter from Havana
not to forward foreign prisoners but to sentence them in Louisiana, Unzaga advised that all
prisoners should receive the same treatment which would quicken sentences and
punishments and help discipline the troops. He further argued that Florida had requested
and received independence from Havana and that Louisiana was a larger territory with
more inhabitants and products and should be granted the same freedom of rule.121 As he

119Unzaga to Josd de GSlvez, June 22,1776, AGI, SD 2547, Folio 167.
120Unzaga’s promotion to Caracas is in Torre to Josd de GSlvez, December 1,
1776, AGI, Cuba 1222, Folio 1202.
121Unzaga to Jos6 de GSlvez, 28 December, 1776, AGL SD 2547.
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left Unzaga could boast of a comparatively dense population of loyal citizens, a
coordinated defense and a financially secure if not wealthy colony.
Bernardo de Gdlvez, the adventurous nephew of the Minister of the Indies, Jos6 de
Gdlvez, arrived in Louisiana to replace Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga as governor in
November of 1776. After a brief time with Unzaga to exchange information and
command he assumed command on January 1,1777, whereupon he immediately adopted
the former governor’s policy of aiding the American rebels. In time Unzaga’s suggestions
and Lee’s promises bore fruit Bernardo de G£vez successfully led Louisiana’s loyal
troops against the British to recapture Florida. The British attack on Havana which
produced the slogan, beware the Mameyes, finally backfired in the American Revolution
The fruit of the Mameyes, Louisiana and its governors, returned Florida to its former
owner and for a brief time re-secured the Gulf of Mexico for Spain.122

122Bemardo de Galvez’s journey to Louisiana in and in Torre to Jos6 de GSlvez,
24, November, 1776, ibid; GSlvez’s report of his command in Bernardo de Gflvez to
Torre, 19 January, 1777, ibid, Folio 1341.
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Chapter 9
Summary
As a result of the peace treaty following the Seven Years War, the Bourbon throne
of Spain inherited the former French territory of Louisiana. Spain’s slowness in
establishing its rule in the colony produced a series of events culminating in a rebellion
which ousted the first Spanish governor, Antonio de Ulloa. The crown’s response to this
insult was swift and certain. Captain-General O’Reilly took formal control of the colony
for Spain in 1769 and quickly punished the ringleaders of the revolt.
O’Reilly had already been involved in a successful reorganization o f the defenses
and economy in Havana. He applied his considerable skill and experience to the defenses
and government of Louisiana. Within a year he created a defensive barrier of forts and
colonial settlements against the possible encroachment of the British along the Mississippi.
He reorganized the government, and established Spanish mercantilistic rules in the
economy. O’Reilly instituted Bourbon rule and reform in Louisiana. He hispanicized its
government and reorganized its economy, but he did not engender loyalty or re-orient its
colonists toward the Spanish Crown. The successful implementation of O’Reilly’s reforms
and colonial re-orientation came under its next governor, Luis de Unzaga y Amezaga.
O’Reilly left Unzaga with instructions to create a viable defense, a colony of loyal
citizens, and make it economically successful for the crown. Unzaga spent the next seven
years working to integrate the Louisiana borderlands into the Spanish system and make
the colony successful for both Spain and for its colonists. Spain’s mercantilistic rules
devastated Louisiana’s trade as the colony produced very little that Spain wanted. From
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the colonists’ view the reforms were a disaster. Unzaga, however, saw an opportunity to
put Louisiana back on its feet economically and create new industry. During his tenure
he backed Louisiana’s tobacco growers, began a new industry in cypress lumbering, and
even stimulated a domestic market While many historians have written about his turning
a blind eye to contraband trade, Unzaga actually used an old Spanish custom known as

obedezco pero no cumplo to glean public funds from illict trade and feed his hungry
colonists. The governor’s efforts even began to integrate Louisiana’s frontier economy
into the colony’s legitimate commerce and filled the colonial treasury, which showed a
surplus at the end of his time in office.
Unzaga’s mandates to create loyalty and order were somewhat more difficult
Within those two commands layers of smaller exigencies existed. Order required he
create peace among both the Indians and his colonists. That meant maintaining a group
of Native American allies as well as dealing with intertribal conflict and the aggressive
Indian policies of the English across the Mississippi. Order also required a stable,
growing, and law-abiding population.
Unzaga’s success with the Indians was limited by Crown funding. Alliances were
made with the Nortenos and the Caddo in the west by Lieutenant-General Athanase De
M6zi£res and between the Apalachee at Rapides but the remaining tribes along the
Mississippi shifted their alliances between the British and Spanish to suit their own
needs. The Osage threatremained a constant during Unzaga’s tenure and because of
limited funding he could not arm his allies. As O’Reilly’s orders had been to keep peace
at all costs, Unzaga refused to fuel intertribal warfare, an effort seen as weakness by the
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Quapaw, Missouri and Little Osage in Upper Louisiana and the Caddo in the West.
Clearly, the Indians retained control of trade and alliances, and elicited the desired
European response by playing the Spanish off the English and continuing conflict and
contraband trade.
Creating a colony of loyal subjects was also a difficult task. To Unzaga's mind it
required that he bring order and stability to the populace, implant the rule of law and
reconcile his colonists to Spanish rule. He began by marrying into one of the colony’s
elite families, a tactic often frowned on by the Crown, but successful in Louisiana. From
this vantage point he used his considerable managerial skills to create trust He stabilized
the population through a series of land surveys and official land grants, creating a denser
and larger population capable of both defense and domestic industry. He also worked to
enhance his colonists’ education and attended to their clerical needs, including the
peaceful solution to a conflict between Spanish and French clergy. This confirmed his
position as defender of the faith as well as his colonial charges.
Centralizing his authority had to be accomplished carefully in order to make
Louisiana’s recalcitrant citizens abide by the rule of law and his orders. In his dealings
with colonists, post commandants, and military underlings Unzaga was firm, but fair. He
did not play favorites, even where family was concerned. Unzaga’s fairness in dealing
with debts in the colony and his determination to place his colonists’ needs first
engendered trust and then loyalty. He also refused to give up his authority over colonial
affairs to his superior in Havana and often wrote directly to the Minister of ladies or
O’Reilly in Spain, whom he considered his immediate superior
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Unzaga used flexible Spanish justice to implant Spanish law and m aintained a
constant presence in the courts. In doing so he centralized authority in the person of the
governor and tied provincial government to the courts in New Orleans, while at the same
time supporting the authority of his commandants as Spanish officials. Justice too
brought loyalty and a grudging obedience to Spanish rule.
Slavery changed under Unzaga. Indian slavery lessened and more lenient Spanish
slave codes allowed a larger group of free blacks to emerge. Emancipation was limited,
as always, by legal codes and the ability to buy one’s freedom.
Unzaga’s most pressing need was to continue a defense against any possible
British attack. This included maintaining a strong network of Indian allies, manning and
refurbishing Louisiana’s deteriorating forts and maintaining a fit army and a colonial
militia. Unzaga drilled, armed and paid his militia regularly. He enforced the idea that
ownership of land was dependent upon service in the militia, an idea backed by the local
commandants. He even started a new militia company in New Orleans with its own
uniforms. Although he was plagued by constant desertion, the governor treated his own
soldiers fairly, advancing their pay and grade regularly and overseeing their marriages to
respectable colonials. This encouraged Louisiana’s colonists to view the Spanish military
as a chance at advancement. Lastly, the governor employed a group of merchant-spies to
continue surveillance of British activities and help the Americans during the Revolution
of 1776.
Although Unzaga considered his efforts at defense futile, he nonetheless created a
loyal group of colonists who successfully helped Louisiana’s next governor fight against
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the British and recapture Florida for Spain. At the end of his tenure, Unzaga applied for
retirement, but the Crown awarded his excellent management of Louisiana with
promotion to the Captaincy-General in Caracas. Unzaga left Louisiana with its colonists,
economy and defenses reconciled to Spain’s Bourbon empire and its reforms.
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Treasurer's Reports for Louisiana1
Martin Navarro 1769-1775
Bernardo de Ortero 1775-1777
Resume of the accounts of Don Martin Navarro:
September 1. 1769 until December 1.1770
Tres millones, setecientos, seiscientos ochenta y nueva
reales cuatro y dos tercios maravedis
dos millones, setecientos, setenta y dos mil ochocientos cinquenta
reales dos y once, quince maravedis
A favor de su excelentisimo-novedentos veinte y siete mil
ochocientos treinta y neuve reales y dos maravedis

3.700.689.4 2/3
2.772.850.2 11/15

927.839.2

Balance

January 1 1771 until December 31. 1771
un millon ochocientos noventa y dos mil, novecientos
cincuenta y un reales, veinticuatro maravedis
ochocientos sesenta y seis mil, docientos veintiocho reales
y ventiseis maravedis
Total-un millon, veinteseis mil setecientos veintidos reales
y treinta y dos maravedis
JamiaTv

1.892.951.24
866.228.26

1.026.722.32

Balance

1 .1772 until December 31. 1772

a cargo de....
data de....

2.022.406.14
957.724.18

Total: un millon, sesenta y cinco mil dosrientos ochenta
y un reales treinta maravedis

1.065.281.30

Balance
[1.064.6821

January 1 1773 until December 31. 1773
a cargo de....
data....

2.036.335.4
858.826.2

Total: un millon ciento setenta y siete mi, quinientos nueve
reales y dos maravedis

1.177.509.2

Balance

January 1 1774 until TV*yniht»r 31. 1774
2.239.453.9
889.385.4

cargo de
data...

'AGI, SD, Legajo 2628. Errors in math are those of the treasurer though I have added corrected
figures in brackets.
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January 1.1774 until December 31.1774

cargo de
data...

2.239.453.9
889.385.4

Total de existencia: de un millon trescientos cincuenta mil
sesenta y ocho rales y cinco maravedis

1.350.068.5

Balance

Resume of the account of Martin Navarro from January 1.1775 untilMav4.1775 when he officially
became Intendant and the treasurer's office was taken by Don Bernardo de Otro:
Cargo de la relacidn
Data

1.400.599.15
1.400.599.15

♦Apparently the treasury had not changed by May when he handed over his office.
Resume of the accounts from Don Bernardo de Otero:
Mav 5.1775 until December 31.1775
Acredita de cargo en la relacidn jurada: dos millones, ocho
mil treinta y quatro reales veintesiete maravedis
y quarenta partes de otro
La Data: quinientos treinta y ocho mil trescientos cinquentaj
y seis reales, un maravedis
Que resulta en favor de Su Majestad: un millon quatrodentos
sesenta y nueve mil seiscientos setenta y ocho reales,
veinte maravedis y 40 partes de otro de existencia

2.008.034.27 so/too2
538.356.1

1.469.678.20 40/100

Balance

January 1. 1776 until December 31.1776
El cargo segtin la cuenta dos millones, quatrodentos sesenta y cuatro
mil, dento quarenta y cinco reales, veinte maravedis y
ocenta y ocho cien otors
La Data: nuevecientos veinte y quatro miL ochocientos
ochenta y nueve reales diez y seis maravedis, y tres
cien otros
La existencia de: un millon, quinientos treinta y nueve mil,
doscientos cinquenta y seis reales, quatro
maravedis, y ochenta y cinco, den otros
a cargo en el cuento reservado para su majestad

2.464.145.20 88/100

921.889.16 3/100

1.539.256.4 85/ioo
[1342256.4 85/ 100]

Balance

^The jump here may be because Navarro bad been to busy to complete his accounts while be
prepared to become Intendent
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January 1. 1777 until December 31.1777

Cargo: dos millones, ochocientos setenta y cinco mil quinientos
setenta y ocho reales treinta y un maravedis y
sesenta y tres partes de otro

2.875.578.31 65/too

Su data con arreglos del libro de caja: nuevecientos noventa y
ocho mil, setecientos veinte y dos reales, un maravedis
y ochenta y tres partes de otro

998.722.1 83/ioo

Exisentcia de un millon ochocientos setenta y seis mil ochocientos
cinquenta y seis reales y veinte y nueve maravedis,
y ochenta y un parte de otro

1.876.856.29 81/100
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Balance

Appendix B
Entradas and Salidas at Havana, Cuba
to and from New Orleans, 1772-1776
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Entradas and Salidas at Havana, Cuba to and from New Orleans 1772-1776
Year 1772

Entradas (from New Orleans)1

Date

No.

January

3

15
February

1
10

March

2
20

April

1
8

Salidas (to New Orleans)

Name

Cargo

La Abundancfa

frutas de aquella
provincia (Louisiana)
same
same

Alejandro
El Sol
Ships In
Nuestra Senora del Carmen

No.
3

9
frutos

Ships In

3

arros, mais y madera
carne y frutos

El Renombrado
Ships In

frutos

Cargo

El Sol
San Antonio
Nuestra Senora de el
Amparo
Ships Out

frutos
same
same

San Luts
San Miguel
El Sol2
Ships Out

madera
frutos
frutos
frutos
frutos

12

Nuestra Senora del Carmen
Nuestra Senora del Rosario
Ships Out

1
29

San Antonio
Ships Out1

frutos

14

La Esperanza
San Antonio
Ships In

Name

2

'Figures from AGI, Cuba Logajo 1215, Nos. 57, 85, 111 and AGI, Cuba Lcgajo 1216, Nos. 139.
2ll is interesting that no record of El Sol's entrance into Havana was made, or reference to where it might have come from.
1This large number of ships leaving is due to a shipment of money, frutos and troops to Cadiz accounting for 13 of the vessels.
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Year 1772

Entradas (from New Orleans)1

Dale

No.

Name

19

San Francisco
news, mail
Nuestra Senora de el
Amparo (alias el Pr. de Orange) frutos
Ships In

May

June

2

14
iy>

July

San Miguel
Nuestra Sciiora del Carmen

Salidas (to New Orleans)
Cargo

frutos
frutos

Ships In

No.

11
4

2

•tx

August

7

Ships In

4

El Principe de Asturias *
(with Goleta in tow captured
San Francisco
La Dcseada
San Antonio
Ships In

20

19
2
for illicit commerce.)
frutos
frutos
frutos

'Figures from AGI, Cuba Legajo 1216, Nos. 162, 199, 228 , 252.

Cargo

0

18

0

Name

12

Ships Out
SM el Principe
Situado
San Francisco
frutos
El Renombrado
frutos
Nuestra Senora del Amparo frutos
Ships Out
San Miguel
Nuestra Senora del Carmen
Ships Out

frutos
frutos

La Pastoris
San Francisco

frutos
frutos

Ships Out
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Year 1772

Entradas (from New Orleans)1

Date

No.

September

5

12

u>
Ul

November

Cargo

0
11

October

Name

Salidas (to New Orleans)

2

2(1

No.

Name

Cargo
lustre
frutos

8

La Deseada
San Antonio
Ships Out

1

San Antonio

frutos

2

Ships In
San Francisco
El Principe*
San Miguel
El Sol
El Sandobal
Ships In
San Francisco (alias La
Esperanza)
La Pastorina
Ships In

produclos
frutos
frutos
frutos
mail

14
2

frutos
frutos

Ships Out
El Renombrado
San Miguel

frutos
frutos

Ships Out

December’s entradas and salidas are missing from the legajo.
Total

156

Ships In (22 from New Orleans)

149

Ships Out (22 from New Orleans)

♦There is no mention of the El Principe as ever having left Havana in August or September.

'Figures from AGI, Cuba Legajo 1216, No. 277 and Legajo 1217, No. 305
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Year 1773

Entradas (from New Orleans)1

Date

No.

January

1
12

Salidas (to New Orleans)

Name

Cargo

San Antonio

Cortes de cana2

Ships In

No.

Name

Cargo
frutos
frutos

19

La Virgen de Monte Negro
La Union
Ships Out

El Cid Campeador
Nuestra Senora del Carmen

frutos
frutos

T h e num bers for F ebruary-M ay are m issing from the Legajos.

Nuestra Senora del Carmen

June

U>
O

20

Nuestra Senora del Rosario
Ntra Sen de la Consolacidn
San Antonio
Ships In

3

Nuestra Senora del Rosario

frutos de aquelle
Provincia
same
same
cortes de cajas por sucre
23

Ships Out

n

July

11

frutos de aquelle
Provincia
San Miguel
same
Nuestra Senora del Asuncidn same
Ships In

2

17

San Antonio
El Renombrado

Ships Out

'Figures from AGI Cuba, Legajo 1217, Nos. 347,437
2Culs of wood for sugar boxes
3Caudales are monies. This ship was captained by Antonio O'Carrol who was bringing the situado to New Orleans.

frutos
caudales1
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Year

1773

Date
August

Entradas (from New Orleans)
No.
2

28
September

1
11

October

2
11

Salidas (to New Orleans)

Name

Cargo

Nuestra Sefiora del Carmen

madurayalquitran1

Alexandro (Beauregard)

cortes de Cafia para
embasar azucar

Ships In2
SM San Juan de Romuseno

1

15
not mentioned3

Ships In
San Francisco
Sun Antonio

No.

2
7

registro4
cortes de Ca jas pant
embasar azucar

Ships In

2
23

Name

Cargo

Nuestra Senora del
Consolasidn

frutos

Ships In
Santisima Trinidad
San Luis (Beauregard)
Ships Out

frutos
frutos

San Francisco
San Antonio

reg.
teg.

Ships Out5

'Wood and lar.
^Several of llie.se ships were carrying the kings mail and silver from Veracruz, another with tobacco from another part of Cuba.
’This was captained by Commander O'Carrol who generally delivered the siluado. He may merely be returning to Cuba.
4Registcr of items - used in place of frutos.
'This shipment contained a large floia to Cadiz including two ships with troops.
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Year

1773

Date

Entradas (from New Orleans)
No.

Name

12

Nuestra Senora de
Consolacidn
Ships In

November

December

4

26
u>
LO

Total*

131

San Luis (Beauregard)
San Marlin
San Francisco
San Antonio
Ships In1

Salidas (to New Orleans)
Cargo

No.
1

Name
Nuestra Senoradel Regia

Cargo
reg.

frutos
11
cortes de cajas
cortes de cajas
cortes de cajas
cortes de cajas

Ships In (18 from New Orleans)

1

Ships Out
Nuestra Senora de
Consolacidn

reg.

5 Ships Out
104 Ships Out (11 from New Orleans)

00

♦While these totals to not show all entradas and salidas (February-May being missing) they are sufficient to give a ratio of
shipping from New Orleans to rest of Indies flowing through Havana.

'Tills larger number of entradas includes ships from Vera Cruz and elsewhere gathering for a (lota.
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Year 1774

Entradas (from New Orleans)1

Date

No.

January

2

19

u>
VO

Name

Cargo

San Juan Nepomucena

cortes de caja y
otras efectos
frutos

Nuestra Senora de Regia
Ships In

frutos
frutos

12
March

1
17

San Antonio
Ships In

cortes de cajas

April

2

San Luis (Beauregard)
San Francisco

cortes de cajas
cortes de cajas

18
May

1
21

Ships In

'Figures from AGI, Cuba N os. 5 9 4 ,6 0 3 ,6 2 3 ,6 3 6 ,6 5 9 ..

3

Cargo

El Alexandro (Beauregard)
San Francisco
San Antonio
Ships Out

en las.
en las.
en las.

Ships Out

♦The salidas arc missing from the legajo.

3
18

cortes de cajas

Name

0
12

Ships In
Nuestra Senora del Carmen

No.

19

El Renombrado
Nuestra Senora de
Consolacidn
Ships In

February

2

Salidas (to New Orleans)

2
22

San Antonio
San Francisco
San Luis (Beauregard)
Ships Out

frutos
frutos
frutos

San Josef
Nuestra Senora del Carmen
Ships Out

frutos
frutos
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Year 1774

Entradas (from New Orleans)1

Date
June

No.
5

30
July

u>
O
O

4

22

Salidas (to New Orleans)

Name
San Francisco
Ntra Sefi de Consol acidn
SM San Antonio
El Renombrado
Ships In

Cargo
No.
cortes de cajas
2
carnes. tablas y brea
troops, pertrechos para escudron
cortes de cajas
19

San Antonio
Nuestra Senora de Regia
El Alexandro (Beauregard)
San Marlin

cortes de cajas
frutos
cortes de caja
cortes de caja

5

24

Ships In

Name
Nuestra Senora de Velon
La Perl a

Cargo
frutos
situado

Ships Out
San Juan Neponuiccna
San Francisco
El Renombrado
San Antonio
El P rincipe
Ships Out

caudales2
en las.
en las.
en las.
en las.

n

August

3

18

San Joseph
San Juan
SM El Renombrado

frutos
cortes de caja
not listed3

Ships In

‘Figures from AGI, Cuba Legajo 1219, Nos. 674, 698, 719, 733.
2The situado for Louisiana brought by Com. Andres Balderrama..
'Carried die Commandanle Andres Balderrama back from delivering the situado.

5

32

San Marlin
Santo (unreadable)
Nuestra Senora del Carmen
San Luis
Nuestra Sn. de Consoleion
Ships Out

frutos
frutos
frutos
not
frutos
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Year

1774

Date
September

No.
4

21

October

7
U>
ON

Salidas (to New Orleans)

Entradas (from New Orleans)1

November

23
December

Name
San Francisco de Assis
El Renombrada
San Antonio
Nuestra Senora de Belen
Ships In

Cargo
cortes de cajas
cortes de cajas
cortes de cajas
cortes de cajas

Nuestra Senora del Carmen

cortes de cajas

Ships In
San Martin
Nuestra Sn. de Consolacidn
San Francisco
Nuestra Sn. de Montenegro
Ships In

cortes de cajas
frutos
cortes de cajas
cortes de cajas

Nuestra Senora del Rosario
Nuestra Senora del Carmen

frutos
cortes de cajas

Ships In

223

Total Ships In (31 from New Orleans)

2Does not include missing salidas from March.

Name
San Francisco

10

Ships Out

18

San Juan
El Renombrada
La Miscricordia
San Antonio
Ships Out

Cargo
frutos

en las.
en las.
en las
frutos

0

16

15

'Figures from AGI Cuba 1219, Nos. 733, 760, 779, 807.

No.
1

3

Ships Out

16

SM San Juan Baptista
not listed
Nuestra Sn. de Consolacidn frutos
San Francisco
frutos
Ships Out

206

Total Ships Out (28 to N. Orleans)2
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Year 1775
Date
January

Entradas (from New Orleans)1
No.
3

17
February

2

M
20
March

3

15

Name

Salidas (to New Orleans)

Cargo

No.

Nuestra Senora del Carmen frutos
La Virgin de Misericordiacortes de cajas
El Renombrado
frutos

Ships In
San Antonio
Nuestra Senora de
Consolacion
Ships In
San Francisco
Nuestra Sn de Montenegro
San Geronimo
Ships In

7

23
cortes de cajas

1

Name

Cargo

Scnor San Joseph
Nuestra Senora del Carmen
Santo Christo del Calvario
San Geronimo
Nuestra Senora del
Montenegro
Nuestra Sciiora del Carmen2

en las.
en las.
en las.
en las.

San Luis (Beauregard)
Ships Out
La Mariana

en las.
none
listed
frutos

en las.

frutos
12
frutos
frutos

2

Ships Out
El Renombrada
San Antonio

cortes de cajas
13

'Figures from AGI, Cuba 1220, Nos. 829, 844, 865.
^There appear to bave been two Nueslra Seitora del Carmen's, one out of Louisiana and one from Spain.

Ships Out

frutos
frutos
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Year 1775

Entradas (from New Orleans)1

Date

No.

April

6

2(1

May
u>
o>
UJ

June
July

Salidas (to New Orleans)

Name

Cargo

San Luis (Beauregard)
Santo Christo del Calvario2
Santo Christo del Carlvario
Nuestra Senora del Carmen
Nuestra Senora del Carmen
Nuestra Senora de Begoiia
Ships In

cortes de cajas
frutos
frutos
cortes de cajas
frutos
cortes de cajas

La Mariana

cortes de cajas

No.

Name

La Luisa
en las.
San Lorenzo “solcitud de maderas"
San Antonio
frutos

17

Ships Out

21

Ships In

27

Nuestra Senora del Carmen
San Luis (Beauregard)
Ships Out

0
10

Ships In

1
23

San Vincente Ferrer
Ships Out

1

3

23

San Antonio

frutos

San Juan
El Renombrado
Ships In

none listed
frutos

Cargo

2

Santo Cristo

20

frutos
frutos
frutos
Situado

Ships Out

'Figures from AGI, Cuba 1220, Nos. 876, 892, 912.
2The first Santo Christo piloted by Pat Buenaventura Gualva and die second by Tomas Tayonera who left on llie 11 o f January for New Orleans.
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Year

1775

Date

No.

August

September

October
U>
S

Name

Cargo

San Luis (Beauregard)
Nuestra Sefiora de Regia

cortes de cajas
menestras y madera

Ships In

1
13

Santo Cristo
Ships In

not listed

San Vicente Ferrer
La Luisa
Ships In

venestras
frutos

2

No.
3

28

18

10

November

Salidas (to New Orleans)

Entradas (from New Orleans)1

20

Ships Out

1

San Luis

4

Ships In

El Renombrada
San Antonio
El Dulcisisimo Nombre
de Jesus
Ships Out

0
6

12

0

Name

17

Cargo
frutos
frutos
en las.

frutos

Ships Out
Nuestra Sefiora del Carmen2
El Victorioso
La Luisa
La Mariana
Ships Out

frutos
en las.
en las.
en las.

'Figures are from AGI, Cuba Legajo 1220, No. 959 and Legajo 1221, Nos. 977, and 995.
2Whilc not on the entrada/salida register this ship had been in the English Caribbean in search of slaves and wheal. There is no record of her
entrance into Havana.
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Year

1775

Salidas (to New Orleans)

Entradas (from New Orleans)1

Date

No. Name

December

0
16
203

Cargo

No.
1

Ships In
Total Ships In (23 from New Orleans)

U>

ON

C /l

'Figures from AG1, C uba, Legajo 1221, No. 1014.

14
206

Name

Cargo

San Vicente Ferrer

en las.

Ships Out
Total Ships Out (26 to
New Orleans)
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Year

1776

Date
January

February

March

Entradas (from New Orleans)1
No.
1
19

Name
La Dulcissima
Ships In

Cargo
frutos

1
23

Nuestra Seflora de Regia
Ships In

frutos

San Josef
San Antonio
San Vicente Ferrer
Ships In

effectos de Europe3
cortes de cajas
niadera y alquitran4

Mariana
N.S. del Misericordia
Ships In

frutos
madera

3
18

K
ji
O
O

April

Salidas (to New Orleans)

2

n
n

17

No.
0

Name

10

Ships Out

0
16

Ships Out2

Cargo

04
20
1
23

Ships Out
La Maria

frutos

Ships Out6

'Figures from AGI Cuba. Legajo 1221, Nos. 1014, 1046, 1059.
2Wlule il did not return to New Orleans the Nuestra Seflora de Regia sailed to Veracruz with the Papel de Cucnta. It appears that boats did
not ferry back and forth between New Orleans and Havana the way they had in 1774. Instead they stopped in Havana to deliver a cargo and pick up
another for elsewhere in empire.
^ h e San Josefs voyage had originated in Santander, Spain.
4The San Josef left Havana bound for Campeche and the San Antonio went to Santander with "frutos."
*tar.
6Among these were two boats with the situado funds for Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo and Cumana but not Louisiana)
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Year

1776

Date

Entradas (from New Orleans)1
No.

Name

Cargo

No.

Name

Cargo

Madera
Madera
Not Listed
Cuenta de Su Majestad
efectos de Luisiana
madera

1

San Antonio

frutos

29

La Luisiana
San Luis
ElRey
El Renombrado
La Luisa
El Victorioso
Ships In

20

Ships Out

May

June

Salidas (to New Orleans)

0

6

Ch

-J
19
July

3

25

32

Ships In
San Antonio
La Maria
Nuestra Seflora del Rosario
Ships In

madera
tablas2
madera

'Figures from AGI Cuba, Legajo 1221, Nos. 1096, 1118, 1155.

2Planks of wood.

SM Santa Catalina
La Luisiana
San Luis
Mariana
El Renombrado
La Luisa
Ships Out

0
35

Ships Out

Situado
en las.
en las.
en las.
en las.
en las e
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Year 1776
Date
August

September

October

Entradas (from New Orleans)1
No.
0

Name

28

Ships In

I

San Luis

12

Ships In

4

17

Cargo

Salidas (to New Orleans)
No.
2
20

madero

2
6

SM Santa Catalina
La Mariana
La Luisa
San Antonio (Foutet)
Ships In

not listed
frutos
frutos
madera

Name
San Antonio (Boutet)
San Antonio (Chouriach)
Ships Out

Cargo
regist.
frutos

La Maria
San Luis
Ships Out

frutos
en las.

0

7

Ships Out

November

2

NS de la Concepcion
La Luisiana
22
Ships In

madera
madera

2

San Antonio (Foutet)
SM Santa Catalina
28
Ships Out

regist.
none

December

2

La Maria
La Luisia
Ships In

madera
madera

2

El Guillermo y la Isabella

none

14
243

Total Ships In (25 from New Orleans)

'Figures from AGI Cuba, Legajo 1221, Nos. 1198, 1216, 1259.

22
239

Ships Out
Total Ships Out (16 to
New Orleans)

Apppendix C
Entradas and Salidas at Havana, Cuba
1772-1776

369
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E n tra d a s a n d S alid as a t H a v a n a , C u b a 1772-1776
1772'
Entradas
D ate
Jan/2

Jan/4

Jan/4

o
Jan/S

Jan/5

Jan/7

Jan/7

Last Port
Ship
C aptain

S alidas
C argo

San Fernando de 6moa
tintas
Balandra Real llaciicnda de Negros/ El Diamante
I). Matamoros
Iil Ferrol
Urca/SM La Noriina
Com. Juan Clavilero

D ate
Jan/3

arinas

Cadiz
Paquelbot/Real Comp. San Miguel
Matheo de Ollanvide

eleclos de
europa

Tijon
Bergantin/N.Sa. del Carmen
Diego del Collado

efectos de
europa

Tijon
Bergantin/Com. Santo Ypto del Socorro
Antonio Baldes

efectos de
europa

New Orleans

frutos de

C argo

New Orleans
Balandra/San Anlonio
I.uis Borigar(Beauregaid?)

frulos

Jan/3

Laguna de termino, con escala em Campeche
Balandra/ San Juan Nepomusera
en lustre
Juan Joseph Zenlero

Jan/18

Cadiz
Urea de SM/San Joseph
Comd. Bnlenlin Cierto

Reg. de Irlamla
Algunos oficials
tie Seville

Jan/18

Cadiz
Paquelbol/N.Sa. del Carmen
Miguel de Herrera

mismo transport

Cadiz
Zactia/San Juan Bautista
P. Jacinto Mont

tabaco de cucnla
de S.M.

Coruna
Fragata correo/iil Rey
Domingo Queluraga

Correo

peltrechos

Santander y Cuba
Bergantin/N.Sa. de la Antiguo
Joseph Ygnacio de Aspillaga

D estination
Ship
C aptain

Jan/18

Jan/19

Jan/19

Campeche

'Figures from AGI Cuba 1215, Folios 57, 85, and 1 11; Legajo 1216, Folios 139, 162,199, 228, 252, and 277; and Legajo 1217, Folio 305.
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Paquetbot/Com. La Abundancia
Juan Antonio de Goycoumia
Jan/18

Jan/19

Jan/19

Jan/19

u>
~

Jan/19

Jan/25

Jan/25

Jan/26

aquella
provincia

Goleta/San Francisco de Paula
P. Joseph Gonzales
Jan/25

New Orleans
Uergantin/EI Sol
Luis Gallot

frutos

Campeche
Zaetia/El Spiritu Santo
P. Joseph Boter

efectos de
Yucatan

Cartagena de lndias
Fragata de Guerra/Santa Getrudis
Comd. Juan Garcia Romero

plata

Cartagena de lndias
Fragata de Guerra, La Esmeralda
Comd. Fernando Cortrosas

plata

Veracruz
Paquetbot correo/El Alvarado
Joseph de la Parra

correo

Campeche
Goleta/N.Sa. Santa Ana
Juan Ronquillo

efectos de
Yucatan

Veracruz
Fragata Com./La Concepcion
Pedro Calvio

efectos de
Nueva Espaha

Campeche
Zaetia/San Ysidro
Pat Isidra

vacio

Jan/26

frutos

Guaranao
Paquetbot/N.Sa. de la Soledad
Pedro Antonio de Gnnostiaga

vacio

New Orleans
Bergantin/N.Sa. del Amparo
Pedro Dias

frutos
de Cuba

For January 1772
Total o f 15 Ships In
Total o f 9 Ships Out
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E ntradas
D ate
Feb/5

Feb/6

Fob/')

u>
-j>
N

Feb/20

Feb/21

C argo

Gulf of Onduras (Honduras)
Fragata/EI Pajaro
Luciano Vicente de Salas

plata y
frutos

Feb/26

Feb/27

Feb/2
correo

Gulf of Honduras
Paquetbot/San Nicholas de Bari!
Joseph Bennave

madero
con tinlas

Coruna
Fragata correo/El Quiros
Joseph Solis

D ate
Feb/l

Coruna
Fragata correo/El Patagon
Manuel Antonio de la Villa

Feb/2

D estination
Ship
C aptain

C argo

New Orleans
Paquebot/San Luis
Bartholome Borigan( Beauregard)

madero

Cadiz
Fragata de Guerra/Santa Getrudis
Comd. Juan Garcia Romero

plata

Cadiz
Fragata de Guerra/La Esmeralda
Comd. Fernando Contreras

plata

Fcb/2

Puerto Rico
Balandra/EI Diamante (Reeal Hacienda de Negros)
Bartholome Matamoros
vacio

Feb/7

Veracruz
Bergantin correo/El Dcspacho
Joseph Antonio Morante

correo

New Orleans
Goleta/San Miguel
Narciso Peris

frutos de
Cuba

correo

Campeche
Goleta/San Francisco de Paula
Joseph Garcia

Feb/24

S alidas

Last Port
Ship
C aptain

vacio
Feb/8

New Orleans
Balandra/N.Sa. del Carmen
Joseph de Ayala

frutos

Cadiz and Cuba
Bergantin/El Principe
Juan de Nechcgoyen

frutos de
Europa

Campeche
Goleta/San Francisco de Ares
Nicolas de Balderas

frutos de
Cuba

Campeche
Bergantin/N.Sa. de la Sur
Bartholome Borreiro

palodetinta
Feb/11
aftil y otras
efectos de Yucatan

Cadiz
Zaetia/San Joseph
Miguel Sopialn

tabaco
de
cuenta

Feb/8
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Feb/29

Feb/29

Feb/13

Campeche
Bergantin/El Gran Poder de Dios
Manuel Millan

frutos

Veracruz
Paquetbot/El Senor de los Milagros
Joseph de Vrioslc

frutos de
Nueva
Espaha

Feb/19

Feb/22

Feb/23

Feb/23
w

For February 1772
Total of 10 Ships In
Total o f 14 Ships Out
Feb/27

Trinidad
Zaetia C/San Antonio de Padua
P. Jayme Ferrer

sal de
cuenta

New Orleans
Bergantin/El Sol
Luis Gallot

frutos de
Cuba

el mar (out to sea)
Fragata de SM/E1 Caymen
Comd. Juan Moscoso

un
known

Veracruz
Paquetbot/Dona Marina
Joseph Parra

un
known

Veracruz
Paquetbol correo/SM Doha Marina
Joseph Parra

correo

Coruna
Paquetbot correo/El Magallenes
Cosmo de Bringas

correo
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C argo

D ate

C aptain

C argo

Mar/l

Veracruz
Goleta/N.Sa. de la Luz
Joseph Antonio de Aspurua

plata y frutos
para Guaiyra
y Maracaibo

Mar/8

Coruna
Fragata SM/Norima
Juan Clavifero

Regl. de
Sevilla y
Irlanda

Mar/1

Veracruz
Urea SM/La Peregrina
Comd. Hernando Barona

transpose de
regia de
Flanders

Mar/8

Cadiz
plata, tintos
Fragata/N.Sa. del Carmen (alias el Pajaro)
Vicento de Salas
y azucar

Mar/l

Veracruz
Urea SM/San Carlos
Comd. Francisco Quevedo

Mar/8
misnui
transporte

Cadiz
I’uquclbol/Suu Nocolas de Bari
Joseph Bennave

madero
plata y
tintas

Veracruz
Urea SM/San Juan
Comd. Francisco Vauies de Morales

Mar/9
misnio
transporte

Coruna
Fragata correo SM/F1 Colon
Manuel Antonio de la Villa

correo de
Sit Majestad

Veracruz
Paquelbot correo/F.l Alvarado
Antonio Gonzales

correo

New Orleans
Balandra/N.Sa. del Carmen
Diego de Alva

frutos

D ate

Mar/l

u*
-j
Mar/2

Mar/3

Veracruz
Balandra SM/La Uelona
Comd. Miguel de Aldexete

Salidas

D estination

Last Port
Ship
C antain

Entradas

Shia

Mar/9
not listed

Veracruz
plata y efectos
Mar/18
Navio/N.Sa de Begoha (alias el Vencedor) *bajo el c. de Navio
Diego Galiano
el Marq. de Cassinas

Mar/3

Veracruz
Navio/San Nicolas de Bari
Juan Ignacio

Mar/3

Veracruz
Fragata SM/La Dorada
Comd. Felix del Corral

plata y otras
Mar/23
frutos *bajo el tnando
del C. de fragata Carlos Sarria
Mar/23

unknown

Guaiyra y Maracaibo
Goleta/Urca SM/Senor de la Luz plata y
Joseph Antonio de Aspunia
frutos
New Orleans
Balandra/N.Sa. del Rosario
Marcos Olivares

frutos
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Mar/3

Mar/3

Mar/5

Mar/7

u»
-4O
C

Mar/l 3

Mar/17

Mar/17

Mar/22

La Sonda (taking soundings?)
Fragata SM/La Dorada
Comd. Felix del Corral

Mar/28
unkown

Veracruz
Fragata/San Carlos
Manuel de Francia

plata y
otras efectos
de Guaiyra

New Orleans
Golela/La Esperanza
Juan Augraud

arros, mais
y madera

Veracruz
Paquetbot/EI Postilion de Mexico
Joseph Urda Aspilleta

correo

Cddiz y Cuba
Zaetia/San Agustin
Mariano Mure

efectos de
Europa

New Orleans
Balandra/San Antonio
Lorenzo Delevau

carne y
frutos

Cddiz y Cuba
Paquetbot/N.Sa. de Africa
Francisco de Ambrona

efectos de
Europa

Veracruz
Bergantin correo/El Despacho
Joseph Antonio Morantes

correo

Mar/29

North Carolina
Bril. Balandra/La Sara'
unknown

unkown

La Coruna
Fragata correo SM/H1 Quiros
Joseph Solis

correo de
Su Majestad

Mar/29

Gijon
Bergantin/El Santo Cristo del Socorro
Antonio Baldes
frutos

Mar/31

Veracruz
Paquelbot correo/El Alvarado
1). Francisco Ambrosio Madera

correo

2The note following this entry says "same one that entered that port last 30,h." No entry was made of the Sara in February, which does not have
a 30lh, or in January of 1772 or in December o f 1771.
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Mar/23

Coruna
?/La Princesa
Joseph Theodora I’eris

correo de
Su Majeslail

Mar/23

Veracruz
Paquelbot/Jesus Nazareno
Vicente Antonio de Verrasueta

frutos de
Nueva
Espafia

Mar/28

Cadiz
Zaetia/San Juan Bautista
Unkown

efectos de
Europa

Mar/29

frutos y efectos
Sevilla
Bergantin/Santisimo Cristo de las Tres Caidas
Pataval Dias
de Europa

For March 1772
Total o f 20 Ships In
Total of 12 Ships Out
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E ntradas
D ate
Apr/1

Apr/4

Apr/17

-4
-J

Apr/18

Last Port
Ship
C aptain
Puerto Rico y Cuba
Zaetia/La Santisima Trinidad
I*. Pedro Marty
New Orleans
Bergantin/El Renombrado
Andres Berrcer
Cartegena de lndias
Goleta/N.Sa. de Soledad
Antonio la Rollet

S alidas
C argo

D ate
Apr/4

vacio
Apr/5
frutos
Apr/8
cacao
Apr/8

Unknown
Balandra SM/La Belona
Comd. Miguel de Alderela

unknown

Apr/21

Campeche
Goleta/San Francisco de Asis
Nicolas Baldera

efectos de
la provincia
de Yucatdn

Apr/21

Corufia
Paquetbot/el Pizarro
Don Manuel de Abona

correo con
Apr/8
cartas de servicio
y corresp. publico

Apr/22

Veracruz
Paquebot SM/Dona Marina
Joseph Parra

pliegos servicios
y correo

Apr/8

Apr/8

D estination
Ship
C aptain

C argo

Campeche
Bergantin/N.Sa. de la Luz
Bartholome Bui rciro

fill los

Campeche
Bergantin/El Gran Poder
Manauel Millun

liutos

Cadiz
Navio SM/E1 San Rafael
Comd. Miguel Gaston

plata

Cadiz
Navio SM/E1 Pedro Alcantara
Comd. Martin de C'astarriva

plata

Gidiz
Urea SM/La Percgrina
Comd/ Fernando Barona

Regia
de
Flanders

Cidiz
con mismo
Urea SM/San Juan
transporte
Comd. Francisco Javier de Morales
Cadiz
Urea SM/San Carlos
Comd. Francisco Quevedo

mismo (same)

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Apr/25

Burdeos, France
Bergantin Frances/el Aesop
Juun Doecalsalbul

harina, vino,
Apr/8
jamones, quesos y
otras mercederias
Apr/8

Cddiz
Navio/La Begoiia (alias cl Vcncedor)
Diego Galiano
frulos
Cadiz
Navio/San Nicolas dc Barry
Juan Ignacio Gorriarian

frulos

Apr/8

Cadiz
Vergantin/La Virgcn de los Dolores
Manuel de Jesus Fernandez
frutos

Apr/8

Cddiz
Zaetia/LI Espirilu Sanlo
P. Joseph Boler

frulos

Cadiz
Zaetia/La Virgen de Misericordia
P. Josef Favler

frulos

Cadiz
Fragala/Jesus, Maria & Jose
Marlin de Fchegaray

frutos

Cadiz
Zaetia/La Purisinia Concepcion
P. Bartolome Monl

frulos

Barcelona
Zaetia/San Isidro
P. Isidro Vigo

frulos

Apr/8
00

Apr/8

Apr/8

Apr/8

Apr/8

Cadiz
Paquebot de la Compahia/San Miguel
Joachin de Lurraquebel
frulos

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Apr/8

"accompanied the expedition until the canal"
Balandra de SM/a Bclona
Comd. Miguel de Aldcrcsc
unkown

Apr/9

Guaiyra
Fragata/San Carlos
Manuel de Francia

plata y
efectos

La Coruna
Ftagata/La Concepcion
Joseph Calvo

frutos

Santander
Bergantin/N.Sa. de la Augustin
Joseph Ignacio Aspellaga

frulos

New Orleans
Balandra/San Antonio
Lorenzo Delisaus

frutos

Apr/18

For April 1772
Total of 8 Ships In
Total o f 29 Ships Out

Apr/18
Further Salidas:

vO

Apr/18

Apr/29 al mar
Fragata SM/el Caynien
Comd. Juan Moscosa
Apr/29 Santo Domingo
Goleta/N.Sa. de los Dolores
Miguel Fernanris
Apr/30 La Comfia
Fragata correo SM/La Princesa
Josef Theodoro Peres
Apr/30 Barcelona
Zaetia/San Agustin
P. Mariano Mare

unknown
Apr/26
vacio
Apr/26
correo
Apr/26
frutos
Apr/26

a la mar (to sea)
Bergantin SM/lil Principe de Asturias
Comd. Antonio O’Carrol
unkown
en su compania (in his company)
Balandra SM/La Belona
Comd. Miguel dc Alderete

unkown

Veracruz
Bergantin correo/El Despacho
Joseph Antonio Urda Uipillcsa

correo

Gijon
Bergantin/N.Sa. del C armen
Diego del Collado

frutos
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Entradas
Date
May/3

May/3

May/3

May/4

u>
oo
o

May/4

Last Port
Silifi
C aptain
La Coruna
Paquebot/EI Lspiritu Santo
Vicente Urago

S alidas
C aruo

Canto

Campeche
Goleta/San Josef
Josef del Aguila

frutos

Cadiz
Bergantin/San Juan Bautista
Gabriel Sistarc

frutos de
aquella isla

May/16

Guarico
Bergantin Frances/El Aciivo
Juan Decasaval

uyuila con
pan, agua
y madera

May/20

Puerto Rico
Balandra de Real Hacienda/La Industria
Comd. Juan Tauso
vacio

May/20

CSdiz
Paquebot/N.Sa. del Rosario
Bernardo Sepulveda

D ate
May/6

harina

Cartagena de lndias y Trinidad
13alandra/La Industria (slave transport)
Julio Flowe

vacio

Unknown
Balandra SM/La Belona
Comd/ Luis de Alberet

(with British
Balandra)

Unknown
Fragata SM/E1 Caymen
Comd. Juan Francisco Moscosa

D estination
Shin
C aptain

May/14

(with British
Balandra)

Unknown
Bergantin SM/el Principe de Asturias
Comd. Antonio O’Carol

frutos

May/4

Tampico
Goleta/N.Sa. de Concepcion
Ignacio Gil

carne,
cuero y
sebo

May/22

Boston
2 British Balandras The Two Brothers and
and Pluto under Benjamin Woppe

May/4

Tampico
Barca/N.Sa. del Carmen
Marcelino Mier

carne,
cuero y
sebo

May/26

Cadiz
Bergantin/San Francisco Pavia
Antonio Saens

tabaco,
cuero y
azucar

May/14

New Orleans
Balandra/San Francisco
Luis Boyen

uoticias y
May/29
pliegos de aquella
provincia

Portobelo y Cartegcna
Goleta/San Francisco de Asis
Nicolas Balderas

tabaco de
cuenta
Su Majestad
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May/14

May/14

May/15

May/16

May/21

u>
oo
May/21

May/24

May/24

M ay/30

Veracruz
Fragata S. M./El Aluna
JosefInvi

plata,
forzados
y polvera

May/30

May/31

Veracruz
Fragata S.M./La Perla
Comd. Josef Bodegos

unkown

Tampico
Zaetia/N.Sa. del Rosario
Pablo Asme

came,
cebo y
cuervo

(came taking on water)
Berganti/San Juan Bautista
(exited for Cadiz M"1o f this month)

frutos

frutos

Barcelona, Malaga, Puerto Rico y Cuba
Zaetia/San Joseph
P. Bartholome Banaza

efectos de
Europa

frutos

Portobelo y Cartagena
Goleta/Santa Rita
Francisco ilaredondo

tabaco para
Su Majestad

Additional Enlrada:
May/31

New Orleans
Bergantin/N.Sa. del Amparo
Pedro Dios Balandon

C&diz
Zaetia/Santisima Trinidad
Pedro Marty

Cadiz
Zactia/San Pedro y San Pablo
P. Bartholome Sarda

For May 1772

Puerto Rico
Bergantin Real Haciendo/La Minerva
Ram6n de la Husia

320 negros

Veracruz
Paquebot correo/El Alvaredo
Francisco Ambrosio Madera

correo

Total o f 19 Ships In
Total o f 11 Ships Out

Pensacola British Bergantin/El Ranger,
madera
Ricardo Hodgsbon, (anchored at the mouth o f the port, taking water, needs repairs)

efectos de
Europa
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E ntradas

Last Port

D ale

Ship
Captain

Jun/9

Jun/11

New Orleans
Goleta/San Miguel
Narciso Fernandez
New Orleans
Balandra/N.Sa del Camien
Diego de Alba

Cargo

La Coruna
Zaetia/Santo Cristo del Calvario
P. I’cdro Gay

Jun/11

Jun/13

Ju n /13

harina,
caldos y otras

Caruo

Jun/3

New Orleans
BergantinSM/EI Principe
Comd. Antonio Ocarol

Situado

Sevilla
Bergantin/El S. de las Ties Caidas
Cristobal Garcia
frutos

Jun/4

New Orleans
Balandra/San Francisco
I.ms Boiler

liutos

New Orleans
Bergantin/El Renombrado
Andres Berman

frulos

Cadiz
Paquebot/El Principe
Juan de Cohegollen

frutos

Cadiz
Paquebot/S. de los Mi lag! os
Josef Antonio de Uriarte

fnitos

Veracruz
?correo/El Postilion de Mexico
Josef la Parra

cartas

unkown
Jun/6

La Coruna
Fragata/ El Cid
Cristobal Murillo

harina y otras
effectos

Jun/7

Jun/15

harina

frutos

Jun/3

Jun/4

correo

Cadiz
Paquebot/San Luis
Salvador Garcia

e lc cto s

La Corufia
Paquebot correo/El Cortes
Juan Mat. de Irsullo

I.a Coruna
Bergantin/San Josef
Ignacio Ibarra

Captain

frutos

Jun/11

La Corufia
Balandra SM/La Belona
Comd. Luis de Alberete

Date

Jun/3

Jamaica (anchored in the mouth o f the port)
Balandra/'I'he Isabel
Asking for bread, meat and water to go to N.C'arolina

Jun/11

D estination
Shin

frulos

Jun/11

OJ
00
1j

S alidas
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Jun/13

Jun/14

Jun/15

Jun/15

Jun/22

oo
u>

Jun/20

Cuba
Balandra/N.Sa. del Carmen
Nicolas Martel

harina y
ncgios

CAdiz
Fragata/La Santisima Trinidad
Vicente de Nieves

efectos de
Europa

La Coruna
Ralandra/La Pastoriza
Josef de Acuentas

harina

Cadiz
Paquebot/San Juan Nepomuceno
Diego de Montes Coca

efectos de
Europa

Veracruz
Paquebot correo/El Sandoval
Antonio Gonzales

Santo Domingo (Frances)
Fragata del Guena Frances/el Cefino
Comd. Baron Escurques
Additional Salida:
New Orleans
Jun/30
Bergantin/N.Sa. del Amparo
Pedro Deas (Dias?)

Jun/29

For June 1772
Total of 14 Ships In
Total of 18 Ships Out

Tampico
Zaelia/N.Sa. del Carmen
Mateo Miese

en lastie

Jun/20

Cddiz
Fragata SM/La Juno
Comd. JosefTansi

plata, frutos
y el Arzohispo de
Toledo

Jun/20

Santo Domingo y Puerto Rico
Fragata SM/La Dorada
Conul/ Feliso el Coronel

siluado

Jun/20

La Guaiyra y Cumana
Fragata SM/EI Caymen
Comd/ Juan Francisco Moscosa

Jun/20
cartas

to check on trouble at the mouth o f the canal
Balandra/La Belona
Comd. Luis de Alberete

cartas para
Jun/20
la Capitan General
en Cuba

unknown
British Bergantin/El Ranger
(that on the 30,h look water in the mouth of the port)

Jun/21
frutos
Jun/26

Jun/28

unknown
(probably the
situado)

Tampico
Goleta/N.Sa. de la Concepcidn
P. Igancio Gil

en lastra

La Coruna
Paquebot Correo/El Pisarro
Manuel Abema

cartas

Campeche
Zaetia/San Pedro y San Pablo
P. Bartholome Sarda

registro
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E ntradas
D ate
Jul/2

Jul/2

Jul/11

Jul/10
UJ

oo
Jul/22

Jul/25

Jul/29

L ast Port
Ship
C aptain

C argo

Campeche
Goleta/San Antonio de Padua
Josef Gaonzales

(turtles)
toi tugas

Campeche
Goleta/Cristo del Buen Viaje
Juan Pino

frutos de
la provincia
de Yucatan

Gij6n
Paquebol/N.Sa. de Cavedonga
Antonio de Anderes

efectos de
Europa

C6diz
Puquebul/I.a Santisima Trinidad
Josef Vitoni

efectos de
Ruropa

La CoruAa
Paquebot correo SM/E1 Magallenes
Francisco de Llanos

S alidas
D ate
Jul/1

Jul/1

Jul/1

C argo

Veracruz
Paquebot Correo/Dona Marina
Francisco Ambrosio Madera

correo

New Orleans
Goleta/San Miguel
Narciso Perez

frutos

New Orleans
Balandra/N.Sa. del Carmen
Captain Diego tie Alva

frutos

Jul/7

Cadiz
Bergantin de Real Asicnlo/La Minerva
Ramon de la Hera
frulos

Jul/7

Cadiz
Zaetia/San Josef
P. Bartholome Ravasa

frutos

Paquebot/Jesus, Maria y Josef
Bernardo Septien

frutos

correo
Cadiz

lsla de Santa Cruz, anchored at the mouth of the port Jul/9
Galeta Dinamorca?
cartas para la
Josef Becuent
Capitan General
Veracruz
Bergentin Correo SM/ El Despacho
Josef Undapilletas

D estination
Ship
C aptain

Jul/14

para su deslino (for its destination)
French Fragata de Guerra (that entered this port
the 29"* o f last [month])

Jul/14

Cadiz
Bergantin/Sanla Gertrudis
Pedro Sanchez de Navas

cartas

Jul/18

Cddiz

frutos
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Additional Salidas:
Jul/28
Veracruz
Paquebot correoSM/El Alvarado
Antonio Gonzales
Jul/28

Veracruz
Paquebot/Jesus, Maria y Josef
Vicente Derrasueta

Jul/18
correo
Jul/19
correo
Jul/19

For July 1772
Total of 7 Ships In
Total o f 19 Ships Out
oo

C/l

Jul/21

Jul/22

Jul/24

Zactia/San Antonio de Padua
P. Onofre de Sala

frulos

Cadiz
Paquebot/N.Sa. de Africa
Francisco Ambrone

frutos

La Coruna
Fragata/LI Cid
Pasqual del Mello

frutos

La Corufta
Paquebot/FI Santo Lspirilu
Vicent Uraga

frutos

Barcelona
Zaetia/Santo Cristo del C'alvario
Felis(x) Grau

frutos

Santa Cruz de Tenerife
Fragata/La Justa de Canerias
Pedro de Sosa

frutos

unknown
Balandra SM/La Belona
Comd. Aguslin de Herrera

unknown

Jul/25

Tampico
Zaetia/N.Sa. del Rosario
Pablo Aromi

Jul/27

para su destino (to his destination)
Golclu Dinamarque (that entered this port the
29,h o f last [month]).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Entradas

Salidas

Last Port

Shin
Date

C aptain

C argo

Aug/1

Trinidad
Zaetia/San Antonio de Padua
P. Jayme Ferrer

azucar y
cuero

Aug/1

Aug/1

Aug/1
00
On

Aug/4

Aug/5

Aug/5

Aug/5

Aug/10

D ate

C aptain

C argo

Aug/2

La Coruna
Paquebot correo SM/E1 Colon
Martin de Oncullo

correo

Campeche
Goleta/San Atnonio de Padua
Julio Francisco Marin

frutos

Ciidiz
Paquebot/San Juan Nepomuceno
Diego de Montes Coca

azucar y
tabaco

Veracruz
Paquebot correo SM/EI Alvarado
Manuel Rodriguez

correo

Santander
Paquebot/N.Sa. de Cavadonga
Antonio Ames

frutos

unknown

frulos

New Orleans
Bergantin SM/E1 Principe de Asturias under Antonio Ocarol
(and following him a captured Goleta)

Aug/2

Cadiz

Aug/10

Zaetia/Santo Cristo del Calvario
Julio Llaso

efectos de
Europa
Aug/13

FI Batavano?
2 Balandras and One Goleta Captured by
Sebastian Pornasio
Barcelona, Cadiz y Puerto Rico
Zaetia/Santo Cristo
P. Salvado Jullia

D estination

Ship

Aug/14
efectos de
Europa

Veracruz
Balandra/San Carlos
Josef Coll y Solar

productos para
Santo Domingo

Santo Domingo
Balandra/San Carlos
Josef Coll y Solar

Veracruz
Fragata/San Miguel
Comd. Frandisco Antonio de Believes

Aug/16
productos del Puerto
de Nueva Espana

New Orleans
Balandra/La Pastorise
Josef de Guerta

La Coruna
Fragata coreo SM/F1 Colon
Josef Merino
New Orleans

Aug/14

Aug/17

C&diz
Zaetia/San Antonio de Padua
Jayme Ferrer

Aug/19

Cadiz

correo
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Aug/11

Aug/17

Balandra/San Francisco
Vincente Meyor

frutos

C/idiz
Zaetia/La Virgen de la Merced
P. Francisco Jubari

efectos de
Europa

Aug/18

Aug/20

OJ
oo
Aug/20

Aug/22

Aug/25

Aug/28

Aug/21

Cadiz
Bergantin/El Velio Indio
Josef Castaneda
New Orleans
Goleta/La Deseada
Francisco Jarar

Aug/27

New Orleans
Balandra/San Francisco
Vincent Mayor

Cadiz
Zaelia/Santa Rosalia
P. Pedro Gatel

efectos de
Europa

Barcelona
Zaetia/San Vicente Ferrer
P. Sebastion Torrent

efectos de
Europa

correo

frutos

Additional Entradas:
Aug/29

unkown

azucar y
tabaco

el Puerto de Ferrando
Goleta SM/E1 Santo Cristo del Buen Viaje
Josef Antonio Diaz
unknown

frutos

Barlovento
Fragata SM/La Dorada
Felis del Corral

Cadiz
Fragata/La Margarite
Julio Doudall

Aug/21
efectos de
Europa

Veracruz
Paquebot correo SM/E1 Postilion de Mexico
harina
Josef de la Parra

Veracruz
Paquebot correo SM/Dona Marina
Francisco Anibrosio Madera

Zaetia/Virgen del Carmen azucar y
P. Pedro Esparrago
tabaco

New Orleans
Balandra/San Antonio
Lorenzo Delveau

frutos

Aug/29

British Balandra The Three Brothers under
Benjamin Wippi, conies "with powers" to
Veracruz with grease?

Aug/29

Balandra caputred by La Belona and the
Principe de Asturia.

For August 1772
Total o f 20 Ships In
Total of 12 Ships Out
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E ntradas
P a te
Sep/1

Sep/3

Last Port
Shin
C aptain

Canto

D ate

Veracruz
Paquebot/N.Sa. del Carmen y Santa Rita
Francisco Montes Sapata

frutos de
Nueva
Espaha

Sep/5

S alidas

Sep/6

D estination
Ship
C aptain

C argo

Veracruz
Fragata SM/La Perla
Comd. Josef Bodega

unknown

La Contna
Fragata Correo SM/EI Rey
Antonio de la Cuadra

correo

Santa Cruz de Tenerife
Fragata/N.Sa de la Rosa
Josef Garcia

Caldos

Sep/3

Campeche
Bergantin/N.Sa de la I.uz
Lorenzo Basa

productos
de la provincia
de Yucatan

Sep/6

Boston
British Balandru/Thc Three Brothers
Benjamin Wipp
grease

Sep/4

FI Ferrol and Puerto Rico
IJrca SM/San Antonio
Cnul. Ignacio Monlcro

equipo
para la
cscuadrnn

Sep/6

New Orleans
fiolela/l.a Deseada
Franisco Ismar

en laslie

Cadiz
Paquebot/La Santisima Trinidad
Josef Vilori

tabaco
y azucar

^
oo
Sep/6

Sep/16

Sep/17

Sep/20

Campeche
Zaetia/San Pedro y San Pablo
P. Bartholome Sarda
•

Cumani
Balandra/N.Sa. del Carmen
Domingo Ja cinto de Anduva

Sep/6
en lastre
Sep/26
carnes
Sep/27

Barcelona, Puerto Rico y Cuba
Zaetia/Santa Ana
P. Isidro Fabregas

efectos

Puerto de San Fernando de Omoa
Paquebot/La Purisima Concepci6nj
Josef Astortillo

plata y
tinta para
Cadiz

New Orleans
Balandra/San Antonio
Lorenzo Delvau(t)

frutos

Veracruz
Bergantin Correo SM/EI Despacho
Josef Antonio Urdaspelleta

correo
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Sep/21

Sep/25

L.J
00

vO

Cadiz
Fragata/La Sanlisima Trinidad
Francisco Magnon
La Corufla
Fragata Correo SM/E1 Quiros
Manuel Antonio de la Villa

efeclos de
Ftiropa

corteo

For September 1772
Total of 11 Ships In
Total of 8 Ships Out
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Entradas
D ate

u>

vo
o

Last Port
Ship
C aptain

S alidas

Ship
C argo

Oct/10

Anchored in the Port, taking water
British Fragata de Guerra/El Zefiro
Comd. Guillermo Bemabi

Ocl/ 1 0

Santander
Fragata/El Infante
Igancio de Antillaga

harina y
otras efeclos

Oct/12

New Orleans
Balandra/San Francisco
Santiago Lciner

efectos de
aquclla
provincia

Oct/13

New Orleans
Verganlin/F.l Principe
Andres Berrur

Oct/15

Oct/16

Oct/17

Oct/21

New Orleans
Goleta/San Miguel
P. N arciso Peres

C aptain

Oct/13

Veracruz
con las misiones
Paquchol/San Joaquin y Santa Rita del Pachuca
Juan Ortiz Zapaata
y Pilipinas

Oct/13

C&diz
Zaelia/EI Santo Espiritu
P. Salvador Julia

New Orleans
Paquebot SM/E1 Sandoval
Antonio Gonsales

cartas y
pliegos

correo

frutos

Oct/13

Cadiz y Barcelona
Zaetia/I.a Virgen de la Miscricnrdiu
P. Francisco Juhani
liutos

Oct/13

Cadiz
Zaelia/Sanla Rosalia
I*. Pedro ( ialel

frutos

Oct/13

Cadiz
plata y tinta
Paquebol/La Purisima Concepcid del Golfo de
Josef Relorillo
1londuras

Oct/13

Campeche
Bergantin/N.Sa. de la Luz
Lorenzo Urosa

frutos

frutos

Cargo

D ate

liutos

New Orleans
Bergantin/EI Sol
Luis Gallot

Veracruz
Paquebot SM/E1 Alvarado
Manuel Santos Rodrigues

D estination

frutos de
Cuba

Oct/14

left for his destination "repaired"
British Fragata de Guerra which entered
the port on the 10 lh o f this month

Oct/14

La Corufia
Fragata correo SM/E1 C0 I611
Josef Merino

correo
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Oct/21

Oct/30

Oct/30

Oct/31

Oct/16

(Arrived with its major sail tom)
Zaetia/N.Sa. del Carmen
Francisco Jubary

unknown

Veracruz
Paquebot/N. Sa. de Guadalupe
Ignacio Baralt

frutos y
alguno plata
de Maracaibo

La Comfta
Paquebot Correo SM/E1 Pisarro
Josef Theodoro Peres
Veracruz
Bergantin de Real Asiento de Negros
Juan Bautista lramategui

Cddiz
Zaetia/Santo Cristo del Calvario
Juan Llado

frutos

La Comfta
Fragata Correo SM/E1 Guiros
Manuel Antonio de la Villa

correo

Oct/30

Cadiz
Bergantin/El Bello Indio
Josef Castafieda

frutos y
cartas de
Nueva Espafla

Oct/30

"repaired"
Zaetia/La Virgen (N.Sa) del Carmen
P. Francisco Jubary
unknown

Oct/30

New Orleans
Balandra/San Antonio
Sebastian Lemer

Oct/20

correo

frutos

vO
Oct/31

For October 1772
Total o f 12 Ships In
Total of 14 Ships Out

Cadiz
Zaetia/San Vicente Ferrer
P. Sebastian Torren

frutos

frutos
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E ntradas
P a te
Nov/1

Nov/1

Nov/2

Nov/2
vo

Nov/12

Nov/16

Nov/16

Nov/16

Last Port
Ship
C aptain
Barcelona, Malaga y Puerto Rico
Zaetia/San Antonio
Antonio de Mora
Veracruz
Paquebot/Jesus Masareno
Vicente Verrasista

S alidas
Cart»o

P a te

Veracruz
Paquebot correo SM/H1 Postilion de Mexico
Josef Parra
correo

Nov/7

New Orleans
Bergantin/E! Renombrado
Andres Bernar(d)

frutos

New Orleans
Goleta/San Miguel
Narciso Peres

frutos

frutos

fmtos

Campeche
Bergantin/N.Sa. del Rosario
Adriano Zorcosa

palo de
zarsa para
Gijon

Nov/11

N o v /12

Nov/12

LaCorufia
Fragata/La Concepcion
Jossef Cabeso

harina

Cadiz
Urea SM/Santa Ana
Comd. Andres Balderranra

Petrechos
para la plaza
y escuadron

Veracruz (taking on water)
Navio/El Buen Consejo
Juan Uresberueta

granos
para Cadiz

Campeche
Balandra/N.Sa de la Luz
Andrds Friorano

efectos de
Nueva Espana

C aruo

Nov/3
efectos

New Orleans
Goleta/San Francisco(alias La Esperanza)
Josef Ayala

P e stin a tio n
Ship
C aptain

Nov/20

Nov/28

Cadiz
Zaetia/San Pedro y San Pablo
P. Bartholome Saida

frutos

Cadiz
Zaetia/Santa Ana
P. Isidro Fabregas

frutos

Maracaibo
Paquebot/N.Sa de Guadalupe
Igancio Baralt

plata y
fmtos

Carolina "repaired and full of food"
Golcta de SMBritish/"which entered
the port on the 21“ of this month
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Nov/18

Nov/20

Nov/21

Nov/23

Campeche
Goleta/San Josef(Alias La Fortuna)
Josef del Aguila

efeclos

Additional Entradas:
Nov/28
Cadiz y Cuba
Zaetia/San Josef
P. Juan Bautista Codina

efectos

Nov/28

Veracruz
Bergantin Correo SM/EI Despacho
Josef Antonio llrda Aspelleta
correo

Pensacola, anchored in the mouth o f the port
Goleta correo SMBritish/The Comet
"needs repair
Genaro Maidonogft
and food"

Nov/29

Cadiz y Cuba
Zaetia/N.Sa. del Carmen
P. Francisco Medin

New Orleans
Balandra/La Pastorina

Nov/29

Cartagena de Indias
Goleta/La Mariana
Francisco Arridondo

cacao

efectos

La Coruna
Fragata/La Santisima Trinidad (alias F.1 Caballo

Marino)

or
vOO
J

Nov/25

Nov/25

Nov/26

Nov/26

Josef de Cues las

frutos

Barcelona y Malaga
Zaetia/San Juan Bautista
P. Luis Baralt

efectos

Cartagena de Indias
Fragata de Guerra/El Caymen
Comd. Juan Moscoso

unkown

Cadiz
Fragata/N.Sa. del Carmen (alias El Soberbio)
Juan Bernardo Bergara
efectos
Cadiz
Zaetia/San Bruno
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Vita
Julia C. Frederick was bom on November 21, 1948 in Newport News, Virginia.
She moved to Lafayette, Louisiana in the fall of 1976. She graduated from the University
of Southwestern Louisiana in the Spring of 1991 with a B.A. degree in History, minoring
in Spanish. She received her M.A. from Southwestern in the Fall of 1993 in Latin
American History, with a minor in European history. She received her doctorate in Latin
American History, with minors in Asian History and Geography, from Louisiana State
University in 2000.
As an undergraduate, Mrs. Frederick was co-recipient of the 1991 Jefferson
Caffrey Award for excellence in research and the Amos E. Simpson award for scholarship
in history. In 1998 she received a grant to do research in Spain from the Spanish Ministry
of Education and Culture, through the Program for Cultural Cooperation. To date, her
publications include, “‘Colinda’: Mysterious Origins of a Cajun Folksong,” co-authored
with Shane Bernard, in the Journal of Folklore Research. 1992; bibliographical articles on
Juan de Oriate and Fabry de La Bruyere in American National Biography. 1998 and an
article on Caudillismo in the Encyclopedia of Mexico. 1999. She is presently teaching
Latin American History in the Department of History and Geography at the University of
Louisiana at Lafayette (formerly Southwestern).
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